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RIVISTA MILITARE



the Iranian


NATO in the 21th

The American



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**...is the e-mail address of
"RIVISTA MILITARE"
magazine**



A patrol of the 66th "Trieste" airmobile Infantry Regiment on training. Competence, professionalism, dedication, loyalty and esprit de corps are the essential qualities which allowed our Army to earn the trust and consent of the allies and, even more important, of the Italian people.

FOUR-MONTHLY

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
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THE IRANIAN DILEMMA

THE IRANIAN DILEMMA

An economic power which is finding it hard to take off

Iran, a country renowned for its huge material and human wealth, is putting itself forward as a world power. But the controversies caused by their nuclear ambitions, the relationship with Israel and the aspiration to oppose American economic policy compromise the already precarious international equilibrium.

Since the revolution of 1979 the Supreme Guide, the *rahbar*, has been chosen by an assembly of religious representatives, based on the *curriculum* and the degree of esteem from the population. The Supreme Guide must choose the Council of the Keepers, composed of 12 members, who then must perform the task to approve the candidatures to the Presidency of the Republic and certify the authority of Parliament and the highest judges. The Supreme Guide is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

To guide the state there is the President of the Republic, elected by absolute public majority (universal suffrage). His mandate lasts for four years. He appoints and chairs the ministers' Council, coordinates the government action and selects the decisions to be submitted to Parliament. The *Majlis*, the Iranian unicameral parliament, Islamic Consultative Assembly, is composed of 290 members elected by a direct and secret vote, also with a four year mandate. Since the beginning all the legislation has been scrutinized by the Council of the Keepers, based on the principles of the so-called *velayat-i-faqih*, the "guardians of Islamic law", to check that the laws do not conflict with the Koran and with the Islamic doctrine in its 12th Century Shiism context. The six layman members of the Council, jurists named by Parliament, judge only on the laws' constitutionality, while the six religious members examine the conformity of the laws to the Islamic dictates (*sha'ria*).

The seat sharing in the current Parliament, elected in 2004, is the following: conservatives/Islamic 190 seats, reformers 50, independents 43, religious minorities 5, 2 not assigned.

FROM THE SECOND WORLD CONFLICT TO 1979

When the Second World War broke out, Iran (the ancient name of Persia was changed only in 1935) declared its neutrality. Shah Reza Pahlevi,



Preceding pages.

Mahmud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and George W. Bush, President of the United States of America.

Above.

The Iranian national flag.

who had been able to neutralize the Russian and British interferences in Iran's internal affairs, had stipulated important commercial agreements with Germany, which initially seemed destined to triumph in the conflict, but in general he had kept a good rapport with all the big powers.

From one side or the other the invasion of Iran seemed inevitable. The Russians and British wanted to secure the pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, while the Germans wanted to occupy the territory after crossing the Caucasus so as to join Rommel's troops coming from the east, thus threatening all the strategic routes in the region. Furthermore, whichever aggressive force conquered the oil wells of Iran and neighbouring Iraq would be assured of having access to the world's largest oil supplies after those of the US.

Cutting across this strategic corridor of Iran, the American and British, supplied with armaments the USSR which had been invaded by the Nazis with Operation Barbarossa in 1943. On December 1st of the same year, Teheran hosted an important summit of the Allied Heads of

State; Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt.. The agreed document, divided into three fundamental parts, also agreed that Iran, in reward for its precious assistance to the Soviet Union would receive economic assistance for its reconstruction, just compensation for the military demands placed on the territory. At the end of the war the Red Army initially refused to withdraw from Iran's northern territories, thus creating the satellite states of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

In 1946, after having obtained the guarantee that it could take part in the exploitation of the Iranian oilfields, the Soviet Union agreed to implement a steady withdrawal of its soldiers. During this process however, the USSR, and in particular its secret services, deployed its largest settlement at such a long distance from its borders.

From 1949 the Country, with increasing fervor, wanted to nationalize its natural energy resources- that for the most part were controlled by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company - which would supply the necessary resources to carry out its important agricultural and industrial development projects. In 1951 Mohammed

Mossadeq was appointed Prime Minister, a leading light for the pro-communist party Tudeh, who subsequently opted for the nationalization of the country's oil. This decision resulted in the 'Abadan Crisis', the name coming from the refinery that had become the world's largest in 1950: as a result the main foreign powers stopped buying Iranian oil.

It was at this point that United States started to put a massive focus on Tehran's policy, making it one of its strategic priorities in the region. In 1953 the CIA and the SIS jointly organized AJAX, an operation that aimed at ousting Mossadeq, strengthening the Monarchy of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Undoubtedly this was due to the American fear of the communist tendencies of the Tudeh party, considering also Iran's natural frontiers with the Soviet Union.

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE WAR AGAINST IRAQ

The reign of the Iranian Monarchy and the use of its power revealed a "particular attention" to

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Area: 1,636,000 km²

Boundaries: total border length: 5,400 km. Countries bordered; Afghanistan 936km, Armenia 35km, Azerbaijan 432km, Azerbaijan-enclave Nakhichevan 179km, Iraq 1,458, Pakistan 909km, Turkey 499km, Turkmenistan 992km.

Climate: generally arid or semi-arid, sub-tropical along the Caspian Sea coast

Territory: Rough and with chains of high mountain. A central desert with mountainous basin. Occasional plains along the coasts. The highest point is Kuh-e-Damavan (5,671m)

Natural Resources: Petroleum, natural gas, carbon, chrome, copper, iron minerals, manganese, zinc, sulphur

Land use: Cultivable land 8.72%, Actually cultivated 1.39%

Population: About 68,000,000 (July 2005)

0-14 years: 27.1%; 15-64 years: 68%; 65+ years: 4.9% Average age 24 years

Population growth rate: 0.86% (2005)

Life expectancy 69.96 years (men 68.58, women 71.4)

Ethnic groups: Persian 51%, Azerbaijani 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurds 7%, Arabs 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, Other 1%

Religion: Shiite 89%, Sunnite 9%, Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian and Baha'i 2%

Languages: Persian (Farsi) and its dialects 58%, Turkic and its dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Baloch 1%, Arabic 1% Turkish 1%, other 1%

Form of Government: Theocratic Republic

Capital: Tehran

Administrative Areas: 30 Provinces (ostan) Ardabil....(etc)

Independence: April 1st 1979 (Date of the proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran)

Universal suffrage: 15 years of age

the interests of America. The Shah put in place a "White Revolution" to westernize the country; with the United States strengthening its economic and military aid, having seen that the key to ensuring access to the oil in the Persian Gulf was its *partnership* with Teheran and Saudi Arabia. At the same time the Soviet Union saw that its key ally in the zone was Iran's neighbour, Iraq.

Between 1965 and 1977, the period of the Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the situation within Iran was one of ever more bitter and insistent public protests, not only from the liberal classes and students but also strongly intertwined in these ill-feelings was the historical context of the situation of the Shi'ites – the majority Islamic denomination in Iran.

The *Leader* of the opposition from 1960 was the ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who on orders from the Shah was arrested in 1963 and exiled to Iraq, in Najaf, from where in 1978 he was expelled to Neauphle-le-Château, in France. From the time of his exile the ayatollah kept sending recordings into Iran of his speeches against and his verbal attacks on the Shah's reign. Many of his followers kept stressing how many supporters, how much power, how much consensus this ayatollah would receive if he were in the country himself.


The protesting public – with feelings heightened by the economic crisis, the continually rising prices, the almost daily black-out in the capital, the ever increasing wealth of the sovereign and limited size of the ruling elite – first forced the resignation of Hoveyda and then on the 31st December 1978 the abdication of the Shah. Just a few weeks later, in February 1979, to the

acclaim of millions of faithful followers the ayatollah ('sign of God') Khomeini returned from France. Perhaps nobody truly imagined that this was the beginning of the country becoming an Islamic Republic, but such an Iran began on April 1st 1979. The political manifesto of the Khomeini, announced in a publication from his time in exile in Paris, the '*velayat-i-faqih*' (Guardians of Islamic Law), foresaw that in order to guide the Republic a *faqih* (a guardian of Islamic law) was required. To be nominated by a religious group, the Council of the Keepers, all voted from the same citizens who had elected the President.

The relationship with the western powers and in particular with the USA became more complicated. On November 4th 1979 63 US citizens were taken hostage in the American Embassy in Tehran by a group of students, 52 of them were held for 444 days before being released – after the Carter administration had to a plan of liberation fail near Tabas, in the Iranian, desert due to mechanical and weather difficulties.

Apart from such happenings the spiritual implications of the new power in Tehran brought a new equilibrium to all of the Middle East region, influencing many internal political decisions of other countries, both Arab and other powers – specially the United States of America. To realize how this change took place in Iran one must undoubtedly acknowledge the success the regime had in being able to penetrate deep into society and fight the foundations of all it needed to change.

This was thanks to an ideology that could put a lot of pressure on the populace, a regime that could meet any problem head on and cut across



THE ARMED FORCES

They number a good 350,000 men. The foreign influence on the army was strong and controversial. From 1955, Iran became part of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) together with Pakistan, Turkey and Great Britain. The United States had heavily assisted military supplies until 1960. After the breaking of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Washington in 1980 the role of the United States was replaced by the Soviet Union. And in turn Russia, then China, then North Korea. Even after the Islamic revolution in 1979 the sale of arms to Iran from the US continued, above all through Israel, and went on irrespective of the international embargo against Iran.

According to the article 110 of the Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Iran, dating from 1979, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is the same faqih, that we remember today as the ayatollah Khamenei.

He has the power to dismiss the Chief-of-Staff as well as some other posts, the Chief of the Pasdaran, the two advisors to the Supreme Council of Defence, and the commanders-in-chief to the army, navy and air force. All on the recommendation of his advice. The President directs the Supreme Council of National Security, but has no role within the armed forces. The Minister of the Interior is the Commander in Chief of the Police and reports directly to the Supreme Guide.

The most interesting part with regard to the Iranian army are the parts related to the paramilitary corps Pasdaran and Basij. The Pasdaran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, number over 120,000. Their structure is quite complicated with their role somewhere between military and political. The troops come any of the army, navy or air force. The Basij in all likelihood are under the same commander as the Pasdaran, and hence to the Supreme Guide of the Islamic Revolution. The intelligence component, who busy themselves with non-conventional warfare, are in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and are about 5,000 in number and very well armed and equipped. In particular, the so-called Force al-Quds have an important role in operations outside of the territory. Taking part in a series of training maneuvers in Libyan and Sudan for example. This force is actually commanded by General Ahmed Wahidi, already the head of the Revolutionary Guard that had successfully completed the revolution against the Shah. Finally Basij, or rather the People's Mobile Army, is composed of about 90,000 men, with about 300,000 reserves and in total about 1,000,000 when fully mobilized. There are 740 regional battalions, each one about 300-500 units, in 3 companies. The Basij are generally young and have completed military service or retired servicemen with a low level of military competence.

Under the control of the Minister of Interior are the Police and the Border Guard, adding an extra 45,000 -50,000 to the total. Military assets and strategies are under the control of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. Under their direction they have started, in 2003, the deployment and testing of Shahab 3 Missiles (range 1,000-1,300 km). There is a programme for the production of twenty new missiles a year and they developing a missile with a greater range, 3,000-5,000km.

strong religious creeds - and by refusing any foreign interference, deeming it the bearer of corruption and moral degeneration.

It was firstly the extraordinary riches of Iran, in terms of its oil and gas reserves, not forgetting its strategic position, that forged its history in the beginning of the twentieth century and still was influencing it 80 years later.

Immediately after the accession to power by the ayatollah, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein started to try to take advantage of the chaotic situation following the abdication of the Shah and laid claim to certain Iranian oil regions in order to also gain direct access to the Gulf at Shatt al-Arab. The Iraqi invasion of Iran was also aimed at trying to take control of its wealthier neighbour and to stop any potential similar political revolution spreading to Iraq - where the majority Shiite population were under the control of the Baath Sunnite party. The war which followed, 'The First Gulf War', was officially

declared 24th September 1980. The concrete help that the west gave to Saddam Hussein, in terms of arms and money, left no doubt that the war was for the control of Iranian oil. (The strikes against oilfields themselves were particularly strong in 1983 and 1984).

But, thanks mainly to the military ineptitude of Saddam Hussein, as well as the skills and strength of the Iranian armed forces and the Iranian people, a war that the Iraqi president undoubtedly imagined would be short, swift and victorious became an extremely protracted near 10 year conflict. At the end no one could be said to have won and the end of the war was announced on 8th August 1988 after Iran had agreed, without adding conditions but refusing precedent, a United Nations resolution to make peace with Iraq.

Iran immediately began the reconstruction of the economy, especially its oil sector which was heavily affected by the conflict, and at the same time the general situation improved at the end of

PRINCIPAL PETROLEUM DEPOSITS

(barrels estimated in barrels per day, from 2005)

ONSHORE

Agha Jari (200 000)
 Ahwaz-Asmari (700 000)
 Bangestan (circa 245 000)
 Bibi Hakimeh (130 000)
 Gachsaran (560 000)
 Karanj-Parsi (200 000)
 Marun (520 000)
 Pazanan (70 000)
 Rag-e-Safid (180 000)

OFFSHORE

Abuzar (125 000)
 Dorud (130 000)
 Salman (130 000)
 Sirri A&E (95 000)
 Soruch/Nowruz (60 000)

Fonte: Energy Information Administration (Country Analysis Briefs)

the Soviet-Afghan War as more than 3 million Afghan refugees returned to their homeland. When Iraq invaded Kuwait ('The Second Gulf War') Iran agreed with the international sanctions against Baghdad, but condemned the subsequent military attacks and gave permission to Saddam Hussain to land in Iranian territory. In 1993 Hashemi Rafsanjani became elected for a second mandate as President of the Republic, and so a new era was anticipated by a country ready to become more moderate, especially after the death of the historically important revolutionary figurehead the ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and then again following the election of the new spiritual leader Ali Hussein Khamenei.

IRAN TODAY

The Iranian economy is predominantly based on crude oil exports which constitutes about 80% of total exports (if only refined petroleum is counted the figure falls to 20%), and 40-50% of Gross National Product. The oil price rises in the last few years has had a positive effect on the Iranian economy, which in 2004-2005 increased by about 4-5%, even if the level of inflation is constantly high at about 15%. Iranian oil reserves is about 125.8 billion barrels, roughly 10% of the total world stock.

The national petroleum company, the National Iranian Oil Company, controls the production of crude oil. It's also important to stress that Iran has large amounts of gas reserves, 62% of it currently unused, but that would make it the world's second largest producer after Russia. The majority of the fields are found in South Pars, North Pars, Kangan, Nar and Khangiran.

Iran's public deficit remains high, also because

of the widespread expenditure on public services, but above all because of the spending on its oil pipelines and the price of fuel; while Iran is a big exporter of crude oil it is forced to import useable fuel because of the lack of infrastructure and inability to process its own crude oil. And combined with a desire to decrease the dependence of the economy on the fluctuating oil market the Iranian Leadership have tried to develop other types of industry. But the lack of a good level of technology heavily penalizes the all-round growth of the country. Basing their plan on the Norwegian Petroleum Fund model, at the end of the 1990's, the Oil Surplus Fund (OSF) - also known as the Oil Stabilization Fund - was designed to manage the enormous inequalities that derived from the selling of crude oil, and directing resources to the economic sectors most in need of rapid improvement. The fund became a useful development instrument, but also a source of much political controversy, top level bickering and appears too unregulated to act as a stabilizer for economy strength.


One of the biggest problems the Iranian government still has to face is unemployment, especially amongst the youth (around 15%). Nevertheless, all this enormous wealth in terms of 'labour force' has forced the government to look into the long-term future: Iran wants to utilize its own resources to make it the number one power in the Persian Gulf, including level of technology. In particular its gas reserves will become one of the key instruments to achieve this plan. Gas should gradually substitute oil as the primary choice of national fuel consumption and could be the deciding factor in achieving positive diplomatic relations within the region as a whole. The opportunities to export are numerous and Iran is extremely well positioned

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

- | | |
|--|--|
| Oil refinery | Cement |
| Industrial chemicals and fertilizers | Light industry (jewellery and ceramics) |
| Natural gas deposits | Textile industries (carpets and clothes) |
| Heavy Industry (car assembly, utensils and large manufacturing projects) | Food industry |
| Metal Working - steel, copper and aluminum | |
- GREAT PIPELINE
- Petroleum
— Gas

MINERAL DEPOSITS

- | | |
|-----------|---------------------|
| Petroleum | Cu Copper |
| Gas | Fe Iron |
| Cr Chrome | Pb Zn Lead and Zinc |
| C Carbon | Mn Manganese |



geographically to take advantage of them. The main gas pipeline connects Iran to Turkey and Turkmenistan – but others are being built; to Armenia, to the autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan (an enclave of Azerbaijan) and to the UAE. The most ambitious project remains the Iran-India-China pipeline, what would soften the Chinese position on the so-called Indian

project 'The Energy Highway' – a gas pipeline through Russia, China and India – cutting through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Chinese Xinjiang before entering India via Ladakh then crossing the Siachen glaciers and the militarized strip of the Sino-Indian control line before going on to supply Southern India with gas.

Clever political management of Iranian resources of hydrocarbon would allow Iran to attract and then create a supply system to all countries interested in its natural deposits of oil and gas. Requiring a true level of energy cooperation. Worried about the development of nuclear arms the United States and the European Union are exercising increasing pressure on Tehran, and Iran has to find a way to turn eastwards and look towards other markets, especially India and China.

Iran is looking to diversify its economy, above all its petrochemical and technology sector, but it also must take note that its efforts are colliding with its internal politics – especially with the delicate balance between the reformists and the conservatives.

Foreign investment has also failed to take off because the future of Iran looks unstable, especially considering the implications of the management of the nuclear research programme, which Iran is carrying out for civil purposes. It's clear that this explanation convinces only a few and that there is only a faint distinction between civil use and military use.

Last year the state approved, with the ultimate sanctioning from the Supreme Guide, a document for a twenty-year plan that intends to free the country from its economic growth dependence on oil, its need to play geo-strategic card games and on the issue of investment in human resources.

The President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, elected in the summer of 2005, gained the popular vote on a manifesto against

poverty, social inequality, widespread corruption and pledging job creation. Since his election many senior public servants have been replaced, but he doesn't need reminding that on three consecutive occasions his proposed candidate for the powerful position of Oil Minister were turned down by the *Majlis* (the Iranian parliament), all this regardless of the majority he has.

Only at the beginning of December 2005 did the *Majlis* express favour at the designation of Kazem Vaziri, but what happened is symptomatic of the difficulties facing the President in delicate matters. We must remember that Iran continues to be subject to an economic embargo from the United States. The initial sanctions imposed in 1995 by Bill Clinton were restated by Bush in March 2004, all in consideration of the threat that Iran constitutes to the current geopolitical international equilibrium and of the lack of transparency within the regimes in Tehran.

The internal political situation, which has already been sketched out, had worsened in the last two years because of the disappointing performance of the reforms of President Khatami, who was unable to give the country the level of freedom that society, especially the young, wanted to be given. The cause of so much that has happened must be looked for amongst the constant obstruction from the Council of the Keepers, that organization composed of 12 religious personnel that in Iran have the authority to block every piece of legislation and opposes all moves to modernize the country even if the populace are hugely in favour of it, the closure of some daily newspapers and the refusal to approve a great number of the reformist candidates that were intended to stand at the last Presidential elections (a good 2,500, of which a large number had already secured decent majorities in the 2000 elections). The conservatives took advantage of the strict vigilance of the Shiite clerics, but also of the widespread disillusionment of the electorate, in February 2004 when the Parliament was reopened and in June 2005 when Ahmadinejad was elected. The moderates were left punished by having only a modicum of power, in comparison to the amount needed to change Iran into a modern country, and the question of a secular state remains a dream. Unfortunately the politics of Bush and the neo-conservative Americans, who following the terrorist attacks in 2001, placed Iran in the 'Axis of Evil' strengthened the position of the Iranian conservatives within the governing of Iran.

It could at least be hoped that the expulsion from direct power of the reformers will reignite in society the fierce debate of social reform and possibly hasten the process of democratization. The limited opposition from the last few years could then soon widen and hence go on to weaken the conservative power, as was seen in the election of the Oil Minister. Ahmadinejad's campaign for the improvement of the country for all will undoubtedly struggle against the difficulty to improve the economy at the same time as

having to risk confronting the west's economic sanctions, all at a time when job creation and the foreign investments appear as much as ever necessary. Unfortunately Mahmud Ahmadinejad seemed excessively exposed to the influences of the most extreme clerics, including the ultra-conservative ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who could be described as the 'spiritual guide' of the newly elected President.

In the light of the influence that Yazdi exercises on the President it begins to be possible to understand some of the actions and declarations of the President, in particular against Israel, and also the line taken about the nuclear research dossier which has so dominated the media and the international political world in the last few months. In this sense it is absolutely fundamental to envisage the role that Iran intends to play in the region and what its desires are for self-protection against forces outside the Middle East, nor with regard to it as a world energy power.

IRAN: A NUCLEAR THREAT OR A PARTNER FOR FUTURE PEACE?

Iran is an important world power. It wants to become a key player at the top level of geo-strategic international relations and wants to oppose the presence of the United States at the economic level and its privileged partnership with Iran's neighbour Israel. Iran, just as Americans and international organs fear (*in primis* the International Agency for Atomic Energy, {AIEA}), could be continuing its research into nuclear weapons for military purposes and not civil purposes. This would put into jeopardy the whole planet's international political equilibrium.

Iran ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaties of 1970 and 1992 so giving the AIEA permission to inspect its nuclear power plants. The first signs of Iranian treaty violation emerged in 2003.

After the end of the 1980's, specifically 1994 and 1996 according to the father of the Pakistani nuclear programme, Abdul Qader Khan, Iran had acquired plans for nuclear testing and then subsequently plans for the building of an advanced centrifuge system for uranium enrichment. Iran had shown a copy of this document to the AIEA claiming how a 'foreign intermediary' had offered Iran parts and designs for the construction of a centrifuge, but these documents stayed in Iranian hands until 2003. The contact with this intermediary could have continued through the 90's but Iran maintains that it never took the initiative and always gave accounts of material in



its possession to the UN. According to the CIA however, Iran had frequently paid for foreign help to do with the nuclear industry, and was continuing to enrich Uranium in quantities far larger than what it was declaring. After an appeal in 2004 from the AIEA for collaboration from the reticent Iranian authorities, in 2005 an agency of the UN was given access to a plant in Parchin and Arak where there were only nuclear installations for civil purposes.

Meanwhile the AIEA were checking their controls to ascertain that, in particular the period 1995–2002, Iran had not been following its research programme, on the 9th January Tehran took the decision to break the AIEA seals at the Natanz site and so setting off an international crisis. Iran seemed not to have the plants nor the technology available, nor the need to produce nuclear energy for civil purposes and so it seemed the uranium enrichment that they were doing was for military purposes. And above all the plant at Bushehr, built thanks to the expertise of the Russia in 1995 was the biggest concern. Namely because the amount of combustible energy it was consuming was out of place for its activities, unless of course it was

being used to conduct experiments on enriching uranium. And the required step via uranium enrichment from civil use to military use is truly short.

Russia had offered a possible solution to the crisis guaranteeing that the process of uranium enrichment would take place on its own territories, under the full control of the international authorities. Iran has refused until today this offer because it believes the tests and research are completely legitimate and all is legal and completely satisfactory with the concept of the rights of a sovereign state.

The only nuclear power station currently in use is that one of Bushehr – while in construction is the plant at Ahwaz, and the nuclear installations for the enrichment of uranium in Karaj, Arak, Natanz and Isfahan. The uranium that is to be used for the process is to come from Savand and Yazd.

The continual attitude of President Ahmadinejad in his ‘face-to-face’ meetings with the AIEA, and especially the United States, has not been confrontational. Even in front of the UN and its economic sanctions, it hasn’t been enough to make the radical leader to follow a

more milder line. For Iran it seems to have become an issue of international kudos to be able to follow its own nuclear regime. The AIEA, meeting at the beginning of February at his general headquarters in Vienna, said that the possibility of negotiations has been kept open and that the situation is not irrecoverable, but the stance taken remains fundamental if the situation is not to become further complicated. The ex-president of Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, has denounced the Ahmadinejad's attitude, publicly declaring the necessity of greater time for reflection, this from one of the wisest men involved in the handling of this nuclear dossier. Even in Iran, however, disregarding the hard-line position of the USA, Europe, Russia and China, the virulent words of the current President doesn't represent the best way to escape from this crisis.

CONCLUSION

We will try and concentrate our conclusions on the geo-political choices of Iran: the sense of encirclement which makes Tehran feel the victim is reinforced by various objective facts, firstly the unstable situation all around its borders, together with the threatening American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and Washington's influence on Pakistani politics.

Israel for one feels the 'nuclear' threat of Iran, especially after an intelligence operation which resulted in it being classified as Top Priority in 2005. A series of sites unheard of by the international authorities, and where any possible uranium enrichment might well be happening, have been targeted by the Israeli Army, just as they did to the Iranian nuclear reactor Osirak in 1981. Its Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, has commented on the recent speech by President Ahmedinejad against Israel, underlining the danger of an Iran with a nuclear arsenal but appealing at the same time to the Iranian business world about the way the conservative

extremists are floating in from the fringes and into real political power (6th Herzliya Conference, January 2006).

If the United States and the allies of Israel feel threatened by the Islamic state, they should remember that firstly in this delicate question there are two other big players; Russia and China.

The challenges and the opportunities that the growing economic and military power of Iran poses, are rising, and the UN forces, in a different mode in respect to the sanctions, are following any potential AIEA infringements by their nuclear programme. China and Russia have the power to veto from within the UN Security Council and are very interested in the diplomatic connections within the region. The Chinese government has invested millions of dollars to ensure receiving Iranian gas, in particular from Yadavaran. In 2004 Chinese businesses imported a large amount of Iranian gas, contravening the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act that penalized any foreign company that invested more than 20 million dollars in the country. Additionally, China and Russia have sold arms and technology to Iran and this trend is surely set to grow.

Also not forgetting that the entire Shiite world is always watching Iran as a point of reference. And Iranians are agitated by the American presence in Iraq, for the sheer numbers and the current situation. Tehran can perceive the possible split in the Shiite unity. Even the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shiite group active in Syria and Iraq, the Sunnites of the Palestinian Jihad and the Hamas Party are following attentively what is happening in Tehran. After the electoral victory delivered by Hamas on January 25, now and the months that follow could bring either positive or negative effects to the Israel-Arab peace process and the Iranian situation. A lot depends on the far-sightedness of their political leaders and on the capacity of mediation that they demonstrate to the principal international organizations. It will be above all the economic environment where the best cards could be played. The soft-

Missile systems				
Denomination	Stage	Propellant	Range	Other denomination
Mushak-120	1	Solid	130 Km	Iran-130, Nazeat 10 Fateh 110/NP-110 Zelzal-2
Mushak-160	1	Liquid	160 Km	
Mushak-300	1	Liquid	200 Km	
Shahab-1	1	Liquid	300 Km	
Shahab-2	1	Liquid	500 Km	
Shahab-3	1	Liquid	1 300 Km	Scud-B Scud-C Zelzal-3 Shahab 3D
Shahab-4	2	Liquid	2 000 Km	
IRIS	1	Solid	3 000 Km	
X-55 LACM	1	Jet engine	3 000 Km	
Shahab-5	3	Liquid	5 500 Km	
Shahab-6	3	Liquid	10 000 Km	

er positions taken up till now by the EU against Iran are primarily in consideration to the large dependence that countries like Germany, France and Great Britain have on Iranian energy supplies and on the large amount of financial involvement they have in many different Iranian economic sectors.

Iran is the main commercial partner from the Islamic republics to the EU. In 2002 alone Italy had an increase of 53% to their Iranian exports from the previous year. Companies that operate in Iran include; Eni, Ansaldo Energia, Danieli, Technipetrol, Snam Progetti, Technip Italia, Sondel, Alstom Power Italia, the consortium Sms Dasmag, Edison, Nuovo Pignone and Fata Engineering. At a European level, created during the period of the Khatami presidency, the High-Level Working Group on Trade and Investment created the Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) in which negotiations started in 2002. The success of the conservatives in the 2004 elections has stalled negotiations, not helped by the Ahmadinejad speech against Israel and the renewal of nuclear testing. Currently the

EU is the number one import source into Iran (44% of total) followed by China (7.8%), United Arab Emirates (6.4%) and South Korea (6.3%). Its unlucky that their would ever be an embargo on Iranian oil by the UN because it is so important to the western markets but rather a focusing on the trade in electronic equipment, technology and arms. Iran has a desperate need for increased foreign investment and mustn't lose any type of advantage that could be gained by moving away from political isolationism would bring.

Tehran has a clear need to sort out its political alliances, in terms of friends or foes, and of course express its true international will. In this regard it's clear that its interests strongly clash with those of America, the super-power, and in particular with the Greater Middle East. It's important that Tehran conducts its politics in a wise and balanced way, so as to not isolate itself and to do it in such a way that its key advan-



tages, geo-political position and its natural resources, are at its disposal and utilized to gain undeniable benefits. Otherwise its priorities are liberalization and democratization of society. The struggle for human rights and the safeguarding of liberty – frequently trampled on during the reign of the Ayatollah (for example; freedom of the press, of expression, of political dissension) – and above all the battle for the improvement of the economy and the internal redistribution of wealth.

The United States and the European Union must in a way that doesn't abandon the progressive forces and the reforming push that exists in Iran, make Iran a reliable partner in their economic and political plan, and help organize a more relaxed environment in all the middle-east and Asia Central.

Andrea Margelletti

President, Centre of International Studies

THE IRANIAN DILEMMA

Three good reasons for avoiding a military intervention

The American political expert, Edward N. Luttwak, explains the reasons why. We propose his point of view to our readers with the certainty that the renowned political scientist, the eminent scholar of military problems, the famous writer and, above all, the Advisor to the State and Defence Departments of the United States may offer a valid contribution for understanding what is happening and what could happen in those faraway latitudes.

The last time the use of force in Iran was seriously considered in the Pentagon, much larger operations were envisaged than the bombing of a few uranium-enrichment installations.

The mission was so demanding that a complete light-infantry division would only suffice as an advance guard to screen the build-up of the main forces, and that too only because the mountainous terrain so greatly favoured the defense. The total number of troops in action would easily exceed the maximum total fielded by the United States and its allies in Iraq since 2003. Most would be Iranian, units of the US equipped, US-trained army, because the mission was to defend the country from a Soviet invasion thrust to the Persian Gulf, in which motor-rifle divisions would descend from the Armenian and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics to link up with airborne divisions sent ahead to seize the oil ports. Although that bit of 1978 contingency planning reflected good Intelligence on the transformation of the Soviet Army from ponderous battering ram to fast-paced maneuver force, it was Afghanistan rather than Iran that was the target-and with good reason. In facing the adventurism of the exceedingly well-armed Soviet Union in its final stage of militarist decline, the government of Iran could rely on the protection of the American alliance in place ever since 1946, when the Truman Administration blocked Stalin's attempt to partition the country. From then onwards, and even in the perilous circumstances envisaged in 1978, the United States stood ready to risk the lives of American troops to defend Iran-it was that important in American strategy.


The reason was not just the oil, although it had counted for much more in 1946 than it does now, because there was as yet no oil production to speak of in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or

Abu Dhabi, and Iraq was the only other oil exporter in the region. Actually the geography of Iran was and is even more significant than its geology. During the Cold War, it was its northern border on either side of the Caspian sea and across its waters that was of greater consequence an essential segment of the Cold War perimeter of containment. Now it is mostly Iran's very long southern coastline that is of strategic importance. It dominates the entire Persian Gulf from the narrow entrance between Oman and Iran at the straits of Hormuz, to the thin wedge of Iraqi territory at its head. All the offshore oil and gas production platforms in the Persian Gulf, all the traffic of oil and gas tankers that originates from the loading jetties of the Arabian peninsula and Iraq are within easy reach of the Iranian coast.

Unchanging geographic realities thus favor a strategic alliance between the United States and Iran with major benefits for each side. Only the strategic reach of the distant United States can secure Iran from the power of the Russians nearby -not even now in abeyance as recent nuclear diplomacy shows, and much more likely to revive in the future than to decline. Only a friendly Iran can keep troublemakers away from the oil installations on the Arab side of the Gulf, where there are only weak and corrupted desert dynasties to protect them.

The vehement rejection of the American alliance by the religious extremists who have ruled Iran ever since the fall of the Shah in 1979, therefore violates the natural order of things, at a cumulatively huge cost for their subjects, starting with the 600,000 dead and uncounted invalids of the 1980-1988 Iraq war that American protection would certainly have averted, and continuing till now with the costs and inconveniences of the American embargo.

That of course is only one of the ways in




Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

which the ruling extremists oppose the natural order of things, thereby being forced into fanatical posturing not to advance any revolutionary agenda, but merely to maintain themselves in power. This most paradoxical radicalism, that seeks to conserve rather than change anything at all, cannot endure in the long run, for the inhabitants of Iran are bipeds of middling sensuality just like the rest of us, and extremist norms can only be imposed on them by brute force. The most obvious evidence of Iranian opinion about the regime is the impulse to emigrate which has formed a vast and still growing diaspora, composed of a handful of political exiles and millions of ordinary people who could have prospered in Iran and made Iran prosperous, but for their refusal to live under the rule of religious fanatics.

It is even more than human nature that the regime must resist every day, for it also collides with the cultures of Iran. Almost half the population is not Persian, yet under an official Persian nationalism that dates back to the 1920s –it is the only remnant of the Shah's imperial regime that Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors have left entirely untouched– all other nationalities are suppressed, educationally first of all because only Persian-language teaching is allowed, except for Armenian-Christian and Jewish religious instruction. This linguistic imperialism condemns all the other non-Persians of Iran to illiteracy in their own

languages, a deprivation hardly felt when illiteracy was still the norm, but now bitterly resented by ever growing numbers.

The Kurds account for some 9% of Iran's population, and their national sentiments have certainly been strengthened by the example of virtual Kurdish independence in Iraq next door. As their demands for cultural autonomy become more forceful, something of an insurgency seems to have started in the Kurdish-inhabited parts of north-west Iran. Smaller nationalities that are known to be disaffected because of recent acts of violent resistance, include the Arabs at 3% of Iran's population and the Baluch of the south-east at 2%. Little is known of the intensity of the national sentiments of the Turkmen and Lurs, each of which accounts for some 2% of Iran's population, while the Gilaki and Mazandarani, who are four times as numerous, may be culturally and politically assimilated, if only because their languages are Persian dialects. Along with the Kurds, all the smaller nationalities, whether in revolt or not, amount to only a quarter of Iran's population, but the Turkish-speaking Azeris add another quarter at least all by themselves. Many Azeri families, in Tehran especially, are thought to be thoroughly assimilated, with only a folkloric interest in their origins if that, but many more Azeris increasingly affirm their Turkic national identity, and groups calling for cultural autonomy or even separation have become increas-



A B-2 "Spirit" U.S. bomber.

ingly active among them. Since Azerbaijan just across the border gained its independence from the Soviet Union, the Azeris have had a national home of their own, and it is not Iran. .

The religious extremism of Iran's rulers has further fractured the country's unity. Their discriminatory practices arouse the resentment not only of the non-Muslim Bahais, Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians who conjointly amount to less than 2% of the population, but also of the Sunnis who form at least 9%. In Tehran, where more than a million of them live, the Sunnis are not allowed to have their own mosque –as they have in both Rome and Tel Aviv, as well as in Washington.DC. The last attempt to build one was blocked by the former mayor of Tehran and current President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose advent marks a definite shift from the institutionalized extremism in place since the fall of the Shah in 1979, to a more strident ultra-extremism that frightens many in Iran, while inspiring hope in others for it denotes a degenerating regime. True, under Iran's theocratic and most undemocratic constitution the elected President must obey the unelected "Leader", a cleric of Ayatollah rank at least, just as the elected Majlis parliament is subordinated to the unelected "Council of Guardians". Hence the views of the previous President , the elegant, learned and utterly ineffectual Seyyed Mohammad Khatami mat-

tered not at all (though fools still quote his impeccably liberal inter-faith pronouncements), as all the Western officials who wasted their time in negotiating with him soon discovered. But Khatami was powerless because he was out of step with a regime that is reacting to its ever increasing unpopularity by becoming even more extreme. Ahmedinejad by contrast exemplifies that very trend.

Although the world now knows him for his persistent denial of the holocaust and his daily rants against Israel and Zionism –blamed for absolutely everything he dislikes from Danish cartoons to terrorism in Iraq – Ahmadinejad is not known to have acted in any way against the Jews of Tehran while he was mayor, nor has he acted against the Jews of Iran as a whole since becoming President, adding nothing to previous impositions and restrictions. Nor did he respond to the letter that Haroun Yashayaei, head of Iran's Jewish community, felt free to circulate to the press denouncing his statements on the holocaust.

By contrast, Ahmedinejad has been actively hostile to Iran's Sunnis, and the religious dimension of his ultra-extremism is now antagonizing even many of his fellow Shi'is, because he is an enthusiastic follower of both Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, for whom all current prohibitions are insufficient and who would impose an even stricter puri-

tanism, and of the messianic, end-of-days, Mahdivat cult centered on the Jamkaran mosque outside Qum. More traditional believers are alarmed by the hysterical calls of the Jamkaran pilgrims for the return of the hidden 12th Imam—they feel that as the Mahdi, the Shi'i messiah, he should have the prerogative of setting the date of his own return— and more urgently they also fear that Ahmedinejad may try to “force” the return of the 12th Imam, by deliberately provoking a catastrophic attack on Iran that he would have to avert.

The shift from everyday extremism to a more active ultra-extremism is also manifest in the persecution of heterodox Shi'is, both the Ahl-el Haqq of Western Iran, and the far more numerous Sufi brotherhoods, who were previously left alone even by the rigorously fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini (who himself wrote his final testament in the form of a typically Sufi allegory). Now by contrast, Sufi gathering places are forcibly closed or attacked, and a major center in the theological capital of Qum was demolished, with hundreds of protesting Sufi dervishes arrested in the process.

The persecuted religions and sects cannot be added to the oppressed nationalities without much double counting (most of the Sunnis are also Kurds), and in any case the regime is opposed to the Persian majority culture as well, because it relentlessly favors an essentially Arab Islamic culture instead. It therefore condemns universally beloved pre-Islamic customs such as the fire-jumping that precedes the Nowruz celebrations of the Zoroastrian new year each spring, and more generally it elevates narrow religion above one of the major cultures of the world, widely influential from the Balkans to Bengal. Well known in the West since the nineteenth century, Persian epic poetry and love songs are widely echoed in the literature and music of Turkey, all of central Asia and much of the Indian sub-continent, and while the specifically Persian arts of the miniature and the woven carpet are consciously imitated, few Arabs, Turks, Pakistanis or northern Indians know how much of their material culture is actually Persian, including many of the best dishes of their cuisines: the now ubiquitous tandoor for example, is simply the Persian (and Hebrew) word for fire-oven.

This cultural dimension is highly significant for the Persians of the Iranian diaspora, for it gives them a strong sense of identity in good working order, quite independently of Islam. Only a few have converted to Christianity or are seriously engaged in the Zoroastrian revival promoted by some exiles, but most have react-

ed to the relentlessly fanatical Islam of Iran's present rulers by becoming post-Islamic, that is essentially secular but for a sentimental attachment to certain prayers and rituals. In this, the exiles are presaging the future of Iran itself.

In contemplating military action against Iran, it is important to recall these fundamental realities that are now submerged but which will certainly reassert themselves, as fundamentals always do. The perfectly valid analogy is with the collapse of Communism in eastern Europe and Russia, and the retreat of Chinese communism to the political realm alone. In both cases, for all the vast pretensions, depredations, massacres and destructions of Communist rule, local cultures and historic identities re-emerged essentially unchanged—except of course for a very principled and uncompromising refusal of political oppression.

It will be just the same in Iran, when the fanatics who now oppress the non-fanatical majority lose power, as they inevitably will. Along with the re-emergence of the country's suppressed Westernization, and the restoration of its own secular Persian culture which the clerics have tried and failed to Arabize, the United States will certainly return on the scene as Iran's ally, as will Israel no doubt. But not everything will be the same as before, for the long and bitter years of religious oppression will have engendered the world's first post-Islamic society, with widespread disaffiliation, many conversions to more tolerant variants of Islam or to other and milder religions, but in any case with all clerics confined to apolitical liturgies, and stripped of any political or judicial power.

The long-term consequences of any American military action cannot therefore be disregarded. Iranians at large —our once and future allies —do not view themselves as enemies of the United States but rather as the exact opposite, and must not be made to feel that they were attacked by the very country they most admire, where so many of their friends and relatives have so greatly prospered.

That is one excellent reason not to bomb Iran's nuclear installations, even though the essential buildings could be destroyed in a single night by less than four hundred precision weapons, without inflicting civilian casualties, barring the gross mechanical errors that rarely occur these days.

In the meantime, while waiting for the emergence of the future post-Islamic Iran, the United States must contend with the regime in power, which started off in 1979 with the



A view of the square of Isfahan.

immense moral authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially the consensual and most latitudinarian leader of absolutely everyone in Iran except for the Shah's intimates: old-line Tudeh Communists, assorted violent radicals, Westernizing liberals, traditional bazaar merchants, modernizing middle classes, the urban poor, rural landlords, and Muslim believers of all kinds, from the moderately devout and quietist to the fanatical clerics of the more extreme theological schools. Except for the latter, all the members of this broad coalition of the deluded were excluded one by one from any share of power, and then variously outlawed, imprisoned, executed, oppressed or at least marginalized and ignored, leaving the more fanatical clerics in full control. Initially they still had Khomeini's prestige to justify their power, and still enjoyed the traditional respect that many Iranians used to feel for the clerics of Shi'i Islam. That is almost entirely gone now, replaced by resentment and contempt.

Too many clerics have used their official government positions, or their control of confiscated property placed in Islamic trusts, to

enrich themselves and their families. Too many have operated scams of all kinds to divert oil revenues or to over-charge the government, not only to fund the hugely swollen theological schools whose hordes of pious idlers must be fed and clothed, but also for their personal benefit. The most notorious of all of them, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, low-ranking cleric by trade, twice President of the Islamic republic from 1989 to 1997, perennial candidate for another term, chairman of the unelected but powerful "Expediency Discernment Council" and a top advisor to the Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, is widely believed to have become Iran's richest man. Born Hashemi Bahramani he renamed himself Rafsanjani, i. e. of the province of Rafsanjan, which is only fair because he now owns so many of its famous pistachio orchards.

Under the Shah, the notorious corruption of government contracting added some 15% to the cost of everything that was bought, from fertilizers for the Ministry of Agriculture to helicopters. Now the graft it is more like 30%, and it turns out that the family and cronies of the

Shah were paragons of self-restraint compared to the clerics, whether ayatollah ozmas or 'grand ayatollah's, plain ayatollahs, hojjat ul islama (Rafsanjani's rank), or humbler thaqqat ul Islams. They form an entire class of clerical exploiters which does not even have the authority of ancient origins: the Persians were only converted to Shi'ism in the sixteenth century — mostly by brutal compulsion — but the Shi'i hierarchy and its ranks are far more recent, not even a century old. So there is no deeply ingrained acceptance of clerical rank and clerical luxury as there is in Catholicism, whose bishops live in buildings officially designated as palaces, whose cardinals are expected to enjoy an aristocratic standard of living, and which has distinct mendicant orders for those who prefer more austere versions of the faith.

A bitter anti-clericalism is now widespread in Iran, as it never was before. The tailor shops of Qum, which specialize in turning the best Italian worsted wool cloths into the flowing robes of Hojatollahs and higher ranks, now do a brisk business in ordinary business suits, because clerics going into Tehran in their traditional headgear and robes are insulted by total strangers, pushed into the gutter by unseen hands, pummeled in crowds, and often left standing when trying to hail a taxi — many of the drivers have now refined the technique, first slowing down as if to pick up the cleric, then speeding away.

Having lost all of its moral authority, the regime must survive on its direct power of coercion alone, derived from the brutish part-time Basij militia of poor illiterates, who really need the modest handouts they receive, and from the full-time Pasdaran Inqilab ("revolutionary guards") forces which include heavily armed ground, air and naval units, but whose men can still be used as enforcers against protesting civilians. It is one more symptom of the regime's degeneration that although the Pasdaran are well paid by local standards, many of them complement their salaries with the income of a variety of legal and illegal businesses, from light manufacturing to contraband across the Persian Gulf. The Pasdaran's naval arm operates fast patrol boats from seven Iranian ports and the Halul oil platform, and they are often used to smuggle in products from the port of Dubai (!), both embargoes items for national purposes, and also perfumes and other luxury products for their private money-making.


With the rise of Ahmadinejad, the first non-cleric to win Iran's presidency and himself a former engineering officer in its ranks, the Pasdaran have become an important political

faction as well as a military force, a political gendarmerie, and a business conglomerate. Ahmadinejad is untroubled by that confusion of roles — itself evidence of a regime in accelerated decadence — and goes out of his way to proclaim his continuing Pasdaran allegiance, evidently his power base. In fact Ahmadinejad's unkempt appearance is not merely the result of boorish if not outrightly unhygienic grooming, for it is in the approved Pasdaran style — the simulated just-off-the-battlefield look of men who have not been in combat since the Iran-Iraq war than ended in 1988.

With this we come to the second good reason not to bomb Iran's nuclear installations, or even to make a large fuss about them. In essence we should not bomb Iran because the worst of its leaders positively want to be bombed — and are doing their level best to bring that about.

When a once broadly popular regime is reduced to the final extremity of relying on repression alone, when its leadership degenerates from an iconic Khomeini all the way down to an Ahmadinejad, it can only benefit from being engaged or even threatened by the great powers of the world — a contemptuous indifference would be far more damaging to it. His own and the regime's frantic extremism reflects a fully justified sense of insecurity, given the hostility and disgust of the population at large. In a political maneuver that should be more transparent than it apparently is for many people, Ahmadinejad keeps trying to evoke nationalist support at home by provoking hostile reactions abroad, through ever more outrageous threats, including his repeated declarations that Iran is about to repudiate the Non-Proliferation Treaty it ratified in 1970, his calls for the destruction of Israel, and his especially clumsy version of holocaust denial, which is plainly an embarrassment even to other regime extremists.


That is how Iran's presentation of its nuclear program should also be interpreted — as a deliberate attempt to arouse foreign opposition, in order to gain support at home. Its aim is to induce an urgent sense of crisis over very slow and repeatedly interrupted efforts that started more than thirty years ago, and which are still years away from producing a bomb. It was as far back as August 1974, when the overnight tripling of Iran's oil revenues seemed to offer boundless opportunities, that the Shah publicly announced his intention to fund the building of 23 nuclear reactors with an electricity-producing capacity of 1,000 megawatts each — a huge total, enough to supply Iran's



A typical Persian village.

entire demand. His declared aim was to preserve the "noble" commodity of oil for the more valuable extraction of petrochemicals, instead of burning it as furnace fuel—and that almost made economic sense at the time. Many suspected that the Shah's real aim was to acquire nuclear weapons and they were right as we now

know, because he was seeking to buy ballistic missiles as well, but he did at least have a plausible explanation because the full extent of Iran's natural gas potential was not yet known. But the Shah's 1974 cover-story cannot deceive anyone at all in 2006, because with its 812 trillion cubic feet of fully proven reserves, 15% of the world's total and second only to Russia's—proportionately much more than Iran's oil reserves that are smaller than those of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or even Abu Dhabi—Iran




can cheaply generate all the electricity it wants with turbines.

The Shah contracted in 1975 with the French for the enriched uranium with a billion-dollar down payment, and with the Kraftwerk Union consortium of Siemens and A.E.G. Telefunken, as well as with ThyssenKrupp AG to build the first two pressurized light-water reactors and their generating units near Iran's major port city of Bushehr, for a total of more than four billion dollars. Work progressed rapidly until the fall of

the Shah but in July 1979, after the expenditure of some two and a half billion dollars, the Germans abandoned Bushehr because the new revolutionary rulers refused to make a 450 million dollar progress payment that was overdue. It seems that Ayatollah Khomeini opposed nuclear devilry –it is certainly unmentioned in the Koran– and besides, anything done by the Shah was viewed with great suspicion. At that point, one reactor (Bushehr I) was declared by the Germans to be 85% completed and the other (Bushehr II) 50% complete, but both were damaged by Iraqi bombing during the war that lasted until 1988 (especially a series of March 1984 air strikes almost certainly flown by seconded French Navy pilots), and when Siemens was asked to come back to complete the work, it refused knowing that the German Government would never allow the contract to proceed.

Negotiations with the Russians soon started but because of quarreling within Iran and very protracted haggling with the Atomic Energy Ministry Minatom, headed by Evgeny Adamov (who would be arrested in 2005 on fraud charges in Bern, Switzerland) and not only in the interest of the respective governments it seems, because negotiators on each side had urgent personal expenses to cover as well, no agreement was reached until 1995, when the then President of Russia Boris Yeltsin ignored American objections to approve the delivery of a VVER-1000 pressurized light water reactor powered by slightly enriched uranium rods. Delivered as a single if large module (VVERs power submarines), the reactor was to be fitted into the Bushehr I building which was to be quickly repaired, adapted and completed by Iranian as well as Russian civil engineering contractors supervised by Minatom. But there were problems, more or less the same ones that may be encountered in remodeling a suburban kitchen, though on a somewhat larger scale of course: as of this writing, some eleven years from the signature of the contract to complete an 85% completed building and install a ready-made reactor module, some 2,500 Russian technicians are still hard at work in famously hot Bushehr, but the reactor is still not quite ready. The United States had originally opposed the Minatom contract, but now accepts that all is proceeding under strict safeguards — the Russians alone are to process the uranium rods –and besides, Minatom's honesty, efficiency and rapidity as a contractor is something of a safeguard in itself.

Much more is known of the Bushehr reactors than of Iran's secret program to produce weapon-grade uranium by the centrifuge



*The Shah Safi mausoleum
near Ardabil.*

process, but there is absolutely no reason to believe that it is an entirely different set of Iranians who are in charge, each and all incorruptible and highly expert monsters of efficiency.

One thing that is known with certainty is that in 1995 the supposedly eminent Pakistani scientific wizard Abdul Qadeer Khan, after whom hospitals and schools are named, a metallurgist by trade and more precisely a thief and smuggler who has never invented or developed anything at all, agreed to sell to Iran the complete centrifuge technology package he had stolen from the European URENCO consortium while working in a modest capacity for one of its Dutch sub-contractors, samples of Pakistani-made centrifuges, full-scale plans for a heavy water and plutonium reactor and separation plant, and also the drawings and calculations for a cannon-type uranium bomb that Pakistan had originally received from China.

Khan did not apparently sell the two first stages of the entire separation process, the straightforward crushing and leaching needed to extract concentrated natural uranium or "yellowcake" from uranium ore, and the less simple but not all that sophisticated chemical plant needed to convert yellowcake into the gas uranium hexafluoride which is fed into centrifuges—but China did that in 1996, selling the detailed and complete plans and blueprints when the United States successfully objected to the sale of the plant itself. It is now completed and installed as big as life near Isphahan, ready for use and already tested apparently, and which could be just as readily be incapacitated with less than twelve 1,000-pound bombs judging by the photographs, though of course that sort of target would have to be revisited periodically, because chemical plants are easily repaired even after their spectacular destruction.

But the core technology in the package was that of the centrifuges themselves, not the ultra-fast, highly efficient carbon-fiber units that URENCO uses now, but two early 1970s models, one built out of dense aluminum that is easier to manufacture with the right machinery which its German producer will sell to anyone at all, it seems ("how can we possibly know ...etc. etc."), and a more efficient maraging steel model that is a good harder to manufacture—both themselves derived from a 1957 German design which was actually an improved version of the original aluminum centrifuges developed in the Soviet Union by the usual team of captured German scientists—its Von Braun was Gernot Zippe, who emigrated to the University of Virginia when released, before returning to Germany to produce his devices industrially.

Because the needed U-235 isotope of uranium with which bombs are made in high proportions and reactors are fueled in low proportions, is only 1.26% lighter than the mass of U-238 that makes up 99.3% of natural uranium, only very fast centrifuges are of any practical use, turning at the rate of at least 1,500 revolutions per second, a hundred times as fast as a domestic washing machine. Things that turn that fast easily break apart, and the detailed design is also far from simple: to reduce friction that would otherwise generate enough heat to melt the whole thing, the electrically-powered rotor must spin in a vacuum, with a magnetic bearing. The Japanese, who are generally believed to be somewhat more advanced than the Iranians in such matters, encountered considerable difficulties in manufacturing their centrifuges.

Nor could Khan possibly sell enough centrifuges to Iran: to separate U-235 for a bomb in less than many years, many centrifuges must be set to work at once, connected by piping to form a so-called "cascade", and with the centrifuge design that Iran has it would take at least 1,000 centrifuges working round the clock for at least a year to produce enough U-235 for a single cannon-type uranium bomb. But first those 1,000 centrifuges must be manufactured and connected into cascades—and they must not break down as poorly-made centrifuges will: of the 164 centrifuges that Iran already had in motion when the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Authority shut down the cascade in November 2003, one third crashed when the electricity was turned off. Nor is it easy to keep the cascade running correctly: because uranium hexafluoride becomes highly corrosive and can easily perforate imperfect tubes—and any leaks would promptly damage more of the plant.

But there was one potential obstacle to Iran's quest for U-235 that proved to be entirely insignificant: European firms, mostly German and Swiss, not only eagerly sold the high-strength aluminum, special maraging steel, electron-beam welders, balancing machines, vacuum pumps, numerically-controlled machine tools, and very specialized flow-forming machines for both aluminum and maraging steel, but also trained Iranians in the use of all this equipment, and—remarkably, or perhaps not, they were also willing to train Iranians in the processes specifically needed to manufacture centrifuges whose only possible purpose is to enrich uranium U-235. When the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Authority came round, they were able to read and photograph the labels on all the equipment, which

neither the manufacturers nor the Iranians had bothered to remove. It remains to be seen if any consequences will ensue.

Yet, in spite of all the industrial assistance so willingly sold to them, it is not clear that the Iranian nuclear organization can manufacture centrifuge cascades of sufficient magnitude, efficiency and reliability. There are a great many talented engineers among the Iranian exiles in the United States and elsewhere in the world, but perhaps not that many in Iran itself; besides, demanding technological efforts require well-organized laboratories and industrial facilities, and not just individual talents. Organization is indeed Iran's weakness point, with weighty consequences: after a century of oil drilling in Iran, the state oil company cannot drill exploratory wells without foreign assistance — lately from a Romanian rig at one location — and Romania is scarcely at the leading edge in oil drilling; even though the US embargo was imposed almost twenty-five years ago, local industry still cannot reverse engineer and manufacture replacement parts of adequate quality for US-made aircraft, which must therefore remain grounded or fly at great peril — there have been many air crashes. In Israel by contrast, within five years of the 1967 French embargo on the sale of Mirage V fighters, locally produced copies were already in full operational service. Likewise, after more than sixty years of experience with oil refining at Abadan, existing capacity cannot be increased without foreign engineering contractors, while the building of new refineries with local talent alone is deemed quite impossible, so that Iran must import one third of its gasoline consumption that it cannot refine at home.

That is the third reason not to bomb Iran's nuclear installations at this time: they certainly cannot produce nuclear weapons in less than three years, and may not be able to do so even then, because of the many technical difficulties not yet overcome. How can people unable to cut metal for replacement parts for US-built aircraft with enough precision to keep them flying, manufacture effective centrifuges by the hundreds, and assemble them in functioning cascades?

True, the nuclear program might be different because it clearly has priority over everything else, and receives funding in huge amounts in a country filled with poverty in spite of vastly increased oil revenues of late: with a population of almost seventy million, oil revenues even now under forty billion come to less than \$ 6,000 per head, while the non-oil economy is miserably unproductive and add less than \$ 2,000 at most.

There are no reliable expenditure numbers for the nuclear program but there is no need of numbers to establish its sheer magnitude. When the installations and activities of Iran's secret program were added in August 2002 to those already publicly known, the total included the Saghand ore processing plant at the uranium mine, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center with its very old US-supplied 5-megawatt research reactor, the Nuclear Technology Center at Isfahan with four small research reactors, the Isfahan Zirconium production plant, the Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center, the Anarak nuclear waste storage site near Yazd, the Ardekan nuclear fuel plant, the shut-down Lashkar Ab'ad laser isotope separation plant, the less defined Parchim, Lavizan II and Chalous facilities and the Yazd Radiation Processing Center, as well as the more important installations already mentioned, the Bushehr reactor, the Isfahan uranium hexafluoride conversion plant, the heavy water and plutonium reactor and separation plant at Arak near the Kara-Chai river some 150 miles south of Tehran, and the huge Natanz centrifuge complex between Isfahan and Kashan (at 33°43'24.43" N, 51°43'37.55"E, in case any friendly pilot should ask). It contains more than two dozen separate buildings within a perimeter of no less than 4.7 miles, but of greatest interest are the two huge underground halls of 250,000 square feet each. Built with walls six feet thick and protected by two concrete roofs with sand and rocks in between and overcast on top — impressive to contemplate but no dice against today's penetrating munitions — these halls are large enough to hold as many centrifuges as the Iranians could possibly want to make any number of uranium bombs, or to fuel many reactors — always assuming of course that they can successfully manufacture, assemble and operate the centrifuge cascades.

That is what Iranian spokesmen themselves now claim, and none more emphatically than President Ahmadinejad, who insists that they have already mastered all the required processes and techniques, implying the ability to rapidly produce highly enriched uranium for bombs. Ahmadinejad's views, which contradict the more optimistic view here endorsed, must of course be taken very, very seriously, especially given his own engineering PhD, though of course that was a doctorate won in a special program for Pasdaran veterans, and in the subject of urban traffic management rather than nuclear engineering. But what undermines confidence in Ahmadinejad's opinion is his rather expansive way with the facts. Most notably, he keeps

claiming that the centrifuge technology was actually developed by Iranians in Iran, that it is "the proud achievement of the Iranian nation", somehow overlooking the 99.99% of it that was purchased from the Pakistani thief and smuggler. He also makes even larger claims, most recently for example on March 14 of this year, in a public speech in the beautiful mountain city of Gorgan in Golestan province, where after again describing the enrichment technology as Iran's very own scientific achievement, he added according to the official translation: "Iranians have played a leading role throughout history... with the lion's share in all the medical sciences, mathematics, astrology, arts, literature and engineering". One presumes that the translator confused astrology with its near namesake in which Iran was indeed the unchallenged leader, till the end of the fourteenth century.

Even casual observers cannot be unaware of the exceptional detail of the world's knowledge of Iran's once secret nuclear program, as compared to what is known of North Korea's, and what was known of Iraq's at any point in time. Only a fraction of what is known about Iran's installations and processes at Arak, Isphahan, Natanz and all other places was uncovered by the much-advertised inspections of the International Atomic Energy Authority, whose recent Nobel Prize must have been a reward for effort rather than achievement. Satellite photography is only part of the story because one needs to know where to look before it is useful. The conclusion is inescapable that among the scientists, engineers and managers engaged in Iran's nuclear program—most of whom no doubt hold the same opinion of their rulers as almost all educated Iranians—there are some who feel and act on a higher loyalty to humanity than to the nationalism which the regime has discredited, thereby providing a continuing flow of detailed information. Iran's regime is extremist but not totalitarian, and cannot control the movement of people and communications in and out of the country, as North Korea does almost completely and Iraq did in lesser degree..

Because of this continuing flow of detailed and timely information, it is both possible to target air strikes accurately enough to seriously delay Iran's manufacture of nuclear weapons in a single night of operations — especially if new imports from Western Europe can be impeded — and at the same time, there is no reason to do so prematurely, because there will be ample time to act before it is too late, before enough fissile material is produced, that is. What gives great significance to the factor of time is of course the advanced stage of degeneration of

the regime with its quarrelling mob of corrupt clerics, Pasdaran careerists and fanatical ultra-extremists, whose antics presage the inevitable end. But high oil prices and the hand-outs are sustaining the regime just now, and it might last even without them simply because of the inertia of any dictatorship undefeated in war. There is certainly no evidence to justify the hope that the regime will fall before it acquires nuclear weapons—but because there is still time, it is not irresponsible to hope just that.


By the same token, none of the arguments advanced to justify coexistence with a future nuclear-armed Iran are persuasive even as purely academic exercises: how could deterrence work against believers in the return of the 12th Iman as the Mahdi, who additionally believe that this redeemer can be forced to reveal himself by provoking a nuclear catastrophe?

But there is not even need to raise this question in order to reject a nuclear coexistence with Iran under its present regime, given what may be observed of its conduct on a daily basis: as of now in 2006, with American and some allied ground and air forces deployed on both sides of it in Afghanistan and Iraq, with powerful US naval forces at sea to its south, with Iran's own armed forces in shambles and of course no nuclear weapons in hand, the rulers of Iran are very openly financing, arming, training and inciting anti-American terrorist organizations and militias at large, as well as doing the same thing under very thin cover within Iraq, where they pursue a logic of their own in helping Sunni insurgents who kill Shi'is, as well as rival Shi'i militias that fight one another. This is what Iran's extremist rulers are doing now, even without the shield of nuclear weapons to protect them. What then would they do if they had it? Even more aggression is the only reasonable answer, beginning with the subversion of their neighbors, which conveniently enough have large Shi'i populations they variously oppress.

Those then are the clear boundaries of prudent action in response to Iran's vast, costly and most dangerous nuclear program. No premature and therefore unnecessary attack is warranted while there is still ample time measured in years to wait in assured safety for a better solution, but, also and equally, Iran under its present fanatical rulers cannot be allowed to finally acquire nuclear weapons, for they would not inaugurate a coexistence of mutual deterrence, but instead threaten uncontrollable perils. END

Edward N. Luttwak
Political scientist





EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Ten years after the Barcelona Declaration

Heads of State and Government of a Europe that has now been broadened to twenty-five members gathered in the Catalan city in order to relaunch the process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

After all, it is fair to have chosen Spain as the venue for starting and relaunching the process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. It was November 1995 when the fifteen Countries of the European Union and twelve non-member Countries situated on the southern side of the Mediterranean signed the historical "Barcelona Declaration", a document that set up numerous co-operative initiatives and, ten years later, during the period 26-28 November 2005, still in Barcelona, was celebrated by the Heads of State and Government of a European Community that has now been enlarged to twenty-five members (table 1).

A FEW PRECEDENTS

Spain, together with Portugal, became a member of the European Community in 1985, after having restored a form of internal democracy; and just then the Mediterranean Integrated Programmes were launched in order to help the southern regions of the Community to face the difficulties inherent in the enlargement. This provides an important precedent which clearly shows how the Community has turned full attention to the complex reality of southern Europe. This attitude has also an enormous political significance, as lots of influential commentators have often pointed out, mainly because it prevents Europe from excessively projecting itself to the North and the or East, threatening to upset the whole balance. It was not simply by chance that Felipe Gonzales made this remark when he was still Spanish Premier: «Spain has conveyed the idea of centuries of history and culture shared with the Latin-American world through the centuries, and the Mediterranean dimension, with a look towards the Maghreb (from «Project», no. 250,1997)».

Nevertheless, the choice of Spain, as venue for the start of the Euro-Mediterranean process, could well mean a special historical recognition,

perhaps accorded unwittingly. As a matter of fact, history is always able to surprise us by rectifying situations and with recognitions to which only a few people had paid attention. To be precise, at the time of Charlemagne, it was a report writer who coined the term «Europeans» for the first time. His name was Isidoro Pacensis. In describing the opposing armies in the battle of Poiter in 723, which Carlo Martello was able to win, stopping in this way the Arabian advance towards Europe, he called «Europeans» the soldiers of the formation led by the Franks: «at dawn, the Europeans went out of the gorge and the tidy tents of the Arabs loomed before them... Actually, the Europeans were worried that they would not be well hidden from their enemy on the path, and built some shelters... (from «Chronicon», 796). The Army of the Franks was made of soldiers who came from different populates and it was just in reference to this complex reality that the Spanish writer for the first time called them «Europeenses», that is to say, Europeans; and this was the baptism of the citizens of the Old Continent.

BARCELONA 1995: THE NEW EURO-MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY

In 1995, the European Union made an attempt, in Barcelona, to create a bridge between the Countries situated on the southern side of the Mediterranean. in order to foster understanding, collaboration and cooperation. On one side, the member Countries of the EU and, on the other, the non-member Countries of the area: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Malta, Cyprus, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey.

In Barcelona, not only did they strike an economic and financial pact; not only did they enter into an agreement on an association between the EU

Table 1

THE STAGES OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS

Ministerial Conferences:

1st	Barcelona	November	1995 Declaration – Working Programme
2nd	Malta	April 1997	
3rd	Stuttgart	April 1999	
4th	Marseille	November 2000	
5th	Valencia	April 2002	Action Plan
6th	Naples	December 2003	
7th	Luxembourg-Kiem	May 2005	
8th	Barcelona	November 2005	10th Anniversary – Conference of Heads of State and Government

"Interim" Ministerial Meetings:

1st	Palermo	June 1998	
2nd	Lisbon	May 2000	
3rd	Brussels	November 2001	
4th	Crete	May 2003	Medium Term Conference
5th	Dublin	May 2004	Medium Term Conference of Foreign Ministers
6th	The Hague	November 2004	Conclusions of EU Presidency

and the States of the other shore (and this policy had just been adopted for some of them already with positive results); not only did they reach a new important political international agreement which committed the governments of 27 Countries to following a series of numerous and fundamental principles.

The basic idea of the new Euro-Mediterranean strategy was to start establishing, together with the non-member Countries of the Mediterranean, good relations among all people of this complex area. But its originality lies in setting out the exact nature of the relations which should have a political-institutional significance, as well as being based on economic and financial exchanges, with reference to security, rights and the role of civil society, and should have a spiritual significance, that is to say cultural, educational and informative, i.e. an effective mutual friendship and understanding.

In short, a far-reaching process in favour of peace, stability and development of the entire region started in 1995 and made it possible to plan a series of actions closely related to each other in order to replace suspicion and preconceived hostility; in order that this strategy could have success all its parts had to influence and support each other, just because the partnership drew inspiration from the clever and valuable idea

of a gradual and harmonious development of each aspect of the relations among the States and even the populations..

According to this view, the programmes concerning the three types of Euro-Mediterranean partnership should have been established and implemented at the same time, integrating all their components with each other, or else the whole action would lose its effectiveness.

THE THREE SIDES TO THE PARTNERSHIP: POLICY AND SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIO-CULTURAL

The partnerships started with the Barcelona Conference in 1995, dealt with three specific subjects: policy and security, economy and finance, the social and cultural situation.

To be precise:

- « Policy and security partnership: to build a common peaceful and stable area»;
- «Economic and financial partnership: to create an area with general prosperity»;
- «Social, cultural and human partnership: to develop human resources and promote understanding and exchanges among different cultures and civil societies».

With reference to every single term of the part-

nership, the Barcelona Declaration highlighted the following main aspects:

- with regard to the policy and security partnership, the primary goals were to promote the regional security «through the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, according to international agreements concerning the policy of armaments control and disarmament, “to respect the equal rights of all populations and self-determination”, to act in “accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter». In particular, in reference with the Middle East, the Barcelona Declaration began with the firm commitment to make that area a peaceful place where *each part will refrain from developing a military power which goes beyond their rightful needs for defence... it will foster the establishment of good and mutual relations... and develop the constitutional state in their political systems*;
- as regards the economic and financial partnership, the main purpose was to create a free-trade zone in the whole Mediterranean basin by 2010. A special fund amounting to 4685 million ECU during the period 1995–1999 (almost 6 billion dollars) and a system of credits, granted by the European Investment Bank, (BEI) were approved in order to ease the process of adjustment and liberalization and the creation of new infrastructures in the non-member Countries of the Mediterranean;
- as for the socio-cultural partnership, the main purpose was to take a series of measures for improving the friendship and understanding among the different Countries, promoting exchanges and mutual contacts especially among people «who are responsible for political and civil society, the cultural and religious world, universities, researchers, mass media, associations, the trade unions, and among public and private companies». The representatives of the Governments undertook, in particular, to curb and handle the migration flows (we can point out some initiatives ranging from professional training to the fight against unemployment). The “Working Plan», enclosed with the document of the «Declaration», gives some indications relating to the first tasks to develop. This Plan, detailed at point V, envisaged the promotion of institutional contacts with the involvement of the Parliaments (Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue) and the European Community Socio-Economic Committee.

Unfortunately, just what was feared happened in part, and the new Conference of the Heads of State

and Government, in November 2005, ten years after the Barcelona Declaration, on the one hand resulted in an evident failure, and on the other relaunched a new form of cooperation. At any rate, the initiative has kept, as well as the essential spirit, the originality of its planning; i.e. to work on the three sides of the intervention at the same time.

POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES:

THE MALTA CONFERENCE, 1997

AND THE PALERMO CONFERENCE, 1998

The Barcelona Process got off to a good start. Ministers, government officials and experts had already attended meetings, called at regular intervals and provided for by paragraph III of the «Working Programme», enclosed with the Barcelona Declaration. Considerable steps were taken towards economic cooperation (energy, transport, tourism, telecommunications, industry and environment), social cooperation (development of human resources), cultural cooperation (meetings and agreements among European and Arab universities, initiatives taken by the Ministers of Culture to enhance the cultural heritage of the Mediterranean). The financial resources, provided by the European Union, however limited, made it possible to introduce measures aimed at carrying through the reforms of the economic and social structures envisaged by the specific “MEDA” programme.

But the policy and security partnership, that is the first and most important of the three cornerstones on which the Barcelona Process of 1995 is founded, encountered the major obstacles in the course of the entire project. Its aim is to «keep peace and stability» in the Mediterranean, and it influences the development of the other partnerships. At once, the crisis in the peace process in the Middle East strongly influenced the start of this kind of partnership and put a brake on it, affecting the whole process in a negative way. The situation became worse in the following years, in consequence of the crises in Albania and Kosovo, the outbreak of the sub-Saharan and Iraqi wars and, above all, the spread of terrorism.

The Euro-Mediterranean conference, attended by Foreign Ministers, took place in Malta (April 1997). On that occasion, the so-called «regular reinforced political dialogue», opened in Barcelona, came to a sudden standstill and the important meeting risked failure. For instance, the European Authorities had to assert again and explicitly the clear-cut distinction between the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the peace

Table 2

EUROPEAN UNION: FOREIGN POLICY, POLICY OF COOPERATION COVERING THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AREAS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

Framework of reference

Foreign and Security Policy

Legal basis: The Treaty on European Union, detailed at Title V, articles 11–18, defines and implements a common Foreign and Security Policy, the objectives of which are:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
- To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways.
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders.
- To promote international cooperation.
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Treaty on European Union, detailed at article 2, defines the general objectives of the Union which are applied to the common Foreign and Security Policy. Article 11 provides that:

- The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyal and mutual solidarity.
- The Member States shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
- They shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.

Policy of Cooperation covering the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries

Legal basis: Treaty on European Union, Title V; Treaty on European Community, Article 133 and 310.

Objectives: The policy of cooperation covering these Countries was defined in the following European Councils: Lisbon (June 1992); Corfu (June 1994); Essen (December 1994). The European Union decided to establish a multilateral and lasting framework of relations with the Mediterranean Countries, based on a spirit of partnership. Through a cooperation with the South, the Union aimed to develop an open-door policy for the Countries in central and eastern Europe.

Bodies: a "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process", consisting of the officials of the three bodies of the Union (Council, Commission, Parliament) and one representative of each Mediterranean partner, holds regular meetings to prepare the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The idea of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly stemmed from the Valencia Conference (April 2002). The Euro-Mediterranean Forum gave a parliamentary dimension to the decision-making process.

process in the Middle East, a basis for the negotiation which had led to the Barcelona Declaration. The purpose was to prevent Syria and Israel from failing to attend the Conference because of the renewed tensions between Arabs and Israelis. The European Union had to recognize again that it did not have enough political and military force, because of its limited foreign and security policy, to play a decisive role in favour of peace and stability in this area, a crucial point for the whole Mediterranean (table2).

However, the purpose of keeping the talks open among people from different and opposing cultures led the participants in the conference of Malta to report (in the hard-won «Conclusions», which were signed and published a month after the session!) on the one hand the obstacles to the peace process in the Middle East, and on the other the first positive results of the «Working Programme», established in Barcelona, as far as the economic and socio-cultural cooperation was concerned.

The approval of a «Charter for peace and security», that was an institutional basis for the political partnership, was postponed until the situation improved.

It is really interesting to note that the approval of a new policy initiative by the European Parliament, aimed at taking the parliamentary assemblies of twelve mediterranean non-member Countries into the policy and security partnership, was regarded as one of the few positive aspects. It led all the observers to agree that the Malta Conference had not resulted in a failure at all. The creation of a permanent parliamentary *Forum*, able to institutionalize the dialogue, appeared to be the best way to lay the foundations of the political partnership.

There is no doubt about this: the relative failure of the Malta Conference in 1997 made it clear that the method, adopted successfully in order to build the European Community, following the Treaty of Rome in 1957, would not have the same good effects on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. That method had already promoted the economic cooperation among the founder States (Common Market etc.) and had made it possible to reach widespread political institutional agreements, thanks to the impressive results obtained in the economy. But in this case, it would not have worked.

There is a basic point that the Barcelona Process raised immediately. To make the partnership work, the three «cornerstones» of the partnership must be developed at the same time. If this did not happen, the entire building would collapse. To take a good example, an inter-governmental conference about industrial cooperation was called off in 1997, because the government of Morocco, which was the venue for the conference, did not want to host the Israeli delegation at that time.

Moreover, in the ministerial «ad interim» conference, which took place in Palermo (1998) and was the first in a series of intermediary conferences, planned among other big events, the Italian Government was able to avoid a failure by adopting a makeshift solution: that conference would not have an official character. On this occasion, the representatives of the eight Arab governments took a political position. From their viewpoint, the peace process in the Middle East did not have to be regarded as a marginal issue; on the contrary, it had to serve as a useful reference point in the project of economic cooperation. After difficult negotiations, the participants recognized that the Euro-Arab dialogue did not constitute a solid basis for the development of the peace process. Nevertheless, «the partnership must not be broken» because it represents

the only *forum* of discussion, prospective agreements and fruitful cooperation involving all Mediterranean Countries. «We remain steadfast in our belief that – we can read in the final declarations – the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation cannot fully develop in the context of a continuing conflict with Israel, but anyway we pledge to maintain it». And this pledge was seen as a positive signal. The Palermo Conference adopted the so-called method of «channelling», that means continuing the talks and analyses on each of the three cornerstones in order to examine various common projects by concentrating on a small number of them and in conformity with a precise global programme so as to assure its financing and its completion. This concerned both the programme «MEDA», in the economic cooperation, and other different courses of actions in the socio-cultural context. The European enthusiasm extolled this little progress: from Palermo, Cock, the President of the European Parliament took the risk of saying: «a new spirit starts blowing on the Barcelona Process».

VALENCIA 2002: A «NEW PLAN OF ACTION»

The Valencia conference in 2002 constituted a considerable step forward in accelerating the Barcelona Process. On this occasion, a precise «Plan of Action» was defined in order to make further progress in the initiative.

In political terms, the significance of this choice was linked with the expansion of the European Community, which had already been started, especially in Eastern Europe. There was a growing fear that the expansion could mean a reduction in attention on Mediterranean matters but it was dispelled by the renewed and concrete commitment made in Valencia. The document stated realistically that, despite some good partial results, they were still far from the goals which had been set in the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. Therefore, it was necessary to draw up the whole strategy again and undertake a series of tasks, considering that the States and the signatory powers had become fully aware of being the real actors behind the process and, at the same time, the «receivers» who really benefited from it. The Plan of Action involved a division of the initiatives into three different actions: regional, sub-regional and multilateral. It defined itself as «complementary» to the agreements on bilateral cooperation which are present, for example, in the Agreements of Association between the EU and the Mediterranean partners and even in the specific Agreements between the same partners. As far as the policy and security partnership is



The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, together with a representative of the Countries which took part in the extraordinary session convened in Rabat, Morocco, during the period 20-21 November 2005.

concerned, the Plan of Action called for precise tasks and actions in the fight against terrorism, in the defence of human rights, in the prevention of conflicts. In regard with economic and financial partnership, the Plan aimed again to create a free-trade zone across the Mediterranean by 2010; it introduced actions in support of the agreement on commercial integration among the partners of the southern area – the so-called South-South agreements – like the accord signed, in Agadir, by Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan to create a common free-trade zone; it set out the principles and guidelines for investment policies and made a commitment to control the effects of liberalization process; it faced, in a definite way, the matter of the free-trade in services and, above all, the trade liberalization in agricultural products; it aimed to promote the constitution of a special « Euro-Mediterranean Bank» required urgently by non-members partners. Other important issues concerned, for example, the simplification of administrative tasks to support investment policies and the constitution of a Union of Industrial

Confederations of the Mediterranean. In regard with the socio-cultural partnership, the Plan of Action focused on the dramatic matters of migration flows and called for a special Euro-mediterranean Foundation to open a closer dialogue among different cultures. Other projects aimed to promote youth exchanges among different Countries, and to monitor, through the constitution of a special Observatory, professional training and occupational plans and to create a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, seen as a top venue for discussion and political-institutional talks. In view of important changes to face, all the partners – as the document concludes – will be enlisted to prepare plans and actions, with specific direct responsibility.

PROPOSALS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DURING THE PERIOD 2005-2010

In view of the tenth Anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, in a «Statement» (2005) to the Council and European Parliament, the Commission put forward «a work programme» to face the challenges in the next five years, with a deadline of 2010. It is about a real agenda, with key points to

discuss, which represented an important reference point for the summit of the Heads of State and Government gathered in Barcelona during the period 26–28 November 2005.

It is important to point out that, in the Statement of the European Committee, the initiative set up in Barcelona in 1995 is defined as a real «turning point» in the framework of relations between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours. Moreover, the planned partnership has an «all-embracing character, because it covers vast geographic areas and encompasses a range of specific sectors and leans towards political, economic and social goals».

The document says Europe is the main partner of the Mediterranean Countries in the market sector. More than 50 per cent of their global trade is represented by the EU (in some of these Countries the export quota rises to 70 per cent). Europe is the major investor in this context (it holds about 55 per cent of the total number of the international investments) and is the biggest supplier of financial support (in total 3 billion Euros). Finally, Europe is the most important resource for all Countries that surround the Mediterranean Sea and also the main destination of the migration flows. As the document adds, all the Mediterranean non-member Countries, which signed the Barcelona Declaration, negotiated Agreements of Association with the EU and intensified sharply bilateral exchanges. The regional character of the partnership has considerably been reinforced. However, in the document the Committee recognizes that the progress, which has been made, is much slower than expected, mainly because of political reasons relating to continuing conflicts and tensions which struck the area. The Committee also indicates the three main crucial points that could compromise the system of Euro-Mediterranean relations:

- human rights and democracy that is barely able to put into effect the real participation of the people.
- the economic growth that is very slow and prevents the Mediterranean Countries from grasping the opportunities given by the globalization; the Mediterranean *partners* would need to create at least five millions of new jobs each year in order to meet the needs of people who are unemployed;
- better educational opportunities which represent a fundamental shift towards human and social development.

In order to sort out these serious matters, the Committee proposed they should follow, as mentioned above, a clear agenda.

THE WORKING PROGRAMME 2005–2010

2005

The Euro-Mediterranean partners should:

- reach an agreement on a road-map in order to liberalize the agriculture. The Commission is submitting some guidelines to the Council for approval to start the negotiations with the partners;
- set a time for the agreements on bilateral economic integration, in reference to investments and services;
- organize a seminar on weapons of mass destruction before the year's out;
- organize a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference concerning the problem of transport, with the European Investment Bank, before the year's out, to discuss projects for infrastructure linking the Euro-Mediterranean partners to each other.

2006

Sub-regional Conferences concerning human rights, in the presence of the representatives from Governments and civil society;

Euro-Mediterranean Conference concerning sexual equality. The Conference should compare specifically the best experiences with each other in order to promote the role of women in society;

Adoption of a clear agenda to take practical measures for depolluting the Mediterranean Sea by 2020;

Explore the possibility of setting up the Euro-Mediterranean development Bank within the year.

Design a Scheme providing scholarships for university students.

2007

- the Euro-Mediterranean *partners* should reach an agreement on a common code of conduct to take measures against terrorism;
- conference of the Ministers of Interior and Ministers of Justice, together with representatives from local Authorities, about how to handle migration flows and social integration;
- adoption of a regional programme aimed at supporting rural development and raising the quality of agricultural productions;
- after wide consultation with the *partners*, the percentage of financial resources for the cooperation in the education sector should be increased by 50 per cent in reference to national and regional programmes.

2010

All the free-trade South-South agreements should be concluded before the year's out, also



Barcelona Conference, 27-28 November 2005. From left, the President of the Palestinian Authority Abu Mazen, the British Premier Tony Blair and the President of the European Committee José Manuel Barroso.

with reference to the service sector, taking into consideration the Agreement of Agadir and the first Pan Euro-Mediterranean Protocol so that the agreements can be compatible and, at the end of their transitory periods, the free-trade zone can become fully operative.

BARCELONA 2005: CELEBRATIONS OF THE 10th ANNIVERSARY OF THE «DECLARATION»

As it had already happened most of time in the past, even in the conference of the Heads of State and Government gathered in Barcelona during the period 26-28 November 2005, political matters suddenly assumed importance and strongly influenced the outcome of the work.

One of the most significant conflicts which led the Arab Countries, except for the Palestinian Authority, and Israel to send delegations without Heads of State and Government (this Summit was snubbed by the protagonists of the Mediterranean, as lots of newspapers articles have remarked) concerns the different approaches to the Middle East problem and the definition of a «common Code of conduct» in the fight against terrorism. According to lots of Arab Countries, fighting against foreign forces that occupy your territory does not mean terrorism; in contrast, European people find these distinctions

unacceptable. The Code of Conduct about terrorism is a document by which all the Euro-Mediterranean Countries, as well as Israel and its closer Arab Countries, issued a firm condemnation of this phenomenon. Some Arab Countries insist on drawing a sharp distinction between terrorists and fighters who take this kinds of actions as «acts of defence and national liberation against an occupation force». This attitude has led to a serious conflict.

The compromise, reached in Barcelona at the last moment, made it possible the approval of the Code, in particular the part about the condemnation of terrorism, but the juridical and legal definition of this phenomenon was referred to the United Nations General Assembly. In this way, at the end of the Conference, a Declaration of the Presidency, but not a common document, passed with a majority of votes, was approved. As Italian Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini has pointed out, it was just a compromise «to let the whole world see a failure».

The agreements reached on the other two forms of partnership appear to be more positive, even though everyone realizes that the missed agreements and sharp differences of opinion on how to develop the political partnership will badly affect the Barcelona Process. In any case, what is beyond doubt is that the Work Programme 2005-2010, drawn up by the Commission, was approved together with far-reaching agreements on dealing with migration flows. The point under discussion is quite interesting. The purposes of the programme are really ambitious, especially the main goal of creating



Italian Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini greets Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem during a meeting.

a fully operative free-trade area covering the Mediterranean by 2010.

However, there have been negative comments also on this decision. Even at the Barcelona Conference, it was realistically realized that there were still lots of difficulties to overcome.

In political terms, the Mediterranean democracies have not made any progress in the last ten years; in economic terms, the results have not been better. The EU has invested 20 million dollars in the Barcelona Process up to now, but this large sum of money has not allow the southern Countries of the Mediterranean to take off. In 2002, Romano Prodi, President of Commission, still had to recognize that the problem of poverty was dramatic in the whole area. In fact, even though currently there are signs of improvement, it is unacceptable that almost 30 per cent of the population of the Middle East and North Africa lives below the poverty line (less than 2 Euro_s a day). In addition, in reference to education: «just think..., only 0,6 per cent of the population uses Internet and only 1,2 per cent has got a computer... - And yet - knowledge and culture represent the cornerstone of the development; education and training are the key instruments for encouraging an active participation in politics and democracy» (Catholic University of Lovanio, November 2002).

Even British Premier Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister José Zapatero have remarked that the relations between Europe and the Mediterranean have not improved at all in the last ten years. As they wrote on the occasion of the summit: *...the migration flows stem from the great inequalities in wealth and opportunities, lack of security, democracy, and civil rights... The gap between the rich and the poor, that is between the EU and the southern Mediterranean Countries, has*


not narrowed, on the contrary it has widened, fuelling a sense of frustration and a massive emigration. In view of this, there is a need to create twelve million of new jobs in the next twenty years, in order to provide for a decent future the young people who live in the Mediterranean area. Then they added: As a real form of partnership, the «Barcelona Process» sets out conditions and expects everyone to observe them: it is essential to go ahead after reaching an agreement. The future generations will not be able to forgive us if our attempts to provide them with greater security, investments, prosperity, commercial trade, and educational opportunities should result in failure. («La Repubblica», 28 November 2005).

Further influential remarks enable us to have an idea even about the atmosphere of tension and conflicts pervading the Barcelona Conference. As Magdi Allam writes for «Il Corriere della Sera», *however hard we try to appear diplomatic, we must admit that substantially the Euro-Mediterranean partnership failed for two obvious reasons. First of all, the Arab regimes, whose leaders all together boycotted the Summit of Barcelona, and cannot be reformed motu proprio from the inside. Secondly, the EU, more and more discredited as political actor, has not been able to set in motion a genuine democratic process in the South and in the East of the Mediterranean, taking advantage of economic help. The hard words uttered by Algerian Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem seem to sum up the failure of the event: They told us: «first you carry out the reforms, then we will give you money». Let them keep their money! We never asked them to undertake reforms. Consequently, they must not ask us to introduce them. («Il Corriere della Sera», 29 November 2005).*

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

What conditions influence the future success or failure of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership? The political conditions of democracy have not take root yet in this area, and the security apparatus must be set up in regions shaken by conflicts and tensions. We should omit from our remarks any empty rhetoric of cooperation among populaces, in terms of peace and development, and ask ourselves whether Europe really has the great political power needed to spread progress and improvements over this field. This point raises legitimate doubts because the European Union itself is going through a severe political crisis after the negative result of the referendum on the constitutional project and the consequent uncertainty. In addition, the EU does not appear to be able to

relate the economic and financial support given to the Mediterranean Countries to a specific political influence on human rights and political liberalization. This situation upsets the balance of the three sectors of the partnership and puts the significance of the Barcelona Process into perspective with regard to its economic potential as well, just as the growing gap between European and Mediterranean Countries shows. In such a situation, the goal of creating a fully operative free-trade zone by 2010 appears to be elusive, because there are still a lot of problems that must be solved. In particular, the liberalization of the agricultural sector, which was strongly supported by the Mediterranean Countries but obstructed by the EU members. Moreover, up to now the socio-cultural partnership has experienced nothing but deficiencies and delays from the EU. We are far from producing a large flow of youth exchanges, that is to say successful initiatives for a mutual understanding among people. In the last years, media attention has been focused on unlikely conflicts among different cultural groups rather than cultural exchanges. The scenario painted in Barcelona is very different from this one. Maybe less rhetoric and a strong determination to monitor carefully the real usefulness of certain initiatives and institutions would lead us to understand what corrections are needed in order to build a more effective partnership. Even though Europe is not able to untie the knots in the political project that should lead its whole action, it persists in having faith in its model of democracy, which is an incomplete model at European level, and in the value of free trade. In view of this, on the other side of the Mediterranean the political, economic and socio-cultural approaches should consider most the significance of differences and needs of those populaces. For instance, a greater readiness to bring themselves into questions and put their skills to the test by making a comparison with the others could open the door to more effective collaboration. Rather than providing training for companies in a precarious state and for people who act as managers, even though they do not possess any entrepreneurial skills, a lot of more social support in those areas could give positive, even surprising results. As Premiers Blair and Zapatero say, the Barcelona Process should have given rise to a real partnership in which everyone should fulfil the commitments taken on. However, the results have been disappointing and the disparities have been growing up to now. In view of this situation, when they go back to their own Countries, they have to face the internal situation and their



Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero.

behaviour appears to be radically different from that established officially. Nevertheless, the Barcelona Process does not have any alternatives and its original and complex planning, with its triple form of partnership, involves reliability, rationality, validity. There is no doubt about this: everyone aims to promote the gradual development of Europe. But if Europe devotes excessive attention to the North and the East, this will cause new tensions and worsen further the crises of the Union. Italy is really interested in reinforcing the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, which is an important element of the development of our Country; exactly like the total commitment of Europe to the South. At least as far as Italy is concerned, it is enormously important to be able to grasp the opportunities offered by the process which still needs to be corrected thoroughly, but anyway it has already been started.

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NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY

NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Fifty-seven years after its constitution, NATO today is not only a bulwark of democratic principles, freedom and legality, but must also meet the challenges of the new century, which entail a revision of its role and responsibilities, in order to achieve three fundamental objectives: new capabilities, new member Countries, new relations and overtures to the East.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represents the politico-military bond that ties Europe and North America in a single alliance, aimed at guaranteeing the collective defence of the territory and constitutes an effective forum of consultation for the problems related to security. In fact, even if it does not have its "own" Army, it has contributed, for 57 years, to the stability and security of the transatlantic area, upholding its principles of democracy, legality and individual freedom consecrated by the Washington Treaty.

Today the Alliance is an institution much different from the one defined by the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which has represented the stronghold of the territorial integrity of its partners for the entire period of the Cold War until the end of the eighties. It is also different from the structure that has watched over the delicate period of transition of the post-bipolarism.

The new international horizon, opened with the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 against the United States, has made us understand how the geo-political context of reference has changed after the end of the Cold War, and the vulnerability of present-day society vis-à-vis the new threats to security, actually speeding up the process of transformation ratified during the Washington summit of 1999 with the new Strategic Concept. In this sense, the Organization has taken a series of initiatives aimed at improving the military capabilities and strengthening the cooperation among the member States and the partner States. The unidirectional organization has turned into a "multidirectional" structure, capable of projecting its forces also outside its borders.

In this scenario, NATO has started a process of transformation of its role and responsibilities, starting a series of politico-structural revisions with the intention of achieving three fundamental objectives, which can be synthesized in the "three news": new capabilities, new member Countries, new relations and openings to the East.

THE EVOLUTION

The origins of the North Atlantic Treaty date back to the post-war period, with the proposal advanced by some West-European Countries (1) to strengthen the mutual bonds in order to define a common defence system against the ideological, political and military risks that were then present in Europe. The accord was formalized with the ratification of the Brussels Treaty that, in 1948, gave birth to a pact of collective self-defence among the contracting States, although the constitution of an international organization was not yet envisaged.

Along the months, the signatory States found the necessity to widen this form of "embryonic" Alliance and started the negotiations with the United States and Canada with the intention of creating a "North Atlantic" Alliance between Europe and America. An Alliance founded on guarantees of security and reciprocal commitments of protection. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were subsequently invited by the signatory Powers to participate in this process. The negotiations ended in April 1949, with the signature of the Washington Treaty, which sanctioned the birth of a system of collective defence between the twelve Countries.

The ratification of the Treaty by all the members gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The member Countries pledged to share the risks, responsibilities and advantages of common security, affirming, consistently with article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the principle of the "natural right" of the States to individual and collective legitimate defence. In order to secure itself such right, the Alliance has thus provided itself with a political structure and a military organization, which, for the whole post-war period, have represented the main form of deterrence in the East-West bipolar confrontation. In order to implement a security policy, NATO has equipped itself with a credible

and effective military structure for crisis management, adopting, at the same time, a pro-dialogue policy.

The stability ensured by NATO during this period has allowed Western Europe to concentrate its energies on reconstruction and development after the destructions caused by WWII.

Today NATO is a well-established reality, fully developed and deeply transformed. Twenty-six Countries belong to it: Italy, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Turkey, United States and, since April 2, 2004, also Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovenia and Slovakia.

The Alliance has continually changed, also due to the radical transformations of the world strategic environment.

The first important changes date back to the sixties and seventies, when some political initiatives deeply influenced the East-West relations:

- First of all, the adoption of the Harmel Report (1967), which pointed out an innovative road, asserting that NATO should pursue a double objective: increase its defensive capabilities and adopt a détente policy towards the Countries it considered enemies.
- Germany's opening to "Ostpolitik" (2) in 1969.
- Ratification of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later turned into Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (3), which, in 1990, started to make substantial cuts in the conventional forces in Europe (4).

As a consequence of such initiative, the Brussels Summit of 1994 outlined the new objectives and principles that were to guide the Alliance in the immediate future, as well as the new guidelines concerning armament control and disarmament.

The events, which in the past years have radically changed the order that had become established during the last 50 years, have diffused within the Alliance a willingness to start a revision of the thought and structure of the organization. Within this framework, the most significant response of the Alliance to the changes occurred in the Euro-Atlantic scenario has been the definition of a new Strategic Concept, approved by the Washington Summit of 1999 (evolution of the military instruments, cooperation and enlargement are its main themes). The security of the member Countries is no more put at risk by the danger of a generalized conflict between regular formations or symmetric conflicts, but the risk comes from more evanescent, but equally dangerous threats, such as terrorism, which proliferate owing to the politico-

economic weakness of the new international actors. The new Strategic Concept, aimed at reaffirming the centrality of the collective defence of the Alliance, is complemented by the role of "active defence" also outside NATO's traditional area of responsibility (i.e. "out of ACE area") (5), widening the prerogatives of both the tasks and the expeditionary nature of the military instrument.

The Washington Summit can be considered the finishing point of the delicate process of adaptation that followed the breakup of the bipolar confrontation and the beginning of a deep process of transformation of the Alliance, as regards the effectiveness of its military instrument. The mainstays of the "NATO system" are now the enlargement and the assistance to the new members in the fields of politics and economy, armed forces and defence, resources and security.

With these assumptions, the concept of security is now understood in more global terms than in the past, for it includes in its elaboration risks of different nature such as, for example, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their carriers, the interruption of the flow of vital resources, terrorist and sabotage actions.

Two more prerogatives of the Alliance are introduced together with the new security concept: the management of international crises, to be carried out "case by case with the consent of the single nations", and the cooperation with the other Countries of the Euro-Atlantic area (partnership). The provisions of reorganization that are leading NATO towards a full adaptation to the geo-political conditions of the 21st Century stem from the Washington Summit of 1999.

The events occurred on September 11, 2001, in fact, have only accelerated the times for the transformation of the military instruments, in quantitative and qualitative terms, through the definition of the "Defence Capabilities Initiative" (DCI) (6), aimed at improving and increasing the military capabilities of the Alliance. The uncertainty of the new threats has spurred the politico-military leadership to accelerate the process of transformation, as sanctioned by the Prague Summit of November 2002. The creation of the "NATO Response Force" (a force of rapid intervention consisting of 20.000 men employable in any part of the world), the adoption of a new projectable Command structure, the development and acquisition of the capabilities for the new forms of conflict (Prague Capabilities Commitment - PCC, as prosecution of the DCI, which entails the allotment of specific resources to the Member States), the spur towards a wider enlargement (open-door policy) and the fight against international terrorism, represent some of the milestones set down during the Prague Summit.

CHRONOLOGY

ISTANBUL, 28-29 June 2004: strengthening of the contributions to NATO in the fight against terrorism; support to the process of stabilization in the Balkans; increase of the capabilities and employability of the forces and of the response capabilities for carrying out the new missions of the Alliance, strengthening of the cooperation with the partners inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

PRAGUE, 21-22 November 2002: participation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovakia and Slovenia in the preparatory talks for admission to the Alliance; reaffirmation of the "open door policy", definition of the increase of the Alliance's capabilities (Prague Capabilities Commitment); creation of the NATO Response Force; redefinition of NATO Forces and Command Structures; adoption of the concept of fight against terrorism; support to the member Countries for participation in the operations in Afghanistan.

ROME, 28 May 2002: creation of the NATO-RUSSIA Council.

WASHINGTON DC, 23-24 April 1999: commemoration of the 50th anniversary; adoption of the New Strategic Concept; qualitative and quantitative development of new capabilities (Defence Capabilities Initiative); development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance; reinforcement of the operational dimension of PfP, as well as consultations and cooperation within EAPC; pursuit of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue; aid to the Countries that wish to become NATO members through a Membership Action Plan (MAP); willingness to exercise an adequate politico-military pressure for the settlement of the disputes in former Yugoslavia (Kosovo); enhancement of Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Mediterranean Dialogue.

MADRID, 8-9 July 1997: participation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the preparatory talks for the admission to the Alliance; reaffirmation of the "open door policy"; official signing of an agreement for a specific partnership between NATO and Ukraine; special pronouncement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, reaffirming their commitment for a full implementation of the Peace Accord and creation of Bosnia Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multiethnic State; meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government and the cooperation partners, under the aegis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The meeting is focused on how the EAPC could be more effectively employed for contributing to security and stability.

PARIS, 27 May 1997: NATO-Russia summit meeting for signing the institutive act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation.

BRUSSELS, 10-11 January 1994: inauguration of Partnership for Peace (PfP). The NACC members and other CSCE Countries that can and want to contribute to this programme are invited to participate in the works; issue of the PfP framework document; approval of the CJTF concept; approval of the measures for supporting the development of a European security and defence identity; manifestation of NATO's willingness to carry out air attacks to avoid the strangling of Sarajevo and of other security areas acknowledged by the U.N. in Bosnia Herzegovina.

ROME, 7-8 November 1991: the Heads of State and Government issue the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, as well as the Rome Declaration on peace and cooperation and the developments in the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.

LONDON, 5-6 July 1990: publication of the London Declaration with proposals aimed at developing the cooperation with the Countries of East and Central Europe.

BRUSSELS, 4 December 1989: the Leaders of the Warsaw Pact Countries, in conjunction with the meeting of the Atlantic Council, issue a common declaration that denounces the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the forces of the Warsaw Pact and reject the Brezhnev doctrine on limited sovereignty.

BRUSSELS, 29-30 May 1989: the American President announces new important initiatives for reducing the conventional forces in Europe; approval of the global Concept for armaments control and disarmament and publication of a statement issued by the Summit.

BRUSSELS, 2-3 March 1988 (Atlantic Council): it underlines the unity of the Allies and reaffirms their common objectives and ideals, as well as the lasting validity of the Alliance; it asks what significant measures are taken to eliminate the disparities between the conventional forces.

BRUSSELS, 21 November 1985: consultation between US President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev on the US-USSR agreements on the reduction of the medium-range and nuclear strategic forces.

One should think that the initiative for the acquisition of capabilities (PCC) is no more a "suggestion" but a formal commitment by the member Countries to develop common capabilities in more than 400 sectors (7). In order to sustain the objectives outlined by the new model, NATO is equipping itself with an expeditionary-type military instrument (8), technologically advanced, flexible and interoperable, which could be rapidly projected in the land, sea, and air dimension, and able to operate in a wide range of missions (from crisis management to fight against terrorism).

THE ADAPTATION OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE

With the evolution of the reference operational environment there has also been the development of a process of "internal adaptation" (9) aimed at making the Alliance more flexible and effective vis-à-vis the new types of threat.

New operational instruments have been developed, in order to accomplish with effectiveness and credibility both the traditional missions in defence of the member Countries (art.5 operations) and the new tasks, with particular reference to "non-art.5" missions.

At the same time, number, type, mission, location of the Commands of the military structure of the organization have also been redefined.

Thus NATO has started the revision of the Command structure, aimed both at reducing the number of Commands and static bodies, especially at intermediate level, and at creating a new structure of the Forces, according to the decisions made during the Washington Summit of 1999.

Command Structure

In the light of the new security context and to develop the Prague provisions according to an


approach based on the "functionality", NATO has proceeded with a revision of the Command organization, which retains its strategic goal, especially focussed on the exercise of Command and Control of the joint operations of the Alliance. A new structure based on parameters of greater flexibility and capability has been approved by the Ministers of Defence at the meeting of 12-13 June 2003. The two strategic commands - SACEUR (10) and SACLANT (11) - have been reorganized with different functions. The NATO operational direction is concentrated in a single strategic Command - Allied Command Operations (ACO) (12) located near Mons (Belgium) -, which covers the whole NATO area of responsibility. This strategic Command has been flanked by a "functional" Command, called Allied Command Transformation (ACT) (13), located in Norfolk (USA), which substantially performs a guiding role for the activities connected with the transformation of the military capabilities of the Alliance. The capabilities of both strategic Commands are integrated and intrinsically independent. From the results of this transformation emerges both a more rational distribution of the tasks between and inside the strategic Commands and a more streamlined and integrated organization.

Allied Command Transformation


ACT commands, besides the General Headquarters, the Bodies and Centres tasked with transformation:

- *Joint Warfare Centre (JWC)* (Stavanger - Norway) supports the activities of experimentation, analysis and development of the doctrine at operational level, in order to optimise the process of transformation, increment the interoperability and the capabilities of the Alliance and provide the training of the staffs.
- *Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC)* (Bydgoszcz - Poland) assists the ACT and ACO Commands in promoting the NATO doctrine at tactical level within the Countries of the Alliance and in training the Staffs.
- *Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)* (Monsanto - Portugal) ensures the collection, analysis and distribution of the lessons (identified and learned) of the operations conducted by the NATO forces in the Operations Theatres.
- Centres of Excellence (CoE) permit to develop, verify and implement the doctrinal concepts through training and experimentation, to the advantage of the units and personnel of the member Countries in sectors of particular interest.

NATO Command Structure



Allied Command Transformation



NATO Schools aimed at forming the Commands at various levels in a "NATO perspective". They include the NATO Defense College – NDC (Rome), the NATO Communications and Information Systems School – NCISS (Latina, Italy) and the NATO School – NS (Oberammergau, Germany).

NATO Undersea Research Centre – NURC (La Spezia, Italy) tasked with research and development of the Alliance's capabilities in an underwater environment.

The growing importance that ACT is going to acquire in the future is due to the fact that the Command for transformation is going to influence the decisions of the member Countries concerning military policy, with very important repercussions in the sectors of doctrine, training and procurement of materials.

Allied Command Operations

The Allied Command for Operations (ACO) has its HQ (SHAPE) (14) at Mons (Belgium), and is commanded by SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) (15), a "double hat" Commander of the American forces in Europe (USEUCOM) (16). The Command's complete reorganization comes up to its new and wider geographic responsibilities.


The ACO Commander (SACEUR) performs

command activities on the three new operational HQs at second level of command, which become responsible for the direction of the operations of the Alliance from their HQs, or constitute a CJTF (17). There are two joint Commands located respectively in Brunsum, The Netherlands) – JFC (18) Brunsum, and in Naples, Italy – JFC Naples, for the constitution of a land-based CJTF, and a Command located in Lisbon (Portugal) – JHQ Lisbon, which is focussed on the Command of a CJTF from a naval platform (sea-based CJTF). Every joint Command must also be able to constitute, by turns, a DJTF HQ (19) within the NATO Response Force – NRF. As concerns the operations under way, JFC Brunsum exercises Command and Control of the ISAF mission (20) in Afghanistan and JFC Naples commands the NATO operations in the Balkans.

The principle of functionality is moreover extended to six "Component Commands" of ACO which are on the third level of Command, two each for air, land and naval forces, respectively in Izmir (Turkey), Ramstein (Germany), Madrid (Spain), Heidelberg (Germany), Naples (Italy) and Northwood (U.K.).

These Commands supply a flexible command capability, in a position to operate in many different operational environments.

Allied Command Operations



Forces Structure

In July 2001 the NATO Authorities defined the parameters and principles of a new structure of the forces (NATO Force Structure - NFS) aimed at acquiring multinational forces with their respective Commands. In view of this, NATO decided to abandon the traditional "mission oriented" structure in favour of a "capability oriented" instrument, made up of capability packages of flexible, modular, highly projectable forces that could perfectly integrate in a joint and multinational environment. The NFS has a goal at tactical-level and allows NATO to equip itself with additional component Command and Control capabilities for missions also outside the territory of the Alliance, on the grounds of the experiences made by ARCC (21) in Kosovo in 1999.

The revision of the structure has led to establish a series of "national framework" Commands of graduated readiness, i.e. the Graduated Readiness Force HQs (GRF HQ) permanently assigned to NATO:

- Six NATO High Readiness Force (HRF) (Land) HQ, with readiness between 0 and 90 days, at Corps level, called NATO Rapid Deployable Corps HQ, among which the NRDC-ITA of Solbiate Olona.
- One Corps HQ (Force d'Action Terrestre) offered to NATO by France and at the same level of a NATO HRF (L).
- Three Forces at Lower Readiness HQs (FLR (L) HQ), with readiness between 91 and 180 days, at Corps level.
- Three High Readiness Naval Forces - HRF (M) HQ, in charge of naval operations, one of which offered by Italy.


The structure of the forces is moreover complemented by an integrated component consisting of six "Combined Air Operation Centers - CAOC, 2 of which projectable DCAOCs, in charge of air operations, one of which offered by Italy.

NATO Response Force (NRF)

Besides the reorganization of the Commands at various levels, the revision of the structure of the NATO forces includes also the constitution of the NRF.

It is a high-readiness force, equipped with technologically advanced means, consisting of land, air and naval components and of special forces made available, by turns, by the Armies of the member Countries.

Once it achieves its Full Operational Capability (FOC) during 2006, the NRF will consist of about



THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.

Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 (27) For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (28), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7 This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8 Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9 The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11 This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (29)

Article 12 After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13 After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14 This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

25,000 men and be able to start its deployment five days after the order and will be able to keep up the operations for thirty days, with the possibility of extending the duration with adequate logistic supplies.

The NRF represents NATO's main, readily employable instrument for facing possible crises in any area of the globe, and has been studied also as pilot project

that will have to lead the future process of transformation of the Alliance's military instrument.

THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

The transformation of NATO is implemented, coordinated and harmonized by the Allied

Command Transformation through a continuous and pro-active process of development and integration of the innovative concepts, doctrines and capabilities aimed at incrementing the interoperability and effectiveness of the forces at NATO's disposal. The main concepts under study are directed at ensuring the Alliance the capability of meeting the new threats on the whole range of operations with speed, agility, precision and flexibility, and refer chiefly to the development of the capabilities of the "Effect Based Approach to Operations (EBAO)".

In practice NATO refers, with an innovative character, to the "Broad Approach to Security" envisaged by the Strategic Concept and reaffirmed both on the occasion of the Prague Summit and at the Istanbul Summit (2004). The concept affirms the necessity of carrying out a series of actions, coordinated and performed by various actors (also non-military), meant to influence the will of the adversary. The application of this concept and of the ensuing capabilities favours the interservice integration through a system of planning, according to the NATO principle "Network Enabled Capability (NNEC)" (22).

The transformation of the military organization of the Alliance will have to meet many challenges before it becomes effective, especially for what concerns the sufficiency of the resources and the cultural approach to the mentioned principles. The ACT, within the "Force Planning Process", has already started to involve the Countries in this process, employing the NFR as catalyst of the Transformation.

THE NATO-EU RELATIONS

The fall of the Soviet Bloc had undermined the *raison d'être* of the Alliance, increasing at the same time Europe's awareness of the necessity to equip itself with its own security and defence capability. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and its military instrument, NATO has remained a point of reference for the defence of the European borders, sanctioned by art.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but has also sustained the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) (23).

After signing the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the European Union has decided to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and plan the possible development of a common defence capability. The fundamental stage which sanctions the beginning of mutual collaboration and the full support of the Alliance to a European Security and Defence Identity is represented by the decisions taken by the Atlantic Council of Berlin in 1996. The accord has endorsed the constitution of a

European pillar within NATO, adopting the principle of common military capabilities "separable but not separate", employable in EU-led operations and in the whole range of the possible missions of the European Union (Petersberg missions) (24).

Nevertheless, the development of the international situation has entailed that NATO and the European Union make a revision of the agreements reached in Berlin in 1996 (Berlin plus Arrangements). In particular, the European Union has acquired its own permanent politico-military structure aimed at ensuring the political control and the strategic management of the crises and, at the same time, has laid the foundations for the revision of the NATO defence planning process, according to the new requirements of the Union.

With respect for the operational requirements of NATO and its command structure the Union has adopted a package of provisions aimed at:

- Guaranteeing the access of the European Union to the NATO planning capabilities, for planning EU-led operations.
- Pre-designating packages of NATO forces, to be employed in EU-led operations.
- Finding the EU Command options for the abovesaid operations.

Thanks to the abovesaid agreement the Union can have access to the logistic and planning resources of the Atlantic Alliance, also for what concerns military information.


Moreover, in order to warrant full reciprocity and transparency of the flows of information between the two organizations, a NATO liaison cell has been activated within the EU Military Staff, a group of the EU (EUSG - EU Staff Group) at SHAPE.

Today we have achieved the stage of joint planning of the NATO predetermined assets that the EU can employ in its operations, the NATO-EU relations have shown their effectiveness on the occasion of the missions carried out in FYROM (25) with Operation Concordia and, at present, in Bosnia with Operation Althea, to which also Italy has given its contribution. In particular, for the mentioned operations, it should be underlined that, according to the "Berlin Plus" agreements, the "NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) holds the office of Operation's Commander.

CONCLUSIONS

Fifty-seven years after its constitution, NATO represents more than a defensive alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual freedom and legality envisaged by the North Atlantic Treaty. The taking on of new tasks, the

HIGH READINESS FORCES (LAND) HQs



"Transparent Partnership" with the EU, the process of enlargement to the new Countries and the internal adaptation continue to guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Within the Alliance of 26 Countries, consent and cooperation are still the keystones sanctioned by the Washington Treaty.

The constant balancing process between the European and the North American interests and, more in general, the interests of all member Countries, makes NATO an organization able to evolve and adjust to the strategic changes. The adversaries of the Cold War period are now partners in the NATO-Russia Council (NCR) for the struggle against terrorism, confirming the validity of the agreements reached in Rome in 2002.

The new threats have shattered the old concepts of security. Unlike the Cold War, which required the preparation of contingency plans for the defence of the territory defined by art. 4 of the Treaty, the defence against the terrorist organizations takes on a wider dimension that, as matter of fact, implies the inadequacy of the "In and Out of Area" border line. During the last summit of the NATO Foreign Ministers (December 8, 2005), the Secretary General himself has highlighted the global dimension of the accomplishments of the organization, which, through the "Mediterranean Dialogue", are now extending from the North

African Countries as far as Pakistan, with the employment of the NRF in humanitarian missions that assist the populations hit by the earthquake (26); or the training of the military in Iraq, as well as the logistic support of the African Union mission in Sudan. Moreover, there is also been the decision to extend the mission in Afghanistan to the southern part of the Country, increasing the number of personnel presently engaged there.

The current year will be fundamental for the NATO process of politico-military transformation. During the summit that will take place in Riga (Latvia) on the coming 28-29 November, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance will decide the objectives that will have to be achieved within the year 2008, as regards the new role, a new Command structure and a new process of enlargement. Are we approaching the politico-military results reached in Washington in 1999 or in Prague in 2002?

NATO's success is the sum of the will and capability of each Country to make the necessary changes and allocate adequate resources in order to give effectiveness to the current process of transformation. In this regard, the Italian Army continues to grant concreteness to the Atlantic Alliance, in accordance with the strategic concept of the Defence Chief of Staff, offering an adequate number of Commands and units to force planning,

operational missions and to the NRF, indispensable instrument that acts as catalyst for focussing and promoting the capability changes of the organization. The NRDC-ITA Command at Solbiate Olona, is an example of the commitment that our Army has taken in the Alliance and for the Alliance. From the aspiration of the early 2000s, the Army has moved forward to the concreteness of the commitments honoured by the Corps Command, protagonist in 2004 as head of the land component of NRF 3, and in 2005 as HQ of Operation ISAF VIII, commitments that place Italy among the main force contributors of NATO.

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NOTES

(1) Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

(2) In order to create a climate of détente with the Countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc, through the adoption of a series of measures aimed at a more precise definition of the borders and the complex situation of Berlin.

(3) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe sanctioned some new norms on human rights, frontiers inviolability, peaceful settlement of disputes and cooperation among States.

(4) The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFF) was signed in Paris in 1990 and came into force in 1992. It is a juridical agreement that was negotiated on the basis of the purposes and aims of CSCE. It was stipulated by 30 European Countries, the U.S. and Canada, and envisaged a substantial reduction in offensive air-land armaments and the mutual verification of the retrenchments through inspections and controls. The area of application of the Treaty is the European Continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, and includes the neighbouring islands belonging to the various States, as well as a large area of Asian Turkey.

(5) ACE: Allied Command Europe.

(6) DCI was adopted on the occasion of the Washington Summit of 1999. It is an initiative aimed at strengthening the "European pillar" of the Alliance with the modernization of its operational capabilities through the improvement/increase of its capabilities in the sectors of mobility and projectability, logistic sustainability, engagement capability, survivability of forces and infrastructure, Command and Control.

(7) The most important are: nuclear, chemical, radiological and bacteriological defence, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, C3 (Command, Control and Communication), strategic transport, complete projectability and sustainability of the force packages.

(8) The term "expeditionary" synthesizes the capability that the military instruments have to be projected also at great distances from their permanent quarters for conducting long-term operations.

(9) White Book 2002 - Ministry of Defence. Part I, chap.1, paragraph 1, subparagraph 3.

(10) SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

(11) SACLANT: Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

(12) ACO: Allied Command Operation.

(13) ACT: Allied Command Transformation.

(14) SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

(15) SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

(16) USEUCOM: United States European Commander.

(17) The CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) concept has been acknowledged by NATO during the Brussels Summit (January 1994). It is a multinational joint Task Force HQ (generated by a parent standing HQ) organized for a specific mission. The concept has been experimented during Exercise "Allied Effort 1997" and "Strong Resolve" in 1998. It has reached its complete implementation in 1999. The following process of acquisition of the specific CIS and control capabilities for the exercise of Command and Control has been validated at the end of 2004.

(18) JFC: Joint Force Command.

(19) DJTF HQ: Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(20) ISAF: International Security Assistance Force.

(21) Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.

(22) These concepts will be described in detail in a coming article.

(23) ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity.

(24) The Petersberg missions have been established in June 1992 during the council of ministers of the Western European Union (WEU). Besides the contribution to collective defence, implementing art.5 of the Washington Treaty and art.5 (modified) of the Brussels Treaty, the military units of the WEU member States can be employed in humanitarian or evacuation missions, peacekeeping missions, combat mission for crisis management, including peace enforcing missions.

(25) FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

(26) The Italian Army has contributed to this mission by sending a task force taken from the Engineer Brigade.

(27) Modified by art.2 of the Protocol of participation of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty (October 22, 1951).

(28) On January 16, 1963 the Atlantic Council acknowledged that all the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty concerning the former French Departments of Algeria were no more in force as from July 3, 1962.

(29) The Treaty came into force on August 24, 1949, after the signatory States had deposited their ratification instruments.





ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

On the brink of the abyss

The region has been blighted for more than seven years by a bloody civil war that caused the death of hundreds of thousands of people. In the last months, the tension has increased so much that there is a well-founded fear that an armed clash can spread like wildfire involving other Countries. The negotiations started by the United Nations the and African Union and the intervention of a multinational Contingent have come to nothing. Because of continuous obstacles to its mandate, the UN has decided to withdraw.

The demarcation of borders is a source of great contention and the root cause of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia broken out in May 1998. The UN offered its help for a pacific resolution of the controversy.

In particular, Kofi Annan asked Algerian ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, his special envoy in Africa, to support the action of mediation of the African Union (OAU). It was in Algiers, in July 1999, on the occasion of one of the numerous summits arranged by this organization, that a first step was taken towards normalization. The two Countries signed a document, denominated «*Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement*», with which Eritrea made a commitment «to reorganize the positioning of its troops outside the territories it had occupied after May 6th 1998».

Ethiopia, in the same way, promised «to reorganize its forces» according to the agreements reached before the situation had come to a head. Subsequently, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a new document «*Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities*», which provided for the institution of a neutral Committee in order to define exactly the borders between the two Countries and form a group of military observers who had to control the withdrawal of the Forces. In addition, the document also provided for the demilitarization of the border. While Eritrea accepted the document, Ethiopia expressed some reservations.

The tension along the border was rather high despite international mediations. The major risk was the renewal of hostilities and the involvement of the civil population.

Fighting broke out again in May 2000. On the

same day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1297, which expressed «concern of the renewal of hostilities», highlighting the serious consequences that would follow especially for the civil population and inviting both sides «to urgently reach a ceasefire agreement» and take again the road to negotiation.


Another resolution (1298) was adopted on May 17th and imposed sanctions in order to prevent the two Countries from receiving arm supplies. As we can read in the text of the resolution – all the States had to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea from

Title pages.

A moment of everyday life in an Eritrean village.

Below

Eritrea and its borders.



being provided with weapons, munitions, military vehicles, equipment and any technical help relating to the manufacture and use of weapons.

The conflict and tension among the two Countries caused devastating consequences. In March 2000, just two years after the tension had increased, the total death count was more than 370 thousand Eritreans, and more than 350 thousand Ethiopians.

In some regions of Ethiopia, the situation became complicated also because of a severe drought that affected the Country killing more than 8 million people. Immediately, the UN General Secretary took appropriate measures and announced a task force would be dispatched to deal with the food shortage. The FAO was entrusted with handling the situation, in particular providing drinkable water, food and basic medicine.

THE SIGNATURE OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

After two years of violent armed clashes, finally the two States signed a peace agreement in June 2000. Thanks to the negotiations conducted by Algeria and the African Union Organization, the document called for a ceasefire.

It was an important political and diplomatic step towards normalization. Furthermore, the Algiers peace agreement provided for the creation of a «neutral committee», which had to watch over the border, and for the establishment of «a neutral committee to oversee the disputed territories», which had to make a decision about the claims from the two sides. In June 2000, with Resolution 1312, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) composed of 100 military observers and a civil staff in support, which would be increased in the following years. The peace progress has made a lot of progress here, but we cannot talk about a completely stable region yet.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The tension has become worse since last October. The internal situation of Ethiopia has increased the level of alarm. There have been indiscriminate arrests, soldiers who shoot on sight, night round-ups and summary executions for a long time. Currently, the tension is high. An internal social protest has caused lots of difficulties for the Government. In addition, new tensions with Eritrea have risen. The two States have entered the difficult phase of troop

movements. But these movements, according to the African Union, «could degenerate into a military conflict with possible wider implications which could hit not only the two Countries but the whole region». This is a pessimistic scenario and a difficult situation to cope with, even for the international community. For this reason, the pan-African organization asked the two governments to «exercise a total control in order to avoid any action that can have negative effects or exacerbate the current situation». There is a real fear that the bloody war of the period 1998–2000 will erupt again. In Ethiopia, the internal crisis has been dragging on since last spring and it has become worse after the legislative elections of May when the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) confirmed its position as leader surpassing the CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy). Because of electoral fraud, the election has been defined by the European Union as «not conform to international standards and marked by a lot of human rights abuses». Recently, the special envoy of the United Nations Security, the Japanese Kenzo Oshima, has been entrusted with assessing renewed tensions over the border.

Last December was a crucial month. Eritrea increased the number of troops garrisoned in the border, adding other two Divisions (about 12 thousand soldiers) to the five Divisions already present at the frontier. However, the decision to expel American, Russian, Canadian and European peacekeepers from the territory had major repercussions.

Kofi Annan accused the Asmara Government to contravene, in this way, the principle sanctioned by the institutive Charter according to which the UN workers had to be considered as generic «international subjects» and not as workers coming from specific States. Therefore, the UN Secretary General invited Asmara to withdraw the ultimatum concerning the expulsion immediately. On the 29th, the Court of The Hague passed judgement on the suit brought by Addis Ababa, accusing them of being responsible for the outbreak of the 1998–2000 war.

The Court supported the thesis and declared Eritrea «responsible for the abuse, injury and killing of innocent civilians, as well as for the destruction of lots of property inside the occupied territories and for huge economic losses». The government of Addis Ababa was also found guilty of contravening the Convention for the treatment of agents and diplomatic seats (it was held responsible for gross violations of territorial immunities entering by force the embassies

and requisitioning documents, for the destruction of the personnel's houses and for the expulsion of the Delegation in 1998).

THE UNMEE MISSION

It was a peacekeeping mission aimed at checking the realization of the peace agreement signed in Algiers in June 2000. With Resolution 1320 of September 15th 2000 the maximum executive organ in New York decided to raise the number of the components of the mission to 4200 soldiers, divided into three infantry battalions. At first, the UNMEE was expected to be relatively brief because it had to finish, except for possible extensions, by March 31st 2001. Joseph Legwaila of Botswana was placed in command of the mission, while a Dutch man, Major General Patrick C. Cammaert was placed in command of the Forces. Troops, civilian and medical personnel and technicians were recruited in: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, India, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Holland, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Rumania,

Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Tanzania, Uruguay and Zambia.

The mission was divided into three phases. Initially, 2 officers had to be sent to Addis Ababa and 2 to Asmara to assess the feasibility of the mission; subsequently, military observers had to swing into action to clear the ground from mines, activate communications and coordinate the activities of the organization, preparing the third phase with the arrival of 4200 soldiers, among which there were 200 observers.

The first representative mission of the UN and OAU started on July 4th and, in a couple of weeks, completed its assignment. The talks with the Countries who are at war with each other turned out to be positive and the United Nations decided to start the second phase.

THE MANDATE

The mission aimed at checking the observance of the ceasefire and the demarcation of the bor-

A typical village of the region.



ders between Ethiopia and Eritrea to maintain a link between the Countries in conflict with each other; to visit the commands and military sites in the whole area of operation, as required by the General Secretary; to establish and follow the procedure for the verification of the ceasefire; to establish the *Military Coordination Commission* provided for by the peace agreement. Another assignment was to provide assistance during the long process of normalization. In the meantime, Eritrea and Ethiopia continued the negotiations to reach a solid peace. They signed a new document, the «*Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea*», which had been stipulated in December 2000.

The military contingent of the UNMEE operates within the UN mission, in observance of the rules of engagement established by the United Nations, as provided for by Chapter VII of the Charter that authorizes, if necessary, the use of force in self-defence. Particularly, as far as the UNMEE is concerned, the use of force is allowed to assure the respect of the peace agreements and guarantee the security conditions and freedom of manoeuvre of the Contingent.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Asmara Government put insistent pressure on the UNMEE mission in the last months and this created lots of problems. The UN Security Council decided to «station temporary» the western personnel of the mission in Addis Ababa. The peacekeepers finally retreated from the territory on December 14th 2005. Actually, difficulties had already arisen when Asmara decided to put a ban on helicopter flights over the buffer zone. For this reason during the peacekeeping operation the military capacity was reduced by 60%. In fact, Kofi Annan had announced that there would be difficulties: «The UN helicopters are forbidden to fly over the territory and this provision stops the military operations. Unless the situation improves, we will have to take a crucial decision since it is pointless to stay there if we cannot operate».

Without any helicopters, in fact, not only the security conditions, but also the possibilities of providing help, were substantially reduced to the minimum.

Because of the ban on helicopter flights, the United Nations had already decided to close 18 out of 40 check-points within the buffer zone and to suspend the mine clearance along the border.

The difficult situation worsened even further because of big obstacles posed by the Asmara Government. According to the United Nations it

was practically impossible for the peacekeepers to perform their tasks along the border. After a while, the withdrawal was the inevitable consequence of this situation.

THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT IN ERITREA

The Italian military forces were deployed in Eritrea in November 2000. It was the start of the third phase of the mission. At first, the Contingent consisted of a unit of the Air Force, whose base was in Asmara, and a unit of the Carabinieri, helped by military observers.

In total, the Air Force deployed about 160 men who had to assure the air transport of personnel and supplies, air reconnaissance along the border, photographic monitoring, needed for the demarcation of the borders, and emergency aeromedical evacuation.

The Carabinieri of the 1st «Tuscania» Paratroop Regiment performed tasks of military police. Since December 2002, the Italian contingent had been reduced at first to the department of the Carabinieri, then, in July 2005, to just 25 men.

Currently, exactly like the whole United Nations mission, also our soldiers have been forced to withdraw.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CARABINIERI

Our soldiers came home a few months ago. They returned to Italy before the UNMEE mission had been completed, because they were working in conditions of extreme danger. However, the Carabinieri had performed their tasks in a very satisfactory way.


In a peacekeeping operation it is easy to run into difficulties. These kinds of operations are defined as «peace operations», but anyway they are always carried out in areas of conflict.

The activities which are related to the peacekeeping are not considered as military activities any more.

They cover a wide range of civil activities, from the humanitarian assistance to the distribution of groceries, from the safeguard of human rights to the restoration of administrative structures and institutional activities. However, this happens in a theatre of constant unresolved conflict. This is the reason why the military contingent should have the opportunity to undertake also, and above all, military operations.

Serena Sartini
Journalist





THE CENTURY OF BLACK GOLD

THE CENTURY OF BLACK GOLD

It entered history in 1859, and progressively became the undisputed protagonist of the 1900's. Its low cost and reliability of use and transportation made petroleum the key factor of world wide economic development in the last century. It is also a dangerous focal point of political and military tension and turbulence.

Whether a primary, indispensable material for industry, a gamble for the superpowers, or an instrument of pressure, precious Black Gold has left its imprinting on the twentieth century.

Petroleum (1) and its natural derivatives (tar, diesel oil, asphalt) (2) known also in antiquity, became useful for many different purposes. The Greek geographer Stradone, living during the early Christian era, recalled that the Babylonians had the habit of burning liquid asphalt in their lamps to produce light. The Assyrians used it to light their torches. In Egypt tar was used for embalming. In Rome, on the other hand, it was attributed with miraculous therapeutic virtues. In fact, as affirmed by Pliny the Elder, in the first century after Christ, this product was particularly well adapted at curing rheumatism, asthma and epilepsy.

Later on, diesel oil was used in the composition Greek Fire, whose composition remained a secret for many centuries and is said to have saved Byzantium from barbarian assaults.

That which would later become Black Gold no longer had a universal purpose. People were unaware that it could be found in the depths of the earth in enormous deposits both in liquid and gas forms. Therefore, only that available in superficial stratum was utilized. Not until the second half of the 18th century did a naturalist observe that drilling caused the leakage of a flammable substance and the flame became livelier the deeper you drilled.

1859-1901, THE DISCOVERY OF A MIRACULOUS PRODUCT

Petroleum truly entered history a century later on August 27th, 1859, when the precious liquid emerged in Titusville, a small city in the south of Pennsylvania. The discoverers were: George Bissel, a jurist from New York, James Townsend, a banker from New Haven, Benjamin Sillman, a professor from Yale, and Edward Drake, called Colonel Drake, an adventurer

originally from Vermont, who was the driving element and "do all" of the business.

All four were convinced that the mysterious fuel that came to the surface and was craftily collected would be useful for illumination if enough of it was produced. With Rock Oil Company's first drilling, industrial utilization of petroleum became a reality. From that moment on, oil lamps substituted wax candles before eventually being beat out by electric lights in their time.

For thirty years or so the oil boom was based essentially on production for lighting. A speculative fever, accompanied by a race for produc-

Title pages.

A plant for oil refining.

Below.

An oil platform.



tion as well as transportation, swept across the United States. In the 1870's, just 11 years after the drilling of the well in Titusville, Standard Oil Company was founded by John D. Rockefeller.

In 1882, after difficult battles waged against its competitors and the large railway companies, Standard Oil was organized into a Trust: a cartel with firms involved in all sectors. This Trust dominated the entire American oil business thanks to its transportation companies and its 39 oil refineries.

It was not until 1915, after an initial decision in 1911, that the Supreme Court, applying the Sherman Antitrust Law of 1890 regarding liberal business competition, would establish a fragmentation of the Rockefeller Empire into about 30 subsidiaries.

Between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, adjustments to the combustion engine (3) caused a decisive acceleration in the development of the oil industry. The automobile industry began its dizzying growth and soon the diesel (4) engine would permit the propulsion of heavy transport and shipping. In this way, the hydrocarbon market witnessed an incredible expansion and not only in North America.

At that time, the Americans were no longer the only competitors in this grand affair. Certainly the United States had advantages at their disposal which the others did not: the vastness of the country, strong demographic growth fed by continuous immigration bringing a fresh and docile work force, and the flexibility and dynamism of American capitalism.

The United States also had huge reserves at their disposal that were easily extractable and dispersed over a vast portion of the country. We have already noted the reserves that came from Pennsylvania. Others came from Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Louisiana, Indiana, and even California. It would not be until 1961 that the gigantic reserves in Texas would be added to the list.

1901-1918, A STRATEGIC BET

During the 10 or 11 years preceding the First World War, the European powers began to seriously interest themselves in this precious fuel. The Rothschilds (British) were in competition with the Nobels (Swedish) for control of the rich reserves in Daku, Azerbaijan, in Russia. Marcus Samuel's British Shell and Deterding's Royal Dutch became direct rivals to Standard Oil focusing their activities towards southeast Asia (Borneo, Sumatra) and towards the Far East,

before their merger in 1907. The Armenian businessman, Caluste Sarkis Gulbenkian, who became a British subject in 1902, interested himself in the exploitation of the reserves in the region of Mossul in Iraqi Kurdistan.

World oil production, which in 1861 was represented exclusively by that in Pennsylvania, passed from 100 thousand tons in 1862, to 4 million tons in 1880, to 21 million tons in 1900, to 44 million tons in 1910, and finally reaching 50 million tons in 1913. At that time The United States produced about two thirds of the total amount, followed by Russia (10 million tons in 1900) Mexico, Venezuela, Romania, India, Argentina, and Peru.

Persia followed far behind. Meanwhile, the yearnings of the powerful were focused on the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire where geologists and speculators had already foreseen the enormous energy potential hidden in the subsoil.

Except for The United States, the number one producer and consumer of oil, other industrialized nations were restricted to resorting on foreign refineries to confront their needs. Therefore, coal consumption continued to clearly maintain first place.

The acquisition of oil grew to an equal level with the extraordinary development of the automobile industry, aviation, maritime navigation, domestic heating, and beginning in 1920, the petrochemical industry.

In this way, the 20th century was initiated with the struggle by the superpowers to access petroleum reserves. Governments entered the scene behind investment groups and large corporations. The British, French, and Germans sought to organize themselves in the Middle East in view of the future exploitation of the mineral wealth of Ottoman Mesopotamia.

In 1903, the concession to a German company of a construction project to build a rail line from Constantinople to Baghdad (called BBB Line: Berlin, Byzantium, Baghdad (was accompanied by the 80 year rights of exploitation of Iraqi soil for a distance of 20 kilometers on either side of the rail). In 1914, the railway also connected Mossul. Meanwhile, the British had for some time begun their counter measures. In 1909, The Anglo-Persian Oil Company gained control of Iranian crude oil and three years later the government had to accept the sublime way under pressure from the Foreign Office.

This investment deal assured the British control of 75 percent of the capital of the Turkish Petroleum Company. In this way the British were able to neutralize not only the Germans, but the Americans as well, who had, by means of

Standard Oil, proposed to the Ottomans a loan and participation in the benefits in exchange for exclusive rights to the exploitation of the empire's oil.

The First World War produced an increased need for oil. Gas and diesel engines had, by now, demonstrated their superiority as means of traction. The new armies, naval fleets and air forces became the grand consumers of gas, diesel and kerosene and the needs grew with the increased losses. The first tanks, the Mark I, used by the British in 1916 at Somme, were the tangible example of the beginning of the mechanization and modernization of war.

Nonetheless, it came to be paid for with an enormous cost in human life. In the same way, on the seas, where in 1917 the Germans provoked all out submarine war, the 185 u-boats sunk, the 800 thousand tons of naval ships torpedoed and the 10 million tons of mercantile shipping sunk to the bottom in a few months time represented yet another ponderous tribute to modernity.

In every weapons sector, even in the skies with the impressive development of military aviation, oil imposed its law. From a few dozen aircraft at the beginning of the war, the air fleet of the Allies reached 7 million units in November of 1918.

Even politicians of the era began to comprehend the importance of black gold in so much as Clemenceau wrote to President Woodrow Wilson that "gas will be important as the blood of war tomorrow."

WWI demonstrated that petroleum was already an element of strategic importance and that controlling the production zones of black gold was as important of controlling coal reserves, especially for the powers which did not possess their own reserves.

He pole position becomes even more important the moment we realize that post war consumption not only did not stabilize but underwent a robust, new upturn due to industrial development, especially in the automobile, aeronautical, and petrochemical industries. In the end, one discovers a grand truism of modern economies, which is that, petroleum equals development.

1918-1945, THE MOMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN

Among the many consequences of WWI was that of putting three principal European powers out of play: Germany and Russia temporarily, and Austria-Hungary in a definitive way. After the war in Europe the chess game for control of

Middle Eastern refinery wealth was played primarily between Britain and France. In March, 1916, the Anglo-French Treaty Sykes-Picot provided for the partition of a part of the spoils from the Ottoman Empire, that is, all of the area which extends north of the Sinai-Persian Gulf alignment to the south of Anatolia. Based on this agreement, Mossul went to the French. The province was rich in oil but at that time the French did not realize the true potential. The British however, perhaps better realizing the extent of the resources hidden in the soil, in 1918 convinced the French to exchange the province of Mossul for the Syrian mandate. In this way the British gained control of all of Iraq including all of its petroleum.

Thanks to the participation of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Royal Dutch Shell in the Turkish Petroleum Company, London controlled the entire area and to politically consolidate its position, Britain offered one quarter of its capital to American and French companies.

Godfathers of the game in Iraq and Persia, the British were forced to align themselves with the Americans. Standard Oil of California, Gulf Oil Corporation (Mellon Group), Texas Oil and others launched themselves headlong in the region to enlarge their market. Beginning in 1920, the Americans adapted a policy of concession hunting for refineries in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates.

The economic risk was huge and the worry was testified to with the words of the President of Standard Oil, "that which we are acquiring is an enormous mass of sand, heat, mosques and ... hope, but history will show that the endeavor will be crowned a success."

On the eve of the Second World War, The United States was by far the number one oil power of the world. With a consumption of more than 160 million tons, they still controlled 60 percent of world production, to which an additional 12 percent extracted by American companies around the world should be added.

The most important, Standard Oil of New Jersey, the principle inheritor of the dissolved trust, produced 41 million tons alone, said to value 15 percent of total world production. It refined 150 million tons of crude oil daily, possessed 8 thousand kilometers of oil pipeline and a fleet of 200 tankers. Opposite this giant was Royal Dutch Shell, which was still flying the flag of old, Europe and was the only rival to the powerful American companies. Royal Dutch Shell had a production of 30 million tons and a fleet of 300 ships. Within this multinational, directed by Deterding and Gulbenkian, Great Britain had about 30 companies. At the moment of the explosion of the

Second World War, petroleum had become an important source of energy and a primary material. By that time, 45 million cars were in circulation, more than half of the entire mercantile fleet that moved with combustible oil or diesel engines. Consumption of the combustible liquid was rapidly growing. Meanwhile, the petrochemical industry was producing coloring, plastics, rubber, synthetics and clothing on a large scale.

The Spanish Civil War demonstrated the role of armored vehicles and aviation in combat, conditional of course, on the possession of sufficient reserves of fuel. In the new context of world war, which began in 1939, Germany, Japan, and Italy were the most disfavored. To confront their shortage of fuel, the Third Reich, which had built modest reserves of fuel during the last years of peace, had no other way than to apply the technique of Lightning War.

This system was designed to rapidly obtain success or control of production zones (looking towards Romania and successively the failed attempt for the Caucasus). In a few words, petroleum and its availability determined the adopted strategy. In Poland, France and the Balkans, Blitzkrieg allowed the Germans to obtain important successes and to take possession of the important reserves at Ploesti, Romania. This allowed them to maintain the conflict for some time. The next objective would be the Caucasus, but against Russia they did not have the same success. Actually, within the Russian offensive, the assault by German armored divisions encountered their special-time limits.

These limits were re-supplying fuel and the climate (at -30 degrees gas freezes in the tank). The change in the German strategic objective from Moscow to Caucasus, to arrive from the north to the immense petroleum reserves of the Caspian, and therefore the Middle East, would be a vain hope definitively faded with the surrender of Von Paulus at Stalingrad.

The Axis troops relived the same tribulations in North Africa where Rommel had to halt his advance towards Alexandria because of the chronic shortage of fuel, among other things. In the resulting retreat, followed by Montgomery's assault of 1942, many motorized vehicles were initially capable of conducting simple tactical maneuvers before being completely blocked in the desert.

The Allies evidently did not suffer the same problems but, all the same, had to maintain the flow of fuel to where it was needed. On the seas it recurred, as in WWI, a conflict between naval escorts and the German submarine wolf packs. Also in this conflict, the Allies would have the last word but with considerable losses.

1946-1960, THE COLD WAR AND THE MIDDLE EAST

WWII was certainly not, like WWI, a war for oil. It did, however accentuate that black gold had strongly conditioned the results of the conflict. It is certainly no surprise that during the conflict in the period after 1946 The United States and the Soviet Union (the primary producers and consumers of oil) positioned themselves for control of principle production zones.

In Iran (third largest producer since the end of 1940) the British held, since the beginning of the century, a near monopoly on the exploitation of oil. During the war the Russians, who had entered the northern provinces, imposed on Teheran in April, 1946, the creation of a combined petroleum company of which the Russians had 51 percent control. The Iranians, with American and British help, fomented revolts and, in the end, achieved an annulment of the agreement.

In 1951, the government of Doctor Mossadek, head of the Nationalist Front, with a unanimous parliamentary vote, nationalized the property of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

But the British reacted by going to the United Nations Security Council and Churchill threatening direct military intervention. Then the tension seemed to decrease. In fact a popular revolt, well prepared and conducted by the CIA in 1953, collapsed Mossadek's government. Mossadek was imprisoned and hanged. In this way the Westerners validated their own rights, at an actual price, of a compromise that ended, in every case, the monopoly of the British companies.

The National Petroleum Company of Iran found itself ceding its property of reserves and refineries over to an international consortium. This consortium was granted 25-year rights of exploitation and refinement of crude oil.

Within the consortium, the Americans, with Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf, and Texaco, obtained 40 percent.

In Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates (where the first prospective wells were drilled in 1930) American influence was developed in a subtler manner in comparison to the European companies, especially the British.

In this zone the Trojan horse was called Aramco (Arab American Oil Company) and contained in its innards the cream of the American oil-producing galaxy (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Texaco and Socony). These companies presented an immense challenge to the prospecting and exploitation of the Arab world's oil reserves. Thousands of kilometers of oil-pipe lines were

built and ports were constructed to be utilized by gigantic tankers.

The results materialized in an explosion of the Arab Middle East's oil production (53 million tons in 1950, 500 million in 1970).

In 1956 the Suez Crisis, other than the direct effects on the oil market caused by attacks on the oil pipelines of Iraq Petroleum and the closing of the canal, clarified the decline of European influence in the Middle East. France and Great Britain had both ceased to play the game in the region to the benefit of the world's two superpowers, in particular The United States. Moreover, the brief shortage of oil in Europe provoked a choice in the transportation system, orienting the specifications of the ship building industry to the production of super oil tankers with a capacity of more than 100 thousand tons.

This was to change the route of traffic, adequately from an economic point of view, towards the Cape of Good Hope.

The industrialized, petroleum-importing nations had, for a long time, based their growth, and therefore their wealth, on the sta-

bility and low prices of oil, imposed by the large companies of producing countries: \$1.20 per barrel of crude oil (about 159 liters) in 1900, \$1.10 in 1914, between \$1.20 and \$1.70 during the acute phase of the Cold War, and less than \$2.00 a barrel at the beginning of the 1960's.

In this period, the oil market came to be controlled by 7 large companies (Majors) (10), the famous "Seven Sisters." These seven, 10 years later, with a business volume of \$67.5 billion and a production of about 1,200 million tons of oil, would still control 60 percent of the market of refined oil.

These proportions were sufficient to lay down the law for exporting nations. What is more is that these nations did not receive even a modest portion of the overall revenues.

To keep oil prices at a relatively low level was doubly favorable to western economic interests. It allowed, especially in Europe, the carrying out of a considerable fiscal gain from the growing use of hydrocarbons and to, contemporarily, finance at a low cost a part of the expenses of the distribution chain. Above all, the use of cheap energy facilitated a dizzying growth of the north of the world; reinvigorating their tex-

A fully operational refinery.



tiles industry, favoring the realization of new technologies, and new business activities. This favorable situation allowed, especially in those more developed societies with greater income distribution and the myth of the automobile, an exceptional capacity of integration and to a lesser degree, "politicization" of the masses.

Basically, the west underwent an economic expansion, which, until the end of the 1960's, seemed limitless. The phenomenon would occur at a cost of a huge squandering of wealth and perhaps a true and real "bleeding" of the producing countries. In so doing, the industrialized world did not know nor want to understand that, by investing everything on hydrocarbons (in 1970 oil represented 71 % of the primary energy consumed versus 30% 20 years earlier) it was tying its hands and, above all, building its future and its prosperity on a fragile base. As long as the relations between consuming nations and exporting nations remained within the context of northern domination of the south, the question of oil dependency did not truly present a problem. On the other hand, it is a political axiom that one is unable to not depend on that which one controls and on that which is controlled by the hegemonic power of the camp to which you belong.

Undoubtedly, Great Britain and France discovered during the Suez Crisis that they no longer had the means to continue the practice of "big gun politics." Nevertheless, western vital interests were no longer a matter of discussion, so it was sufficient that the United States show their authority so that the eventual contestants of the established order would get back, more or less quietly, in line. Mossadek in Iran in 1953, and both Egypt and Syria with the events in Lebanon in 1958, would see that you could not get away with challenging American might.

Ten thousand men landed in Beirut under the protection of a fleet armed with tactical nuclear weapons. It was more than sufficient for the west to continue to not question the future of petroleum supplies. The overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States on the international scene and this undeniable position of force seemed to offer no serious doubts for long.

It was during this period, however, that the contestants in the world economic order of petroleum began to organize themselves, instituted by the suppliers and embodied by agents of the "Seven Sisters," they were supported even by the ideological penetration in the Arab world on the part of the communists.

Following the decision of the "Seven Sisters" to unilaterally reduce the price of crude oil,

which had been practically untouched for half a century, OPEC, The

Organization of Oil Exporting Countries, was born in Baghdad in September, 1960. Its members at that time were Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. Later joining them would be Qatar, Libya, Algeria, Abu Dhabi, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Gabon, for a total of 13 states who, from 1970, controlled 85% of the world's crude oil exports.

1960-1979, OPEC'S STRUGGLE

From the start it was considered essential to coordinate and unify the petroleum politics of the member states in order to ensure the stabilization of prices and to supply a constant income for the producing countries. These were, in any case, the apparent aims of the organization whose treaty was registered with the United Nations in 1962. In the first ten years of its life, OPEC conducted a true and incessant struggle against the companies. They were able, with growing control of reserves and the direct exploitation of oil on the part of producing nations, to not only stabilize the price of crude oil but also to sensibly modify the revenue tax.

The turning point took place at the beginning of 1970 with the 21st Meeting of Caracas. OPEC decided to fix the sales tax on revenues at 55% for agent companies. Despite fierce resistance, the companies were compelled to accept, with the agreements of Teheran in February 1971 and Tripoli in April of the same year, a substantial increase in prices. These automatic revisions set in motion international inflation.

The offensive on the rules of rent and on the prices of crude oil were accompanied with an action intending to assert full sovereignty over their oil reserves. In 1971, the example came from Algeria where Houari Boumedienne decided unilaterally that the country had to rearrange the majority of the French companies operating on their soil and that the oil pipelines and reserves had to begin working for the good of the state. In the following year, 1972, the government of Baghdad nationalized the powerful Iraqi Petroleum Company and then in September, 1973 Colonel Gheddafi announced that Libya would become the owners of 51 % of the companies operating on their soil. Elsewhere, the "Seven Sisters" were able to maintain their control of production, transportation and refining of crude oil even if their contracts were amended or replaced with new types of contracts. Joint Venture contracts still existed which entrusted the exploitation of

existing reserves to financially mixed companies on a generally even basis.

With the Kippur War of 1973, this onslaught of petroleum decolonization assumed a completely particular dimension.

This conflict was accompanied by a decision of remarkable importance for the economic future of the world. On 17 October, 1973, while the outcomes of the war were still unclear, the ministers of six Persian Gulf nations: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar, meeting in Kuwait City, decided unilaterally to increase the price of crude oil by 70%. This was the first step in a race of price increases that in the next two months would quadruple the price per barrel from \$3 to \$11.65.

The day after this decision, with the exception of Iran, but the support of other Arab nations, OPEC decided to use Black Gold as a weapon of war, initiating a reduction in production of 5% for months or until the international community forced Israel to abandon all territories occupied in 1967 and the rights of the Palestinians were reinstated.

On the 28th of October, as soon as the cease fire came into existence, OPEC declared an embargo against the United States, "the protectors of the Jews," and in the following days the same embargo was declared against Holland, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa.

The Kippur War therefore offered Arab exporting nations the occasion to stress the energy debate and to obtain, with a single blow, considerable results.

This decision played a fundamental role in the process of price increases and in a reversal in the strength of relations between exporting countries and the concessionary companies. These relations were already being discussed for some years.

On the other side, if the signals of economic crisis were perceptible from the start of the decade, the decisive measures of Kuwait City suddenly engraved the scale and the gravity of the economic situation that would show its pernicious effects on every state of the planet.

These crises appeared to be a corollary to the deterioration of international relations and a return to the Cold War with the development of peripheral conflicts in Asia, Afghanistan, in East and Central Africa, and even in Central America.

On the whole, even if directly attacked by the oil embargo, which came to an end in March 1974, the United States was practically untouched. It was extremely difficult for an exporting country, even if it wanted to, to control the final destination of its product. In the

western world the United States was, above all, the least vulnerable to the weapon of oil, taking into account that, at that time, only 5-6% of the oil imported by the Americans came from the Gulf region.

The embargo, during its initial phase of price increases, brought more advantages than inconveniences to America.

In reality, the event had contributed to reinforcing the position of the United States within the capitalist world, diminishing the competitiveness of their European and Japanese competitors and causing their Allies to be confronted with the scarcity of the margin of remaining maneuvers.

At the same time, the new situation had even contributed to a consolidation of American influence in the region. This was because the primary beneficiaries of the operation were the "moderate nations," tightly connected to the Majors and therefore to the politics of the United States.

From an economic point of view the price increases reinvigorated the internal production of the United States, which by this time had been slowed by the cost of extraction (Alaska) some 10-20 times more expensive than that of the Middle East. It also permitted research and exploitation of substitute energy sources in a new way: coal, nuclear energy, and sand and oil shale.

On an international level, the first oil crisis and then the second, which came in 1979-80, following the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq/Iran War, had the effect of pushing oil companies and governments to search for solutions to stabilize prices and slow the exhaustion of the world's petroleum reserves.

The two crises, especially the first of 1973-74, but also the second of 1979-80, were needed because as a result the consuming nations adopted economic measures and, above all, developed alternative energies.(13)

The exploitation of new resources (North Atlantic, Mexico, Angola, Alaska), the expropriation of OPEC, and the politics of "to each his own," adopted by many producing nations starting in 1985, did the rest.

1980-2003, THE AMERICAN TRIUMPH

The turbulence of the last quarter of the century contributed to accentuating the absolute, central role oil assumed in the life of the world and the evolution of international relations. In 1975 Soviet intervention in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and



An oil well.

Afghanistan aimed to exert pressure on petroleum shipping routes and therefore on the primary arteries of western supplies. This situation, if successful, would have assured the Soviets, with addition of a highly developed navy, an important winning card in case of an explosion of regional conflicts, but also in the eventuality of a direct conflict with the west.

The U.S.S.R. never had the pleasure of enjoying the benefits of its presence in Persian ports and along the "arc of world crisis," well described in geopolitical texts as; a zone which goes from Indochina to the Cape of Good Hope, across the Horn of Africa and whose control would permit the entanglement of western energy resources from the south.

The Cold War disappeared practically at the same time as communist power. The U.S.S.R., one of the principal producing nations at the start of 1980, with the dissolving of its empire, watched its production fall nearly 50% (from 600-350 million tons). This happened not without a connection to the behavior assumed by Russia in the recent Iraq Crisis and explained by their politics in Chechnya (In Fact there are larger political reasons connected to the cohesion and the subsequent survival of the struc-

ture of what remained of the Soviet Union. Victorious without having to wage a single battle in the field, the Americans found themselves after 1990 in a hegemonic position without a counter-balance who could play; a Russia with its superpower prerogatives reorganized or a China just coming out from an underdeveloped economic position.

Massimo Iacopi
Major General (ret.)

NOTES:

(1) Normally present in soft, porous rocks which maintain in their interior a natural, combustible, mineral oil composed mainly of hydrocarbons.

(2) Diesel, tar/pitch- a clear, yellow liquid produced from the distillation of oil used as fuel and combustible; bitumen- natural, organic material or coming from the distillation of oil, used in public works and construction; asphalt- a blackish mixture of sediment and bitumen, used for paving roads.

(3) Gas engine in which the combustion of gas provides the moving force.

(4) The German Rudolf Deisel invented the diesel engine in 1893. A combustion engine which functions with auto-ignition of the fuel injected into an air chamber and compressed at 800 degrees.

(5) Founder in 1911 of the Turkish Petroleum Company, also called Mr. 5%.

(6) 50% of the capital went to the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company, later AngloIranian Company, and then British Petroleum.

(7) Liquid derivative of oil, obtained from distillation of crude and used as aviation fuel.

(8) In 1929 will become Iraqi Petroleum Company.

(9) Dutch businessman, patron of Shell, later became a supporter of NaziGermany.

(10) The "Seven Sisters": Standard Oil of New Jersey, American; Royal Dutch Shell, British/Dutch; Mobil Oil, American; Texaco, American; Gulf Oil, American; British Petroleum, British; Standard Oil, American.

(11) Fees paid by an oil company to the country of which the product is exploited or a country crossed by a pipeline.

(12) Iraqi troops attacked Iran in September 1980; the conflict lasted until 1988.


(13) While France aimed towards nuclear, Italy decided, under pressure from emotional and political factors, unrelated to rationality or national interests, to renounce the only way out that the present offers to those who do not have oil.



INFANTRY IS STILL QUEEN OF BATTLES

INFANTRY IS STILL QUEEN OF BATTLES

The ancient "Queen of Battles" is still the spearhead of today's strategic and tactical context. But more than in the past, its "head" must be sharp, technologically advanced and polyvalent, and its "spear" and "shaft" much stronger, in order to ensure the highest performance.



An old infantry Officer in the reserve, who served as 2nd Lieutenant at the height of the Cold War, told me that he was particularly impressed, and very proud, when reading a sentence written very visibly on a wall near the entrance of the Infantry School at Cesano: "This is the School of the Infantry, Queen of Battles". The truth of this sentence has never been questioned since the past centuries. Useless to mention the Infantry's role in WWI: the Branch always paid heavily with blood and sacrifices and is the only one deservedly decorated with the Military Order of Savoy. Also at the beginning of WWII, one of the best "naval" (or, better, "navalist") (1) writers of the XX Century, Adm. Giuseppe Fioravanzo, concluded his strategic considerations on the war, then under way, with these words: *"the infantryman, as usual, will have the last word, asserting unequivocally, with his foot on the enemy soil, every definitive conquest: but his action, directly or indirectly made easier by the air and naval power, will be to the advantage of the air*

Italian infantrymen in Iraq.

Title pages

A squad of Alpine paratroopers in the Afghan desert.

force's and navy's operational possibilities, broadening their action over wider horizons".


In order to complete the historical reference picture, it is also useful to remember that:

- Since WWI included, the Infantry has constantly increased its fire and transportation means, as well as logistic means; all this in addition to the growing firepower of the Artillery.
- Until recent times the importance of the Infantry, in principle acknowledged by all, has never been accompanied by an appropriate selection of personnel. For instance, in 1908, the future Marshal Pietro Badoglio, then a Captain in the General Staff Corps, although originally an artillery-man, deplored with unusual frankness the excessive and often unne-

cessary impoverishment of the Infantry in favour of the so-called "specialist Arms", (Artillery and Engineers) which was made even worse by an additional considerable skimming of the line infantry in favour of the "special infantries" (Grenadiers; Bersaglieri, Alpini).

Granted that today, by "Infantry" we mean by and large the whole infantry and its traditional branches, whose number has notably increased after WWII (Grenadiers, "Bersaglieri" and "Alpini" were joined by Tankers, Paratroopers and "Lagunari") it is natural to ask: what is the role of the Infantry in the complex and difficult context of the post-Cold War period and in relation with the new technologies? A series of high-quality studies exempt us from making minute and detailed descriptions, very abundant in military literature in general. Obviously, opinions are not always in agreement; for example, an article published in June 2003, which with an emblematic and categorical title stated that "The Queen of the Battle will be the revolutionary central computer network", is the cause many reflections. Another article of the same month asserted that *in the year 2003, when we celebrate the centennial of the first human flight, the air power (but perhaps it would be better to start to call it air-space power) asserts itself once more as the winning Arm, the solver of conflicts* and, after affirming, without naming the "normal" infantry, that *we Italians are proud of our "Bersaglieri" and "Alpini"(...) engaged in peace missions (...)* asks whether within the context of our alliances *we will be providers of high technology or only suppliers of men, albeit professionally and spiritually well prepared.*

From these interventions one may assume that the most advanced technologies have acquired a greater – perhaps excessive – importance, not only in terms of effectiveness but also in order to spare human lives, which, as everyone knows, is a great concern of the Western politico-social system. This has induced to employ with great prudence the piloted aircraft (which are besides very expensive) replacing them with pilotless airplanes and/or with long-range missiles of the "Tomahawk" type. On the other hand, despite the continuous – and sometimes spectacular – progress, technologies have never been able to replace man and never will. The Army Chief of Staff of the time had already underlined it in 2003 commenting on the subject selected for the Army's Communication Plan of that year (an eloquent subject: "From satellite to man") (2), rightly pointing out that after the Gulf War (1991) and in view of the most recent events, the illusion of achieving a "zero-dead war" through technology had vanished.



Italian servicemen on patrol.

Therefore the Army cannot be reduced to a merely subaltern role, since *it carries out indispensable activities, at home and abroad, when it is a matter of providing complete operational capabilities ...*, to which one should add that of reconstruction. As a matter of fact, *the proliferation of unconventional forms of fight, the absence of any restraint in recurring to indiscriminate violence (...) lead to a further revaluation of the human factor, owing to which the physical, moral, cultural and professional qualities of the personnel of every category must be developed and increased with constant determination. Of course, this does not mean closing the door to progress and go back to the past, but only finding the right balance between the human and technological component, compatibly with the resources available.*

The same concepts were confirmed and itemized by the Chief of Staff in June 2003, when the first phase of the war in Iraq was concluded, with the conquest of Baghdad and the fall of Saddam's regime. These events marked the revaluation of the fighter's role since, in order to turn a military victory into a political success, it is necessary, as our Anglo-Saxon friends say, to have "the boots on the ground". For the sake of brevity we omit other convincing remarks made at the same time or later, which widen and insist on the same concept, keeping in mind also the delicate and more difficult phase of the Iraqi war, commonly called

"post conflict". One thing is certain: the war in Iraq, not yet concluded, provides lots of technical and military lessons that can significantly influence not only the future military organizations, but also, and even more, the study, preparation and selection of new materials, with the largest use of the available technologies which, on the other hand, must be resolutely steered towards the new requirements and measured – after exhaustive studies – against the technical and financial possibilities.

First of all, some preliminary remarks are necessary: the application of advanced technologies regards the Western forces and almost not at all those, which at present are opposing them in Iraq. Faced by the initial "blitzkrieg" conducted by the American and British forces, the regular Iraqi Army has rapidly dissolved, with a performance far inferior to that objectively assumed until that moment. This highlights once more an elementary and not-new truth, which unfortunately favours the recourse to terrorism and guerrilla warfare: it is unprofitable for the enemies of the West to engage technologically advanced air-land forces with a "classic" strategy conducted by regular forces, since their opponents could employ their own fire and manoeuvre superiority. The second phase of the Iraqi war has shown, in fact, the excellent performance of very simple, and almost archaic, modalities of action and weapons: lorries loaded with explosive and driven by "kamikaze", mines, mortars and automatic weapons.

Against these arms – thoroughly exploited with the application of procedures based on surprise and disregard of human life, a thing unacceptable to the West – the most advanced technologies and the most modern fire sources have been unable to fully exploit their capabilities. It is also well known that the American and English losses in the second phase of the war have been much greater than those suffered in the first phase. Even considering that the first phase consisted not so much in hard fights but rather in daring offensive raids with almost exclusively logistic difficulties, it still confirmed the old theory that one needs a large number of men – or, to be more precise, many units of Infantry – to fully control a territory not completely safe, with populations partly or potentially hostile. This is because the air force can intervene only against targets with a minimum of consistency and persistence, while the support of the even most powerful fire sources on the ground cannot always be well timed, adherent and effective. This confirms that the West needs a sufficient number of real fighters, motivated, trained, well armed and appropriately equipped, as it should have been, and not always was, especially in our case, also for the wars of the XX Century. Only that

this time either the fighter, who is destined to "look the enemy into the eyes" (as the young infantry officers were told many years ago) has at his disposal all the moral and material tools of his trade or he is simply unable to operate well, because nothing (fire means, technology, etc.) can offset his basic moral or training shortcomings. It is for all these reasons that, precisely at the beginning of the second phase of the war in Iraq, it has become necessary to reinforce the already considerable Western forces already present there: a fact that should be considered carefully.

Are therefore the new technologies of no use at all or less useful? Or, are they, at least in this phase, of secondary importance? Taking for granted that also in the future it is unlikely that they will be able to prevent or neutralize terrorist actions or guerrilla warfare, the present situation is such that the new technologies should be whipped along, requiring that they suggest new and difficult paths of research, which for the first time in history should no more be aimed at increasing the weapons' power but at improving the security in general. It is a fact that the needs of personnel protection, both at individual and collective level, are today in the forefront (we refer to personnel of all Branches of the Army, including helicopters and logistic assets). One should also point out that – as was confirmed by recent events reported by the press – this protection has had important repercussions on the fighters' morale and on their confidence in their weapons, equipment and organization. It ensues that, at individual level, armament and protection (bullet-proof jackets, helmets), which are already carefully studied, should make further steps forward, giving the individual, and in particular to the infantryman, the possibility of seeing – and intervening very quickly with his individual weapon – as much as possible also behind himself and on his flanks. At collective level, in every case and situation, priority must be given to protection and security against the wide range of all possible offences, starting from mines and bomb-vehicles.

It is actually a matter of deducing the consequences from the fact that there are no more front lines and rear lines, as was the case until the Cold War included. Researches and studies should therefore preferably be directed towards the protection of the following sectors of collective interest:

- Installations (commands, troops and logistic units), to be protected also from rockets and mortars (whose emplacements should be located immediately) and also from air attacks from light and ultra-light aircraft, which cannot be ruled out.
- Fixed and mobile logistic means. Studies are under way – and sometimes have already been



Infantrymen of the 66th "Trieste" Airmobile Regiment in Iraq.

concluded – for protecting also the crews of the logistic vehicles. Such protection must now be extended also to the loads, ammunition and fuel in particular.

- Combat systems (tanks, APCs, helicopters, guns). Tanks have often become moving fortresses and the differences from APCs have diminished. Therefore in the new context the protection of these systems should be privileged, even to the detriment of the armament, while the light and medium artillery pieces should adhere as much as possible to the formula "self-propelled with reinforced protection" (the gun-tractor unit is of course more vulnerable). An armoured vehicle should be able to detect, rapidly and timely, the surrounding threats (mines, kamikaze, automatic weapons) and to intervene without having to detach a man outside (albeit partially protected) near the machine gun. In other words, the space surrounding the vehicle should be easy to control and be stricken also from the inside.

In short, technology must be conceived first of all in the service of the security of man, who should thus be put in the best condition to fill with his actions the gaps inevitably left open by

technology. If one says "man", it means first of all "infantryman", an infantryman who has never been, and cannot be, left alone, because the effectiveness of his action and his material and moral conditions depend on what the entire military organization – including of course the other Services – does before him, with him and behind him, in the sky above him and on the sea that is perhaps very far from the field of his action. To insist that we need a joint organization of the national defence and security – sanctioned by a special law in 1997 – is by now a pleonasm, considering that all military leaders are convinced and continuously underline this necessity. What counts is that the infantryman needs everybody more than ever, just as everybody – as always – needs the infantryman.

Battles – or, in wider sense, operations – are won, lost and brought to an end by all together. Therefore it does not seem necessary to use categorical terms such as the adjective "decisive" or "determinant" referred to this or that Service, this or that Branch. The boundaries between Services



A 6x6 "Puma" armoured car on a reconnaissance mission in Iraq.

and/or Branches little by little are destined to shrink and dissolve. Each component has an irreplaceable role. By insisting on certain subjects, one runs the risk of becoming entangled in inconclusive debates, such as the discussion that over a hundred years ago took place in Britain, where the argument was if in the frequent expeditions overseas the Royal Navy (the gun) was more important than the Army (the projectile). Obviously both of them were important: to achieve the goal of the mission, the former could not do without the latter.

Going back to the present geo-strategic reality, we see that each mission requires a careful assessment of its characteristics, which must logically lead to an appropriate dosage of the forces, different from case to case. A centuries-old historical datum counts today more than ever: the regular armies are in a plight when they have to face guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks (for example, just think of the debacle of the until then undefeated Napoleonic armies in Spain, in the war 1808-1813), also because in many cases the solution of the problems cannot be obtained through military means only. In any case the latter are necessary, first of all in order to carry out the activities in favour of the civilian population in a frame of security. Activities that require well organized land forces.

Secondly, the human factor – i.e., practically, the infantryman – cannot certainly take second place vis-à-vis technology. Significantly, the future demanding and costly technologies are studied mainly for man: but it is certainly not easy to motivate a Westerner, inspiring him with confidence in his mission, his weapons, his equipment and leadership, to train him, command and provide him with the necessary supplies and rise him to a high level of conscious discipline. It is a fact that the recent conflicts have been characterized by a "hunger for men" precisely from the strongest, richest and most technologically advanced Army, such as is, by far, that of the United States. The reason is that technology has, and will always have, insuperable limits and, as always, the terrain will affect the operations and when the environment is difficult – as was recently the case in Afghanistan – it will favour guerrilla warfare, which, as always, can be effectively fought only by large units of light infantry, which must adopt as much as possible their procedures.

On the other hand, if technologies cannot replace man, the contrary is also true: masses of men cannot take the place of technology; therefore we need

a sufficient number of men, accurately selected and prepared. The old concept of Infantry as "Mass Arm", which was already obsolete in WWII and even more during the Cold War, is by now "money no longer in circulation". And the same is true also for a Navy based on a group of large ships and escort vessels and for an Air Force made of large and very expensive bombers and/or aircraft conceived mostly for "strategic" interventions. Also in these cases the pursuit of protection must become a top priority, within an operational framework, which - by indirectly acknowledging their importance - more than in the past makes necessary both the interventions on the ground, also very close to the fighting forces, and the direct protection of the hulls of the individual ships, as well as the close escort of convoys. It must be underlined that protection and security are topics not totally new. As regards the land force, "Rivista Militare", already at the end of the 19th Century, published a number of debates on the need to protect the infantry from the increasing effectiveness of the repeating firearms, both at individual level (cuirasses and shields) and at collective level (armoured vehicles with internal-combustion engines, derived from the British armed trains employed in the Anglo-Boer war 1899-1902). As a never belied truth proves, also in this case by turning to the past one creates the indispensable starting base for meeting the challenges of the future.

In conclusion, in today's strategic and tactical context, Infantry is actually the spearhead; but more than in the past this head must be sharp, technologically advanced and polyvalent, and its spear and shaft much stronger, in order to ensure the highest performance. One should not overlook the fact that also in purely humanitarian employments of assistance to the populations, the Infantry has always been widely employed in the front line.

The old infantry Officer that we mentioned at the beginning can therefore be reassured. Infantry is as always the basic Arm that dominates combats (the decisive great battles between regular armies of the past centuries have become obsolete) but, like the other Western military forces, especially in "combat" missions, Infantry asks much more than in the past and meets greater difficulties. In short, it is a constitutional Queen who cannot rule by herself, and more than advanced technologies and various kinds of backings, starting from air support, she needs Information and Command-and-Control systems that ensure a maximum performance with minimum possible harm to the security of the individuals: certainly these are no easy objectives for the Staffs.

Ferruccio Botti,
Colonel (ret.)




NOTES

(1) "Navalism" is a school of thought aimed at demonstrating - with frequent quotations of the works written by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan at the end of the 19th Century - the pre-eminence and the decisive role of the naval forces and, therefore, the need to give the highest priority to shipbuilding. At the beginning of the 20th Century this theory was also called "maritism".

(2) *Reflections of the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army*, "Rivista Militare" no 2/2003 and *The role of the land forces in modern scenarios* - Lecture by the Army Chief of Staff (Rome, June 19, 2003), published on "Rivista Militare" no 4/2003.



THE «FRIULI» BRIGADE IN JORDAN



THE «FRIULI» BRIGADE IN JORDAN

Exercise «Eastern Desert 2005»

The infantrymen, airmen and cavalymen of the only airmobile Major Unit of our Army, after the exercises in Poland and despite their commitment in Iraq, have been welcomed by the desert of the historical land of the Moabites, where they have been engaged, side by side with the Jordanian soldiers, in exercise "Eastern Desert 2005".

THE EXERCISE

The name comes from a previous occasion of bilateral planning with the Armed Forces of the Jordanian Kingdom when, in March 2003, the process of bilateral negotiation for the use of the training area of Al Qatrana, which had reached by then the conclusive stage, had to be suspended because of the rapid deterioration of the international situation in the Middle East.

It was therefore inevitable to adopt the name chosen in the preceding occasion: "Eastern Desert".

Title pages.

King Abdullah II of Jordan and the Italian Army Chief of Staff, General Filiberto Cecchi, attend the exercise.

Below.

A Jordanian AH-1 "Cobra" (in the background) and an A-129 "Mangusta" (launching a volley of 81-mm rockets) in joint training.

Actually also this edition, which took place in September 2005, risked to suffer the consequences of a terrorist action soon after the departure from Italy of the first marine carrier. Luckily, the terrorist attack against some American military ships docked in the port of Aqaba was unsuccessful. The immediate assessment of the situation, sustained by the will to continue to maintain the same relations with the Jordanian counterpart, induced the chiefs of the Army to proceed on the path they had started on, taking some precautionary measure such as, for example, that of employing the night time for conditioning materials and means for the subsequent transport.

The decision to continue the exercise, despite the reviving of the atmosphere of restlessness that characterizes the area of the Middle East, turned out to be quite appropriate, and the results achieved are an ample reward for the worries that pervaded the initial phases.





AB-205 Helicopters and airmobile infantrymen carry out an attack, supported by an A-129 (in the foreground).

THE TRAINING AREA

Located at about 120 km south east of Amman, in the vicinity of the important road that links the capital with the only Jordanian coastal outlet, wonderful Aqaba is a meeting point of Countries with very different political, social, economic and, last but not least, religious features: Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan itself.

The morphologic characteristics of the range of Al Qatrana are similar to those that were in the background of the legendary adventures of Lawrence of Arabia, the fascinating chief of the Bedouin tribes. These places, which have been the setting of the sci-fi duels of the knights of the star wars, remind, although at a distance of some meridians, the African military campaigns of WWII, ideal stage for the tactical genius of indomitable and imaginative leaders.

The weather conditions that characterized the period of permanence at Al Qatrana of the "Friuli" Brigade were a temperature that in the middle of the

day reached 34-35 degrees centigrade and at night 12-13 degrees. The almost constant northwesterly wind represented the leitmotiv of the exercise and with its afternoon insistence it weakened even the most persevering spirits. The peaks exceeding 10 knots, in fact, caused blasts of dust so dense that it was impossible to see even at a distance of a few



"Centauro" armoured cars in action.



120mm rifled mortars transported by AB-205 helicopters with barycentric hooks.

metres and this induced the western guests to follow the Bedouin habit of wrapping more or less improvised turbans around their heads.

LOGISTICS

The figures referring to the participation of men, materials and vehicles of the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade make clear the significance (especially logistic) of this training event. It is therefore correct to assign the place of honour to the planning and logistic conduct, as well as the praise for having been able to face, and overcome, the difficulties of a distant and almost unknown land.

Talking about logistics, clearly the reference concerns all its distinctive activities that go from transports, both international (with naval and air carriers) and inside Jordan, to normal provisions (making ample recourse to local resources) and urgent supplies from home, to the medical activities, a syner-

gic fruit of the fusion of the resources of the Army itself with the highly professional ones provided by the Military Corps and the Corps of the Voluntary Nurses of the Italian Red Cross, and to maintenance, which has forced the technicians to adopt special devices in order to control the effects of an unusual and sometimes hostile environment.

The circumstances in which the units had to operate have shown, on the one hand, the need to adjust some materials to the particular environmental conditions, while on the other have proved how some nominal limits of employment of some resources can be overcome to the advantage of totally unexpected performances. The 36 helicopters lined up on the Al Qatrana airstrip, belonging to all types of aircraft of the Brigade (there were also four helicopters AB-205 and AB-212 from the AVES Brigade, precisely from the 2nd Regiment "Sirio" from Lamezia Terme and the 21st Squadron "Orsa Maggiore" from Cagliari) have confirmed the great flexibility of employment of the Army aircraft and the extraordinary spirit of adaptability of the technicians and pilots, which has created the conditions for making almost seven hundred hours of flight according to all the envisaged training and operational aspects. The unloading and conditioning at the port of Aqaba of 36 helicopters from the RO-RO Ship "Skamderborg", and their successive flying transfer to the Al Qatrana area, represent an unprecedented, extraordinary success of organizational efficiency, and are moreover an expression of the human and professional capabilities of the personnel of the "Tuono" Task Force.

No less remarkable was the movement of over 300 vehicles, among which 14 "Centauro" armoured cars of the "Savoia" Cavalry Regiment and of about 200 containers, which transported the materials necessary for starting from scratch a field organization capable of meeting the life and working needs of almost 1000 people. The recourse the local resources concerned the supply of some services, such as victuals, electrical energy, as regards both supply and macro-distribution, sanitation, disposal of normal and special waste-material, transport of heavy equipment and containers form the entry points to the training area. The "Friuli" Command and Tactical Support branch, employed as logistic unit responsible for the only large service zone of the Brigade, has known how to amply benefit from services outsourced in loco, complementing their quality with its own resources and personnel.

COOPERATION AND TRAINING

The relationship with the cooperating Jordanian unit represented, after the peculiarity



A 120mm mortar in action.

of the logistic organization, the cause of greatest interest of "Eastern Desert 2005". The exercise, born essentially as a national activity for the utilization of a foreign training area, already since the planning phase has become a real bilateral exercise that involved, besides the "Friuli", the "First Royal Guard Mechanized Brigade" of the Jordanian Army and some assets (4 "UH-1 Huey" multirole helicopters and 4 "AH-1 Cobra" attack helicopters) from the Air Force of the host country. Our Jordanian colleagues received the Italian soldiers with a strong sense of hospitality and repeatedly expressed their appreciation for a Nation that they feel as friendly and in many aspects close to the cultural character of their people. It is a consideration of great importance that should lead to some reflections, and not only of a technical nature: the Italian soldiers, who can express a professionalism unquestionably appreciated everywhere, enrich their behaviour with an extraordinary sense of humanity, which is open to dialogue, irrespective of culture or religion.

The training activities were developed in three phases: unilateral, bilateral, joint.

The first activity envisaged training actions carried out unilaterally by Italian and Jordanian units, after the joint use of the Al Qatrana range.

In the second phase, defined bilateral or "cross training", there were exchange activities between both the land units and between the helicopter

units belonging to the two Nations.

The conclusive phase, defined "combined", proposed joint exercises at different levels, until their conclusion, on the occasion of the "Distinguished Visitors Day", with a Brigade exercise and the implementation of a Command Post of a JOR-ITA Major Multinational Unit, charged with planning and conducting CRO (Crisis Response Operations) and Warfighting Operations. In the bilateral phase, the most interesting activities were those concerning anti-terrorism, survival in a desert environment and the so-called cultural awareness on Arab culture, subjects treated by the Jordanian units for the benefit of the Italian soldiers and, among these, in particular the soldiers of the 66th airmobile Infantry Regiment "Trieste" and the cavalymen of the "Savoia" Regiment, who have profited by the knowledge of the special techniques of combat and adaptation to the environment suggested by their Jordanian colleagues. On the other hand, the item most requested in exchange by the Jordanian counterpart was airmobility training; therefore a platoon of the "First Royal Guard Mechanized Brigade" attended the course for first-level airmobile qualification, while 150 soldiers conducted activities of night-and day-embarkation and disembarkation with helicopters AB-412, for obtaining the certification of tactical heli-transport. An equally intense exchange activity occurred between the "Tuono" Task Force and the Jordanian Air Force, that consisted mainly in flights with joint formations, the development of pilot exchanges on "A-129

Mangusta" and "AH-1 Cobra" helicopters and in joint fire activities carried out with combat helicopters.

The final exercise, which took place on the occasion of the "Distinguished Visitors Day", permitted to put into the field all the available assets of both participating nations. In particular, it tackled some technical-tactical subjects regarding Crisis Response Operations (reaction to a land attack carried out against a motor column, pursuit and capture of some hostile elements, non combatant evacuation), as well as an important conclusive event, assumed in a so-called "war" environment, were it was possible to appraise the employment of all the available weapon systems and verify the Command and Control capability of the Main Command Post of the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade.

Right.

The Defence Chief of Staff, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, on board an A-129.

Below.

Helicopters deployed on the Al Qatrana airstrip.



A Combined Coordination and Control Structure (CCCS) disciplined all training activities from the beginning, with particular attention to live-fire activities.

The range, about 500 sq km wide, approximately seven times the Capo Teulada training range, was divided into five areas where "Centauro" armoured cars, light and mechanized infantry, tanks, helicopters, artillery and mortars operated, also simultane-

ously. A common radio-room, heart of the joint structure, monitored all the activities making use of Jordanian Army and Air Force liaison Officers.

COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES

The exercise offered also the opportunity to visit places of historical and artistic interest in Jordan.



King Abdullah II of Jordan with the Commander of the "Friuli" Brigade.

Such as, for example, famous Petra, with its rosy architectures dating back to the VI Century B.C.

Another very interesting location was Mount Nebo, where the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Filiberto Cecchi, attended a ceremony for the donation of two ornamental tiles that now adorn the floor in front of the edifice realized as memento of the visit of Pope John Paul II.

THE VISIT OF THE KING

King Abdullah II, the reigning Sovereign of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, visited the personnel of the "Friuli" to convey his personal salute. Successively he attended the final phase of the exercise and, on his express wish, he set himself at the controls of a A-129 "Mangusta".

The contingent received also the visit of the Defence Chief of Staff, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Filiberto Cecchi, and the Italian Ambassador in Jordan, His Excellency Gianfranco Giorgolo.

CONCLUSIONS

The training carried out in an environment that was unusual, difficult, and sometimes even hostile, has improved the knowledge of the Italian soldiers as regards operational situations that occur more and more frequently.


The logistic activities have once more shown the extraordinary national gift for adapting materials and working techniques to the environmental conditions, so as to ensure the performance of the task in any situation.

The professional experience of the personnel, who worked to assure the efficiency of the means, offered an invaluable performance vis-à-vis the costs borne. The level of cooperation achieved with the Jordanian units makes us hope for a better future, in view of an integration that proved possible and profitable.

The objectives of "Eastern Desert 2005" in the fields of training, logistics and international cooperation have been achieved: their value strengthens the identity of the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade and increases the importance in the world of the Italian Army and the Italian Armed Forces.

Antonio Bettelli
Colonel, Commander,
66th "Trieste" Airmobile Infantry Regt





TECHNE

THE AMERICAN ANTIMISSILE SYSTEM

THE AMERICAN ANTIMISSILE SYSTEM

The strategic and technological evolution

While the first Ground based Interceptors of the American anti/ballistic missile system are being installed in their sites at Fort Greeley, Alaska and Vandenberg, California, it is useful to review the history and the doctrines regarding the operational formation of these systems, studied and developed to achieve strategic objectives of the utmost importance.

If one were to analyze the events which have characterized the attempts of the United States to formulate an anti-missile defense system one would find that there exists an evident red line which ties everything together; from the motivations advanced to justify the considerable industrial, scientific, managerial and organizational resources dedicated to the realization, to the costs of research and development in relation to the effectively achieved results.

In reality, considering the predictions of a probable future missile threat, one cannot help but notice how these have been based on assessments of a worst case scenario, which have often been shown, over time, as less credible than proclaimed. If we could examine the results, it is correct to assert that the history of these systems in terms of the cost/effectiveness relationship must be valued above all as a full strategic-technological advantage.

HISTORY AND PROSPECTS

The desire to substitute or add a defense system against inter-continental missiles to the strategy of retaliation has been present since the 1970's. In September, 1967 the United States announced their decision to build a "light" system called Sentinel to protect the entire nation against an unsophisticated threat like that of the Chinese. It was based upon radar warning and anti-missile missiles armed with nuclear warheads that could intercept incoming missiles and explode them outside of our atmosphere and far from urban territories. The projected system lent itself to important objections, such as, at those heights it is difficult to distinguish between missiles and other objects such as air balloons of an opportune shape. This shape is only possible during the phase of atmospheric breaking due to their high ratio of area over mass.

The system would actually not be sufficient against a Soviet threat. On the other hand, during re-entry in the atmosphere by means of a nuclear explosion is not the appropriate solution to defend cities that would pay severely for the cataclysm produced over their heads. An inertial flight of an ICBM (Inter-continental Ballistic Missile) would have an orbital speed of approximately 29,000 km/hr which means a flight time of approximately 20 minutes for a target 10,000 km away. The time of launch and the altitude reached depend upon the requested height of orbit, the power of the combustible, and other factors as well. In both America and the Soviet Union, rockets have been designed with a "boost phase" of less than one minute. The Soviet Union, aware of the problem, began to simultaneously develop a similar system around Moscow. The interceptor Galosh of 2-3 MT was introduced in the 1980's and later substituted with the SH-II Gorgon as the front line of defense against attacking missiles, and with Gazelle aimed directly at its target by means of the command radar Flat Twin. Terminal phase guidance, however, could be carried out with an infrared system. For this reason, and also because of the commissioning of new inter-continental rockets (in particular the SS9 Scarp) the United States transformed the Sentinel project into the Safeguard project. The primary objective of this last project was to defend two missile sites. The system used was similar but also to be employed were shorter range anti-missile missiles ready to intercept incoming missiles with a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere. The two vehicles employed, with their respective statistics, were the Spartan which carried a W71 5 megaton warhead and would impact at 480 km in space and the smaller, two-stage Sprint which had a very short range, rapid interception and was armed with W66, 1 OKT warhead. The Sprint could reach live enemy explosives in the range of 130-180 km. This took care of local defense dedicated to better insuring survival from the forces of attack and



Launching of a "Patriot" missile in the PAC 3 version.

Title pages

A sea platform equipped with X-band radar for the direction of missile fire.

retaliation. Both of these systems required the use of large radar installations which were extremely vulnerable. Added to the protests of a possible nuclear explosion over national territory were doubts regarding the system's reliability and concerns about the chain reaction within a global strategy. The Soviet Union, which was initially opposes to any limits on defense systems, changed their attitude; which is to say they sought a treaty and signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972. The ABM allowed the two signatory superpowers to develop only two systems for local defense.

The treaty was amended in 1974 with a protocol in which the number was reduced to one system. While the Soviet Union decided to maintain their

defense system of Moscow, the United States installed their missiles to defend the the ICBM silos in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Seventy Sprint and thirty Spartan missiles stood guard in protected, underground silos; already operational in 1975. Washington, however, in February 1976, a few months after installation of their missiles and realizing the high cost of a limited local defense,

abandoned the "Safeguard" and the base was dismantled. The missiles were retired and finally destroyed in 1983. From that point on the project of "traditional" defense was a shelved matter.

THE AIMS

The motivations which led to the signing of the ABM Treaty are complex. First of all, one must remember that the nuclear equilibrium was based upon the threat of retaliation with which one could inflict unacceptable losses upon the attacker using even a small portion of the strategic arsenal at hand. Therefore, retaliation has as its primary targets combined urban and industrial centers. In this respect every attempt to neutralize or diminish the effect was perceived as offensive in as much as it jeopardized the only possible defense> this in particular applied to systems of interception of incoming missiles against civilian targets. This paradox, the offensive characteristics of certain defensive measures is typical of the nuclear situation which brought to light the truly "revolutionary" aspect of the foundation of MAD(Mutual Assured Destruction) ; it is not the weapons in and of themselves, but the capacity of a "second strike" in which either of the two superpowers were in apposition to inflict upon the other unacceptable losses and damage (25% of the population and 50% of industrial capacity) after having absorbed an adversarial "first strike."

Defense of the missile bases, however, as a primary aim of diminishing the interest of an adversary to strike first, has a stabilizing role. In general, every measure which diversifies, protects, and renders the power of a nuclear response less vulnerable is positive. If global security is so secured, the terror of a preventive attack is eliminated or diminished and in the sphere of a more relaxed international situation, one can proceed with a progressive and controlled reduction of nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, we must also keep in mind the inevitable chain reaction that every new system of defense against missile defense systems generates; the construction of a similar system by the adversary, the counter-measures and the ways to nullify it. Regarding the "ABM Treaty," one must consider that these negative aspects and the cost of the operation did not make up for the margin of growth in the stability of a deterrent.

NEW PROSPECTS

In the 1980's, even before President Ronald Reagan's discussion of a " Strategic Defense

Initiative" of 23 March, 1983, the debate about its defense systems against missiles resumed in the United States in terms of new technologies, above all with regards to space activities.

Despite everything we must consider some not so radically innovative developments such as the precise systems of maneuvering space vehicles. One such development was heat seeking bands which were widely used in tele-observations and sophisticated, illuminated electronics.

These are able to control and modify the orbit of a space craft in an autonomous manner; all of which allowed planning and experimenting with weapons based on a simple collision which, considering orbital elevation and speed, is generally lethal. Even operations of an approach followed by a conventional explosion were made possible.

The principal counter-measures against these anti-missile systems were armor and frequent maneuvering which is relatively and easily realized regarding satellites, especially those in a low orbit.


As far as their orbit is concerned, satellites are equivalent to targets in space. In the case of missiles however, the brief time available and the lack of knowledge regarding the force of atmospheric breaking during both launch and re-entry makes this type of attack much more difficult.

Different methods of acceleration for projectiles were thought of based upon the combined effects of electrical fields and magnetic intersections. An electrically conducted projectile running a track of some dozens of meters will achieve a speed of 2030 km a second.

These systems must be based in space (to prevent the destruction of the projectile by atmospheric friction) and require an enormous amount of energy on board the base station.

The development of powerful lasers and their systems of focusing allow the damaging of an incoming missile or an orbiting satellite by hitting their surface with an adequate quantity of luminous energy and since light travels at a speed of 300,00 km/second, this can be achieved in an instantaneous manner.

Certainly the mirror which directs the laser must be in orbit in order to control a vast area. The laser, however, needs to be installed on land which greatly increases the energy necessary which is equal to four times the distance. This is why the hypothesis of a fleet of space stations in an orbit of some thousands of kilometers is favored. This hypothesis immediately brings forth the problem of the extreme vulnerability of such delicate systems.



THE CONSEQUENCES

President Ronald Reagan's program of an impenetrable umbrella of protection covering the entire United States of America was ended in 1993, again because of the awareness of the immaturity of the necessary technology; above all regarding the space stations as confirmed in April, 1987 by the "American Physics Society," and by the prohibitive cost of development. Until 1993, more than 55 billion dollars had been spent. With the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the primary motive, that of defending the United States from a Soviet missile attack collapsed.

Nevertheless, by the end of 1987, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, or SDIO, developed the concept of Strategic Defense System Phase I Architecture, consisting of a system of interception based in space together with two sensors and a

An «Aster 30» missile.

system of interception based on land using the same sensors and a system of Battle Management.

Even if the system never became operative, the enormous force of research and development produced results: in particular in the field of Hit to Kill technology adapted for all new interception systems, X-Band Radar technology in laser technology, particularly in the Directed Energy Weapons- DEW whose deformable mirrors are today used in astronomy and whose outer coverings no longer needed heavy cooling systems, and in the miniaturization of various components and sub-systems. The result was to develop small missile engines weighing approximately 12 pounds and able to develop a force of more than 10,000 pounds.



THE 1990's

In early 1991, President George W.H. Bush replaced the Strategic Defense System Phase I Architecture with Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. Its responsibility was to protect the nation against limited missile attacks and to defend American forces abroad from attacks by short range ballistic missiles. GPALS utilizes a defense model based on three elements: an interception system based in space called Brilliant Pebbles, a theater of operations defense based in part on land and in part at sea, and a limited national defense system based on land.

As previously mentioned, the red line, both militarily and technologically, which ties all these systems together is evident.

Nevertheless, if we consider not only the motivations connected to a threat, whether actual or future, but also those motivations less explicitly attributed to the need of the United States to

finance incessant technological progress, everything becomes clearer.

The decision is more comprehensible in light of the strategic philosophy which explicitly became part of the Bush Administration's new National Security Strategy, adopted in September, 2002 in which they confirm, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing or equaling the power of the United States." This objective can be followed only if the United States continues to maintain their technological edge in the military arena with a financing of research and development that does not bring to realization only new weapons systems but also has a benefit in the civilian world. This can, in time, lead to the development of further technologies which can have military applications, so creating a process of osmosis and interaction rich in results.

In this sense, the best application in the field of research and development is that related to

Right.
A «Spartan» missile.

Left.
A «Sprint» missile.

anti-missile defense systems. These systems contain a remarkable series of components (missiles, sensors, radar, lasers, aerial platforms, command and control systems, and communications, "intelligence," reconnaissance, elaborate electronics) capable of providing, in perspective, a notable technological fallout, above all a series of connected and collateral military sites.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE


The Clinton Administration did not support the GPALS and in 1993, together with the abandonment of SDI and the transformation of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization into the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, adopted a new series of priorities.

With the publication of the Bottom up Review in Autumn of the same year, the anti-missile system was reoriented in three diverse components with differentiated financing according to priority.

The most important was missile defense of the theater of operations which would receive 12 billion dollars over 5 years. There were three programs: technological perfection of the Patriot missile with development of an advanced capacity system, the Patriot Advanced Capability-PAC3, modification of the Navy's air defense system Aegis (from the mythical shield of Minerva, "Egida") giving the Navy the capability to intercept even ballistic missiles and designated Navy Area Defense, and thirdly, a new missile for the Army called Theater High Altitude Defense-THAAD.

The second priority considered National Missile Defense with financing of 3 billion dollars over 5 years. In reality it dealt with a program of "technology readiness" which would decrease the time for system alignment if a new missile threat against the United States materialized.

The third priority, with financing of more than 3 billion dollars over 5 years, was given to a research and development program to develop new technologies improving the efficiency of missile defense both for theater of operations and the nation.



FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

An additional two programs were successfully added: that of Navy Theater WideNTW and that of Medium Extended Air Defense Systems- MEADS, which until now was based upon American and European defense industry cooperation. It was a trilateral program (Germany, Italy, and the United States) that availed the complex of a light launching armed with the extremely mobile Patriot- PAC3 in participation with the U.S. Air Force.

The new direction of anti-missile defense capacity research undertaken by the Clinton Administration, with a major emphasis on defense of a theater of operations rather than defense of national territory was a direct consequence of the radical transformation of the threat. This was the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new relationship between Washington and Moscow, and Saddam Hussein's use of SCUD missiles during the Gulf War.

However, the weight of internal politics and the impact of international events after the first half of the 90's required a different choice.

In 1994, the control of Congress returned to the Republicans who always favored a National Missile Defense System.

In February 1996, in part due to political pressure and in part due to predictions of a threat by "intelligence services," the Pentagon decided to transform the National Missile Defense Program from a technology readiness program to a deployment readiness program. The program was also known as Threeplus-Three, which is that the program would be completed in three years time and ready for an integrated testing by 1999. Based upon which, the United States predicted they would be ready to put the NMD in place in three years if the need arose.


If on the other hand, the NMD formation was not needed, the BMDO would continue to improve and refine the programmed operative components to align the program within three years of any decision of need.

1998 was a particular year not only for the Rumsfeld Report, which served to accentuate the missile threat against the United States, but also for the ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea and Iran, the technological espionage of China, and the mounting Republican pressure on the White House for a new approach to the problem of anti-ballistic missile defense.

In January 1999, Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, announced an additional 6.6 billion dollars for the NMD Program to ensure that the United States could, if necessary, fix the date of formation before June 2000 with a fully operative system between 2003 and 2005.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NMD

The NMD would consist of twenty land-based interceptor missiles, a new BandXradar, modernization of alert radars already in use, space sensors, and Command and Control System. Additional interceptor missiles would be added after two years together with other eventual





improvements resulting from technological developments.

The system's purpose is to intercept a very limited number of ballistic missiles "accidentally launched or launched without authorization by a nuclear country, or deliberately launched by a Rogue Nation," according to the definition of the NMD Act approved by the American Senate on 17 March, 1999 with 97 votes in favor and 3 opposed.

The approval of the NMD Act with such a large majority (with the obvious support of Democrats) to put the system in place as soon as technologically feasible would have been unthinkable only a few months before. It is interesting to note that the formation decision is no longer based on threat but the time of technological development.

The Clinton Administration's decision to no longer oppose an ABM System (the President signed the NMD Act) came from the visible growing support for such a system from American public opinion and, at the same time, from the White House's need to avoid the accusation of not sufficiently considering the defense of the United States during the upcoming 2000 Presidential Election.

The development of an anti-missile system would be one point of the Republican's election platform.

The democrats voted in favor because they realized that they could not allow the Party to be considered soft on defense. The Democratic senators reaffirmed, however, that their approval was a qualified approval: the system could be aligned if the threat was real, if the technology was efficiently secure, if the cost was acceptable, and if the international implications were manageable.

President Clinton emphasized his personal satisfaction for two amendments added to the law because he was opposed to the initial draft.

The first amendment specified that the formation of an NMD system would be subject to a normal process of authorization and approval which was significant because no decision for formation of the system had yet been approved. The second amendment reaffirmed that the Senate would continue to support a negotiated reduction in nuclear arms and emphasized that the politics connected to the eventual formation of NMD would have to take into account the parallel objectives of Arms Control.

Launch of a Ground Based Interceptor missile.



A Boeing 747 Airborne laser.

Clinton promised to continue, with Russia, the direction initiated with the work of Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit of March 1997 to arrive at a "START III" treaty. This treaty would reduce by 80% the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers during the Cold war and would also maintain the ABM Treaty as a basis for reciprocal, strategic security.

Finally, on September 1 St, 2000, in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, Clinton announced his decision not to authorize the formation of a NMD system. He cited the lack of trust in the maturity of technology, Russian opposition to any modification of the ABM Treaty, and persistent international opposition even from Allies.

THE ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM OF PRESIDENT BUSH

During the electoral campaign, the Republican candidate for President, George W. Bush, confirmed his desire to achieve an effective anti-missile defense based on the best available options at the earliest possible date.

Therefore, with his victory, the program became a priority of defense politics and the fact that Bush chose Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, the author of the "Missile Threat Report" of 1998, clearly indicated the direction.

The new program of defense politics planned a new approach to deterrence which would have reduced the dependence of the United States on nuclear weapons. Regarding the question of the eventual use of their nuclear weapons, the "Nuclear Posture Review" and the "National Security Strategy" expressed respectively the re-examination of the nuclear position and the National security strategy of the Bush Administration (complete with the capacity for defense against precise attacks with conventional weapons).

A consistent component of the new nuclear arsenal should be a modernization to make it capable of destroying bunkered weapons depots and to "burn" chemical and biological weapons without dispersing them into the atmosphere. Until now, this preventive action could not be conducted by any other means.

The Strategy of Decapitation would thus be possible. In the scheme of these strategies some involved were already calling this new strategy Fourth Generation War or Dissuasion of Force to the Insane.

This is reminiscent of the French concepts, structures and doctrines of "From Weakness to Strength" during the Cold War which, from a speculative point of view, foresaw a situation in

An "Aster 30" immediately after launching.

which the Soviets could find themselves in similar difficulties as those confronting the United States.

Regarding these capacities, the United States intended to develop a missile defense capable of intervening with all types of ballistic missiles: intercontinental, medium range, and short range, as well as intervening in all 3 phases of a launch: boost phase, mid-course phase, and the terminal phase.

The system was considered much more urgent after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 as a defense of the American territory against a threat from Rogue Nations.

11 September had at least 4 specific effects on the American Administration: it consolidated the emphasis that Bush had from the start of defense as a primary means of confronting the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), less priority to the tools of diplomacy, control of exports, means of verifying treaties, and arms control, pushing a dramatic urgency to empower Homeland Defense, changing their initially skeptical attitude towards programs of Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia, and adopting a much harder position against Rogue Nations, some of which, according to Bush, constitute an Axis of Evil.

The accelerated work on a missile defense program pushed the American President to announce on 12 December, 2001 a part from unilateral reductions of nuclear missiles from the strategic forces to a level of between 1,700–2,200 by 2010 (a position presented to Putin on 14 November during the American/Russian summit in Washington and finalized with the signing of the "The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" in May, 2002), a retreat from the ABM Treaty to allow a continuation of testing (there would be two tests on 14 July and 5 December, both crowned successes) and to begin work in Alaska on the interceptor missile silos and the Defense Command Center at Fort Greeley.


By 2004–2006 the objectives of the Missile Defense Agency which by now aimed for a global cover were the following: interception capacity at mid-course achieved with missiles based on land in Alaska, interception capacity provided by Navy Standard Missile–3 mounted onboard 3 Ticonderoga class cruisers and all equipped with Aegis, 15 others equipped with Radar Spy–1 systems modified to support the functions, an airplane based prototype laser system, a follow through of the technological development and



placement of Patriot–PAC3 missiles, and an initial operation of THAAD.

CONCLUSIONS

The actual systems in the development phase consist of satellites equipped with IR sensors to locate launch sites, EW land-based radar and X-Band radar for tracking which are on board naval



ships and at least 8 different kinetic energy systems(missile interception) and direct energy systems (Lasers).

The Ground- Based-mid-Course-Defense system, even if characterized by a limited capacity, is actually placed in 9 underground launch silos each containing a single interception missile. Seven of these are installed at Fort Greeley, Alaska, the last of which was installed 18 September, and two are installed at Vandenberg Air base, California. In the coming years more silos will be built. The inter-

ceptors are capable of guaranteeing only partial protection to the west coast of the United States in confrontation with attacks coming from Asia and appearing over the Pacific Ocean. The Bush Administration is, however, evaluating the possibility of expanding the existing system as a missile defense from Eastern Europe and as a protection in a confrontation that may come from the Middle east.

Finally, according to the long term program, by 2020 the anti-missile defense of the United States

Right.
Placing the first GMD in its silo at Fort Greely, Alaska.

Facing page.
A laser employed in the antimissile-defence project.

should consist of other land-based missiles and others on naval ships, a constellation of alert and tracking satellites: from 24-40 satellites equipped with laser systems capable of striking a target as far as 4,000 km away, as well as a group of 7 Boeing 747s armed with laser cannons. Five of the planes could be employed in a theater of operations with two aircraft on continuous patrol at an altitude of 12,000-13,000 meters and hundreds of kilometers from the border of an enemy nation, ready to attack ballistic missiles in their acceleration phase.

Such a system would allow for the interception of ballistic missiles in all three phases of their trajectory and in any part of the world where they may be launched.


It seems clear that space will be the next technological frontier of the United States. It is reasonable to suppose that all of the experience gathered during the development of various defense programs, above all SDI, will find other outlets not only as those anti-missile components already highlighted, but as offensive weapons as well. It is very likely that in the near future the question of "killer" satellites will return to front stage.

On the other hand, it is significantly clear that the United States, with the complete Command Restructuring carried out in 1992, have fused the Space Command and the Strategic Command into a single command called Stratcom (with headquarters at Offutt Air Base, Nebraska).

Today many countries are capable of building an atomic bomb and even one would confer an enormous strategic advantage to the possessor. Let us not forget that even one is infinitely more powerful than none. There is the danger that the most dangerous weapons could end up in the hands of the worst. The anti-missile defense represents a potentially good and valid idea if it is a continuation of new discoveries.

In conclusion, it seems credible to think that the Aristotelian principle of revenge should be abandoned because it is morally unacceptable as a military strategy. It is useful to follow the path of research we are attending to and to the Kantian principle of respect for Nations according to moral principles of universal validity.

Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi
Expert in Strategic Sciences



TECHNE



DARPA
GRAND CHALLENGE

TRANSPO

RAMMAX

FASTENAL

ArvinMeritor

ITL

FATON

ARMOR HOLDINGS

21

FINISH



THE LAND ROBOTS

TECHNE

THE LAND ROBOTS

Where should they be employed and with what objectives?

The Armed Forces and the Defence Industry are working full speed on the design of complex systems not necessarily destined to replace man, but rather to integrate and increase his combat capabilities.



The helicopter lands without wobbling and within a few seconds a wheeled vehicle rolls down the ramp and leaves immediately the aircraft, which then takes off and continues its flight. Some hours later the same scene takes place the other way around on another site: the wheeled vehicle arrives on the envisaged spot of its retrieval, the helicopter lands, embarks it and they fly together towards the base of departure. A scene of this type could seem an ordinary helitransport operation, but the substantial difference is that during the loading/unloading phases of the vehicle, no man has been seen controlling the activities of the vehicle during its descent and ascent phases; actually no man has been seen driving the vehicle and, coming to think of it, there was no pilot on board of the helicopter! Science fiction? Not exact-

Title pages.

An Oshkosh truck on its arrival at the DARPA Grand Challenge 2005.

Above.

PACBOT vehicle equipped with a camera mounted on an extensible support, remote-controlled by an operator.

ly, considering that last autumn a non-piloted helicopter has put on the ground a robotic vehicle, which, after travelling some distance, has been retrieved and carried to the point of departure. It is by now an established fact that robotics is about to "invade" the field of military operations: the American programme "Future Combat Systems" envisages autonomous air and land systems,

although the time for their realization depends mainly on the level of autonomy required. A milestone in the field of land robots was set, still last autumn, with the "Grand Challenge" competition, organized by the US DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) which witnessed five competitors complete the 132-mile itinerary (over 210km) entirely on a off-road vehicle. Meanwhile, at a lower technological level, other smaller robots are operating in Iraq and Afghanistan in the hands of the US military.

How and where should the land robot systems be employed in the present scenarios? And what are the aims that the Armies intend to achieve with the employment of these systems? The answer to the latter question is simple enough: the non-piloted vehicles are employed first of all to reduce the risks for the personnel. The robotic systems therefore enter into play in potentially dangerous situations, not necessarily to replace man but at least to warn him in good time about an impending danger. If one considers the UAVs as robotic flying systems, as they in fact are, clearly they allow the soldier on the ground to "see" much more than what Mother Nature permits him, and to prepare himself to face or avoid dangerous situations. The same warning can be given by a land robotic system that in some cases can also intervene to remove the threat: it is the case of the Talon robots (employed by the explosive ordnance disposal units), SWORDS (Special Weapon Observation Reconnaissance Detection System - a Talon armed with a light machine gun) and Pacbots deployed by the US Army and the US Marine Corps in Iraq, employed mainly for the reconnaissance of zones potentially infested with improvised explosive devices. If UAVs are free to move in the air according to pre-established routes or following corrections imposed to them through radio commands by an operator on the ground, and those sensors can be directed on a target and then follow it automatically, today's land robots are essentially radio-controlled vehicles that follow the directions coming from the console for what concerns movement, orientation of the visual sensors and the possible attackers'. This limits their range and applications considerably.

The technological level of a robot can be linked to the level of independence from the operator that the vehicle can maintain during the conduct of a complex operation. Robots that necessitate a man to operate them carry advantages only for what regards the safety of the operator; if this is a short-term important objective; at medium-long-term the Armies intend to entrust robotized systems with relatively simple tasks, which imply not only a reduction of risk but also a cut in the necessary manpower and increase the systems' effec-



A SWORDS vehicle armed with a light machine gun.

tiveness. Just think of a motor column of supplies consisting only of robots: the risk of human losses would be nil, and consequently it would be possible to spare considerably on armouring, increasing the payload (excepting particularly sensitive materials). What would happen in case of enemy attack? Would it be convenient to leave the column to its fate, maybe equipping it with self-destruction systems in order not to let the supplies fall in the hands of the enemy, or would it be better to equip the vehicles with self-defence systems? What would happen if the robotized guidance system were unable to understand if an obstacle along the road is really insurmountable? Would the vehicle autonomously be able to find an alternative road or to make the decision to retrace its steps? Should all this be done by the vehicle in total autonomy or it would be better to keep a remote link with a control station, from where an operator could intervene, deciding on the basis of the panoramic images sent by additional sensors




The vehicles especially designed for clearing explosive devices reduce the risk of human losses in operation theatres.

placed on the means of transport (different from those employed for guiding the vehicles) or by sending there a drone, which observing the scene from above would amplify the field of vision and facilitate even more motivated decisions? After all, already now the conductors of the logistic columns in Iraq avail themselves of images from above to have a full knowledge of the situation on the sector, and the same conductors maintain a continuous radio link with the bases of departure, arrival and possible transit; why should a robotized truck be able to do it all on its own?

All these and other considerations are being examined by the Armed Forces and by the Industry, which have also identified intermediate solutions. Next to the abovementioned employments concerning the detection of improvised explosive devices in zone of limited extent and usually under man's control, robotic vehicles are now being planned which are aimed at incrementing the scouting capabilities of means such as, for

example, the Fennek, adopted by the Dutch and German Armies: the Bundeswehr in fact intends to equip some of its Fenneks with scout robots, and some German firms are working on radio-controlled light systems, which will allow the mother-vehicle to observe hard-to-reach zones or avoid to expose oneself to unnecessary risks. In the family of the US Future Combat Systems there are three land robots (in addition to as many as four classes of UAVs). ARV, or Armed Robotic Vehicle, a five-ton vehicle on a wheeled hull 6x6, in an assault version and a reconnaissance, survey and target acquisition (RSTA) version, both transportable by CH-47 helicopters. SUGV (Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle), conceived like the small tracked Pacbot, now employed in Iraq, destined to reconnaissance, especially in urban environments and in zones difficult to enter, such as tunnels, sewer systems and caverns; it is equipped with modular sensors of various types (optical, chemical). Finally, the MULE (Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment vehicle), a 2,5-ton, wheeled (or tracked) 6x6 robot, highly mobile thanks to a system of articulated suspensions, equipped with the same Autonomous Navigation System (ANS) of the ARV and of three different mission packages: transport, demining and light attack. The MULE will operate in direct support of the teams, transporting their load (up to more than a ton), ensuring the function of mine detection, signalling and neutralization, as well as supplying support fire and reconnaissance. The autonomous navigation system of the MULE and the ARV will allow the vehicles to move with full autonomy but also to be operated by remote control, while the SUGV will function only by remote control, starting from a portable console. On board the MGV (Manned Ground Vehicle), the piloted vehicle that will be produced in numerous versions, there will also be the ANS, whose data supplied to the robotic vehicles will provide the connection between the column leader and the follower when required. The FCS (Future Combat System) developing team works in close connection with the DARPA, and therefore the results of the Grand Challenge, held in October 2005, will certainly have an influence also on the future robots of the US Army.

The second competition among robotic vehicles – the first had witnessed the failure of all the prototypes presented, also due to the limited time allowed to fine-tune the systems – had a remarkable success of participants. More than 23 participated in the final out of 195 that had presented themselves for the qualifying round. Many compared the results to the first flight of the Wright brothers, which took place a little over a hundred years ago. The racecourse,



Some versions of MULE.

entirely off-road, was marked by numerous waypoints, more or less numerous according to the orography of the zone crossed. In the end only five vehicles were able to go all the way; they were mostly modified off-road vehicles, the first of which, baptized "Stanley" and realized by the Stanford University, on the whole employed 6 hours, 53 minutes and 58 seconds, at an average of 30 km per hour, followed by three others. The fifth vehicle arrived beyond the time limits of 10 hours, having covered the distance in 12 hours and 51 minutes, but it was also the heaviest and bulkiest of them all, for it was a 16-ton Oshkosh truck. One of the vital elements of the system of automatic navigation of this vehicle was of particular interest for Italy. The system called TerraMax, the artificial vision system, came from our Country and precisely from the Artificial Vision and Intelligent Systems Lab of the Department of Information Engineering of the University of Parma. Based on daylight cameras, the system was entirely passive, an essential thing in view of possible

military developments, and was based on three sensors on the front of the vehicle; in order to exploit the stereoscopic effect it is necessary to employ two cameras simultaneously, and the triangulation capability must be gauged on the distance. Hence the need to have a base more or less wide according to the speed and distance of the obstacles, therefore the spaces between the cameras were different, providing spacing respectively of 0.5, 1.0 and 1.5 metres. At minimum speeds, under 15 km/h, the closest cameras were employed, between 15 and 30 km/h, those at a distance of one metre, and over 30 km/h, the most distant ones. Besides the cameras, the TerraMax carried a four-plane laser-scanner in front, and two simpler laser-scanners on the sides, in order to follow the roadside. The front laser-scanner and the cameras completed each other in detecting the



the far infrared and two cameras in the visible spectrum, which create two separate systems whose data are then fused in order to ensure an all-weather navigation. According to the engineers of the Parma University the research is rather advanced, and the vision aspect can now be solved at very low cost, owing to the price of cameras and the calculation power of normal computers; the critical element remains the development of the algorithm, but also here the researches launched already several years ago have produced their fruits and the experience

Left.

A vehicle employed for clearing explosive devices.

Below.

A 6x6 MULE vehicle equipped with its autonomous navigation system.

obstacles, since the former could not "see" some of them, while the optical system, being of a daylight type, could not steer the vehicle inside tunnels. The only critical situation occurred during a windstorm on the initial flatland, on the bottom of a lake, where the storming sand and dust almost blinded the system, which also here proved to be very similar to a human being. A GPS system was obviously also present, to enable the vehicle to head for the following waypoint. The speed was regulated automatically according to the narrowing of the spaces and the presence of obstacles. The main reason that made the Oshkosh truck overrun the time limit is apparently connected with its dimensions; considering that among the obstacles that had to be overcome there were very narrow passages among shrubs, underpasses and a mountain pass with a winding road, it is easy to guess that cars had the edge on the truck. Nevertheless, from the experimental viewpoint the TerraMax' results have been perhaps more complete: just think that in some underpasses the truck was forced to stop, had to manoeuvre in order to align itself perfectly and then passed leaving on its right and left a space of only 12 cm. The same can be said for the mountain stretch of the road, where on several occasions the truck was forced to manoeuvre in order to overcome the hairpin bends. The laboratory of the Parma University is now developing a navigation system with two sensors in



gathered until now permits to look confidently to concrete developments in the near future. Certainly, before achieving a full autonomy there are still many problems to be solved, first of all the knowledge of the type of obstacle in front of us; but, as we said before, the autonomy of the vehicle does not preclude the possibility of help from outside, and if during the action a close collaboration between piloted and non-piloted systems is probable, the complete autonomy could be used, for example, to lead the robotic system back to the friendly lines in case of interruption of the connection.

The "man in the loop" principle will probably continue to be valid for a long time for what concerns the weapon component; in fact it is hardly conceivable that, especially as regards lethal

Right.
A MULE in action.

Below.
A tracked vehicle employed in reconnaissance activities, surveillance of the battlefield and target acquisition.

weapons, it could be possible to entrust to entirely automated systems the acquisition-identification-targeting-firing cycle, especially in a land environment, where sometimes, as in case of other-than-war operations, it is not sufficient to identify the target as "unfriendly" (this in the future will be simplified by the presence of IFF systems on the battlefield) but one must evaluate its more or less hostile attitude and proportion the response accordingly. But to do this one should be able to replicate human intelligence and nourish it with the experience and the notions that a human being acquires all along his life, but this is not possible yet.

Having spoken about robotics applied to vehicles, there is another type of system that interests the Armed Forces: it is the exoskeleton, a biomechanical system that permits to utilize a mechanical system as man's "force amplifier", giving him a speed, force and resistance greater than he normally has. If an infantryman (for example one of the Special Forces) could carry a heavier weight, he could attain a greater autonomy or firepower on the ground, while, if necessary, he could reach a speed sufficient to disengage from an enemy, or could generate a force in his upper limbs sufficient to solve crisis situations. For example, the same force given to a sapper would enable him to put up a bridge without the employment of a crane, with movements much more precise because they would be directly pantographed from those on his arm. Sci-fi? Probably not really that much: also in Italy a research programme launched in 2003 by the General Secretariat of Defence, called "Advanced applications in the military field of robotic technologies of teleoperation", with the active collaboration of the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento "S. Anna" of Pisa and the "Signo Motus" company of Messina. Initially the idea was to equip the operator of an engineer tank with a system including only the upper limbs, but now the system is apparently evolving towards a complete exoskeleton including also the lower limbs. In this case one of the main problems is not so much that of transmitting force, but rather that of grading it: an excessive grip on a relatively fragile object




could damage it and it is therefore necessary for the mechanical "hand" to have sensors that transmit to the operator's hand the sensations that usually one feels in getting hold of an object. The same is true for speed, which in case of systems destined to assemble particular parts must be limited, so as to make a precision job possible without necessitating micrometric movements from the operator.

Here also the applications are manifold and the technologies are now reaching a level of maturity sufficient to approach to the real world what until a few years ago was conceivable only in fantasy tales. Vis-à-vis such innovative systems, an accurate analysis of the requisites will be of great importance, in order to concentrate the scarce resources on the systems that may represent the real force multipliers in the military environment.

Paolo Valpolini
Journalist

/// RIVISTA MILITARE



1856

**150 YEARS OF
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RIVISTA MILITARE

MILITARE

RIVISTA

Maggio - Giugno 1993
Lire 4.000

Spedizione
in abbonamento
postale
Gruppo IV - 70%

RIVISTA MILITARE
PERIODICO
DELL'ESERCITO
FONDATO NEL
1956



★ UMBERTO COLO
Tecnologia e svolti
nei prossimi anni

6
Novembre
Dicembre
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Euro 2,10



RIVISTA MILITARE

PERIODICO DELL'ESERCITO FONDATO NEL 1956

UN GRAN



Una democrazia
universale


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RIVISTA MILITARE



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
«RIVISTA MILITARE» IS 150 YEARS OLD

The message of the Army through the covers of this ancient magazine

“Rivista Militare” can be considered a prism that reflects and synthesizes on its covers separate stories that travel side by side: the civil and social evolution of the Country, the changes in the international scenarios and, therefore, in the concept of defence, the transformations of the military institution and its capability of communication following the progress of technology.

The periodical press is a power. It is actually the only power of modern times. It is that because of the means at its disposal and for the very nature of its apostolate; because it speaks and insists; it links the virtues of strong convictions with those of long-lasting customs; it speaks to all and everyone, to the multitudes as well as the individual; it strikes all the notes that vibrate in the human soul; it travels rapidly and at a set hour through the entire Country to which its word is destined; it ploughs through it, penetrates it, so to speak; it meddles with everything; it employs every faculty; it doubles all forces; it is for the intellect what steam is for the industry. It is with the passion of these words that in 1836 Giuseppe Mazzini was explaining the irreplaceable function that information performs in society. One could add, borrowing an expression from Arthur Miller, that the press is a nation that speaks to itself, meaning for this latter the link, strong and elusive at the same time, that distinguishes a people that is conscious of being the custodian of common patrimonies and destinies.

The spirit of this reasoning turns out to be useful for introducing a reflection on a historical magazine such as “Rivista Militare”, which, born in the time of the Risorgimento, has accompanied the life of our Country till the present. Leafing through the issues of the review along the many years of its existence assumes a twofold value: on the one side it permits to go back over the most important stages of the life of our Army and of our society, of which the military institution is an expression. On the other, it is like to witness the itinerary of an institution, which has taken shape and evolved along the times while always abiding by its principles. In short, one could say that by telling the story of this review one tells the story of an idea. The idea that in 1856 two Officers of the Bourbon



The first issue of «Rivista Militare».

army, who had settled in Piedmont, brought forth driven by the need to create a free arena of opinions, open to study and discussion on military issues.

It was therefore an instrument destined not only to record the events, the developments, the aspirations and the turning points of the Army, but also a real field of cultural battles aimed at catalysing the debate and the innovative sugges-

tions of a dialectic spirit, aware that, in agreement with Plato's teaching, when two or more stones clash, the fire of knowledge is born. In this sense "Rivista Militare" along the years has, so to speak, worn a double attire: that of means of diffusion of the military thought and, at the same time, that of formation of an analogous culture. Having being conceived as a modern instrument of participation of the military base to the choices of the summit, the magazine has eventually revealed its potentialities becoming a means of information for the technical-professional updating of the personnel, but also a way of making civil society aware of the problems of defence.

Here we propose to sketch out an analysis of this history that runs through two centuries of Italian life. An analysis which, in its attempt at being original, limits its scope to a particular field of vision: that of the covers of the magazine, convinced that, living in a society more and more dominated by images, where the new technologies are transforming at an inconceivable speed the ways of producing information, this choice may represent a thought-provoking key of interpretation.

Today, in fact, any journalistic product tries to define its own specific identity so as to make it recognizable by the public among the competing newspapers. Therefore, the periodical press, particularly when specialized, at present does not just transmit defined information contents, but tends also to construct and project its own image. In this sense the cover performs a strategic function, because it represents not only a showcase of the contents proposed by the review but is, above all, the "face" of the magazine. As acutely suggested by Mario Garvia, one of the main scholars of "media" and "design" of the American newspapers, readers do not devote more than ten seconds to the first page. It is not the object of study but rather a stimulus to which one reacts. In the light of these considerations, one understands that what assumes significance is not only the fact that a cover carries certain news rather than others, but also the way the news are placed and their graphics are elements that can carry a specific meaning.

At present a cover, in order to win away a reader from the competition, usually tries to create a strong visual impact, which often relies on the employment of a good photograph: the cover is in fact the portion of the editorial product where the visual element is exasperated. The analysis that we propose here aims at studying the organization of the expressive plan of the cover of "Rivista Militare" (i.e. its format, paging, graphics, plastic analysis and chromatisms of the pictures) trying to understand the function performed for the reader,

as well as the relation that does, or does not, create with the organization of its contents. Today the journalistic text, in fact, takes the shape not only of a syncretic text that employs two codes (verbal and visual), sometimes in a complementary and sometimes in a parallel way but, as analysts Calabrese and Violi explain, is above all a relational text, i.e. a kind of mosaic where not only the single elements are significant, but also their relations.


If, as Susan Sontag points out, memory resorts to "freeze-frame"; in an era overflowing with information, covers, exactly like photographs can supply a rapid way of learning and fixing in our memory a particular historical event, a personage, an epoch.

In this sense the Review can be considered a kind of prism that on its cover reflects and synthesises at the same time separate stories that travel side by side: the Country's civil and social evolution, the changes in the international scenarios and therefore in the concept of defence; the transformations of the military institution and its ways of communication following the progresses of technology.

FROM THE «RISORGIMENTO» TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The choice of employing the covers of the Review as a basis of the analysis proposed here actually restricts our field essentially to its most recent editions. As a matter of fact, until 1974 the magazine has appeared in a rather anonymous and simple format. Its cover, with no images, for a long time carried only the name of the magazine on coloured card, which had a protective and presentation function rather than a promotional one. This limits, however, does not exclude the possibility of expressing a reflection also as regards the most ancient numbers of the magazine, starting from the epoch of the Risorgimento.

The Review was founded in Turin, in March 1856 by Luigi and Carlo Mezzacapo, and was first published by the Barera printers in quarterly volumes, each of which grouped three monthly papers. The examination of the format of these first numbers proves the economic difficulties that probably marked the first appearance of the periodical. The medium-small format, typical of a book, (13x21 cm), the modest paper, the black print, the small and close type, the plates covered by a simple paper lining, are the external mark of a second-class typography, as was moreover stated by the word "Economic" printed on the frontispiece of the first volume.



In 1974 the format changes.

The originality of the Review emerges therefore especially from the analysis of its contents. In this regard, it is useful to consider the first pages of this periodical in the bud, devoted to what we could call "programmatic intentions", where the Mezzacapo brothers, complaining about Piedmont's delay in possessing newspapers that dealt with weapons and military science, asserting the inevitable necessity for an Army to have a periodical publication, so that the Officers would not be distracted from the movements of studies and ideas, invited the Officers of all arms and the persons learned in military matters to give their contribution for presenting experiences and suggestions for solving military problems, with the only limit of political questions, useless polemics and personal discussions. It was actually this pluralist and modern formulation that determined the originality of the Review and, at the same time, its longevity. In fact the innovative drive of the founders' idea can be traced to the anticonformism with which the Mezzacapo brothers wanted to address the Italian military thought, which in their opinion was to be intended not restricted to a limited circle of Officers who interpreted the ideology of the summit, but it should rather be expanded to every Army com-

ponent, as a fruit of study and research. These were activities practically unknown by the Armies of those times, where the stress was laid more on practice than on culture.

Another sign of the modernity of the "Rivista" can be found in the close examination of the index placed at the end of the first volume, characterized by a multiplicity of subjects, subdivided in surveys well proportioned among military, scientific and humanistic sciences. Next to the traditional subjects of technical-professional updating there were avant-garde columns, such as military ethics, contemporary and past history, military aphorisms and retrospective and contemporary criticism. These themes, since then, have given the Review its configuration of an instrument intended not only to answer the needs of technical and scientific preparation but also, in a strictly conservative environment, to spur public criticism on the most interesting military questions.

Another line, indicated in the programme of the Mezzacapo brothers and destined to survive the passing of time, was the attention given to the military experiences abroad and the topical presentation of the Magazine: every study and proposal should have been linked to the military reality of the moment and precisely for this reason the "Rivista" predisposed the "Military Chronicle" section, thus underlining even more the need to have a real contact with the current events.

After the first year the magazine was forced to interrupt the publications for four months because of financial difficulties: only a hundred subscriptions had been made, while there should have been at least three hundred in order to meet just the printing expenses. But it was only a short interruption: in 1857, in fact, the periodical resumed its publications thanks to the support of young editor Carlo Voghera. The most evident novelty of this second edition, from the purely formal point of view, consists in the indication of the new printer, "G. Cassone", specialized in military publications, and therefore more suited to sponsor the effort of the Mezzacapo brothers.

Anyway, until the eve of the First World War, the graphic analysis of the covers of the magazine does not suggest evident innovations, excluding the edition of 1859 when the review, by becoming the "Rivista Militare Italiana", took an adjectivation, which on the one side represented a good omen and, on the other emphasized the national vision through which, already from the first issues, the national military problems were considered.

In 1869, the periodical, while remaining in the hands of the Voghera publisher, passed under the control of the War Ministry: this fact, while from

the one side assured the means necessary for its edition and diffusion, at the same time it gave it a greater authority, at least until the issue of December 1918 when, because of the war events, the Publisher was forced to suspend the publications.

In 1927, the publications started again following the decision of the War Ministry and were entrusted to the General Staff Corps, which in the beginning assumed the edition and the technical-military direction of the Review and subsequently acquired its publishing property and entrusted its printing to the "Tipografia Regionale" in Rome.

The format of the reborn Review was simple: medium size (22x16cm), Bodoni type, modest paper, the colour of the cover was grey-green (like the uniforms of the time), the print was black, with the exception of the headline that was impressed in red. It was however a brief experience that lasted only seven years. The frequent rotation of its directors represents, from the formal point of view, the most evident sign of the moral and intellectual difficulties that hit the periodical in those years.

The end of the Second World War reawakened the stimulus to discuss the problems of the Army with a new vigour. This is proved by the numerous changes in the graphics of its cover that the magazine experimented in those years. The traditionally protective function of the cover was flanked by that of presentation page of the magazine's contents.

THE WHITE PERIOD BETWEEN INNOVATION AND TRADITION

Starting from 1974 "Rivista Militare" underwent such a deep transformation of its format that it represented almost a formal separation from the past. The change concerns first of all its format: the medium-small dimensions of the preceding years, typical of the academic reviews, are replaced by larger-size pages (28x21cm), typical of most periodicals circulating in Italy in those years. The format permitted not only to contain more information and place it in an orderly way, but also to easily include different elements (text and iconographic display). Already this choice by itself contributes to create a sensation of a new and less traditional review, intended for a more modern and informal public.

Also the type of pagination adopted reflects the wish to offer a more dynamic modality of fruition: the text is distributed in a more uniform manner, using sometimes two columns, besides the three and often five columns, according to a not-always

vertical trend. This is a layout that not only gives rhythm to reading, enlivening the rigidity of the previous model, but at the same time transmits an effect of composite sense, which emphasizes the pluralist character of the contents of the "Rivista", which also visually appears as the fruit of the contribution of various enunciators.

Another graphic element that lets us reflect on the wish common to the transformations adopted during these years concerns the choices regarding the type, the so-called lettering. In fact, if on the one side one wants to modernize the Review by experimenting innovative and informal colours, stiles and types in the headlines of the articles, on the other the will to project the image of an authoritative and institutional Review emerges clearly from the choice to keep for the body of the text a small, classic format, which gives it an overall visual effect of a dense and not much differentiated whole, difficult for the eye to penetrate.

All these typically graphic elements (format, number of columns, type style and dimension) thus contribute to define a new identity of the magazine, which, while maintaining the character of a periodical of technical analysis, in line with its ancient and famous tradition, does not hide its wish to be up to the times, as was moreover made clear by an editorial in no. 6 of 1974 that explained to the readers the meaning of the new format.

Actually the effort common to all the changes introduced in this period seems to be that of making up a product that is in constant pursuit of a balance between innovation and tradition.

The most evident sign in this sense is offered by the numbering of the Review: the first number of 1974, in fact, bears the words "Anno XCVII" on the upper left side of the cover, underlining the ideal continuity of the new series with the Risorgimento spirit of the periodical. The message that such choice implies is evident: the intention is that of livening up the Review without altering it.

Another indication is the choice of the colours adopted for the background of the cover (white) and for the name of the magazine, placed on the upper right, on two lines, with rounded type (black): also in this case the choice privileges neutral tones which reflect the wish to connote the magazine with an overall character of sobriety, respecting the absolute non-political position and moderation of tones that the Mezzacapo brothers wished since its foundation. Moreover, for the first time, the initials of the magazine (RM) are placed before the name of the periodical. In every number the initials are printed in a different colour, the same used for the frame of the photo-

graph printed on the cover as well as for the frame of the lower plate, where the initials are repeated and positioned at the centre. These simple graphic ornaments actually show the elegance of the periodical and the meditation with which the cover has been studied; moreover the preciousity and refinement of the Review emerges also from the glossy and thick quality of the paper employed for its pages and for the cover itself.

But the most evident novelty that marks the new format is doubtlessly the introduction of a colour photograph on the cover, which takes up about three fifths of the space. Also this choice is clearly suggested by the wish to adapt "Rivista Militare" to the aesthetic innovations of the other periodicals of the time.

Beginning from the second postwar period, also in our Country photojournalism started to characterize all the editorial production of the periodical press, following the pattern of American magazine "Life", which, particularly in Italy, created a school. The opening and greater flexibility of the pagination, together with the inevitable progress in photographic technology and transmission (just think of the appearance of light and handy cameras such as the Leika, but also the employment of rotogravure, telex and telephoto and the appearance of television) permitted to rethink the spaces and weight of the image, giving it increasing importance. Thus it became more and more evident the image's power to form public opinion in a manner sometimes more incisive than words, owing to some characteristics typical of the photographic medium, such as universality, immediacy and symbolic potentiality.

At the same time a debate started in Italy on the photographic language, which developed within the wider linguistic, semiologic problems, which, starting from the sixties, hit also the image field. Initially the discussion was centred on the mimetic conception of photography, i.e. on its capability of mechanical reproduction of the reality produced by the images. But soon various scholars challenged the assumed innocence of the dark room and the photo's very objectivity: Roland Barthes, for example, although acknowledging the causal relation that links a photograph to reality, deconstructed the referential illusion of the photograph, underlining how this necessarily must operate a manipulation of its external point of reference.

These brief considerations offer a valid support for understanding the images proposed on the covers of "Rivista Militare" starting from 1974.

The photographs normally refer to the third "banner" on the cover, which refers to the internal column "Arms and Services" and concerns a Service or a Speciality of the Service (Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers and Signal Corps).

Nevertheless the photos do not show a direct or evident link to the event with which they are connected: i.e. they are not news snapshots but images intentionally decontextualized with a marked artistic effect. Just consider the cover of number 3 of 1974, which shows a close-up of a detail of a soldier's boot on a green meadow and an airplane gliding against a red sunset. Not only the unnatural colours but also the grainy and blurred contours of the photograph produce an evident evocative effect rather than that of a presence.

The link with the paratroops is explained by a caption on the frontispiece which points out the will and self-control that are necessary to parachute, the familiarity with difficult situations, the example of the Commanders, the deep harmony among the units and the indomitable aggressiveness that are indispensable for conducting tough land combat, in prosecution of dangerous air transfers. The written text, in this case, has a double anchoring function vis-à-vis the photo, for it fixes the precise meaning that the picture must transmit and, at the same time, it determines the sense-paths of the message. It should be noticed that also the caption, like the photo, does not have a really journalistic tone: it does not say where the photo was shot, who is its author and the name of the subject portrayed, but rather it describes in rhetoric and celebrating terms the series of values of a military category.

Referring to a typology recently proposed by Lorusso and Violi in a book devoted to the semiotics of journalism, one can place these photographs within the category of symbol-images, whose aim is not to document but to carry out a function of interpretation and mythicization. One deals with images representing the Army's figurative universe that refer to the sphere of the ideals at stake in this context.

Besides the mentioned effect of distance from reality, one should point out how the photographs published on the cover of 1974 portray, always and only, military subjects: an expedient that defines the periodical as a sectorial review addressed to a specific public. This is also confirmed by the quotation on the frontispiece (which from now on we are going to adopt as qualifying element of our analysis) that presents the magazine: *Rivista Militare's purpose is to expand and update the technical-professional preparation of Officers and NCOs of the Army. To this end it constitutes an organ of diffusion of the military thought and arena of study and debate on subjects concerning the Army's sphere of competence. It presents moreover a survey of the most qualified foreign press and develops topical technical and scientific subjects.*

It is therefore clear that the Review's intention is not to inform the Italian citizen about the military thought and the problems of security. Its aim is to be an instrument of scientific updating for the military personnel.

The overall effect that one derives from these considerations on the covers on 1974 (in its visual and textual aspects) transmits on the whole the image of a military class wrapped up in itself, that somehow reflects the situation in which the Italian Army lived around the seventies vis-à-vis public opinion. Some authors trace the origin of the difficult relations between the Army and the Italian society back to the institutional and military collapse of 1943, and to the connected wish to forget the defeat as soon as possible. Militarism became then a synonym of Fascism and the Armed Forces were associated to concepts like aggression, war and defeat. A diffuse antimilitarist sentiment was thus nourished which, on the other hand, ended by being functional to the bipolar confrontation, where the Army represented one of the few proofs of the Italian partnership in the Atlantic Alliance. This split between the Army and the civil society grew wider between the sixties and the seventies on the spur of the student protest and the crisis of the traditional values. It was fed with news regarding assumed deviations attributed to some Top Brass, which questioned the democratic spirit of the Armed Forces. Finally, between the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, it was channelled into the wider process of delegitimization that hit all the State institutions. All these factors caused a deep split between the Army and public opinion, which for a long time remained centred on the denial of the validity, usefulness and legitimacy of the military institution, to the point that it fed an endemic refusal of military service, which was sometimes endured as a true affliction. On the other hand, one must acknowledge that, as underlined by Leonardo Prizzi in a recent publication, on the military side there was no willingness to bring the truth to light: to a society presented as hostile, the response was an equal and contrary prejudicial hostility.

Actually an attempt at realizing an ample national debate on the problems of defence was made in 1975, together with the decision to implement a deep reorganization of the Armed Forces. Also "Rivista Militare" was involved in this debate, as witnessed by the covers of the biennium 1975-76, entirely devoted to the process of modernization and renewal of the Army.

In this regard, the covers of 1975 deserve a special consideration; unlike those of the preceding year they bear no photograph but only optical-style drawings: in this case it is the caption on the frontispiece that shows the reading paths of the

image and facilitates an immediate understanding. The choice of employing the geometric images fashionable at the time, strongly characterized by colour and dynamism, may perhaps be connected with the wish to communicate an unconscious sense of modernity, novelty and evolution, in line with the progress experienced in those years by the military structure.

Starting from the last number of 1975 the process of reorganization of the Army is again represented on the cover of the "Rivista" through symbolic images: in fact, photographs (grainy, and therefore highly evocative) of antique toy-soldiers, cannons of the eighteenth century and military symbols such as war flags, are used all along 1976, almost to reassure that the changes underway were in any case inspired by and anchored to the respect of the past and the traditions. As there is no evident link between the photographs and the event, it is again the caption that fixes the precise meaning that the image must transmit and whose function appears therefore essentially explanatory: referring to a historical and paradigmatic inventory of the memory it offers the clue for reading the information.

Close-ups of young officers are repropounded in the biennium 1977-78: in this case the caption describes a particular military training school. The

The first number of 1975. The optical style.




novelty of these issues this time resides in the connection with the index: in these number, in fact, the photo on the cover not only refers to a header but points out to a subject that is analysed in depth with two or more articles.

Number 3 of 1977deserves a particular comment: in this case it is a highly symbolic photograph, intentionally constructed to communicate a message thought to be of high importance. On the forefront, on the right, there is a coat-stand with military caps of various foreign armies hanging on it. On the left, the cap of the Italian Army stands out on a desk, where there are different periodicals, among which "Rivista Militare" takes a prominent place. In the background, a beam of light enters through a large window. In this case the caption is decisive, for the photograph is neither connected with an easily identifiable subject nor to an article of the Review. Instead, it concerns an event full of meanings for the public of the periodical: in fact, as is explained by the caption, the image wants to emphasize the first meeting of "Rivista Militare" that has taken place on the occasion of the anniversary of the Treaties of Rome.

In 1979 the magazine makes the experiment of proposing on the cover an image that does not expressly recall an article inside, but wants to stress a link between events of topical interest: every edition of that year, in fact, bears on the cover a model of a particular weapon-system which, as explained by a caption on the frontispiece, has been recently adopted, or will soon be adopted, by the Italian Army. In this sense the cover has the function of emphasizing the specialist character of the periodical as means of technical-professional updating of the military personnel, as stressed also by the editorial appeared on the first number of 1980.

In order to understand the sense of these covers we should briefly refer to the spirit of those years. The beginning of the eighties in Italy was characterized by a growing awareness of the vulnerability of the internal and international scenario: the persistence of a significant level of criminality and internal terrorist violence, the marked delegitimization of the institutions, together with an international scenario characterized by a drop of confidence in the spirit of Helsinki, and by the military expansionism of the Soviet army, caused a sharp decline in the general sense of security. Thus, while on the internal plane these years were characterized by a rationalization of the battle against crime and terrorist subversion, at international level they were marked by the Italian Government's decision to deploy on the national territory the "Cruise" and "Pershing-II" NATO medium-range missiles, deemed necessary for re-balancing the massive deployment of analogous missiles, the "SS-20s", carried out by the Soviets.




The third number of 1977. The EMPA Congress.

At the same time, there was a marked interest for the problems of the foreign defence policy.

In this sense, the photographs on the covers of the first two numbers of "Rivista Militare" of 1980, which portray an Italian and a foreign soldier in a friendly and cooperative attitude, are rather significant. Also the numbers of 1982 have an originality of their own, being totally taken up by the reproduction of paintings on the Risorgimento; also in this case the right interpretation of their meaning is given by the caption, which explains that the Minister of Defence had consecrated the year 1982 to Giuseppe Garibaldi. "Rivista Militare" had seized the opportunity and published various articles on the Hero's figure and deeds.

But the true innovative covers, in a certain sense precursors of the immediate future, are those of the last two numbers of 1981, one of which deals with the cooperation realized in those years between the Army and the State Railways, and the other with the anniversary of the earthquake that on the 23rd of November 1980 had hit Campania and Basilicata. For the first time, in fact, the photos on the cover, although not yet related to topicality but with a distinct symbolic value, propose next to the traditional military stereotypes also civil ones. Similarly the caption for the first time extols the work for the community carried out by




Above and right.

The cover of the fifth issue of 1981 underlines the fruitful cooperation existing between the Italian Army and the State Railways, while the following no.6 highlights the intervention of the Service in the assistance of the populations hit by the earthquake of 1980.

the Army. In fact those years marked a turning point in the difficult relations between Army and public opinion, brought about by a diffuse appreciation within the national community for the reliability and efficiency shown by the military units in the numerous activities against terrorisms and of assistance to the population. These activities find their preliminaries in the law of 11 July 1978, n.382, which contains the "Norms of principle on military discipline" which defined the institutional tasks of the Armed Forces and set side by side the traditional task of defending the Mother Country and the contribution to the safeguard of the free institutions and the welfare of the national community in case of public disasters.

THE YELLOW PERIOD: THE DIALOGUE WITH SOCIETY

Starting from 1983, "Rivista Militare" undergoes a new transformation in its format, which involves not only the graphic layout of the cover, but also the selection and the whole set-up of its contents.



Unlike that of 1974, the need that moves this spirit of renewal can be identified not so much in the wish to keep the periodical "abreast of the times", as had happened in the past, but rather that of inserting it "in the times". Starting from that period, all the changes seem to have only one common denominator: to conquer the interest of a large public, in line with the new "look" that the Army had assumed in the opinion of civil society. In fact there is in those years a kind of reversal of the image of the Armed Forces, which set out on a path of wider opening towards the civil world, with the purpose of doing away with the preconceptions and the mutual mistrust that had characterized the relations between the military planet and civil society.

This intention is moreover made clear by the heading of the magazine, placed on the frontispiece, where the traditional purpose of widening and updating the technical-professional preparation of Officers and NCOs is significantly complemented by the Review's wish to inform public opinion about the Army and issues of military interest.

Another typically graphic element that witnesses the wish of the magazine, and therefore of the military institution, to be open to the civilian world is undoubtedly offered by the indication of the price, which for the first time is printed on the cover of the magazine, as a sign that it is sold at newsstands and bookshops.

Also the colour chosen for the background of the cover, which from a neutral white goes to a bright yellow, indicates the wish to present a captivating and immediately identifiable product. In this regard, it is also interesting to note the position of the name of the magazine on the cover: compared to the previous format, it is shifted from the upper right side to a still high but central position, which privileges the "Militare" term placed in a horizontal sense, vis-à-vis the "Rivista", which has a vertical and therefore less evident position. On the other hand, the "trademark" of the magazine, which can define its identity without hesitation, in this edition assumes a discreet but unprecedented visibility: in fact, for the first time the logo of the Army is placed on the cover through a graphic expedient which positions it elegantly on an angle of the central photograph.

This spirit of renewal concerns also the graphics of the contents, where one can observe an intervention aimed at making the product more homogeneous: not only because the text is always set on three columns, but also because the type-size is made uniform and increased. These changes permit a readily available and effortless reading. As regards this, it is also interesting to note that, starting from 1983, commercial advertising enters the magazine together with promotional pictures about the possibility of subscribing to the publication. In relation to the photographic arrangement, one should underline how this assumes a more and more journalistic and news-related set-up, with the purpose of illustrating and completing the information of the articles.

Also the photograph on the cover deserves a special comment, owing to the differences it shows in comparison with the previous format: first of all its position changes and privileges a vertical trend, vis-à-vis the preceding horizontal one; secondly, it is a vividly coloured photograph with precise contours, which in itself produces a greater "effect of presence". A sensation that grows when one considers the photos' subjects: until 1985, in fact, they are soldiers' close-ups, which tend to privilege their countenance, their look, their expression. Resorting to the already-mentioned typology of Lorusso and Violi, the photographs can be set within the category of the emotion-images, whose aim is to transmit an emotional reaction by staging the passions of the protagonists of the events, i.e. hinting at the individual dimension that every incident presents. In this case the photograph produces vis-à-vis the event a substantial enhancement, where the signs of the photographic form are cancelled as far as doing away with captions, in order to increase the illusion of adherence to reality.


But the aspect that more than any other distinguishes the photographs of the covers of these years

is that military subjects are represented together with elements linked to current events and civil society. Just think of the cover of the fifth number of 1985 which portrays the then President of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga and the Minister of Defence, Giovanni Spadolini, during a visit to the "Alpini" Corps; or the cover of no. 6 of 1986 that shows a moment of Pope John Paul II's visit to the military school of the "Alpini". Remarkably, in this period many photographs regard female subjects, in line with the then topical debate about women's military service envisaged by the bill of September 1981.

Moreover, starting from 1986, the covers show another novelty that once more reflects the need to establish a dialogue with civil society that the Army felt in those years: from that date, in fact, in the three banners set on the lower section of the cover (often parallel rather than complementary to the photograph) there are the names of the authors. These are prestigious names of the academic, political, literary and newspapers world of civil society, which witness not only the greater attention given to public opinion, but also the magazine's wish to represent a stimulus for a conscious involvement of all citizens in the problems of the Army.

The turning point of this restored and less controversial relationship between the Army and society can be undoubtedly be found in the consent that followed the Peace Support Operation in Lebanon (no.1 of 1984), which was the most significant Italian military engagement after the War of Liberation, to which, not by chance, "Rivista Militare" dedicated a cover. Even if the Armed Forces of the Republic had been employed in other occasions outside the national territory, the Lebanese mission distinguished itself for the amount of forces and means employed and for the demanding the tasks assigned. Above all, it was a brilliant success for our Army, acknowledged at home and abroad.

After the Lebanon operation, our Armed Forces enter a new period marked by a greater consciousness of the role that Italy can play on the international stage, but also by an increased sense of self-esteem of the Armed Forces and of the national society. Actually the covers of the last numbers of this period (1993-1994) are almost entirely dedicated to "Operation Ibis", coherently with the changed national and international scenario. The peace-support operations in fact characterize the second half of the twentieth century, as a response of the international community to the conflicts started after the fall of the Berlin wall. Their development implies, on the one side a change in the concept of defence and on the other a revision of the military strategy and of the units' attributions. Evolutions that go hand in hand with a new format of "Rivista Militare", starting from 1995.



Above.

The visit of Pope John Paul II to the School of the Alpine Troops is the outstanding event of the sixth issue of 1986.


Right.

The cover of the third number of 1993 is devoted to peacekeeping operations.

THE BLUE PERIOD: THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM

In 1995 the magazine undergoes a new transformation of its format, which is destined to record epochal events, such as the beginning of a new millennium and the adoption of the Euro. From the formal point of view, the size, paging and paper are the same as those of the previous editions, only the graphics of the cover are different: the background is blue crossed by slanting lines, on which the name of the magazine stands out on the upper side printed on two lines in thick red type. The headings are placed on the left, with type that alternates a yellow colour for the title and white for the author. The intentions seem to be that of producing a strong visual impact through an emphasized use of colour.


The attention to the news items that had characterized the layout of the previous numbers is kept and accentuated in the new edition through a proper column "Attualità in breve" (News in short),



which even precedes the index. Also the photographs on the cover reflect this intention: the images in fact portray soldiers in action (almost always close-ups of men in battle dress), contextualized in a real and often identifiable environment. Nearly all the photographs of these years refer to a particular mission of the Army, from Somalia to Yugoslavia, from Albania to Sicily.

With reference to the methodology adopted up to now, one can set these photographs within a category across the "emotions" images and the "document" images, whose aim is to document a particular event giving the proof and substantiation of the facts reported.

Actually, the covers of these years can be divided in two distinct categories: those devoted to the missions abroad and to those on the national territory. Starting from the nineties, in fact, the impact on the concept of security produced by the risks connected with clandestine immigration and organized crime becomes more and more evident, to the point of inducing the Government to confront it through the employment of the Armed Forces, confirming the new legitimization of the military institution as a means to safeguard the national interests. It is in this context that Operation "Pellicano" in Albania and "Forza Paris" and "Vespri Siciliani" on the national territory, take shape and, for the first time, the Army operates in favour of the community outside situations of



Above.
The second issue of 1995. The new graphic.

Right.
The cover of the last number of 1999 introduces the theme of the new millennium.



national disasters. The consent acquired by the Armed Forces in such operations persuaded the Government to increase the employment of the Army against organized crime also in Calabria, Campania and Puglia.

The other category of covers is instead dedicated to the operations in support of peace, to which Italy increasingly committed itself after the Lebanese mission: also in this case the photographs have a strong emotional impact which, by portraying mainly Italian soldiers in informal and friendly attitudes with children or women of the local population, tend to emphasize the humanitarian aspect of the mission, and therefore the legitimacy of the intervention (see for example the cover reproduced on the upper left). At the same time, these are symbolic photographs, for they tend to highlight details more or less immediately connectable to the stereotypes of the peacekeeping operations and to the international bodies.

One last observation concerns the most recent covers, which, while maintaining the structure mentioned before, show some innovations. In fact, starting from 2003, although the covers exhibit

images of a documental quality, they emphasize the illusion of immediacy by choosing a photograph that occupies almost the entire cover, without any kind of frame, almost cancelling the marks of its being set in a photographic form. Nevertheless, these are images that, although representing recognizable events, necessitate an explanatory title, which does not bring to light the objective evidence, but rather the intervention of the observer, who defines "reality" according to one of his possible interpretative hypotheses.

Actually the aspect that both typologies of covers have in common can be retraced to the evolution that the concept of defence went through in the years after the fall of the Berlin wall: with the overcoming of the bipolar confrontation, in fact, the concept of "threat" is replaced by the more hazy and insidious concept of "risk", which becomes more and more global because it can radiate its destabilizing effects also outside any territorial boundary. The covers of "Rivista Militare" therefore bear witness to a gradual success in the Italian context of the new concept of defence, understood as prevention from any type of threat, with no limits of space and nationality, as opposition to any type of violence and, finally, as reinforcement of peace and internal security.

In this sense, we find once more resolute the definition of the periodical quoted in the index, which, next to the review's traditional object of expanding and updating the technical-profession-

al training of the Cadres, adds that of informing public opinion on the themes of defence and security. Its aim is to be an organ of diffusion and a field of study and debate. The new environments where the prevalently joint and multinational operations are now carried out, have produced a reconsideration of the structure of the Army by emphasizing the function of the individual fighter directing it towards a Force of professionals. "Rivista Militare" anticipates the debate about this evolution through a constant reference to the debate "Army. Project 2000", in the titles of its covers. On the other end, the events of September 11 have awakened the interest of public opinion for the defence and security issues, prompted by a threat that is felt as global.

As a matter of fact, if at the end of the last century we had convinced ourselves that we could inaugurate a third millennium of peace by foreseeing and managing in advance the crises in the various areas of the world, the attack on the Twin Towers has made entirely evident the hazard of those who, like Francis Fukuyama, after the fall of the Berlin Wall had hypothesized the end of history. The beginning of the new millennium has thus coincided with the opening of new areas of instability that have accentuated the multiform and volatile character of the new threat of international terrorism, whose particularly gratifying target is very often constituted by civilians, who are the real objectives chosen in order to hit and divide public opinion.

The discontinuity of such conflicts not only implies a transformation of the structures and assets of the Army and, more in general, of the military thought in a new perspective of synergy with the civilian society, but it also generates an increased attention from the citizens towards the problems of Defence. Evidence of the results and solidarity, facts but also dialogue and transparency: this is what the citizens, worried for their future, increasingly ask of their Armed Forces, which are no more considered a distant and self-absorbed institution, but a an integrant part of society.

The new format of "Rivista Militare", which starts from this issue, can be interpreted in the light of these considerations. It is a further effort to acknowledge the new requirements of the public vis-à-vis an Army which on the one hand is perceived as defence and development of state-of-the-art technologies for the security of the citizen, and on the other appears more and more ready to open up to the outside world. The periodical, which has maintained the same format and pagination, it now divided into four new sections which, with their Greek denomination, remind of the link with tradition and, at the same time,




The cover of the third number of 2003. The value of the photographic image prevails over graphics.

emphasize the importance given to dialectics. But, once more, the most evident change can be found in the cover which, for the first time, uses a full-page image, highlighting the effect of "presence" of the subjects portrayed. As regards the meaning of the photo chosen, one can imagine that it may enclose and synthesize at the same time all the models of the typology used here (symbol-images; document-images; emotion-images; interpretation-images) relying on an eminently evocative character. In other to avoid superimpositions with a specific terminology which employs terms such as icon, index, symbol with terms very precise but often not coincident with the common use, for these photographs it can be expedient to use "emblem", as a figure that symbolizes a concept. In confirmation of this, one can notice that on the cover there is no explicative title, as there was in the previous edition. The captions are highlighted, creating an effect of harmonious balance between image and contents. It is a further piece in the variegated mosaic that "Rivista Militare" has contributed to assemble in the Country during the long time of its existence.

Sabrina Carreras
Journalist

THE LEGIONNAIRE'S CODE OF HONOUR

- Legionnaire: you are a volunteer serving France faithfully and with honour.
- Every Legionnaire is your brother-at-arms, irrespective of his nationality, race or creed. You will demonstrate this by an unwavering and straight forward solidarity which must always bind together members of the same family.
- Respectful of the Legion's traditions, honouring your superiors, discipline and comradeship are your strength, courage and loyalty your virtues.
- Proud of your status as a legionnaire, you will display this pride, by your turnout, always impeccable, your behaviour, ever worthy, though modest, your living-quarters, always tidy.
- An elite soldier: you will train vigorously, you will maintain your weapons as if it were your most precious possession, you will keep your body in the peak of condition, always fit.
- A mission once given to you becomes sacred to you, you will accomplish it to the end and at all costs.
- In combat: you will act without relish of your tasks, or hatred ; you will respect the vanquished enemy and will never abandon neither your wounded nor your dead, nor will you under any circumstances surrender your arms.





THE FOREIGN LEGION

THE FOREIGN LEGION

Honour, bravery and warlike spirit

In more than 150 years of history, the deeds of the Foreign Legion have created the myth of one of the most feared and admired military formations. This article will cover the history of this military institution, from its bloody and glorious page of Camerone, which made it the legend it is, until the present day.

On 14th July 1919, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rollet, at the head of his men and surrounded by the insignia of his Detachment, which were covered with decorations, had the honour to open the grand Victory parade along the *Champs Elysées* in Paris.

While the band struck up «Le Boudin», his contingent paraded proudly with swollen chests. Their unique marching cadence of 88 steps to the minute was superb and majestic: they strode with the step of Kings and Emperors (this was quite exceptional since all the regular Armies marched about 120 steps to the minute). The contingent carried the heavy burden of a conflicting tradition, that was a mixture of bravery, indifference to danger, and legendary deeds, but also a mixture of insubordinations, desertions, alcoholism, cut throats, and lungs pierced by the long regulation bayonets.

Surrounded by an aura of mystic romanticism the contingent was parading: soon it would become one of the most feared Units in the military history of the whole world.

There was a moment of respectful silence before the French people burst into so thunderous an applause that even the Authorities present at the ceremony had to stand up and dramatically pay tribute with an equal intensity to each nobleman, labourer and criminal: *Monsieur le Légionnaire* was marching.

THE CONSTITUTION

The reactionary Charles X, succeeded as King of France (1824–1830) after the death of his brother Louis XVIII – longing for military successes in foreign policy to divert attention from its anti-liberal policy – took advantage of a diplomatic incident to declare war on Turkey. After having occupied the coastal strip of Algeria, his troops entered Algiers triumphantly in July 1830. In fact, the French expe-

ditionary force – composed of around 37 000 soldiers under General de Bourmont's orders – actually defeated the Turkish forces rapidly, but was not able to prevent a violent guerrilla movement under the leadership of the dexterous Emir Abd el-Qader, who would create lots of problems for the contingent stationed in Algeria for about twenty years. It was the new *Armée d'Afrique*. The French troops, well trained and equipped according to the military criteria prevailing across Europe at that time, were not in fact capable of adapting to the warlike culture of North Africa and facing the risky unknown environment (after the Restoration, the European armies adopted again the military doctrines which had been established in the late 18th century). Consequently, the new Commander, General Clauzel, took a series of important measures which would deeply mark the whole French military system. This represented the first important military intervention after the famous Napoleonic campaigns. So General Clauzel, and after him also General Bugeaud, succeeded in bringing mobility and flexibility to the French Army in accordance with the new operational needs. The French contingent was reduced to 10 000 men in order to avoid any logistical problems and, at the same time, two battalions and two mounted squadrons, composed of people coming from a local tribe (the *Zouaouas*, Zouaves) were founded on March 21st 1831, together with the first Regiments of *Chasseurs d'Afrique*, with indigenous and French personnel.

In addition, there were irregular units composed of mounted fighters and led by the brave Algerian Yusuf Bey (*the Spahis*) – who would become soon one of the most effective means of contrast to the growing bloody guerrilla warfare. There were also two battalions of *Infanterie Légère d'Afrique* with mixed personnel. The aim was still to use the same military techniques which had been adopted by Abd el-Qader.

The time was ripe for the arrival of the Foreign Legion. In the meantime, in Paris, Charles X made



Above
Recruitment poster.

Title pages
Patrolling a Bosnian village.

a commitment to suppress any internal opposition by staging what today we could call a «white coup d'état»: he dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and with the «Four Ordinances» of July 25th 1830, abolished the fundamental rights – such as the freedom of the press – and significantly reduced the electorate to oppose the dangerous advance of the liberals. He was not able to fulfil his purpose but nevertheless succeed in causing a popular uprising which, after hard clashes with the King's troops during the *Trois Glorieuses* (27 – 29 July 1831), put him to flight and then dismissed him.

On August 9 of the same year, liberal Louis Philippe d'Orléans came to the French throne (1830 – 1848) and accepted the Crown following the will of the Nation, not by divine right, without adopting the traditional title of King of France. He became King of the French, and with his «Monarchy of July» the glorious tricolour was restored. It was the symbol of the Revolution, of liberty and of the Napoleonic Age. International

prestige was of great concern to the new Sovereign. It had been put through a hard test in Algeria, during the raids conducted by the elusive Abd el-Quader against one of the most powerful European Armies, thus undermining French *leadership* in the Old Continent. In addition, a series of struggles and internal political intrigues were sources of worries for France during that tormented period. Lots of people and soldiers were considered as awkward and dangerous for the new Monarchy and even some Officers aroused suspicion because they had seriously compromised themselves with the old regime.

Finally, it was also important to assure the French colonial expansion – like a real Empire – and protect thousands of colonials who were pouring into the colonies as a privileged white *élite* in order to civilize the nomadic tribes which still lived “in the wild”.

Therefore on March 9th 1931 Louis Philippe d'Orléans did not have any hesitation in establishing a new Regiment which would operate outside the metropolitan territory, with voluntary service and without excessive formalities in the enlistment. It would be open to foreigners, but always under the glorious French flag: the *Légion Etrangère Française*.

However, it must be kept in mind that the Foreign Legion cherished a tradition which had been maintained by the French Army since the Renaissance survived until shortly before the Revolution, when Francis I recruited Italian troops – besides the Swiss, traditionally regarded as mercenaries – and Henry III hired soldiers coming from all the European countries. Training methods were extremely strict because there were not only good and experienced soldiers, but also the dregs of society: a rigorous regime, characterized by the brutality of the non-commissioned officers, and harsh corporal punishment. The main purpose was to gain a heroic reputation on the front line where France had a colonial war to fight.

The recruitment procedure, which is still more or less the system used today, involved a preliminary interview, getting through a test, a medical examination, physical aptitude tests and an «interrogation» conducted by the *Bureau des Statistiques de la Légion Etrangère* at the Centre of Selection of Aubagne (about 15 kilometres east of Marseille), the Headquarters of the Legion.

Candidates, who were obviously all volunteers, were not required to have any military experience or any knowledge of the French language (because «... it will be acquired during the service»). They had to be aged between 17 and 40 and be physically fit for military service. Personal particulars and curriculum vitae declared by the candidate were certainly arbitrary (his past was often questionable).

Reaching the *Office of Recruitment* in France represented the fundamental step towards this new career. Travel expenses were directly paid by the candidate, with no contribution by the Legion. The Legion arranged for the transfer to Aubagne for the selection tests. In case of failure, the Legion would provide the candidate with a train ticket to reach the frontier zone nearer to their country of origin.

Those who were capable of passing this stage signed a five-year contract (unconditional and irrevocable, with rare exceptions). According to the agreement, they had to serve the French Foreign Legion any time and anywhere, complying with the code of honour and pledging their loyalty to the Corps.

During the following four months of training at the 4th Regiment stationed in Castelnaudary (west of Marseille) the real selection took place. The harsh discipline and physical violence towards the new recruits (historically, 50% of them were not able to pass this course) has been only recently moderated by the safeguard of human rights. The physical aggressiveness of the Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers suppressed all possible insubordination.

Initially, the Foreign Legion consisted of a battalion of Polish exiles (who had already enlisted in the 67th Infantry Regiment) and other battalions divided by nationality: in the 1st there were the Swiss, in the 2nd and 3rd the Germans, in the 4th the Spanish, in the 5th the Italians and in the 6th the Dutch and Belgians, who were actually almost all French.

The baptism of fire took place in Maison-Carrée in August 1831 (in the operation zone of Algiers-Oran-Bone, under the command of Colonel Stoffel). Thanks to the bravery shown during the first clash against Arab and Berber Algerian tribes, the Legion was awarded the Flag (Colonel Combe) and the red epaulettes of the Grenadiers (a corps historically regarded as valiant) on the jacket. The first uniform – with the red Kepi (now white) covered with white cloth and equipped with the famous «nape-guard» – consisted of a dark blue tunic with a white lapel and highly-visible red trousers, symbol of vehemence (*èlan*), which were designed to inflame the French soldiers during the offensive.

However, this time the young and rich Islamic Emir, Abd el-Quader, who was 25 years old in 1831 and claimed to descend from Mohammed, was the principal enemy to defeat. He could rely on armed bands of 50 000 men, who used to employ guerrilla tactics. The Legion engaged them in an exhausting battle which would last, with mixed and bloody fortunes, more than one century.

The King of Spain died in 1833, and this event would suddenly affect the young Legion's fate: the descendants of Ferdinand VII of Bourbon – on one side his brother Charles with his reactionary forces, on the other his wife Christina and his daughter Isabel (the future Isabel II, who was just three years old at that time) with the support of the constitutional liberals – competed for the throne of Spain with a long and bloody civil war which ended only in 1839 with the victory of the constitutional forces.

England and France went to the help of the liberals. England sent a contingent of 12 000 men. It came as surprise that France ceded the Foreign Legion to Spain. Probably, France believed that the operation would have a lower cost than expected. However, it paid a bitter price, losing almost 4 000 men and having second thoughts later, in 1835, as we shall see.

THE MYTH OF CAMERONE

The first military campaigns acquired their names from previous battles: Costantina (1837), Djidelli (1839), Milianah (1840), Ischeriden (1857), the Crimean War (Alba and Sebastopol) and the war of Italy (Magenta and Solferino where two Regiment Commanders, Colonels Viénot and de Chabrières lost their lives). However, the myth became firmly established in the popular consciousness in Mexico, in a secluded farm which still now is called Camerone. As time went by, it became (officially in 1920) the bedrock of the code of «*honneur and fidélité*» of the Legionnaire, in token of respect for the fallen and of the moral courage the Foreign Legion had shown in extreme adversity.

In 1861 the new Mexican Prime Minister, Benito Pablo Juárez, decided to suspend the payment of the international debts contracted by Mexico, filling Napoleon III with anger. He had recently bought a large part of the Mexican debt from a Swiss Bank. At the beginning of 1862, the first French expeditionary Corps (about 3 000 men) arrived in Mexico, together with English and Spanish contingents, with the task of guaranteeing the enthronement of Maximilian of Hapsburg, the youngest brother of Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria and Hungary.

Although the French infantry suffered heavy losses, Napoleon III did not want to accept face such a great humiliation and sent an additional 40,000 soldiers during the year. He concentrated the troops in Puebla, laying siege to Mexico City.

On 19th January 1863, the French Sovereign also approved the dispatch to Mexico the Foreign Legion, which had formally requested to go to the



defence of the French troops engaged outside the metropolitan territory.

After a month, the «Foreigners' Regiment» of the Legion – around 1 500 men assigned to two infantry battalions and a Headquarters Company under Colonel Jeanningros' orders – sailed from Oran and arrived in Vera Cruz on 28th March, about 200 kilometres from Puebla, where the French troops were just encountering serious difficulties with the large and combative Mexican army.

But the 48 Officers and 1432 Legionnaires just arrived in Mexico were ordered to guarantee only the security of the communications and logistical supplies, in a particularly unhealthy area stretching for 120 kilometres of tropical swamps, which badly impaired the contingent's health to the point of conditioning the dispatch of two Companies in defence of an important convoy bringing material for siege, munitions, a cargo of gold, which had been sent to General Elie Forey, Commander in Chief of the French army, barricaded in Puebla with his soldiers..

When the news arrived of a possible ambush to the convoy by the regular Mexican troops, Jeanningros ordered the 3rd Company of the 1st battalion to intercept the enemy and warn the

Legionnaires in action.

escort of the convoy, by giving it all the useful information obtained during the patrol.

Decimated by diseases (yellow fever, typhoid and infectious diseases still unknown) the Company was reduced to just 62 men (at first they were 120) and did not include not even an Officer capable to command it. Captain Jean Danjou, Staff Officer of Commander Jeanningros, together with Second Lieutenant Vilain and Sergeant Maudet, volunteered to lead the Company.

On 30th April 1863 (an historic date) at 7 a.m., after an exhausting twenty-kilometre march, the Legionnaires were intercepted by the Mexican Cavalry and after a desperate «square» defence, which caused a temporary withdrawal of the enemy, Danjou and the 48 survivors were able to take shelter in the *Hacienda* of Camerone, an old farm surrounded by a low stone wall that afforded them some protection.

The Mexican cavalymen, taken aback by the hard reaction of such a handful of men, asked the infantry to intervene. The infantrymen were encamped an hour's march from the place of the clash. Led by Colonel Milan, they intervened with



Captain Danjou's wooden left hand.

no less than three line battalions, as the Legionnaires were still bravely resisting the attacks of the Mexicans.

At 9,30 a.m., a Mexican Lieutenant, Ramon Laine, offered Captain Danjou the possibility of an honourable surrender – explaining that more than two thousand soldiers had already surrounded the *Hacienda* and, consequently, there would be no hope of escape – and gave him the guarantee that they would be issued a safe-conduct as prisoners of war.

Danjou refused the offer with disdain. He asked his soldiers to swear the oath that he himself had taken («Fight to the death!»). The Legion never broke that oath and fought valiantly and proudly even after the honourable death of their Commander, hit in the chest by a bullet.

In the meantime, the situation was deteriorating rapidly because of the oppressive heat, lack of water and food, shortage of munitions. The fighting raged for nearly eight hours and then the few Legionnaires who had survived and killed 280 Mexican soldiers were subjected to the last brutal attack by the cavalry and infantry, after the barn had caught fire.

After firing the last bullet, the five Legionnaires who were still alive went out and

attacked with bayonets. They were hit by a volley of shots: two of them died immediately. The other three were surrounded by thousands of Mexicans because they were seriously injured.

Corporal Maine said that they would agree to surrender only if they were rendered the military honour and the most critically injured of them, who had fallen on to ground and was unable to walk, was given medical assistance. Colonel Cambas chivalrously accepted the conditions imposed and the lives of the three Legionnaires (Maine, Costantin and Wenzel) were spared.

After a few days, when Commander Jeanningros reached the scene of the tragedy in order to bury the fallen according to the stern tradition of the Legion, he found just human remains, devoured by vultures and torn to pieces by coyotes, but he did not notice that the wooden left hand of Captain Danjou had been spared. Some people say that he had lost his hand during military training with a rifle. According to others, it was the result of a seri-

ous injury suffered during the Crimean Campaign.

His hand was found later by a local *ranchero* who seized the opportunity of a good deal and sold it to the Legion for 15 piastres.

The hand of the heroic Officer was taken to the *Salle d'Honneur* of the Legion Headquarters, which at the time was in Sidi Bel-Abbès.

When he heard of this heroic deed, Napoleon III ordered that the name of Camerone would be inscribed (to be remembered) not only on the regimental Colours but also on those of the future Units – as if it had been a real victory – and that the name of Danjou, Vilain and Maudet be written in gold letters on the walls of the *Hotel des Invalides* in Paris.

At the scene of the clash a monument was erected with the following inscription: *Here less than sixty men clashed with an entire Army whose mass crushed them to death. Life, not bravery, deserted these French soldiers on 30th April 1863.* Passing by the monument, still now, the regular Mexican Units present arms.

Today the wooden hand of Captain Danjou is kept in the Great Crypt of the Museum of the Foreign Legion, in the barracks of Aubagne, and is shown once a year during the most important celebration of the Legion, on 30th April, which is the anniversary of the heroic battle.

On that occasion, in all the barracks of the Legion, as in the military garrisons and associations of ex-legionnaires, the fallen are paid homage still today, by telling the story of the battle (*Récit du Combat*) and with celebrations in their honour.

... I heard the story about the battle of Camerone for the first time as I stood at attention and presented arms in the parade ground of the Legion in Sidi Bel-Abbès, observing the wooden hand of Captain Danjou, which was found after the slaughter and was now carried with respect and care by a veteran adjutant of the Staff.

I could not help noticing that tears were streaming down his face although he was wearing a black bandage covering the orbit where there had been an eye.

By order of the superiors and at the request of the Legionnaires, on 30th April the Récit du Combat is recited in front of all the men present at the parade ground. After the ceremony the Legionnaires sit down for a banquet, followed by a total relaxation of discipline and formalities. Each Legionnaire is allowed to celebrate the rest of the day as he likes. On this day, a Legionnaire is not likely to be accused of

minor infringements of the regulations and end up in jail if he is charged with an offence less serious than a murder [...]. Camerone is something more than a day of celebration, it is almost a faith for the Legionnaires and ex-Legionnaires. It is essential to understand the reason why this is the most celebrated day of the Legion. Why does a worthless battle fought in Mexico on 30th April 1863, in an unknown place, mean such a great deal to the Legion, especially considering that it was a lost battle? The fact is that it is an exceptional example of the inner essence of the Legion – never surrender – and of what it will represent in the future. This is why it is still now celebrated with utmost respect. These words were uttered in 1998 by Jim Worden, Secretary General of the British Association of the French Foreign Legion, one of the most reliable official historians of the Legion.

THE FIRST ORGANIZATION

As we mentioned before, on 6th December 1835 Louis Philippe d'Orléans signed a new decree in order to create a «second» Foreign Legion (according to some historians, this is the real ancestor of the present-day Legion) six months after the first battalion had been sent to Spain. The reasons were the same as those already given in March 1831, but what made the situation worse was the heavy losses that Algerian guerrillas were inflicting on the regular French troops.

In 1837 the Legion had 3000 soldiers constantly engaged in a fierce struggle against the men of Abd el-Qader. Not only did they confront the enemy with hand-to-hand fighting. Not only did they try to avoid the danger of ambushes. They took action to prevent the spread of African diseases and had to face bitter accusations made by French public opinion after the slaughters in the villages where the colonists lived.

Three years later, Thomas Bugeaud de la Piconnerie was appointed as Governor General and the Legion was organized into two Regiments: the first and second *Régiment Etranger*, better known as 1st RE and 2nd RE.

This new organization had to pursue a clear military strategy formulated by the new Governor: «flying columns of men», employed as the vanguard of the bulk of the Army, would penetrate deep into enemy territory mounting a series of surprise attacks on villages and enemy settlements. Nowadays, this strategy is could be defined as «dirty work», but what made it

worse were the exhausting forced marches, on inhospitable ground and with a minimum of supplies – stocked up on the spot – and with limited equipment. In the light of this, the Legion earned its reputation as being composed of brave soldiers who were able to endure any kind of exertion.

One of the military bases which had been built as supply depot for the «flying columns», is in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, about one hundred kilometres south of Oran. In 1845 it was a fortified town and became the Headquarters of the Legion. It was abandoned just after the independence of Algeria in 1962, after eight years of war fought by the Front of Algerian National Liberation against France. The last Commander of the garrison, Colonel Vaillant, on leaving the «Vienot» barracks, declared: *The Legion did not deserve to have to slip shamefully away. This represents a hard blow to the Legion. Nevertheless, the Legionnaires do not talk about politics and will obey orders. They are paid to fight and they fight well.*

It was Algeria that gave birth to the first legends regarding the Foreign Legion, as well as the ancient traditions that still now survive. To give an example, the monthly salary must be paid according to the Legionnaire's custom: after the military salute and declaration of the name, rank and record of service, the pay is slipped into the *kepi blanche* with a single gesture. The white *kepi* made its first public appearance in Paris on July 14th 1939, together with the red and green epaulettes. They date back to 1866, disappeared over the years but sometimes were revived until this custom became definitely established thanks to General Rollet, regarded as the father of the Foreign Legion. The blue belt, in the past, was worn under the jacket in order to prevent intestinal diseases.

The green tie originates from a large stock built for the «Yards of Youth» during the period 1940–1944 and then used by the Legion.

Every five years the Legionnaire earned a stripe. The stripes highlighted the time honourably spent in the Foreign Legion.

The Legion was essentially a corps of Infantry. However, it is interesting to note that the first mounted component was not instituted when the Corps was first formed – that is to say during the fighting in Africa where maybe it would have been much more useful because of the peculiarities of the guerrilla warfare. Paradoxically, it was adopted just when the other European Armies decided not to use any more the traditional Cavalry, just after the end of the First World War.

However, the creation of the first Infantry unit was also due to favourable circumstances: at the

end of the war, and after the Russian revolution, the ranks of the Legion were swollen by Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers who came from the Cavalry (almost everyone came from the ex-Czarist Army) and had great technical competence and professional skills. Over the years the *Légion Etrangère Française* has been represented by various nationalities. After the Russian revolution, there was a large flow of Russians. Italians joined the Legion especially during the campaigns of Napoleon III because of the romantic appeal of the Italian Unity. Currently, lots of Slavs join the Legion both because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and as a consequence of the wars between the new Slav nations which have caused the flight of militaries and refugees.

On August 5th 1920 the French Parliament approved a proposal concerning the establishment of three new Regiments of the Foreign Legion, among which the first Cavalry Regiment. Four squadrons were formed. They consisted mostly of Russian personnel, French Officers coming from other units of Cavalry and soldiers of the 2nd REI. Sarda, in Algeria, provided the venue for the constitution and training of the personnel.

Once the training had been completed, the Regiment was transferred to Tunisia under Colonel Perret and was called the 1st REC, *Régiment Etranger de Cavallerie*.

The uniform and equipment are extremely fascinating: the white *kèpi* has a piece of *kaki* cloth which serves as a nape-guard.

A full garment is worn over the uniform (*gandourah*) and fastened on the chest by a green horizontal bar (1st Class Legionnaire) and decorated with a kit of accoutrements made of leather and containing a bayonet case, water bottle and two cartridge cases for the munitions, besides the cartridge belt around the horse's neck, according to the tradition of the Oriental Cavalry.

There were also the 8 cal. carbine, model 1892/16, with a magazine storing five bullets, the sabre with a metallic case covered with *kaki* cloth, according to the custom of many mounted colonial units. Long stiff bootlegs made of black leather completed the distinctive uniform of the mounted Legionnaire.

In 1925 during the Druse uprising in Syria the 1st REC distinguished itself by the bravery shown in the hard and bloody fighting, in spite of its recent constitution, and had the rare honour of marching at the head of the legionary columns (the Hymn of the Regiment is still today «*Une colonne de la Légion Etrangère*»).

The memorial to the fallen of the Legion, which had already erected in Sidi-Bel Abbès,



Legionnaires boarding a «Puma» transport helicopter.

was transferred to Aubagne in 1962. It consists of an enormous dark globe, which represents our planet, around which four bronze Legionnaires wearing the traditional uniform are represented.

The regions which were witness to the fervour and bravery of the Legion are covered with golden paint which stands out brilliantly against the black background.

«A nous, la Légion!», this is the battle cry with which the Foreign Legion intervened in France in 1870 (this was the first time that the Legion was called to intervene in a metropolitan area), in Indochina in 1883, in Dahomey in 1894, in the First and Second World Wars, again in Indochina during the dramatic events between 1945 and 1954, and during the Algerian rebellion during the period 1957–1962, in Gibuti in 1970 and in Zaire in 1978, in Lebanon and in Chad the following year, in French Guyana in 1987 and finally in the


Gulf War of 1991 (in the spring of that year Lieutenant-Colonel Terrason, Head of the History Office, painted with gold the territories of the Arabian Gulf, where the Legion excelled during Operation «Daguet») in Bosnia in 1993 and in Congo in 1997.

Also more recently the Legionnaires distinguished themselves during the intervention in the Ivory Coast. The political role played by the Legion in Abidjan as military instrument of neocolonialism has provoked criticism, as the «Corriere della Sera» pointed out in November 8th 2004 with an article, entitled «Paris sends the Foreign Legion», dealing with the serious risk of a civil war in this country.

The current peacekeeping operations cannot be forgotten although they do not have a very significant echo: the Legion continues to perform its duty with «honour and fidelity», to the glory of the seven-flame grenade.

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THE ARMIR'S EPIC DEEDS

ANTHROPOS

THE ARMIR'S EPIC DEEDS

The Italians on the Eastern front

The eastern front witnessed levels of ferocity and ruthlessness never reached before, with the opposing forces engaged in a war of extermination, with no regard for international conventions.

In that environment, the behaviour of the Italian troops was decidedly different. To revisit those moments does justice to the Units and to those who heroically fell on the gelid Russian steppes.

The bibliography concerning the war operations of the Italian contingent sent to fight in Russia during the Second World War is very extensive. There are many diaries and memories of the soldiers returned from the front and from imprisonment and, above all, books on the epic retreat that involved tens of thousands of ARMIR (Armata Italiana in Russia - Italian Army in Russia) soldiers. On the contrary, the behaviour of the Italian soldiers towards the civilians is less known, because they had the role of an occupying army, in conformity with the political orders which imposed to wage war on the Soviet Union.

Recent studies on the eastern front, translated into Italian, have analysed thoroughly the dramatic involvement of the civilians in the harsh confrontation between the two most dictatorial and sanguinary regimes in the history of Europe. The combats between Russians and Germans of 1941-1945 reached peaks of ferocity and ruthlessness never achieved during the Second World War (1). The two belligerents fought a war of annihilation, with no regard for international conventions on humanitarian laws, which did not spare the civilian populations. It was a conflict fought without quarter, a highly ideologized confrontation between two dictatorships, which played on the patriotic and nationalist sentiment of the two peoples, on the atavic hatred that separated them and, for what concerns the German side, also on racial convictions. Special units of the secret police were sent to the Russian front with the task of eliminating the so-called enemies of the race: Jews, Bolsheviks and Slavs. A task that the *Wehrmacht* had to support with a merciless war conduct.

Already since the first phases, the military operations have been marked by battles of great intensity, where, to the superior training and

manoeuvring capabilities of the Germans, the Russians tried to oppose a valiant resistance in defence of their motherland. Even when surrounded and isolated, the Russian troops generally fought till the last cartridge, regardless of the high losses in human lives. After the first defeats of the summer and autumn 1941, and the following general retreat, the Soviets turned to the technique of "scorched earth", systematically destroying during the retreat every road infrastructure, every artefact connected with industrial production, every source of food supply. This worsened the Germans' logistic problems of provisioning their units, but also reduced the civilian populations to starvation, for they had to suffer the mass expropriations and requisitions of the occupants, who tried to exploit as much as they could, as war booty, the remaining economic resources of the invaded territories. Already since the summer of 1941 both adversaries had been treating inhumanely the enemy that surrendered: they went from the immediate elimination on the spot to a forced exploitation as labour of the prisoners of war, who were subjected to exhausting working time and terrible life conditions.

The Russian government had not ratified the Geneva conventions of 1929 on the treatment of the prisoners of war and in August 1929 went as far as declaring in private, through diplomatic channels, that it did not consider itself bound by the international agreements concerning the prohibition to use chemical weapons and the assistance due to the wounded and ill of the other fighting armies. The German army, on paper, issued orders that complied with the international treaties, but in practice never respected them. A better lot was reserved to the hundreds of thousands of volunteers and Russian prisoners that were sent to the territories of the *Reich* to con-



Title pages.

Capture of Russian soldiers.

Above.

Celebration of the Holy Mass attended by Soviet prisoners.

Right.

Distribution of food rations at an Italian concentration camp.

tribute to the German war economy, while those who remained to work behind the lines lived in pitiful conditions, often to the limits of survival (2). In the German concentration camps, the Russian officers and the Russian soldiers lived together, with almost no medical assistance, insufficient food, and were subjected to continuous harassments and hard work (3). On the opposite front, the Russian concentration camps were even worse than the Nazi ones, and there were several cases of anthropophagy among prisoners driven by hunger and deprivations (4). The Russians immediately started to wage partisan guerrilla warfare behind the German lines, recruiting informers and saboteurs also among women and boys and infiltrating within the enemy lines units of special troops in civilian dress to carry out attacks and organize the resistance. The Germans replied to these systems of non-conventional and subversive warfare with brutal methods, with a large-scale retaliations against civilians and the indiscriminate capture of hostages.

During the counteroffensive of 1943-1945 towards the heart of Germany, the Russians repaid the German army for the violence perpetrated against the civilian population with an equally barbaric and vindictive behaviour towards those that had supported the occupation of the territories of the Soviet Union, especially Ukrainian, Cossacks, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. The advance

of Stalin's troops towards the west was accompanied by the mass flight of the civilians of German origin, who tried to find a way of escape from the hordes of the Red Army.

The massacre that was taking place on the eastern front had become known to the Italian military leaders already in 1941, when the Italian Military Mission in Berlin reported to the Supreme Command about a confidential meeting with a high official of the German intelligence. The report informed about the terrible losses suffered until then by the two adversaries which totalled to no less than 600,000 men for the Germans (between dead, wounded and missing) and 4 million of Soviet soldiers. "The figures of the Russian losses given by the O.K.W. (High Command of the Army) - 5 million - are slightly higher than reality, because they include many workers, but they are certainly no less than 4 million. Having acknowledged the initial mistake, the Russian prisoners are not shot anymore and they are more conveniently employed as labour". Other sources of the Italian Supreme



Command confirm that the conflict fought in the east had assumed tragic aspects with no regard for the war laws.

The winter campaign (1941-1942) has confirmed and highlighted even more the characteristics of this war, that is not only total but also a war of annihilation. Germany and Russia fight for their existence and therefore have impressed on the struggle a character of destruction and ferocity, as for many centuries had not been happening in the European wars. The mass killings of prisoners, the harsh measures taken by both sides against the populations, the destructions, constitute a characteristic aspect of this struggle, as pointed out in an article by



Summer 1942. Prisoners assembled at a camp for Soviet soldiers captured by the Axis forces.

the Swiss military critic Colonel Danicker: *"It is a real war of annihilation in the ancient sense, which concerns the very substance of an entire people. In other campaigns it was rather like a game of chess. If one was surrounded, he surrendered. Now it is war "to the knife". The Russian strategy - where Asian conceptions naturally emerge - puts into the field also women and adolescents, destroying everything during the retreat. It is, besides, a phenomenon that recurs every time there is a clash of two opposing ideologies, fanatically upheld by the adversaries (...) there is the manifestation of the same characters of ferocity that occurred during the wars of religion of the past centuries.*

In view of the brutality of these systems of fighting, contrary to every norm of the war law, the behaviour of the CSIR troops first, and of the ARMIR later, towards the Russian prisoners and the Russian civilians, distinguished itself from that adopted by the other belligerent armies. In the period of the CSIR, between July 1941 and July of the following year, the captured Russian soldiers, according to previous agreements between the Italian and German Governments, after a perfunctory interrogation were sent to the concentration camps under the surveillance of German units, where there was no interfering by the Italian Commands or units, because the CSIR had always operated under orders of a German Army. Only late in autumn did the German Command allow the Italians to keep a few hundred prisoners who, in collaboration with Engineers and Logistics units, were occasionally employed behind the lines as labour for road works or for clearing the runways

from snow (5). The prisoners were given the same rations and number of cigarettes distributed to the Italian soldiers and a special well-organized camp was set up, where the Russian soldiers found an acceptable accommodation. The treatment was such that the prisoners spontaneously offered themselves for work, in order to avoid to be transferred to the camps run by the German authorities. Many prisoners were employed without any surveillance.

Differently from the North African front, where the prisoners of the Commonwealth were sent to concentration camps in Italy, CSIR and ARMIR never sent Russian prisoners to Italy. At the beginning of the war the Soviet Government had declared that, although it had not signed the Geneva Convention, it would all the same respect its provisions, on conditions of reciprocity.

Two months later, on 21st August 1941, the German Government declared in its turn that, in the face of the proven atrocities perpetrated by the Russians against the German prisoners, it would not consider itself anymore bound by the Geneva provisions. In the same circumstance, the German Command issued a memorandum to its own and to the allied troops fighting on the eastern front, justifying its decision by listing a series of terrible atrocities which had supposedly been committed by the Russians, with a kind of terrifying summary. The Italian Government

did not join the German declaration and the CSIR Command continued to comply with the norms fixed by the international conventions ratified at The Hague in 1907 and in Geneva in 1929. Only much later, on March 12, 1942, it informed the Red Cross International Committee that from that moment, owing to lack of reciprocity, it would stop to communicate the lists of the Russian prisoners.

In the period from July 1942 and January 1943, the constitution of the ARMIR determined the organization of two prison camps at Stalino and Dniepropetrosch, with 835 soldiers. Later the number of camps increased to ten, with a total of about 5000 prisoners coming mostly from German camps, from which they arrived in frightful conditions. The Germans had issued detailed and humane instructions about the treatment of the prisoners, but while in their camps they were never enforced, in the Italian ones the analogous norms given by the Italian commands were always duly applied. The sick, completely neglected by the Germans, were treated and then sent to a convalescent home for prisoners, which was built for this purpose by the Italians at Rikovo. While in the German camps officers and privates were quartered promiscuously, in those of the ARMIR they were suitably separated, as envisaged by the international conventions. The Italian behaviour differed from that of the German ally also in the field of victuals and clothing that should have been supplied by the German command also for the prisoners held by the Italians. While the German authorities had established different rations for the men assigned to heavy work, for those with light jobs, for the non employed and for the sick, the logistic Command of the VIII Army, having observed the serious insufficiency of the rations envisaged by the lists, ordered that rations similar to those of the Italian soldiers should be distributed to the sick in the infirmaries and to the men underfed or in bad health, and authorized the Commanders of the camps to give the other men the rations established for those assigned heavy jobs. As for clothing, since the numerous requests addressed to the Germans had never been granted, it was decided to distribute the used clothes collected from the Italian troops that had received new ones.

Some episodes are good examples of the attitude of the Italian Commands towards the Russian prisoners. At Voroscilowgrad, in order to distribute blankets to the Soviet soldiers who had none, a blanket was temporarily taken from each Italian soldier of the garrison. On the 21st of December 1942, during the retreat, a group of Italian soldiers belonging to a reinforcement battalion coming from Kantemirowka arrived at

Voroscilowgrad; after collecting their rations they shared it with the Russian prisoners, who had voluntarily followed them in the retreat, becoming their protectors and rescuers. At Rikovo, the German Command blamed the Commander of the local camp for having allowed the prisoners to take a bath. The "Cuneense" Alpine Division took over, from the 294th German Division, about 600 Russian prisoners, employed in works of field fortifications, who were in bad conditions of nourishment and clothing (most were barefoot). At the beginning of November, an order from the German intelligence fixed that the POWs were to be given a reduced ration of food. The Division Commander, considering that the few prisoners in custody were working and were sufficiently efficient, ordered that they be distributed almost the same rations given to the Italian soldiers and changed the uniforms of a company with new ones in order to give the used clothing and shoes to the prisoners.

The relations between the civilian population and the Italian troops were generally marked by mutual respect and sometimes even with affability, especially in the Ukrainian regions. Some sporadic cases of violence and delinquency reported to the Italian Command were severely punished. Thus, for example at Rikovo, a soldier that had killed a woman in a robbery was immediately tried by a special court sent on the spot and, after a public hearing attended by many Russians, was sentenced to 26 years' imprisonment. Still at Rikovo, an Italian Officer accused of having attempted rape on a woman was punished with one month of fortress arrest and immediately repatriated. The orders of the Higher Commands were categorical: *"It is my precise intention that our units gain the confidence of the civilians, so as to make sure to obtain the ever more active cooperation of the population of the zone. I therefore ask to carry out an effective and vigorous effort to convince Officers and troops of the absolute necessity of the abovesaid. Behaviour towards the civilian population: it must be correct, dignified, energetic. Avoid soldiers going about with civilians, especially women. Thefts of livestock or of any other kind must be absolutely avoided. Repress with utmost energy and severity the unauthorized shots (liable to accusation). (...) I shall severely punish any abuse committed against the population."*

Considerable relief was given to the population with food and medical assistance: in winter 1941-1942, the Command of the "Torino" Division organized and operated the local orphanage, distributing food and clothes to approximately 400

children, bearing the costs of the hired teaching staff; in the zone behind the frontline, ARMIR set up and ran 29 hospitals and 75 outpatients stations, with the cooperation of 71 doctors and 157 midwives; during the stops, in many cases our soldiers helped the farmers with their work. This is the report of the Health Director of CSIR: *On my order all the Italian field- and reserve-hospitals set up free outpatients stations for the civilian population who greatly benefited from such aid, lacking, as they were, of any means of treatment and especially of medication materials (...) In accordance with my precise directions, good relations were established and maintained with the Russian medical staff, for a cooperation deemed indispensable for a hygienic protection of the troops, which could not disregard the civilian population's health, for which, as there were spreading endemics of diphtheria, typhus exanthematicus and dysentery, we provided prophylactic means and personnel for disinfections and disinfections, medical material and food.* In confirmation of the friendly attitude of the Russian population towards the Italian troops, there is the fact that the Commands and units were rarely the targets of raids and actions of sabotage by the partisans and, in any case, the losses caused by Russian snipers were notably lower than those suffered by the Germans. Also during the retreat from the river Don, our units met no hostilities but often received help and comfort from the local civilians. In many cases the Russians, especially the women, turned to the Italian soldiers to be protected from the abuses and violence of the German soldiers. Every time that, in the occupied territory, the Italian troops were rotated and replaced by the German ones, the inhabitants were deeply worried that the situation would get worse. The Italians tried to keep the requisitions to a minimum, preferring a little reduction of their ration and, when the requisitions were made, they were regularly paid for. Food contributions from private citizens were avoided, while the requisitions of houses were limited exclusively to public property, even if sometimes, for its location and housing qualities, it did not meet the requirements.

A report by Marshal of Italy Giovanni Messe, Commander of CSIR and of the XXXV Corps, subordinate to ARMIR until October 1942, written in September 1945, says: *(...) Also in operational phases that would have needed a maximum exploitation of local resources (due to supplying difficulties, authors' note), our troops weighed as little as possible on the population. When the mud of the tracks did not allow the logistic columns to reach the most advanced units, nothing was requisitioned by violence and everything was regularly paid to the lawful owners. (...) By personal*

ascertainment I can say that I have seen terrifying devastations such as those made by the retreating Russian troops, only after scientific air bombings. Living aside any consideration of humanitarian character, I believe that the Italians, at least for the zones where they had to stop and live, had no interest in increasing the scene of desolation and dreariness already existing. (...) More than cordial relations were established between our troops and the civilian populations. The Italians had known how to conquer the heart of the Russians, of all Russians, also of the partisans, whom we never realized were behind our lines. From this point of view, we had the impression that we were operating in a friendly country!

Marshal Messe presented perhaps too an idyllic picture of the relationship between Italians and Russians, as evidenced in the account of the Commandant of the "Reali Carabinieri" of CSIR on the first six months of activity on the Russian front, which reports that 249 suspected enemy agents were handed over to the German secret police and 27 partisans were shot for "they were caught in flagrant crime" (6). However, the orders issued by Messe between 1941 and 1942 on the attitude to be assumed towards the civilians were clear, and left no doubt about the intention to respect the population as much as possible. *With aim of eliminating presence of civilians near the lines and permit greater liberty of troop movements and maximum control of transit through same lines for repression spying, I order all population still dwelling in buildings across defensive positions be moved back. (...) Division Commanders organize departure so as to ensure evacuated populations safe refuge in buildings behind the lines with particular regard to women and children.* Also General Italo Gariboldi, who replaced Messe as highest Italian military authority in Russia, followed the line of his predecessor, ordering that: *it is economically necessary to ensure to the populations the respect of their properties and products. The populations should serenely and trustingly resume their occupations, especially in the rural areas, in order to increase production. Politically it is necessary to show the victor's great superiority in his respect of law, right and justice. Therefore the best propaganda is to demand and obtain correctness of behaviour, respect of property, justice, safeguard of life and possessions of our subordinates.*

Messe continues in his report: *The stay of the Russian prisoners and deserters at our Commands was limited to 36-48 hours or a little more, after which they were taken - almost always by motor-vehicles - to the nearest concentration camp indicated by the German Commands. But soon news started to spread*



A column of Soviet prisoners escorted by an ARMIR "Carabiniere".

within the Italian Commands about the treatment that the Germans were giving to the Russian prisoners. An exceptionally harsh, and sometimes bestial, treatment. No pity for the weak and the ill; officers quartered with soldiers; the daily ration reduced to a single distribution of disgusting millet slops, without the vitamins necessary not so much for working but for simply sustaining a human life (...). These facts could not but trouble the Italians and in fact our Commands ceased to indicate the precise number of the prisoners, taking advantage of the shortage of vehicles and impassability of the roads, and kept a certain number of prisoners, assigning them to auxiliary services. This was done to save as much as possible the prisoners from the sufferings that were inflicted to them in the German camps and put off the day of the handover, which at the end had necessarily to take place. (...) The location chosen for the concentration camp of Karjnskaia was a large kolkhoz, with spacious barns, well protected, divided with wood partitions, disinfected, provided with straw. Sanitary facilities (bath, disinfestation, infirmary) and general services (kitchen, latrine) were set up. The guard personnel were constituted of about twenty soldiers paired by Ukrainian prisoners, who had volunteered for guard service. The Russian officers had premises for themselves, where they ate and slept isolated from the privates. They were never employed for work but only for organizing the prisoners who, as a matter of fact, were extremely well behaved. Mass was celebrated in the camp and the relatives of prisoners and civilians were allowed to go inside the camp to enquire about their kinsmen and bring presents. The news about the humane treatment that the Italians were giving to the prisoners soon spread also

through the enemy lines with the result that within 15 days (25 August – 10 September 1942) over 800 Russian deserters turned up at our lines on the Don. (...) When in mid-February 1943 the retreat, momentarily interrupted, started again and the prisoners had to be handed over to the Germans, the news was received with grief and tearful outbursts; many prisoners took flight, helped by our soldiers on guard. They had in fact spontaneously followed the retreating Italian troops and did not want to end up in German hands (8).

The Italians, during the period of administration of the territories occupied by ARMIR, reorganized the civil and social activities that had been temporarily interrupted by the war. The offices of the Corps Headquarters for the operations zone and the Direction of the Halting Places for the area behind the lines arranged for a census of the population, the reopening of schools and churches, the administration of justice, the fixing of emergency sanitary services and the maintenance of public order. The population expressed their gratitude to the Italian authorities for the reopening of the churches (over 50), a provision that satisfied the wishes of the great majority of the people, deeply pervaded by a religious sentiment and practising the Christian-Orthodox rite. On the whole, 477 schools were reopened, attended by 28,000 students. The health service was organized by repairing the damaged civilian hospitals, reopening the outpatients' departments and restocking the chemists' shops as much as possible, in order to ensure a minimum of health assistance to the inhabitants. When an immediate opening of the pre-existing sanitary facilities was impossible, military doctors were called in. All the Italian field- and reserve-hospitals set up free clinics for the civilian population, who widely benefited from such aid. The administration of justice was never a problem, because the population was peaceful: the most common offences were thefts and infringements of the provisions of the local authorities (blackouts, curfew). In order to finance the local administrations all the inhabitants aged 18 to 65 had to pay a personal tax. The relations with civilians remained good also during the second part of 1942, so much so that the Command of the Alpine Corps in its "Monthly report on the spirit of the troops and of the populations of the occupied territories" of December 31st, 1942, specified that *the relations between the troops and the civilian population have continued to be normal. No incident to be reported, because the relations with the population persist being correct and cordial*. Earlier, the same Command had pointed out that *the soldiers, dur-*

rations; our doctors gave treatment disinterestedly and supplied also the medicines to the sick civilians (...) As man sows, so shall he reap, and CSIR, which in Russia had lavished generosity and sympathy, could not but be repaid with the same money. CSIR, without coercion, could have at its disposal snow shovellers, rooms of all kinds, personnel for performances and concerts and for the most varied auxiliary work. During the Christmas battle, (25-29 December 1941) the situation went through moments of remarkable fluidity, owing to which villages were lost and reconquered, also after furious night fights and with a temperature 35 degrees below zero. In these circumstances, several of our soldiers were saved by the generous intervention of Russian peasant women who, defying the punishment from the political Commissars, gave them shelter, food and protection until the Russians were compelled to retreat by our counteroffensive. (...) Also during the sad days of our final retreat, all the veterans agree in declaring that the civilian population wept for emotion in seeing our soldiers dragging themselves along in the snow, ragged, tired, hungry and often gave them clothes, food and hospitality. This could certainly not have happened if the Italian soldiers had left a bad memory to those populations.

In conclusion, the Italian soldiers' behaviour in Russia was inspired by a humanitarian spirit and respect of the enemy and the civilians. The Italian Commands did not oppress the population with strict coercive measures, in order to avoid weighing even more negatively on the already precarious life conditions of the inhabitants of the areas crossed by war, and especially to avoid nourishing the partisan phenomenon.

The Commander of the Expeditionary Corps had to rebuke the natural and instinctive propensity of the Italian troops to be too friendly towards the civilians, which risked encouraging both spying and the activity of the Russian partisans. The Italians were completely different from the Germans, who were more inclined to use harsh and merciless manners.

The treatment of the Russian prisoners of war complied with that imposed by the international conventions, even if the enemy never reciprocated such attitude. Although there may have been sporadic acts of atrocity made by Italian combatants or Officers, which are part of the war conduct, the orders issued by the High Commands never included the recourse to extreme measures for restoring order in the rear lines or ensuring the security of the troops in the encampments and during transfers.

The troops that from 1941 to 1943 marched against Stalin's Russia, within the expansionist war wanted by Mussolini's government and coolly supported by the

Top Military who would have preferred to concentrate the war efforts on the Mediterranean theatre, fought with determination despite enormous supplying difficulties and often without adequate weapons. The Italian soldier did his duty till the end and the Commanders did not have to use the extreme forms of virulent propaganda that had characterized the political indoctrination and the fighting spirit of the Germans already since the initial phases of the conflict on the east.

Pietro Quaroni, Italian ambassador to Moscow, in a report of May 1945 stated: *I have received information about the conduct of the Italian troops in Russia from three different sources: Italian Communists, foreign journalists that where there after the retreat of 1942, Soviet subjects on the spot. They were all agreed in asserting that not only were the Italian soldiers never responsible of abuses on women but, on the contrary, in many cases they defended the Russian women from German violence. Towards the local population they have behaved generally well, certainly much better than all the other occupiers.*

Giovanni Sargerì

Colonel,
Head, History Office,
Army General Staff

Filippo Cappellano

Lieutenant Colonel,
History Office,
Army General Staff

NOTES

(1) Almost half of the 55 million people killed all over the world during the conflict were Soviets, most of them civilians.


(2) In 1944 there were more than 7 million civilians and prisoners of war employed as labourers in the Reich's economy. A great many of them were from the USSR.

(3) Altogether 3,300,000 prisoners died, out of a total of 5,700,000, equal to about 60%.

(4) This aberrant phenomenon occurred in at least four Russian camps where also Italian prisoners were detained.

(5) A report by the Prisoners' Office of the Italian Army, issued in 1942, mentioned the capture by CSIR of 14,267 Russian servicemen. 12,472 were turned to the Germans and others to the Rumanian authorities. Only 3 Russian soldiers were detained in concentration camps in Italy, the others were kept in Ukraine.

(6) It must be remembered that the international war laws at the time did not grant the qualification of "regular fighters" to the partisans.



Una potenza regionale che stenta a decollare, di Andrea Margelletti (pag. 2).

Un Paese dalle enormi ricchezze materiali e umane che si candida a potenza di livello mondiale. Ma le controversie legate alle ambizioni nucleari, ai rapporti con Israele e alle aspirazioni di contrastare la politica economica americana rendono assai precari gli equilibri internazionali.

Tre buone ragioni per evitare l'intervento militare, di Edward N. Luttwak (pag. 14).

Ne spiega i motivi, per «Rivista Militare», Edward N. Luttwak. Proponiamo ai nostri lettori il suo punto di vista nella certezza che l'illustre politologo, l'insigne studioso di problemi militari, lo scrittore di successo e, soprattutto, il Consulente dei Dipartimenti di Stato e della Difesa degli Stati Uniti possa offrire un valido contributo alla comprensione di ciò che sta accadendo e potrà accadere in quelle lontane latitudini.

Europa e Mediterraneo, di Marco Ricceri (pag. 26).

Capi di Stato e di Governo di un'Europa allargata ormai a venticinque Membri, si sono riuniti nella città catalana per rilanciare il processo di cooperazione euro-mediterranea.

La NATO del XXI Secolo, di Pietro Serino e di Stefano Del Col (pag. 38).

A 57 anni dalla costituzione, oggi la NATO non è solo il baluardo dei principi democratici, della libertà e della legalità. Essa deve affrontare, in modo efficace e innovativo, le sfide del nuovo secolo, che impongono un processo di revisione del proprio ruolo e delle proprie responsabilità per conseguire tre obiettivi fondamentali: nuove capacità, nuovi Paesi membri, nuove relazioni e aperture a Est.

Etiopia ed Eritrea, di Serena Sartini (pag. 50).

Da più di sette anni la Regione è funestata da una sanguinosa guerra che ha provocato centinaia di migliaia di vittime. Negli ultimi mesi, la tensione è aumentata tanto da far temere un confronto militare su vasta scala che può coinvolgere altri Paesi. A nulla sono valsi i negoziati intrapresi dalle Nazioni Unite e dall'Unione Africana e l'intervento di un Contingente multinazionale. Per i continui intralci al mandato l'ONU ha deciso di ritirarsi.

Il secolo dell'oro nero, di Massimo Iacopi (pag. 56).

Entrato nella storia nel 1859, il petrolio è divenuto progressivamente l'indiscusso protagonista del Novecento. Basso costo e affidabilità d'uso e di

trasporto, lo hanno reso un fattore chiave dello sviluppo economico mondiale del secolo scorso, ma anche un pericoloso focolaio di tensioni e turbolenze politiche e militari.

La Fanteria ancora regina delle battaglie, di Ferruccio Botti (pag. 66).

L'antica «Regina delle battaglie» rimane la punta di lancia dell'attuale contesto strategico e tattico. Ma, più del passato, questa punta deve essere acuminata, tecnologicamente avanzata e polivalente, con un'asta e un'impugnatura molto più salde che ne assicurino il massimo rendimento.

La Brigata «Friuli» in Giordania, di Antonio Bettelli (pag. 74).

Dopo le esercitazioni in Polonia e nonostante l'impegno operativo in Iraq, è stato il deserto della storica terra dei Moabiti ad accogliere i fanti, gli aviatori e i cavalieri dell'unica Grande Unità Aeromobile dell'Esercito impegnata, a fianco dei militari giordani, nell'Esercitazione «Eastern Desert 2005».

Il sistema antimissile americano, di Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pag. 82).

Mentre i primi *Ground Based Interceptor* del sistema antimissili balistici statunitense vengono installati nei loro siti a Fort Greely in Alaska e a Vandenberg in California, è utile ripercorrere la storia e le dottrine relative allo schieramento operativo di questi sistemi, studiati e sviluppati per conseguire obiettivi strategici di grandissima importanza.

I robot terrestri, di Paolo Valpolini (pag. 96).

Forze Armate e Industria per la Difesa lavorano a pieno ritmo sulla progettazione di sistemi complessi destinati non necessariamente a sostituire l'uomo quanto piuttosto a integrarne e ampliarne le capacità di combattimento.

«Rivista Militare» ha 150 anni, di Sabrina Carreras (pag. 104).

«Rivista Militare» può essere considerata un prisma che riflette e sintetizza sulle sue copertine singole storie che viaggiano tra loro parallele: l'evoluzione civile e sociale del Paese, i cambiamenti degli scenari internazionali e, quindi, del concetto di difesa, le trasformazioni dell'Istituzione militare e la sua capacità di comunicazione in osmosi ai progressi della tecnologia.


La Legione Straniera, di Daniele Cellamare (pag. 118).

In oltre 150 anni di storia, le gesta della Legione Straniera hanno creato il mito di una delle formazioni combattenti più temute e ammirate. Ripercorriamone la storia dalla sua istituzione, passando per la gloriosa e sanguinosa pagina di Camerone che l'ha consegnata alla leggenda, fino ai giorni nostri.

L'epopea dell'ARMIR, di Giovanni Sargerì e di Filippo Cappellano (pag. 128).

Il fronte orientale vide livelli di ferocia e di spietatezza senza precedenti, con i contendenti impegnati in una guerra di annientamento senza alcun riguardo per le convenzioni internazionali.

In quel contesto, il comportamento delle truppe italiane si differenziò nettamente. Ripercorrere quei momenti rende giustizia alle Unità e a quanti eroicamente caddero nelle gelide steppe russe.



A Regional Power Hardly Able to Take Off, by Andrea Margelletti (p. 2).

A Country with an immense material and human wealth, which stands to become a world power. But the disputes connected with its nuclear ambitions, its relations with Israel and the aspirations to oppose the American economic policy make the international balances very unstable.

Three Good Reasons for Avoiding a Military Intervention in Iran, by Edward N. Luttwak (p. 14). Edward N. Luttwak explains why, in this article for «Rivista Militare». We propose his viewpoint to our readers with the certainty that the distinguished political scientist, eminent expert in military problems, successful writer and, above all, Adviser to the State Department and Defense Department of the United States, can offer a valid contribution for understanding what is happening, and could happen, in those faraway latitudes.

Europe and the Mediterranean, by Marco Ricceri (p. 26).

The Heads of State and Government of the new 25-member Europe met on the Catalan city in order to relaunch the process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

NATO in the 21st Century, by Pietro Serino and Stefano Del Col (p. 38).

Fifty-seven years after its constitution, today NATO is not only a bulwark of democratic principles, freedom and legality, but must also meet the challenges of the new century, which impose a revision of its role and responsibilities, in order to achieve three fundamental objectives: new capabilities, new member Countries, new relations and overtures to the East.

Ethiopia and Eritrea, by Serena Sartini (p. 50).

For more than seven years this Region has been ravaged by a bloody war which has caused thousands of victims. In the last months, the tension

has risen so much that there is the possibility of a large-scale conflict that could involve other Countries. The negotiations undertaken by the United Nations and the African Union, and the intervention of a multinational Contingent have been to no avail. Meanwhile, due to the continuous hindrances to the implementation of the mandate, the Italian Foreign Ministry has decided the disengagement of our Country's military.

The Century of the Black Gold, by Massimo Iacopi (p. 56).

It entered history in 1859 and progressively became the indubitable protagonist of the Twentieth Century. Owing to its low cost and to the reliability of its use and transport, oil has become the key factor of the world economic development of the past century, but also a dangerous hotbed of political and military tensions and turbulences.

Infantry is still Queen of Battles, by Ferruccio Botti (p. 66).

The ancient «Queen of Battles» is still the spearhead of today's strategic and tactical context. But, more than in the past, its «head» must be sharp, technologically advanced and polyvalent and its «spear» much stronger, in order to ensure the highest performance.

The «Friuli» Brigade in Jordan, by Antonio Bettelli (p. 74).

After the exercises in Poland, despite the operational commitment in Iraq, the desert of the historical land of the Moabites welcomed the infantrymen, airmen and troopers of the only Airmobile Major Unit of the Army, engaged, side by side with the Jordanian soldiers, in Exercise «Eastern Desert 2005».

The American Antimissile System, by Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 82).

While the first Ground Based Interceptors of the U.S. antiballistic missile system are installed in their sites at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg, California, it is worth retracing their history and the doctrines on the operational deployment of these systems, which were studied and developed in order to achieve extremely important strategic objectives.

The Land Robots, by Paolo Valpolini (p. 96).

The Armed Forces and the Defence Industry are working at full steam on the design of complex systems, not necessarily destined to replace man, but rather to integrate and increase his combat capabilities.

«Rivista Militare» is 150 years old, by Sabrina Carreras (p. 104).

«Rivista Militare» can be considered a prism which reflects and synthesizes on its cover individual stories travelling in parallel: the civil and social



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evolution of the Country, the changes in the international scenarios and, therefore, in the concept of defence, the transformations of the military Institution and its communication capabilities, which are keeping pace with the progress of technology.


The Foreign Legion, by Daniele Cellamare (p. 118).
In a century and a half of history, the feats of the Foreign Legion have created the myth of one of the most feared and admired fighting units in military history.

The article describes the story of its institution and of the glorious and bloody page of Camerone, which has immortalized it in legend.

The ARMIR's Epic Deeds, by Giovanni Sargerì and Filippo Cappellano (pag. 128).

The eastern front witnessed levels of ferocity and ruthlessness never reached before, with the opposing forces engaged in a war of extermination, with no regard for international conventions.

In that environment, the behaviour of the Italian troops was decidedly different. To revisit those moments does justice to the Units and to those who heroically fell on the gelid Russian steppes.



Une puissance régionale qui a du mal à décoller, par Andrea Margelletti (p. 2).

Un pays riche en ressources matérielles et humaines aspirant au titre de puissance mondiale. Cependant, les controverses liées à ses ambitions nucléaires, à ses rapports avec Israël et à ses aspirations à contrecarrer la politique économique américaine, rendent bien difficiles et précaires les équilibres internationaux.

Trois bonnes raisons pour éviter l'intervention militaire, par Edward N. Luttwak (p. 14).

Edward N. Luttwak, en explique les raisons à «Rivista Militare». Aussi, nous proposons à nos lecteurs son point de vue, car nous sommes convaincus que l'illustre politologue, l'éminent spécialiste de questions militaires, l'écrivain célèbre et surtout le Conseiller des Départements de l'Etat et de la Défense des Etats-Unis nous permettra de mieux comprendre les événements actuels et ceux qui pourraient se produire à l'avenir dans cette région lointaine.

Europe et Méditerranée, par Marco Ricceri (p. 26).

Les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de l'Europe élargie, qui compte désormais 25 membres, se sont retrouvés dans la ville catalane pour relancer

le processus de coopération euro-méditerranéenne.

L'OTAN du XXIème siècle, par Pietro Serino et Stefano Del Col (p. 38).

Depuis 57 ans l'OTAN n'a cessé d'être le rempart des principes démocratiques, de la liberté et de la légalité. Elle doit maintenant trouver des moyens efficaces et innovateurs pour relever les défis du nouveau siècle. Pour ce faire elle devra engager un processus de révision de ses responsabilités et de son rôle, en vue d'atteindre les objectifs fondamentaux suivants: nouvelles capacités, nouveaux pays membres, nouvelles relations et ouvertures vers l'Est.

Ethiopie et Erythrée, par Serena Sartini (p. 50).

Voilà plus de sept ans que la Région est endeuillée par une guerre sanglante qui a provoqué des centaines de milliers de victimes. Au cours des derniers mois, la tension s'est accrue au point de faire redouter une recrudescence des conflits militaires sur une grande échelle pouvant impliquer d'autres pays. Les négociations entamées par les Nations unies et l'Union africaine tout comme l'intervention d'un contingent militaire se sont avérées inutiles. Face aux continuelles entraves à l'accomplissement du mandat, le Ministère italien des Affaires étrangères a décidé le retrait des militaires italiens.

Le siècle de l'or noir, par Massimo Iacopi (p. 56).

Ses débuts dans l'histoire remontent à 1859. Il est ensuite peu à peu devenu l'indiscutable protagoniste du XX siècle. Des coûts peu élevés et une grande fiabilité quant à l'emploi et au transport, ont transformé le pétrole non seulement en un facteur clé pour le développement économique mondial du siècle dernier mais aussi en un dangereux foyer de tensions et de troubles politiques et militaires.

L'Infanterie demeure la reine des batailles, par Ferruccio Botti (p. 66).

L'ancienne «reine des batailles» est toujours la pointe de lance dans le contexte stratégique et tactique actuel. Plus que jamais, il lui faudra être bien affilée, avancée sur le plan technologique, polyvalente et dotée d'une poignée beaucoup plus solide capable d'assurer un rendement maximal.

La Brigade «Friuli» en Jordanie, par Antonio Bettelli (p. 74).

Après les exercices en Pologne et malgré les engagements opérationnels en Iraq, c'est dans le désert du territoire historique des Moabites que se sont rendus les fantassins, les aviateurs et les cavaliers de la seule Grande Unité Aéronefs de l'Armée participant, avec les militaires jordaniens, à l'Exercice «Eastern Desert 2005».

Le système antimissile américain, par Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 82).

Alors que les premiers Ground Based Interceptors du système antimissile balistique américain sont installés à Fort Greely en Alaska, et à Vandenberg, en Californie, il conviendrait de retracer l'histoire et les doctrines qui sont à l'origine du déploiement opérationnel de ces systèmes, conçus et mis au point en vue d'atteindre des objectifs stratégiques de toute première importance.

Les robots terrestres, par Paolo Valpolini (p. 96).

Les Forces armées et l'Industrie de la Défense travaillent activement à la mise au point de systèmes complexes visant non pas tant à remplacer l'homme mais plutôt à en compléter et en accroître les capacités de combat.

«Rivista Militare» fête ses 150 ans, par Sabrina Carreras (p. 104).

«Rivista Militare» peut être considérée comme un prisme qui reflète et synthétise sur ses couvertures des histoires parallèles: l'évolution civile et sociale du pays, les changements intervenus dans les théâtres internationaux et, par conséquent au niveau du concept de défense, les transformations de l'Institution militaire et de sa capacité de communication qui va de pair avec les progrès de la technologie.

La Légion étrangère, par Daniele Cellamare (p. 118).

En un siècle et demi d'histoire, les hauts faits de la Légion étrangère ont créé le mythe de l'une des formations militaires les plus redoutées et les plus admirées de l'Histoire militaire.

Voilà l'histoire de sa création et de la glorieuse et sanglante page de Camerone qui l'a immortalisée dans la légende.

L'épopée de l'ARMIR, par Giovanni Sarger et Filippo Cappellano (p. 128).

Sur le front oriental la cruauté et la férocité auront été sans égal. Les contendants s'étaient en effet engagés dans une guerre d'anéantissement, sans aucun respect des conventions internationales.

A cette occasion, les troupes italiennes se distinguèrent nettement des autres belligérants de par leur comportement. Rappeler ces événements c'est rendre hommage et honneur aux Unités et à tous ceux qui périrent héroïquement dans la neige des steppes russes.



Eine regionale Macht, die Mühe hat, zu beginnen, von Andrea Margelletti (S. 2).

Ein Land enormer materieller und menschlicher Reichtümer, das als Weltgroßmacht kandidiert. Aber Streitigkeiten verbunden mit den nuklearen Ambitionen, den Beziehungen zu Israel und den Bestrebungen, die amerikanische Wirtschaftspolitik zu behindern, machen die internationalen Gleichgewichte sehr prekär.

Drei gute Gründe, einen Militäreinsatz zu vermeiden, von Edward N. Luttwak (S. 14).

Die Gründe dafür erklärt die "Rivista Militare" (Militärische Zeitschrift), Edward N. Luttwak.

Wir stellen unseren Lesern seinen Standpunkt vor und sind sicher, dass der berühmte Politologe, der wichtige Forscher militärischer Sachen, der erfolgreiche Autor, und vor allem der Berater des amerikanischen Staats- und Verteidigungsministeriums einen wertvollen Beitrag zum Verständnis dessen beitragen kann, was in jenen weit entfernten Breitengraden geschehen könnte.

Europa und der Mittelmeerraum, von Marco Ricceri (S. 26).

Die Staats- und Regierungschefs Europas, mittlerweile auf 25 Mitgliedsstaaten angewachsen, haben sich in der katalanischen Stadt zusammengefunden, um den europäischen-mediterranen Prozeß einer Zusammenarbeit zu verankern.

Die NATO des 20. Jahrhunderts, von Pietro Serino und von Stefano Del Col (S. 38).

57 Jahre nach ihrer Gründung ist die Nato nicht nur ein Schutzwall für die Prinzipien der Demokratie, der Freiheit und der Legalität. Sie muss in effizienter und innovativer Weise den Herausforderungen des neuen Jahrtausends gegenüberreten, die einen Revisionsprozess der eigenen Rolle und der eigenen Verantwortung auferlegen, um drei Hauptziele zu erlangen: neue Kapazitäten, neue Mitgliedsländer, neue Beziehungen und Öffnungen zum Osten.

Äthiopien und Eritrea, von Serena Sartini (S. 50).

Seit mehr als 7 Jahren wird diese Region von einem verheerenden Krieg heimgesucht, der Hunderttausende von Opfern hervorgerufen hat. In den letzten Monaten ist die Spannung soweit angewachsen, daß ein umfassendes militärisches Eingreifen auch noch weitere Länder einbeziehen könnte. Die Verhandlungen seitens der Vereinten Nationen, der Afrikanischen Union und einem Kontingent mehrerer Einzelstaaten führten zu nichts. Aufgrund unaufhörlicher Behinderungen des Mandats beschloß die "Farnesina" die Nichtbeteiligung des italienischen Militärs.

Das Jahrhundert des schwarzen Goldes, von Massimo Iacopi (S. 56).

Seitdem das schwarze Gold 1859 in Erscheinung trat, wurde es zu dem unbestrittenen



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Entwicklungsfaktor des 19. Jahrhunderts. Mit niedrigen Preisen und als vertrauenswertes Beförderungsmittel, wurde das Petroleum zum Drehpunkt des weltweiten Wirtschaftswachstums des letzten Jahrhunderts. Somit wurde es jedoch zum Mittelpunkt politischer und militärischer Spannungen und Auseinandersetzungen.

Die Infanterie: noch heute Schlachtenkönigin, von Ferruccio Botti (S. 66).

Die alte "Schlachtenkönigin" bleibt bis heute strategischer und militärischer Mittelpunkt. Jedoch muß sie, mehr noch als in der Vergangenheit, technologisch verfeinert und allumfassend ausgestattet werden, damit sie eine optimale Wirkung erzielen kann.

Die Brigade "Friuli" in Jordanien, von Antonio Bettelli (S. 74).

Nach den Manövern in Polen und ungeachtet der Einsätze im Irak, wurde jetzt die Wüste, das historische Gebiet der Moabiter, zum Schauplatz der Infanterie, der Luftwaffe und der berittenen Truppen der einzigen Grande Unità Aeromobile des Heeres, wo sie zusätzlich mit den jordanischen Soldaten an der Operation "Eastern Desert 2005" teilnahmen.

Das amerikanische Anti-Missile-System. Die strategische und technologische Entwicklung, von Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (S. 82).

Während die ersten Ground Based Interceptor des Anti-Missile-Systems der USA in Fort Greely in Alaska und in Vandenberg in Kalifornien installiert wurden, ist es notwendig auf die Geschichte und die Doktrinen zur Aufstellung dieser Systeme zurückzugreifen, die erforscht und entwickelt wurden, um strategische Zielobjekte von großer Bedeutung zu erreichen.

Die Erdroboter, von Paolo Valpolini (S. 96).

Die Streitkräfte und die Verteidigungsindustrie arbeiten ununterbrochen am Entwurf eines umfassenden Systems, was nicht notwendig darauf ausgerichtet ist den Menschen zu ersetzen, sondern eher sie mit einzubeziehen und die Erweiterung des Kampfpotenzials zu gewährleisten.

Die "Rivista Militare" ist 100 Jahre alt, von Sabrina Carreras (S. 104).

Die "Rivista Militare" kann als ein Prisma gelten, das in seinen Heften einzelne Phänomene reflektiert und zusammenfaßt, die parallel zueinander verlaufen: die bürgerliche und soziale Entwicklung des Landes, die Veränderung der internationalen Szenarien und somit des Konzeptes der Verteidigung, die Wandlungen der Militärinstitution und seiner Fähigkeit mit dem technischen Fortschritt, Schritt zu halten.

Die Fremdenlegion, von Daniele Cellamare (S. 118).

In den anderthalb Jahrhunderten haben alle

Heldentaten der Fremdenlegion den Mythos entstehen lassen, demzufolge sie eine der gefürchtesten und bewundertsten Kampfformationen der Militärgeschichte geworden ist. Die Geschichte dieser Institution und die ruhmreiche und blutige Seite von Camerone hat deren Unsterblichkeit in der Legende begründet.

Das Epos der ARMIR, von Giovanni Sargerì und von Filippo Cappellano (S. 128).

Die Ostfront sah ein bis damals nie erreichtes Niveau von Grausamkeit und Erbarmungslosigkeit mit Gegnern, die in einen Vernichtungskrieg ohne jegliche Achtung vor den internationalen Konventionen verstrickt waren.

In diesem Zusammenhang war das Benehmen der italienischen Truppen deutlich anders. Diese Momente in der Erinnerung vorüberziehen zu lassen, schafft den Einheiten und den in der eisigen russischen Steppe heroisch Gefallenen Gerechtigkeit.



Una potencia regional que no logra despegar, Andrea Margelletti (pág. 2).

Un país con inmensas riquezas materiales y humanas que se presenta como candidato a potencia mundial.

Pero las controversias suscitadas por sus ambiciones nucleares, sus relaciones con Israel y sus aspiraciones a contrarrestar la política económica estadounidense vuelven muy precarios los equilibrios internacionales.

Tres buenos motivos para evitar la intervención militar, Edward N. Luttwak (pág. 14)

Edward N. Luttwak explica a "Rivista Militare" las razones para evitar la intervención militar. Proponemos a nuestros lectores el punto de vista de este ilustre politólogo, eminente especialista de cuestiones militares, afamado escritor pero sobre todo Consejero de los Departamentos de Estado y de Defensa de los Estados Unidos, porque estamos convencidos de que nos permitirá entender mejor lo que está pasando hoy y lo que podría suceder mañana en aquella lejana región.

Europa y Mediterráneo, Marco Ricceri (pág. 26).

Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de una Europa ampliada que ya cuenta 25 Miembros, se reunieron en la ciudad catalana para reactivar el proceso de cooperación euro-mediterránea.

La OTAN del siglo XXI, Pietro Serino y Stefano Del Col (pág. 38).

Al cabo de sus 57 años, la OTAN sigue siendo el

firme baluarte de los principios democráticos, de la libertad y de la legalidad. Pero además tiene que hacer frente, con medios eficaces e innovadores, a los retos del nuevo siglo que imponen que emprenda un proceso de revisión de su propio papel y de sus propias responsabilidades, con miras a alcanzar objetivos fundamentales tales como nuevas capacidades, nuevos países miembros, nuevas relaciones y aperturas hacia el Este.

Ethiopie et Erythrée, par Serena Sartini (p. 50).

Voilà plus de sept ans que la Région est endeuillée par une guerre sanglante qui a provoqué des centaines de milliers de victimes. Au cours des derniers mois, la tension s'est accrue au point de faire redouter une recrudescence des conflits militaires sur une grande échelle pouvant impliquer d'autres pays. Les négociations entamées par les Nations unies et l'Union africaine tout comme l'intervention d'un contingent militaire se sont avérées inutiles. Face aux continuelles entraves à l'accomplissement du mandat, le Ministère italien des Affaires étrangères a décidé le retrait des militaires italiens.

El siglo del oro negro, Massimo Iacopi (pág. 56).

Ingresando en el Historia en 1859, se transformó progresivamente en el indiscutido protagonista del siglo XX. Bajos costos y fiabilidad en cuanto a empleo y transporte convirtieron el petróleo en el factor clave del desarrollo económico mundial del siglo pasado, al tiempo que en un peligroso foco de tensiones políticas y militares.

La Infantería sigue siendo la reina des las batallas, Ferruccio Botti (pág. 66).

La antigua «reina de las batallas» sigue siendo la punta de lanza en el actual contexto estratégico y táctico. Más que nunca, esta punta ha de ser afilada, tecnológicamente avanzada y polivalente, con una empuñadura mucho más sólida para asegurar un rendimiento máximo.

La Brigada «Friuli» en Jordania, Antonio Bettelli (pág. 74).

Luego de los ejercicios en Polonia y a pesar del empeño operacional en Iraq, ha sido en el desierto de la histórica tierra de los Moabitas donde fueron acogidos los soldados de infantería, los aviadores y los caballeros de la única Gran Unidad de Aeronaves del Ejército que, junto con los militares jordanos, participa en el Ejercicio «Eastern Desert 2005».

El sistema antimisil norteamericano, Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pág. 82).

A la hora en que los primeros Ground Based Interceptors del sistema de antimisiles balísticos son instalados en Fort Greely, Alaska, y en Vandenberg, California, resulta útil trazar su historia y recordar las doctrinas inspiradoras del

despliegue operacional de dichos sistemas, estudiados y concebidos para alcanzar objetivos estratégicos de suma importancia.

Los robots terrestres, Paolo Valpolini (pág. 96).

Las Fuerzas armadas y la Industria de la Defensa están trabajando activamente al diseño de complejos sistemas destinados no tanto a reemplazar al hombre sino más bien a completar y reforzar sus capacidades de combate.

«Rivista Militare» cumple 150 años, Sabrina Carreras (pág. 104).

«Rivista Militare» puede considerarse como un prisma que refleja y sintetiza en sus portadas historias que viajan paralelas: la evolución civil y social del país, los cambios de los escenarios internacionales y, por ende, del concepto de defensa, las transformaciones de la Institución militar y de su capacidad de comunicación, la cual corre parejas con los adelantos de la tecnología.

La Legión Extranjera, Daniele Cellamare (pág. 118).

A lo largo de un siglo y medio de historia, la Legión Extranjera creó con sus gestas el mito de una de las formaciones de combatientes más temidas y admiradas de la Historia militar. He aquí la historia de su institución y la gloriosa y sangrienta página de Camerone que la inmortalizó en la leyenda.

La epopeya del ARMIR, Giovanni Sarger y Filippo Cappellano (pág. 128).

En el frente oriental la ferocidad y la crueldad alcanzaron niveles sin precedentes. Los contendientes estaban empeñados en una guerra de aniquilamiento sin respeto alguno a las convenciones internacionales. En semejante contexto, las tropas italianas se distinguieron de los otros beligerantes por su comportamiento.

Recordar aquella época es rendir homenaje a las Unidades y a todos aquellos que murieron heroicamente en las gélidas estepas rusas.



Uma potência regional que tarda a decolar, de Andrea Margelletti (pag. 2).

Um país de enormes riquezas materiais e humanas que se candidata a potência de nível mundial. Mas as controvérsias ligadas às ambições nucleares, às relações com Israel e às aspirações de contrastar a política econômica americana tornam bastante precários os equilíbrios internacionais.



Três boas razões para evitar a intervenção militar, de Edward N. Luttwak (pág. 14).

Explica os motivos, para a "Rivista Militare", Edward N. Luttwak. Propomos aos nossos leitores o seu ponto de vista na certeza que o ilustre profissional da Ciência Política, o insigne estudioso de problemas militares, o escritor de sucesso e, sobretudo, o Consultor dos Departamentos de Estado e da Defesa dos Estados Unidos, possa oferecer um válido contributo para a compreensão do que está a acontecer e do que poderá acontecer naquelas longínquas latitudes.

Europa e Mediterrâneo, de Marco Ricceri (pág. 26).

Chefes de Estado e de Governo de uma Europa alargada, hoje, a vinte e cinco Membros, reuniram-se na cidade catalã para relançar o processo de cooperação euro-mediterrânico.

A NATO do Século XXI, de Pietro Serino e Stefano Del Col (pág. 38).

A 57 anos da constituição, hoje a NATO não é apenas o baluarte dos princípios democráticos, da liberdade e da legalidade. Esta deve enfrentar, de modo eficaz e inovativo, os desafios do novo século, que impõem um processo de revisão do próprio papel e das próprias responsabilidades para atingir três objectivos fundamentais: novas capacidades, novos países membros, novas relações e aberturas a Leste.

Etiópia e Eritreia, de Serena Sartini (pág. 50).

Há mais de sete anos que a Região é amargurada por uma sangrenta guerra que provocou centenas de milhares de vítimas. Nos últimos meses, a tensão aumentou tanto ao ponto de fazer temer um confronto militar em grande escala que pode envolver outros países. De nada valerem as negociações empreendidas pelas Nações Unidas e pela União Africana e a intervenção de um Contingente multinacional. Entretanto, para os contínuos obstáculos no cumprimento do mandato, a «Farnesina» decidiu o desempenho dos militares italianos.

O século do ouro negro, de Massimo Iacopi (pág. 56).

Entrado na História em 1859, tornou-se progressivamente o indiscutível protagonista de Novecentos. Baixo custo e afidabilidade de uso e de transporte, fizeram do petróleo o factor chave do desenvolvimento económico mundial do século passado, mas também um perigoso centro de tensões e turbulências políticas e militares.

A Infantaria rainha das batalhas, de Ferruccio Botti (pág. 66).

A antiga «rainha das batalhas» mantém-se a ponta de lança do actual contexto estratégico e tático. Mas, mais que no passado, esta ponta deve ser aguçada, tecnologicamente avançada e polivalente, com uma haste e uma empunhadura muito mais sólidas que lhes asseguram o máximo rendimento.

A Brigada «Friuli» na Jordânia, de Antonio Bettelli (pág. 74).

Após os exercícios na Polónia e não obstante o emprego operativo no Iraque, foi o deserto da histórica terra dos Moabitos a acolher a infantaria, os aviadores e os cavaleiros da única Grande Unidade Aeromóvel do Exército empenhada, ao lado dos militares jordanos, no Exercício «Eastern Desert 2005».

O sistema anti-míssil americano, de Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pág. 82).

Enquanto os primeiros Ground Based Interceptor do sistema anti-mísseis balísticos dos Estados Unidos são instalados nas suas posições em Fort Greely no Alaska e em Vandenberg na Califórnia, é útil percorrer a sua história e as doutrinas relativas ao alinhamento operativo destes sistemas, estudados e desenvolvidos para conseguir objectivos estratégicos de grandíssima importância.

Os robots terrestres, de Paolo Valpolini (pág. 96).

Forças Armadas e Indústria para a Defesa trabalham a pleno ritmo no projecto de sistemas complexos destinados não necessariamente a substituir o homem mas sobretudo a integrar e ampliar as capacidades de combate.

«Rivista Militare» tem 150 anos, de Sabrina Carreras (pág. 104).

A «Rivista Militare» pode ser considerada um prisma que reflecte e sintetiza nas suas capas histórias singulares que viajam paralelas entre si: a evolução civil e social do País, as mudanças dos cenários internacionais e, portanto, do conceito de defesa, as transformações da Instituição militar e da sua capacidade de comunicação a par com os progressos da tecnologia.

A Legião Estrangeira, de Daniele Cellamare (pág. 118).

Num século e meio de História, as façanhas da Legião Estrangeira criaram o mito de uma das formações combatentes mais temidas e admiradas da História Militar.



A história da sua instituição e da gloriosa e sangrenta página de Camerone que a imortalizou na lenda.

A epopeia do ARMIR, de Giovanni Sargerì e Filippo Cappellano (pág. 128).







A frente oriental viu níveis de ferocidade e de crueldade sem antecedentes, com os contendores empenhados numa guerra de aniquilamento sem qualquer relação com as convenções internacionais.

Naquele contexto, o comportamento das tropas italianas diferenciou-se nitidamente.

Repercorrer aqueles momentos rende justiça às Unidades e a quantos, heroicamente, caíram nas gélidas estepes russas.



THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



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A New World
Order


Rebuilding
Afghanistan

The Media in the
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A Ranger on exercise, wearing the new overall suit. Rangers are an élite Corps of the Italian Army, highly appreciated in all operational Theatres.

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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.



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A NEW WORLD ORDER



A NEW WORLD ORDER

With the end of bipolarism, the Peace of Westphalia is again under discussion. Today we witness the success of a globalizing vision, against which its opponents will be able to do very little. The United States will naturally lead this revolution, comparable to the universalist view of the Roman Empire.

The world order, which was established after the Second World War and the Cold War, has disappeared. There is not anything able to bring it back. There are "visionary" or "revolutionary" States and «conservative» ones. The first ones want to build a «new world order». The others try to restore the *status quo* and the international laws governing the previous world order. Obviously, they would need to make a slight alteration to their political set-up which reflects the new world order, but they are not able to make it. In fact, the reform of the UN Security Council proved to be a dismal failure, in September 2005. It has been deprived of its meaning as time has gone by. It will not become a world government. If it became a world government, it would be the end of the Society of Nations. The right of veto of the five permanent members serves their own interests. It is not used for establishing peace and ensuring security. Peace and security will survive only if we are able to approach and solve global problems.

The conservatives would like to keep that international order established by Roosevelt and Truman in 1945. This onerous task was given to a security system, which was under the United Nations and the Great Powers that had won the Second World War. All the states should have obeyed the rules relating to international law. The United Nations was given full sovereignty. It was the only organization that possessed *jus pacis ac belli*, which is the power and right to use force against other countries, except for self-defence. The national sovereignty of the states was defended against external interference.

The Security Council has made attempts to reform the international political system in order to make the United Nations more representative of the new international context and more effective, without changing its role and fundamental rules,

even though some idealists harbour the ambition to transform it into a world government. In this case, it would have the right to violate the popular sovereignty of the states for humanitarian reasons. In the political reality, as the examples of Kosovo and Iraq show, the humanitarian reasons hide other objectives. This is not a problem. The sovereignty has always been limited. Difficulties arise from the fact that, after the Cold War, the United States does not accept limitations of its sovereignty and freedom of action. The United States is the only sovereign power. The most important countries should share the view of this new world order. This view would remind us of the

“Even during the most acute phases of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow always shared the rules which derived from their community of interest. Among conservative and revolutionary powers this is no more possible”

common interests which linked the Americans and Russians after the Second World War. Even during the most acute phases of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow always shared the rules that derived from this community of interest. Among conservative and revolutionary powers this sharing is no more possible.

The geopolitical rift occurred in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since then the United States has managed the world order and other States have had less freedom of action. Many attempts to create new balances of power (a European order and an Asian order) have failed. Also possibility of a world order founded on a Westphalia-type balance of power between sovereign States disappeared. As time has gone by, an «empire not-empire» has been established, i.e. the *pax americana*. It has been built around the so-called «Imperial Republic», a term that was coined by Raymond Aron. The United States follows a «great strategy» which is similar to that of the Roman Empire, as Edward Luttwak pointed out at the end of the Seventies, when serious rifts started to develop within the Soviet Empire. This made it impossible for the United States to establish an

order similar to that imagined by Roosevelt. Everybody knows that. Now there are two global organizations: the United States, which holds the power; the United Nations which has the legality (it has lost the principle of legitimacy with Srebrenica and the «oil for food») scandal. If the United Nations had been strengthened it would have been like giving more power to the Senate, in ancient Rome, in order to limit the power of the Emperor. A real joke!

For this reason, the discussion about the reform of the UN was not brought up in order to make the Organization much more effective and to face any problems concerning the new order. It centred on the composition of the Security Council. Many states wanted to become members for a matter of prestige; many wanted to prevent the others from becoming members for the same reasons.

Some states, like France, are called «conservatives» because they would like to keep the official rules of the world order established in 1945. Others, such as China, take advantage of its existence. They fear that the United States can alter this order. In fact, the US has become the international institution which is competitive with the United Nations. It has inherited «the heavy burden of the white man», first from the *pax hiberica* and then from the *pax britannica*.

As Virgilio Ilari has pointed out, Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri have drawn an analogy with the Roman Empire adhering to an economic view according to which the US is a useful instrument to serve global financial interests. Their «Messianic» view clashes with a new antagonistic internationalism based on the *no global people*, destined to follow the same route as Christianity in the Roman Empire. These views are all fantasies and do not reflect the objective reality of politics.

The radical Islamic movements (Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims) on which President Bush, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, has declared war, contrast with this new view of a globalized world. This war will extend the western modernization, including the Islamic world in the globalization. It will end in success, because a good result is in the Muslim people's interest. As time has gone by, this war has disclosed its ultimate aims. War has been declared even on «the vanguard of tyranny», in order to ensure victory for democracy and freedom. War has been fought not only by performing military actions, but also with the penetration of evangelic missions and lay organizations such as the "Freedom House" and the "National Endowment for Democracy promoters of the "coloured revolutions". The current regimes of Russia and China perceive the new order as a threat, exactly like the Islamic states, especially, perhaps, those that are traditionally allied with the United States.



Title pages.

George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Vladimir Putin.

Above.

A patrol of the "Cobra" Task Force in the Afghan desert.

After the victory in the Cold War, the revolutionary feature of the history, culture and composition of the US has become evident. This aspect had already been underlined by the Prince of Metternich during the Congress of Vienna, after the end of revolutionary France.

The "Project for the New American Century" links the Jacksonian tradition to the Wilsonian tradition of democratic interventionism. The world superiority of the US enables it to export «the religion of freedom» to the rest of the world. Whoever opposes it will not be regarded as an enemy, but a criminal who must be «eradicated». This explains Guantanamo and the illegal actions carried out also on the territory allied States, but does not justify nor legitimise them. As Kishore Mahbubani observed in the latest issue of «Survival», the power of the US has become an important resource for the whole world. If it did not exist, there would not be the multipolar world on which Chirac philosophises, but violence and chaos.



Tony Blair.

Facing the revolutionary "empire not empire", which aims to spread the new order of globalization, the main conservative country is China. Its remarkable development can occur only with a «peaceful growth». In other words it should take place within the framework of the stability guaranteed by the guardians of history not only in the «Asia-Pacific» system, but all over the world. Today China has to tackle enormous internal problems. Only in four or five decades will it become a great global power and be competitive with the United States, provided that the current demographic crisis does not prevent its growth. Another obstacle could be the system of alliances «of containment» between the US, Japan, Australia and India, which could be joined also by Russia. Beijing is trying to keep the current *status quo*. In particular, it finances the enormous US trade deficit, buying dollars and American treasury bonds. In this way, it supports the American power in the world, naturally in the national Chinese interest.

Putin's Russia desperately wants to keep the status of the Soviet Union. It is in search of its own identity, considering that it was transformed from a vast empire into a State-nation. Russia suffers a demographic crisis. It needs to invest in western technologies. It is under constant Islamic threat on

its southern borders.. In perspective, it has to face the Chinese danger in the Far East. All these factors will lead Russia to reach an agreement with the West, in particular with the US. For this reason it has opposed the inclusion of Iran in the Organization of Cooperation in Shanghai, which probably China would have desired. It has avoided clashing with the US. It has resisted the temptation to give Washington "tit for tat" taking revenge against the Americans who had supported the «coloured revolutions» and had penetrated deep into the Caucasus and Central Asia. After Ukraine and Georgia, now these revolutions threaten Belorussia and even Putin's regime.

This policy of «land versus sea» had already been adopted by Primakov. It was called the «continental dimension» of the Russian foreign policy. The apocryphal will of Peter the Great provides a solid basis for it. This document said that the central aim of Russian foreign policy was the expansion into the Gulf and India. In addition, it is supported by the Euro-Asians of Zirinovski and the communists of Zuganov. Both of them are inspired by some geopolitical theories which have their roots in history (even in the Bible) and regard the opposition between continental and maritime powers as the real motor of change...with the Orthodox Church's blessing.

Western Europe belongs to the conservative bloc. It is fraught with difficulties and internal divisions – in particular, it has to deal with lots of problems arising from its recent enlargement – its countries do not share a common vision for the European and world future; it has ambitions that exceed its decision-making and operative abilities and a poor political and strategic culture. This makes it

“ Western Europe belongs to the conservative bloc. It is fraught with difficulties and internal divisions... ”

unable to face up to a grim reality of a world where war and violence have erupted again. The partial loss of national sovereignty – with its formal transfer to the international organizations that are responsible for keeping peace, but in practice to the “comfortable” American guarantee – has caused the paci-

fist euthanasia of the State in most of Europe. A demonstration of this is the rhetoric of a post-modern and «post-heroic» state which does not have any projects and is mocked even by Iran.

The negotiations of EU-3 – which is the European «executive board» composed of France, Germany and Great Britain – with Iran have been pathetic. Their aim was to convince Iran to interrupt its programmes of uranium enrichment in exchange for economic, technological and financial incentives. After the Europeans have announced their a-priori intention of renouncing

the use of force, Teheran has started to make fools of them. The Iranians even asked them to apologize for their request for the demolition of the factories used for uranium enrichment. Humiliation was joined by insult.


The US looked on, a little sceptical and a little amused. The US would be pleased to have powerful and determined allies as Imperial Rome had. The Romans had allies who were always ready to intervene and provide them with auxiliaries in order to make the legions stronger and keep the peace. But this is not the case. As far as Iraq is concerned, the European contribution has been minor. Differently from what took place in Rome, as Virgilio Ilari has pointed out, it is the American «legionnaires», not the European «auxiliaries», who suffer the heaviest losses. As far as Iran is concerned, on the one hand Washington probably feels that it cannot stop the nuclear proliferation and, on the other, the fact that Iran is armed with nuclear weapons will legitimise the permanence of American troops in the Gulf for decades.

Europe is divided over its relationship with the US. Some States would like to be autonomous. Some others want Europe to be in opposition to the United States and aim to make Europe a world geopolitical actor. However, Europe does not have the unity, military resources and culture needed for this role. In the past, it even needed American help to solve serious problems concerning the «European» Yugoslavia. It is difficult to say what could happen in the Middle East. Europe is divided not only against, but even without the United States, as in the Iraqi crisis. Europe needs the US more than the US needs Europe. Since there is not another country like the US, the Europeans have to try to get along with it. The weakness of Europe is structural, not incidental.

It will not be easy to overcome Europe's economic stagnation, considering its worsening economic crisis which reduces its geopolitical weight and could even cause its going out of history in the second half of the 21st Century.

Europe could become a global partner, respectable and therefore respected by the US. It should determine its top priorities again and be more able in the decision-making processes. At the moment it is still desperately clinging to the UN, as source of legitimacy. Some countries, such as France, adopt this strategy in order to put a stop to the great power of the US. Others use the UN as an excuse for their inactivity.

The inefficiency of the United Nations in *high politics* masks that of the EU. It is only an excuse in order not to support the American policy and to be «free-riders», which means taking maximum advantage of the security provided by American



George W. Bush.

taxpayers and soldiers.

Europe should focus on the «law politics» of the UN. This approach would seem more reasonable, sensible. The EU should concentrate its efforts into creating a corps of «colonial officers» within the Committee on Peacebuilding, which was established in September 2005. This turned out to be successful in its colonies during the 19th and 20th centuries.

It should wake up from the «distant dreams» of its General Staffs and concentrate on increasing «auxiliary» military capabilities. It should excel in those sectors in which the US are less competitive. Only in this way could the Europeans become indispensable for Washington. They should regain the right of sovereignty. Today this process is much easier than before, since the dissuasive strategy of the US has become a prevention strategy. The American Army represents the least imperial part of the «empire not-empire». In fact, it is too technological and lacking in light Infantry. It is heavily dependent on reserves and the National Guard. These factors prevent the US Army from getting what is necessary for the control of the conquered territories, which is a strong foundation for any peacebuilding and political change.

With regard to those powers that want to change the status quo: they are called «visionary». These countries hold that they have a historic mission. On the one hand, there is the United States which, has changed radically since



An iron sculpture, symbol of NATO, at the SHAPE HQ in Belgium.

September 11. The US wants to establish a new world order: a liberal, democratic and capitalist globalization which has been promoted and defended by the its world supremacy. There are different reasons which can explain the process of globalization. The image of the United States holds a powerful appeal for the world. To give an example, there are prestigious universities from which new members of the ruling classes of most countries have graduated. On the other hand, according to Hard and Negri, lots of no-global movements are characterized by anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, democratic and liberal globalization. Their main component is the Islamic fundamentalism which is an advocate of a regeneration of Islam and opposes the United States that is seen as «the Great Satan», corrupter of morality and tradition and protector of Israel, the «Little Satan», which occupies the land of Islam by force.

The US has always been a revolutionary power. The founding fathers were convinced that they had a kind of divine mission, and lived in the new

Jerusalem, the lighthouse of the world. They thought they had to redeem the Old Europe which was intolerant, dynastic, warlike and colonialist. According to them, the American ethical and political principles had to be spread across the world by giving a good example. They had no option but to do so: they were much weaker than the great European colonial powers. They had a different attitude towards Latin America, according to the expansive Monroe Doctrine. At the end of the 19th century, their fundamental strategic objective was to defend the Panama Canal, a critical zone of «the western hemisphere». The war of Cuba against Spain and the consequent conquest of Hawaii (and then the conquest of the Philippines) brought about an «offensive» change of the Monroe doctrine.

With the two World Wars, the US became a global power. With the Cold War, it became even a European power and, with the downfall of the European colonial empires, the real «guardians of history», as Adlai Stevenson said in 1962, and «the sheriffs of the world» as Richard Haass says today. The US took the place of Europe and Japan in keeping stability in the Middle East and East Asia. The alliance with China, which was cemented when Nixon and Kissinger went to Peking in 1972, completed the process of containment of the Soviet Union.

The downfall of the USSR Union left the US without a global project of foreign policy. The existence of an enemy makes it much easier to plan a project. It is much more difficult to replace an enemy with positive objectives, such as the world development of globalized capitalism. As Robert Kagan has pointed out, this event eroded the legitimacy of the foreign policy of the United States. For fifty years the US

had enjoyed the right to intervene and maintain the world stability. It had made acceptable the American interventions against the Franco-British expedition to Suez, exactly like Korea and the Vietnam war. This legitimacy sprang from the fact that Europe was highly dependent on the US as far as security was concerned. So, Europe put

up with it. In the old world order, the Soviet Union was the best ally of the US. It legitimized the supremacy that the US had established over the whole world, except for the regions garrisoned by the Red Army. The leadership of Washington made this situation more acceptable because it saved the form and did not humble its allies. Apparently Washington observed the rules that it had imposed on the world. In particular, the law and the internation-

“The US wants to establish a new world order: a liberal, democratic and capitalist globalization which has been promoted and defended by its supremacy”

al institution, as well as the permanent alliances it had created. A serious split appeared after the Cold War. The situation changed fundamentally. The terrorist attacks of September 11 changed it even formally. To its great surprise, the US realized that the world was much more dangerous than it imagined. It knew from the past experience in Kosovo that its traditional European allies were unreliable. The potential Soviet threat, which after all the balance of terror made less insidious, was replaced by other more real threats – terrorism and proliferation – which could neither be reduced nor «deterred». This produced profound changes:

- unilateralism, considering that the freedom of action and the «mission» of the US could not be limited by laws and international institutions which, on the contrary, had to be respected by all other countries;
- preventive attack instead of deterrence and containment;
- greater importance to coalitions «ad hoc of the willing and the able» than to permanent alliances. Consequently, the US was allowed to ignore all rules.

The goals of this strategy were to maintain the American superiority over the world and carry out what the end of the Cold War should have caused: the end of history, in the Hegelian sense, which is the end of ideology with the decisive and irreversible victory of liberal democracy. This policy had been already outlined in September 2002 in the National Security Strategy – which does not concern only «the war against terror», which is a short-term objective. After the re-election of President Bush, all the aspects of this programme were explained in a detailed way: the US would use the most effective instruments – even military force, if necessary – in order to spread freedom and democracy and to fight tyranny.

This represents a threat not only to the so-called «rogue states», but also to the all «conservative» States, (Arab states and Eurasia). To implement this programme, the US should overcome only an internal difficulty: it should be able to persuade public opinion that this project is definitely worth carrying out. The so-called «visionaries», in particular the neo-conservatives, oppose the American realists, like Kissinger, who are worried about the logistic burden, the internal political costs of this policy and the high risks that this project would involve. Democratizing Islam could mean replac-



Vladimir Putin.

ing authoritarian regimes allied with the US with others dominated by fundamentalists. It could even spark off a series of civil wars (like in Algeria). Illiberal democracies could arise in other countries. After Tito's regime the spread of democracy has brought about the establishment of an illiberal democracies in Yugoslavia. The «visionaries» also oppose the liberal internationalists (like Brzezinski). They criticize President Bush for his aggressive policy, because it causes the US to lose its appeal and leads to the increase of anti-Americanism across the world.

The dynamism of this policy wrongfoots the Europeans. This makes it difficult for the US to form efficient coalitions. In addition, it fuels anti-Americanism across the world. For many European countries the friendship with the US used to be advantageous in their

internal politics. Nowadays a close relationship with the US puts the pro-American parties at a disadvantage (exactly as it happened in Germany in 2002 and in Spain in 2004).

Nevertheless, the American policy is unlikely to change. Terrorism and proliferation are increasingly dangerous and the United States is determined to root out them. However, only economic globalization and the spread of democracy could achieve this objective.

“To implement this programme the US must only overcome an internal difficulty: to persuade public opinion that the project is worth carrying out”



US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Its foreign policy will not change, also because the rest of the world must continue to fund the double American deficit. Only global superiority will be able to keep the fragile but indispensable trust between the US and the rest of the world. Only the expansion and defence of globalization will be able to create the considerable wealth which is needed to build trust. Not only the US but also the rest of the world would benefit from this. In fact, the growth of many countries depends on the American economic «locomotive».

Finally, this policy corresponds to the deep roots of the American ethical and political culture and historical experience. It keeps the American Dream alive, so essential also for the American internal unity.

Another global and revolutionary challenge is a consequence of the revolution of information which has removed all geographical limitations and has made the populations much more sensitive to the reasons of justice rather than to those of freedom. This revolution allows the US to carry out its strategic programme. In the short term it could pose different obstacles. Becoming aware of the economic differences might fuel further humiliation and frustration and set off nationalistic reactions whose geo-political significance should not be underestimated.

“Terrorism and the War against terror will not stop the “new world order” of globalization and the pax americana”

The «reawakening» of Islam has been the most important event. It has been caused not only by European colonialism, which has woken up the societies of many Islamic countries, but also by radical Islamic movements which, in the past, were used by the West, especially the United States, in order to weaken the lay Islamic regimes that had supported the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The «reawakening» of Islam has its roots in the religious persecution of the Muslims peoples. As well as being a threat to Islamic culture and identity, the West supports corrupted and ineffective dictatorial regimes which serve its interests, robbing Muslims of the wealth they have «inherited» from Allah.

The spread of fundamentalism is due to the idea that Muslims, unlike westerners, do not fear death. In addition, modern technology provides individual terrorists or small groups with a power of destruction which, in the past, was held only by governments. Therefore they could win, as they did in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.

Finally, the spread of fundamentalism is facilitated by the Islamic governments, especially Arab ones, in order to divert people's attention from domestic problems. The oil revenue represents a real curse: since the governments are not obliged to make the citizens pay taxes, they do not have to account for what they do.

The neo-Salafite terrorism cannot achieve its purposes. Its goals are unrealistic: unity of the «Ummah» and the restoration of the Caliphate are myths. The Islamic world is divided into different States which their deep roots in national identities. Considering the economic force of

the West, it is not realistic to expect these States to win the war against the western economies or to assume power in an Islamic country. Now the *neo-salafite* terrorism «stays on the defensive» everywhere. Its geo-political impact is more and more limited. Apart from Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, the

annual death toll of terrorism did not reach one thousand all over the world in 2003. As far as car accidents are concerned, the number of deaths reached 1.2 million. With regard to murders, the toll is even heavier. It has risen to 1.6 million. When President Ahmadinejad drew attention to the principles of the Khomeinist revolution, this attitude highlighted an internal conflict of the Islamic world rather than a threat to the new world order that the US was building.

In future, Iran will be likely to have nuclear weapons, but this fact does not seem to worry the US very much. Iran cannot use them as instruments of projection, not even against Israel, because the following day, Iran would be destroyed. Iran fears to be occupied, and could use its nuclear weapons as a deterrent. However, its fears are completely unfounded, because nobody has the intention of occupying Iran, taking both into account the not very brilliant results obtained in Iraq up to now, and because Iran is still the most pro-American country in the Middle East. In the majority of Arab states, the ruling elites are pro-American and the population is anti American; in Iran the opposite is the true, and the American neo-conservatives know this very well.

In substance, terrorism and the war against terror will not prevent the «new world order» of globalization and the *pax Americana*. They are just temporary obstacles on the way to the new world order.

The war against terror facilitates the *pax americana*. It has greatly extended the influence of the US. It has shaped an economic policy aimed at supporting the American power. The GDP (gross domestic product) has risen to 6–7 per cent. This has stimulated the economic development of the US, has enabled the Country to overcome the crisis which existed before September 11, has restored the trust of the international finance in the United States, which has continued to play the role of «locomotive» of world economy. China and the whole of East Asia have been the strongest allies of the US, by financing its double deficit and increasing American consumption; however, they have left American families without any savings. The ownership of social expenses will allow the US to fund adequately political and military costs in the next decades, despite the demographic crisis which will hit the Country during the period 2030–2040, arise after the crises of Europe and China.

Therefore the *pax americana* will dominate the world in the next decades. As Kissinger suggested, it will consist in a decentralized system, when democracy is spread across the world and the process of globalization is completed. Up to that time the American «legionnaires» will carry a heavier burden than that of the «auxiliaries», and the action will be highly centralized in Washington.

Of course, China remains an unknown quantity and the prediction of a Confucian-Islamic alliance made by Samuel Huntington could come true. However, this hypothesis appears to be quite unlikely. In fact, it is based on long-term predictions. For this reason, we cannot place it in a geo-political context. ..The only danger



Japanese Premier Junichiro Koizumi.

that threatens the new order of globalization comes from the possible «tiredness» of the American people. If the US decides not to meet any more international commitments, this would cause the disorder and chaos described by Colin Gray in his book «Another Bloody Century». This would lead to political, strategic and economic chaos and undo all the advantages of globalization. The revolution of information would increase the world chaos by making the poor much more aware of their situation and more impatient of living in penury. This would create new conflicts. Up to now, the redistribution of world wealth has not been a decisive factor in the fight against poverty. In fact, the poor of the rich nations have got poorer, because their money is given to the rich of the poor countries. As experience has taught us in the last decades, only globalization can fight poverty. If we put a stop to globalization, every hope of development would fade. Even world peace and stability would fade. For this reason, the American supremacy represents a valuable world resource. The Chinese know it. Most Europeans do not. The sooner they realize it, the better for themselves and the world.

Carlo Jean
Lieutenant General (ret.)





AL-QAEDA

AL-QAEDA

A long trail of blood

Its peculiarity is in its capacity to reinvent itself to match the strategic and social contexts in which it gets involved. It doesn't have flags or borders. Within its ideological 'umbrella' is the confluence of those terrorist groups who, through global strategy, intend to fight the moderate Islamic governments and those countries that support their power and authority.



Title pages.

A patrol of the 186th Paratroop Regiment in Khwost, in the region of Paktia, Afghanistan.

Above

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.

The September 11 attacks marked a clear escalation in quality of Islamic international terrorism, provoking a more determined and global reaction which in fact started a large-scale campaign, composed of various action plans, from truly military campaigns to *Intelligence* operations, to financial prevention. This terrorist phenomenon is largely represented by al-Qaeda and

its face Osama bin Laden, but in fact it goes much further, and via the terrorism it has become an ideology able to inspire various groups, and via the West and its governments has made the way for a new total strategy for the Middle East and its democratisation.

Al-Qaeda has an historical core of inspiration but at the same time is decidedly modern. The media strategy, the organizational globalisation and the violence of its attacks make it singular in its field. In particular relevance is its own media strategy, the functioning of which is studied attentively and in the types termed new media, with a variety of video messages but above all the unprejudiced and innovative use of the internet, with messages but also *forums*, news features, debates and other items organized by the terrorists themselves.

Its peculiarity is definitely its capacity to reinvent itself to match the strategic and social contexts in which it gets involved. In this way, the 'Foundation' (literal meaning of the Arab "al-Qaeda") differentiates from other subversive movements that claim the region as their own. It does not have flags or borders and its men rather than constitute a complex network, are instead a number of 'islands' scattered everywhere.

THE IDEOLOGY

Al-Qaeda has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from the phenomenon of terrorism in general, and in particular from those of a strictly political nature. Substantial differences exist, for example, between the Palestinian terrorism of the years 1970-80 and al-Qaeda: the Palestinian terrorism was lay,

nationalistic and of a Marxist-Leninist style. Al-Qaeda instead is composed of religious 'revanchism' carried out in a decision-making style that has experience of being in contact with the West. Nonetheless it draws strength from a kind of 'social revolution', in particular from those excluded from power who for this reason are against the current Middle Eastern societies (and their western "protectors") invoking a return to the mythical original Islam.

To understand its nature well, the al-Qaeda structure and genesis must be viewed as necessarily socio-political and socio-economic and with the means of control of power in places from where their members come from. The interpretation of the social phenomenon shows in fact, for example, that the common social ranks of its major exponents are the middle and upper-middle classes of the Arab countries. Men who have studied and often trained in the West, where at times they have refound their faith and chosen the ideals and the practising of the orthodox religion. They are cultured and mature and have, lucidly and with full consciousness of their actions, chosen to enter into real and total projects. Their projects are essentially political, and concern the internal dynamics of division and power management. The *elites* that predominantly govern in the Arab countries have limited the rich and cultured middle classes from participating in managing power: The sense of frustration that has been born in this environment, spawned from the most extreme elements, a feeling of revenge and reprisal has rebounded with a political agenda much wider and larger in scope.

Al-Qaeda does not support free elections in which it competes as a political party. In such a sense it is sharply distinguished, for example, from political organizations even though inspired by religion like Hamas, who, also through electoral process, has accepted to enter an institutionalised democratic system of governance and to form a defined political plan.

Ignoring these and other distinctive aspects of the movement and of the present reality of the internal Muslim world has always created confusion in the approach to problems and compromised the effectiveness of all the strategies put into operation for tackling this phenomenon.

"To understand its nature well, the al-Qaeda structure and genesis must be viewed necessarily as socio-political and socio-economic and with the means of control of power in places from where its members come from"



Ayman Al Zawahiri, Egyptian doctor, number two in the organization.

THE HISTORY

The history and the structure of al-Qaeda are in continuous evolution. For the time being the major changes seem to concern the structure of

the organization, the capacities and the *leadership* burden, the tactical objectives, the preferred settings. They seem however to remain substantially unchanged, at least at the level of statements, the ideological lines, the international agenda, the preferred means of communication, the lines of operation.

It was in 1989 that together with Muhammad Atef and Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, that Osama bin Laden founded al-Qaeda, lit-

erally 'the foundation', recruiting converts from the ranks of the mujahedin who were fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets. With the final defeat of the Red Army and its retreat, many of the so-called 'Afghan Arabs' returned to their places of origin, convinced that it was the moment to repeat their success in the rest of the world, starting obviously with the Islamic countries. They soon realised how difficult it would be, above all they were opposed by their own countries of origin. At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) Osama bin Laden, who in the meantime had gone back to



A checkpoint in Afghanistan, manned by soldiers of the American 82nd Airborne Division and Afghan servicemen.

Saudi Arabia, his country of origin, offered King Fahd to fight the Iraqi troops with the Arab international brigades based on the model of those that had defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan. But the Saudi sovereign instead relied on the international coalition and above all on the United States. In 1991, as a result of his growing opposition to the royal al-Saud family, bin Laden's citizenship was revoked and he was forced to return to Sudan, where he remained until 1996. The first attributable attack by al-Qaeda goes back to 1993, a partial failure, against the World Trade Center of New York, which killed six and was carried out by a Brooklyn cell under the direction of a religious Egyptian, the blind sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.

From the moment of his departure from Sudan, Osama bin Laden has remained in Afghanistan, where he joins his forces and his project of total jihad with the extremist Islamic Taliban regime, organizing an efficient international recruitment network and ensuring support and funding, through various channels, to his men all over the world. These are the means that allowed al-Qaeda to carry out the attack of September 11th, 2001 against the Twin Towers, New York and the Pentagon, Washington.

With the subsequent attacks in other areas of the Middle East, but above all with the terrorist actions in Europe (Madrid, March 2004 and London, July 2005), the current al-Qaeda objectives become clear: increase the autonomy and preparation of regional and local groups; search for new alternative sources of funding; increase media visibility of the organization and improve, at the same time, the communication capacities through technological tools; represent more and more a ideological 'umbrella' to the core of various Islamic terrorist groups, to draw them into a unified strategy of struggle against the Islamic moderate governments and the countries which ensure their power and their authority (i.e. the western democracies).

AL-QAEDA AND THE INTERVENTION IN IRAQ

The military intervention by the international coalition headed by the United States in Iraq and the consequent overthrow of the Saddam Hussein

regime, offered various chances to the system managed by the Saudi sheik.

The question of hostages, for instance, is a good example for understanding the new al-Qaeda strategy.

Even though the hostage-capture phenomenon had a spontaneous and anarchic origin, connected to the high instability of the period of post-war transition, it soon turned into a deadly weapon in the hands of the terrorist groups and especially for the Iraqi network of Ahmad Fail al Khalailam, aka Abu Musab al Zarqawi.

Through an organized management and thanks to the strong impact of television and media tools, hostages have become an instrument of decisive pressure for directly and frequently affecting the decisions of the governments who concurrently have military contingents in Iraq.

The strategy of the destabilization of Iraq by al-Qaeda follows two parallel paths.

From the point of view of an internal structure, and accepting the hypothesis (quite controversial, to tell the truth) that the new al-Qaeda base is in Iraq, even though the power of Osama bin Laden is eroded and his leadership charisma is tested by his forced seclusion, he still remains the recognized al-Qaeda leader.

The new strategy is however necessary for allowing to continue the phenomenon that can no longer 'rely' on only one man and that, therefore, needed a structure that guarantees its survival in a context much more 'fragmented'.

It must absolutely be underlined that the Iraqi theatre had supplied the focus for combatants to meet and that in this way they have been able to improve their technical capacity, their pre-
vailing ideology and their network of contacts, even international contacts. In this way Iraq replaced what Afghanistan had offered for the movement of international Islamic fighters and especially for al-Qaeda. It is no accident that in recent years (from 2003) many initiatives inspired by al-Qaeda originated from Iraq, and that the Iraqi model (from suicide attacks to internet videos) was propagated by the terrorists in neighbouring countries.

THE TERRORIST ATTACKS

The renewal of terrorist activities, with a dramatic increase, claimed by the organization of the Saudi sheik is confirmation that al-Qaeda is not defeated and that it has changed itself from 'a group' to 'a movement'.



Osama bin Laden, Saudi, founder and head of al-Qaeda.

“Even though the hostage-capture phenomenon had a spontaneous and anarchic origin, ..., it soon turned into a deadly weapon in the hands of the terrorist groups...”

The attacks conducted in Arab countries and in Europe stem from a precise and well outlined strategy. Firstly it turned to the striking the presence of foreign citizens in the Islamic world, the internal stability of Arab regimes and important industries from an economic point of view, such as tourism or oil extraction, especially in Saudi Arabia. Secondly al-Qaeda was able to verify what would be the political and military reactions of its attacks and, above all,

those of public opinions following terrorist action.

Before the fateful September 11th, 2001, the main attacks led by al-Qaeda, were the following:

- August 1998, American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es-Salaam, in Tanzania, with a total number of 224 victims;
- October 2000, in the port of Aden, Yemen, an attack to the United States cruiser USS Cole with 17 victims.

After September 11th, 2001 it is necessary to focus the attention on certain attacks, that produced a large number of victims, and were be car-



Above.
New York, September 11, 2001: The attack on the Twin Towers.

Right
Madrid, March 11, 2004: A carriage destroyed in the terrorist attack.

ried out also on European territories. This list is not exhaustive and several other terrorist acts, some of which luckily failed, were carried out in other countries during the last five years:

- October 2002: attack on a discotheque in Bali, Indonesia, with 202 victims;
- May 2003: four bombs kill 33 people in Casablanca, Morocco;
- March 2004: ten bombs placed on four trains explode in the rush hours in Madrid, Spain, killing 202 people and wounding more than 1 400;
- July 2005: terrorist attack on three underground trains and a bus in London, Great Britain, with 52 victims;
- July 2005: a series of car bombs explode in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, killing 90 people and wounding more than 150;
- November 2005: 57 victims in three American hotels in Amman, Jordan.


We must finally remember the recent kamikaze attacks in the Dahab tourist resort, in Egypt, with 18 victims.

THE AL-QAEDA LEADERS' RECENT MESSAGES

In April it was distributed, with limited intervals from each other, an audio message from Bin Laden

and a video message from the leading al-Qaeda figure in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

The bin Laden audio message was transmitted by al-Jazeera on April 23rd, the date of the recording remains for the moment unknown. However, one infers from the content of the message itself, it must necessarily have been made in the five weeks prior to its transmission, since in the recording audio, bin Laden refers to the episode of the Israeli swoop on the prison in Jericho, happening on February 14th. Instead, the



al-Zarqawi display message was found on the internet (on an Arab site), from some Italian Intelligence agents on April 25th, but it was dated April 6th.

There are three key points to the bin Laden message.

He, as he had already done in his previous message in January, turns to the western peoples and not only to his leaders. In particular this time, however, unlike the previous messages, where his tone was more agreeable and in a certain sense more persuasive, he was almost accusatory.

The umpteenth charge is made to the western governments, with regard to the campaign against the Palestinian government of Hamas which, even though was freely and democratically elected via elections that the West recognised as being free and democratic, it withdrew the ANP fundings, as well as nearly completely isolated the Palestinian government diplomatically.

Finally, another important accusation that Osama bin Laden made was this time against the whole Muslim community, concerning Darfur and

“ It must be underlined that the Iraqi theatre supplied the focus for combatants to meet and that in this way they were able to improve their technical capacity, their ideology and their networks of contacts, even international contacts ”



Osama bin Laden with his heir apparent, Ayman Al Zawahiri.

the difficult Sudanese situation. The al-Qaeda leader makes a true and honest appeal to all those of a Muslim faith to go to help those Muslim's fighting.

Besides the hard and very strong tones which bin Laden uses in respect to the West, the message seems almost to want to confirm that his leadership is not under discussion.

In this regard and also in the declarations

London, July 7, 2005: A bus destroyed by a bomb.



regarding Hamas we really notice a few substantial differences from the al-Zarqawi message. In particular, he affirms that one must not to fall into the trap of those who want to fight the jihad through institutional means, because the parliamentary system is 'tyrannical'. Therefore the jihad, for the Iraqi leader, is eminently social and popular, and not political and institutional; one fights shouldering a kalashnikov (like those who always appear next to the al-Qaeda leaders in the videos) and not dreaming of votes and democracy.

The importance of such affirmations about Hamas has several aspects and lends itself therefore, to different analyses:

- in stark contrast with the Bin Laden declarations, it highlights a divergence of core opinion, showing different outlooks and approaches which the two have always shown in respect to the concept of the struggle and the jihad;
- the expressed contempt for the parliamentary system and for institutional processes could be a message to the Iraqis, and in particular to the Sunnites who voted in last December elections.
- the criticism of Hamas is the most important part of al-Zarqawi's message, since he points out (like bin Laden) that the enemy of the 'dear Islamic nation' is the Zionist crusader and that, like the Prophet, they fight in Iraq, but have Jerusalem in their heart. Like bin Laden with regards to Darfur, at the end he appeals to the Muslims of al-Abnar and the other Iraqi regions, urging them to join the mujahidin armed struggle.

Andrea Margelletti
President, International Study Centre





NATO: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS



NATO: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

The fight against terrorism, the characteristics of the new operational scenarios, the integration of the Eastern Countries, the policy of dialogue with the Arab world and the South Mediterranean Countries, have forced NATO to make a radical change, which has strengthened its power and influence. But there is still a long way to go, particularly in order to achieve a full cooperation with the European Union.

On September 12, 2001, surrounded by the affection and honoured by the regret of all those that owed it more than fifty years of peace and freedom, the old Atlantic Alliance passed away. There are some that die badly, enclosed in a myopic egoism. And there are others that die well, after a life devoted to their fellowmen. NATO died well, offering to the United States, attacked by the Islamic extremism, the application of Article 5, which automatically transformed the war of one into the war of all, allowing at the same time the Atlantic Council to remain the political hinge of every military action undertaken by the West. Unfortunately the United States declined the offer, adducing as official justification that – in the fight against a shifty and multiform terrorism – it had to avoid the lengthiness and uncertainties deriving from the adoption of decisions whose main characteristic was that they had to be always universally shared. The so-called war by committees, just to be clear.

Besides the motivations produced, the American choice transformed the Alliance, which until then had been a galaxy of equivalent relations among a multitude of partners of different weight, into a sole big star of bilateral relations, with the United States at the centre and all the other allied Countries at the periphery. How difficult it was for this periphery to count, was verified after the beginning of the Iraqi conflict. On this occasion, in fact, neither the French nor the Germans, who acted from the outside, reinforced on the multilateral plane by the United Nations and on the bilateral plane by

Russia and China, nor the English, even, who operated within the coalition, managed to exercise a substantial influence on the United States at the more decisive moments. Therefore, at the end, Washington's decision to reject the idea of a reaction carried out under the flag or the aegis of NATO resulted into the full and open taking on of the central role by the Americans, with all the consequences that such a decision entails. On the one side the United States at the centre of everything and as mover of everything, on the other a group of minor peripheral powers, which at the critical moment of the decision never considered the hypothesis – which indeed concretely existed – to try to act together as counter-

weight of the scales. In such a situation, the primary function of NATO, which the "Report of the Three Wise Men" in 1957 had defined as the main political decisional court of the military actions of the West, automatically lapsed. As German Chancellor Schroeder complained a few years later, thus the Alliance ceased to be the political and diplomatic forum where the most important problems concerning the general security could be discussed.

At this point what was left to NATO was the fact of being the only military organization capable of effectively expressing the common force of its partners. But to what purpose? The question – certainly intriguing – had actually been there a long time. From 1989 to be precise, when the fall of the Berlin Wall had ended the fundamental *raison d'être* of the two opposing Alliances. And in fact the Warsaw Pact had come

“ Washington's decision to reject the hypothesis of a reaction carried out under the flag or the aegis of NATO resulted into a full and open taking on of the central role by the Americans, with the consequences that such a decision entails ”



to an end almost immediately and in full consonance with the logic of the events. NATO instead had survived, appealing at first to an improbable offensive return of the Soviet Union and afterwards progressively transforming itself into an effective instrument for managing the crises that were becoming increasingly dangerous and numerous. Considering the dimensions and hysteresis of the structure, the transformation of the military component of the Alliance had been fast enough, having been almost completed in six years. In 1995 a NATO fundamentally modified in its structures and its lines of action had in fact been able to show itself on the Balkan zone, which the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia had set on the path of an unending rosary of wars. From the political viewpoint the change had instead required longer times. In fact, only in 1999, in Washington, when the Heads of State and Government signed the New Strategic Concept of the Fiftieth Anniversary, could the Alliance have again at its disposal a systematic strategy, later integrated with a coherent doctrinal body. As well made as it was, in any case the transformation of the old lady did not succeed in keeping the pace of the unceasing change in progress. In Art.23, for example, the "New Strategic Concept" already clearly pointed out the terrorist threat, including it among the new worries of the coming years. But the subject was dropped there, without proceeding to further investigation, without deducing,

Title pages.

Prague, November 21, 2002: Summit of the Heads of State and Government.

Above.

Washington DC, April 24, 1999: NATO is fifty years old.

from the observation, all the consequences that perhaps could have been presumed already at that time and could probably allow the West to have clearer ideas and prevent the event of September 11 from producing the devastating impact of a total strategic surprise.

As almost always happens, also in this case the facts, i.e. reality, clearly proceeded at a speed higher than that of the organization of the response, at least until such response remained in the field of speculation and theory. The attack on the Twin Towers later tragically changed the entire perspective, while the problem of structuring itself according to a totally new operational scenario appeared before the Alliance in all its entirety. In theory, the task of waging war on terrorism, with its corollary of resistance to the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, was only added to the old tasks of NATO, without replacing them. However, in practice the idea that in the short or medium term one could fight again a nuclear and/or conventional war against a bloc or an alliance of equivalent power seemed a thing overcome once and for all. The war on terrorism therefore went together only with the

tasks of crisis management. Nevertheless the nature of the subjects involved changed radically, owing to which the adversary stopped to be necessarily a Westphalian State and became something much more fluid, sometimes a bankrupt State, sometimes an extremist ideological movement, a rogue State or a terrorist galaxy. Also the characteristics of the possible operational theatres changed radically. The Alliance could be called to intervene everywhere. At home first of all, on the national territories of the member States which had to be constantly protected with an action in which it was difficult to understand where the boundary between defence forces and police stood. And perhaps this boundary does not exist anymore, when one speaks of prevention and repression of terrorism. Considering that the terrorist extremism could choose its targets anywhere, consequently one should have been able to extend the response immediately and without difficulty to the whole world. This marked the end of all the geographic limitations that had conditioned the action of the Alliance since its constitution and which had been partially reviewed only in the nineties, when it had become clear that it was necessary to choose between "to go out of area or go out of business". In view of the new occurrence that influenced the scene of international security, also the list of desirable allies and friends changed considerably. Thus it became important and urgent to manage, if not to totally integrate, at least to assimilate in some form all that Arab trans-Mediterranean world to which NATO, all in all, during the last fifteen years had given a benign as much as vague attention. In the final announcements of the recurrent summits of the Alliance of that period, the hints at the so-called "Mediterranean Dialogue" initiative are in fact always consigned to one of the last paragraphs. Usually the second-last, since the last is avoided only for diplomatic bon ton. Not to speak of the extension of the Dialogue, limited to six, and only later to seven Countries, and of the contents, anything but significant. The events of September 11 emphasize instead the importance of "holding on at all costs" in the moderate Arab Countries in order to check the advance of Islamic extremism. Therefore one should somehow include this "belt of friendly Countries" in the perimeter of the Alliance, anchoring this belt to NATO more securely than the Dialogue has ever been able to do. As a consequence, one

"NATO proceeds, and will continue to proceed along this line, side by side with the European Union, inserted in a package where the adhesion to the Alliance represents for the newcomers the access to security"

should also consider how the problem of the inclusion of the other Mediterranean shores ends up by deeply affecting the parameters of the NATO action in Eastern Europe. The complete integration of the ex-Communist Eastern European Countries and their full fledged access to the common defence instrument, at this point becomes more urgent than before. Only the definitive, complete closing of this process will in fact permit to orient towards the south and overseas all the available resources, at the moment almost totally committed to the East.

NATO proceeds, and will continue to proceed, along this line, side by side with the European Union, inserted in a package where the adhesion to the Alliance represents for the newcomers the access to security, while the EU membership is considered a hope of prosperity. A last problem will be that of defining precisely the boundary between NATO and the EU as regards security. It

has been a moderately important matter until the attacks on the Twin Towers. Until NATO has been the main political forum of Western security and defence, its undisputed primacy has never been challenged. In this climate the points of friction between the two Organizations have mainly concerned the coordination issues, which must be defined with rapidity if one wants to avoid the risk of wasting resources.

Even the United States, before September 11, shows if not a liking at least neutrality towards the growth of the so-called European Identity of Security and Defence. If anything, the difficulties derive from the initiatives of those Europeans, like Turkey for example, which, as members of only one of the two Organizations, fear that they will be at a disadvantage, being excluded from some part of the process. As a consequence of the change that occurs on September 12 - when the choice of the United States changes the nature of the Alliance completely, giving it an official American centrality, hardly consistent with a precise alignment between NATO and the EU - all the protagonists, i.e. the Organizations as well as the States, have to define again and with rapidity a relationship that before had appeared well-established and firm.

Thus a new period of radical renewal opens after the attack of September 11, 2001 and the US decisions of the next day. In the following years NATO changes almost integrally. The overhaul goes so much in depth that this is probably the most complete transformation occurred in an Organization, which on the other



NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson.

hand has never managed to remain without radical adaptations for more than a decade of its long and troubled history. If this were not enough, for the first time the change, and the consequent transformation that must constantly derive from it, are identified as part of an incessantly open process, which will have to be followed and explored with continuity in order to avoid the new surprises of a reality that knows no respite in its evolution.


The opening of the discussion on the subject within the Alliance is almost immediate and it is a difficult and very hard debate, which in some moments risks becoming a dialogue of the deaf, or at least of people that do not want to hear.

In such complex organizations the definition of new tasks, of new lines of action, of new structures ends by becoming naturally also the definition of new internal balances, entirely disliked by those destined to lose power, influence and resources.

As we said before, on the specific occasion the affirmation of the fight against terrorism as main task of the Alliance, on the one hand shifts towards the south and overseas an attention traditionally concentrated on continental problems while, on the other, considerably reduces the times of the integration of the so-called "Mitteleuropa" within NATO. However at the

Prague Summit, in the autumn of 2002, the Alliance is ready to adopt the first spate of fundamental decisions. First of all the enlargement, which is extended as much as possible, to the point of including States that a little later and in the same conditions the European Union will deem still immature, such as Bulgaria and Rumania. The possible limits of NATO's expansion towards the East are also outlined, albeit informally, on this occasion, envisaging a later integration also of the Balkan States, born of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, and Albania, which have now become the rear lines of the Alliance. There are still the open questions regarding Ukraine, Georgia and, above all, Russia. But if Russia had to be integrated, one might as well have done it at the beginning, when to modify the Alliance it sufficed to extend the membership to the sole Soviet Union, which was then relatively solid, and the history of the last fifteen years might have been different.

In Prague the structure of the Alliance Command also changes substantially. The two Strategic Commands are replaced respectively



Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union.

by the Command for Operations and the Command for Transformation, precisely destined to follow with continuity the change in progress, reflecting it almost immediately on its structures. At the same time the number of the Commands at lower level drops and they are more rationally distributed according to the new needs. The axe cuts the dead wood pitilessly, sparing the life and functions of only those structures that actually have a role to play in the new situation. In this new setting of the key pillars of the Alliance, the Country that seems most advantaged is perhaps Italy, which in this occasion profits by its characteristic of hinge between the two Mediterranean basins and that of bridge between Europe and the overseas Islam. At the same time, the Alliance decides also that the constant imminence of the possible threat requires the availability of rapid reaction forces. This leads to the planning of a NATO Reaction Force (NRF), which only recently has become fully operational and has been employed for the first time in Pakistan in a humanitarian mission in the period between

“ NATO is no more a political forum, the policy of the West matures elsewhere, in different multilateral summits or through bilateral contacts ”

2005 and 2006. Expecting that terrorism may sooner or later acquire also NBCR weapons, the Alliance strengthens its equivalent component. NATO equips itself with NBCR battalions and mobile labs, which turn out to be very useful when they are put at the disposal of member Countries and provide preventive assistance on the occasion of the Athens Olympic Games and Turin Winter Olympics. A particular attention is also given for the first time to the problems of the Southern Mediterranean and therefore to the initiative of the corresponding “Dialogue”. Moreover there are talks about the possibility of transforming the dialogue into a partnership, making the South Mediterranean follow the course towards a complete integration, as outlined in the past for Eastern Europe. The process, roughly sketched at the time, would be revived at later times and, on the one hand, on the occasion of another Summit generated the “Istanbul Initiative” and on the other corresponded with the idea of Enlarged Middle East, which would later be advocated by President Bush. At the same time also the integration between NATO and the European Union advances, a process that the permanent tension between France and the United States keeps in a constant unpredictable state. On the other hand, considering how each of the two Organizations has finally taken shape, it is quite logical that this should occur. Their very nature often leads them to oppose each other. NATO is no more a political forum; the policy of the West matures elsewhere, in different multilateral summits or through bilateral contacts. That emphasized the military aspect of the Alliance but makes it single-sided and very much unfit to dialogue with someone who speaks lan-

guages that deal only with the force of weapons. If this did not suffice, the continuous pursuit of improvements in this sector has ended by expanding the civil and military bureaucracy of the structure, to the detriment of the influence of the member Countries. Thus today the two strategic Commanders enjoy a power and an influence incon-

ceivable until five years ago while, at the same time, has correspondingly decreased what the Atlantic Council can express. Not to speak of the Military Committee, which just now starts to re-emerge from a shady area which has lasted some years. A precise idea of the situation can be obtained from the way the Command for Transformation sometime ago went as far as

developing an actual Strategic Concept. This is a fact that constitutes a serious "invasion of the pitch" in an area pertaining typically and exclusively to politics. In the same period, on the contrary, the European Union was characterized by a progressive resumption of control by its member States, which, to use the EU jargon, led it to "be less community-minded and more intergovernmental", probably exaggerating to the point of being involved in a semi-permanent crisis. Even if the EU Strategic Concept worked out by the Secretary General, "Mister PESC", Solana, at Thessaloniki, has done away with all the remaining misunderstandings about the Union's willingness to employ the military force, if and when indispensable; the same document has affirmed once more that Europe is and wants to be essentially a "civil power". Equipped, that is, with a very large panoply of means of intervention, and conceives its military assets, the headline goal, only as an instrument of peace or of self-defence at most. Hence the difficulties in the relations between the two Organizations, difficulties that do not prevent the everyday cohabitation and cooperation but which become stronger and lead to open disputes when the word "war" is pronounced. A clear example of this was the Iraqi conflict, which has torn the conscience of almost every Country of the Union, as regards governments, political forces and public opinions.

However, in the Atlantic Alliance as well as in the European Union things are proceeding, while the mentioned day by day cooperation starts to delineate a harmonious whole, destined to be fully realized in a future that seems still undetermined, but which should not go beyond the medium term. Between the two, the distribution of the forces and operations on the ground is increasingly identifying the European Union as the organization most suitable for taking care of the conflict with all its countless facets and a reconstruction, which is too complex an action for an exclusively military logic.

It is no accident, but it is entirely within this perspective, that the responsibility for the management of Bosnia should have been transferred from the Alliance to the Union. And when one speaks about prospects of independence for Kosovo, one again turns to the EU and not to NATO for the contingents that should keep a watch on the respect of the rights of the minorities, especially the Serb one. NATO would retain instead the most typically military functions, i.e. the preparation of a common instrument capable of facing all events, as well as intervening in cases of actual conflict. In a certain sense, it is what Rumsfeld, the American Defence Secretary,



Decontamination activities conducted by the NATO multinational NCBR Battalion.

predicted and envisaged already a few years ago, when he spoke of "those who will have to cook dinner and those who will have to wash up and tidy the kitchen".

As regards the contents of that famous (and contested!) statement, at present there are two fundamental differences. The first is that next to its warlike vocation, NATO is now discovering also a profitable possibility of trending towards the sector of Civil Defence, which in the past was totally alien to the Alliance.

The matter may seem a little untimely. But one should consider how the "consequences management", aimed at minimizing the loss of human lives and material damages in case of NBCR attack – which all the Alliance's handbooks point out as NATO's main task in such circumstance – would precisely take the shape of an intervention of Civil Protection.

The experiences connected with the most recent annual CMX Exercises, which envisage always at least one terrorist event with employment of non-conventional weapons, have led to a fast development of the whole sector of the Alliance that had been envisaged for these matters and then disregarded or forgotten for about fifty years. In view of this, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and the Euro Atlantic Disaster



Specialists of the NBCR Battalion on training.

Relief Coordination Center (EADRCC) have progressively gained importance. Also politically the operation has soon produced its fruit. In fact, the Alliance is at the moment in Pakistan, engaged with a section of its NATO Response Force in helping the victims of the earthquake that has recently hit the entire area. It is a humanitarian operation, certainly, but it has also political aspects that should not be underestimated. Moreover, this new and unprecedented drift seems to be destined to bring NATO and the EU nearer and nearer. Also a consolidation of the European Union could in the future act in favour of an improvement of the dialogue between the two organizations.

It is true: the times do not seem to be very favourable for an opening in this direction. In any case Europe is following the law of the pendulum, which once it has reached the lowest point of its course can only go up again. And

already the signals that come from the last European Summit, with a Community budget approved and, above all, with Angela Merkel determined to give Germany its historical driving function, appear very promising. This does not mean that we at present can count on a Europe so cohesive as to really represent a pillar of the Alliance, opposed, when indispensable, and cooperating, whenever possible, with the American mainstay. It only means that we can keep on hoping, which is already a big deal.

Finally, a few indications at what will probably be the main development trends of the Alliance. At present the most urgent point, which needs a great deal of working on, is apparently still that of the transformation of the forces of the member States. Even if much has been done in this sense, both on the plane of the organizational structures and on that of training and preparation of the personnel, as well as that of materials updating, the body of the allied forces is still very far from that ideal expeditionary force that is considered the ultimate goal. There are still several obstacles to the change, first and most important the financial ones. In some countries there is still the idea that "la victoire soit aux grands bataillons", with the ensuing reluctance to give up conscription and count more on quality than on mass. Next there is the refusal – almost general at present – to give up once and for all the expensive and useless models of defence self-sufficient at national level. If one day there were to be a single model of defence, the economies of scale and those deriving from a sharing of the tasks among the members, in

“If one day there were to be a single model of defence for the Alliance, the economies of scale ...would be extraordinary, to say the least. To the point that one should ask why our governments have not realized it up to this day”

accordance with the particular valuable specializations towards which each Country could orient itself, this would be extraordinary, to say the least. To the point that one asks why our governments up to this day have not realized it!

According to the programmes that are now being outlined in Brussels, NATO should tackle the question of the renewal and change of the nature of the forces in the Summit of 2006,

programmed in Riga, after Portugal has withdrawn Lisbon's candidacy.

The problem of the enlargement, partially mentioned before, will instead be discussed in 2008. It is an issue much more intricate than appears at first sight. In fact, given for granted the opening of the doors of the Alliance to Albania, Croatia and FYROM, there is still to decide what and how much purgatory should still be inflicted to Serbia



Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina. Moreover, there is still to study in depth the if and when for two Countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, deeply convinced that they have recently acquired, with their respectively "orange" and "tulips" revolutions, every right to enter into this exclusive club. Moreover, also the relationship NATO – Russia will have to be redefined on the basis of the decisions concerning Moscow's "near abroad" adopted by the Alliance. The "Istanbul initiative" will also have to be reconfigured, accepting a partnership that should include the Islamic Countries of the Mediterranean basin or nearby. It will also be necessary to make clear, and possibly somehow institutionalise the relations with protagonists such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, whose troops are more and more frequently implicated in the same crises across the world, where the Alliance, which now has no geographical limits to its range of action, is present.

Finally, also NATO's interaction in the multilateral field will have to be re-examined: i.e. NATO's relations with other organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union – but we have diffusely dealt about this point before – and others, such as, for example, the

French soldiers of the NATO Response Force (NRF) during an exercise at Doganbey, Turkey.

Organization for African Unity, for which NATO is already working in Sudan in the logistic sector. As one can see, it is an extremely crowded programme, certainly very ambitious for a single Summit. However, one should also consider that the 2008 Summit will be the meeting that, in a certain sense, will prepare that of 2009, i.e. that of the sixtieth anniversary. NATO's intention, on that occasion, would be to succeed in projecting itself clearly towards the future, outlining a scheme of political-strategic development of the Alliance which should be valid for at least ten years, or even longer. As a matter of fact, a change, as deep and as necessary as it may be, can in no way be eternal, for now and then there must be pauses that permit to consolidate the results acquired, to restock, to realize and accept what has occurred up to that moment. And finally to be ready to go ahead in case a new change became necessary.

Giuseppe Cucchi
Lieutenant General (ret.)



A photograph of a white UN military vehicle, possibly a Land Rover, driving on a dirt road. Several soldiers wearing blue helmets are visible in the vehicle. The vehicle has a yellow circular sticker with the letters 'LS' on the front grille and a license plate that reads 'E172980'. The background shows a dirt road, some greenery, and a utility pole.

THE UN AND THE USE OF FORCE



THE UN AND THE USE OF FORCE

Peacekeeping often imposes timely interventions and the use of force

Along the years the face of peacekeeping has deeply changed. The food-distributing blue berets today are patrolling the streets, supported by attack helicopters. This different employment produced a sense of peace and stability. Peace and stability worth fighting for.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations have changed in the past decade and will continue to do so, to incorporate many elements, military and civilian, working together to restore peace. This increased complexity of the peacekeeping environment has resulted in more complex mandates and a new name: multi-dimensional peacekeeping. Since the end of the Cold War, such complex and risky mandates have been the rule rather than the exception: United Nations operations have been given relief escort duties where the security situation has proved too risky for humanitarian personnel. These missions have been given the mandate to protect the population and to control heavy weapons in possession of local parties when those weapons were being used to threaten the mission and the local population. In two extreme situations, the United Nations were given executive law enforcement and administrative authority where local authority did not exist or was unable to function.

This article analyses some of the challenges for peacekeepers in the grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcing. It also includes a few observations on the participation of some countries to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, and on the UN Strategic Reserve. Peace enforcement, in appearance and execution not much different from war, is usually conducted by a multinational force and commanded by a lead-nation. Examples include Korea (1950), carried out by a group of States on the invitation of the State concerned, and Kuwait (1990), authorized by the Security Council. Peacekeeping, tradition-

ally lead by the UN, is increasingly also conducted by regional organizations, usually based on a Security Council resolution. This article will focus on UN led peacekeeping operations: currently there are 16 operations with over 80.000 peacekeepers deployed.

“Peacekeeping activities, traditionally led by the UN, are more and more conducted also by regional organizations, usually on the basis of U.N. Council resolutions”

PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY THE UN

With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council looked at UN peacekeeping as the instrument of choice for international conflict management. UN peacekeeping successfully transformed itself into a mechanism for not only observing cease-fire agreements, but for implementing comprehensive peace agreements. In Namibia, El Salvador and Mozambique, UN peacekeeping was quite successful and achieved qualified success in Cambodia as well. In these complex and dangerous missions, peacekeepers were regularly authorized to use force in the context of their mandate. The humanitarian mission in Northern Iraq was the first mission authorized to use force, not as a measure of peace enforcement but to guarantee the protection of the population and the delivery of assistance. Traditional UN peacekeeping operations have shifted, in the course of an evolving conflict, from Chapter VI to Chapter VII, as was the case in Somalia (I). Other missions have been transformed into hybrid operations including both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement elements.

These changes in mandates transformed the peacekeeping missions into something closer

to peace-enforcement. From then on, most new peacekeeping missions were directly authorized to use force. Following the events in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the Brahimi report confirmed that message by stating: *'Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that the United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers'*. Mandates these days include routinely an operational paragraph on the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (2). A slightly different paragraph, but aiming at the same result, was included in the UNPROFOR mandate (3).

TODAY'S VOLATILE ENVIRONMENT

The recent political developments may have improved the security situation, but a Country remains very unstable if armed groups, organized militia and criminal elements are present throughout it. Exact figures are not always available regarding the strength of the various armed groups that may include child soldiers and paramilitary personnel. Armed elements and criminal gangs may have been moving in and out of the country and neighboring countries. Such armed groups generally have weak Command and Control mechanisms and poor communication systems. In Haiti, Cité Soleil, an inaccessible slum area of 100.000 inhabitants with roadblocks and barricades manned by armed gangs, is presenting serious challenges to peacekeepers. Poverty, high unemployment

and a large number of small arms compound the insecurity. Institutions of justice may have suffered a breakdown as a result of the conflict and the disregard for the rule of law. It may also have suffered from corrupt practices and political interference. Frequently, irregular militias and smaller factions do not respect the ceasefires, disagree with the major parties or act independently. In the case of minor resistance, consisting of isolated acts of violence and banditry, peacekeepers must deal with the situation on the basis of 'self-defense', backed by clear and robust rules of engagement.

It is precisely in these circumstances that field intelligence assets are needed, to find out where the spoilers are and what their intent is. 'Intelligence' for long time has been a word hard to accept in the peaceful UN world. Still today it is a sensitive issue, as openness is the name of the game. But in fact, information gathering never has been the problem in UN Peacekeeping: our military observers are top-class HUMINT people. It is the analysis, evaluation and distribution phase where we continue to experience difficulties. Poor intelligence means you will not have the right forces with the right equipment at the right time and at the right place. This has too often resulted in casualties – peacekeepers lives – or the lives of innocent civilians as we have seen in Rwanda, Somalia and Srebrenica.

The cornerstone in improving this capability is the establishment of what we now call the "Joint Mission Analysis Cell"(JMAC), an integrated

Title pages.

"Alpini" on duty with the ONUMOZ mission patrolling a road in Mozambique (1994).

Below.

The Blue Helmets are engaged in many peacekeeping missions.



structure, incorporating representatives, military and civilian, from key elements of the mission. The task of the JMAC is to handle information, conduct and present analyses and provide advice at a level that will ensure that decisions are made with awareness of all available and relevant factors. It provides in-depth current and longer-term analysis of all issues affecting the mission. As such, the JMAC is at the heart of any operation and it requires highly trained intelligence professionals.

After the disaster in Baghdad – the attack that killed 22 UN staff – the ambush on Bangladeshi peacekeepers in March 2005 that killed nine, and other tragic incidents, we are forced to acknowledge that the UN sometimes has become a target of violence, challenging the long-held perception that we are protected by our flag and by our status as an impartial actor. This new reality provided a compelling rationale for security reform. The General Assembly therefore approved in December 2004 the establishment of a new Department of Safety and Security. It is designed to ensure that we are organized to provide reliable threat and risk analyses.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The Security Council resolution for a new peacekeeping operation is no less than a compromise of the deliberations of the fifteen Members of the Council. The Mandate therefore leaves much room for interpretation by mission planners when developing an initial concept of operations. Secondly, a concept of operations will leave the necessary operational space for planners at Force Headquarters level, adjusting plans to situations as they occur. Despite the necessary room for interpretation, clarity is needed when it comes to the authority to use force. Not only will this clarity protect individuals against excessive use of force, it also protects peacekeepers from prosecution when force is used within the parameters of the Rules of Engagement. Rules of Engagement must be based on the mandate, the operational circumstances and by Troop Contributing Countries' accepted legal norms. The Rules allow peacekeepers to use up to deadly force, to defend themselves and other UN or international personnel and installations against a hostile act or a hostile intent. Moreover, it accepts the use of force, even deadly force, to protect United Nations installations and areas, or goods designated by the Force Commander.

These rules may seem relatively easy, but when it comes to application in the field, soldiers may be confused.

What constitutes a hostile act? How to recognize hostile intent? Even with clear-cut definitions, simple answers are not always possible in certain situations. A hostile act is defined as: *'An attack or other use of force, intended to cause death, bodily harm or destruction.* How will the individual soldier make his split-second decisions when an action is likely to demonstrate hostile intent? Hostile intent is defined as: *'The threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act'.* The soldier will be backed by the remainder of the definition, namely: *'Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized'.* Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene Commander, on the basis of one or a combination of factors, including: the capability and preparedness of the threat, the available evidence which indicates an intention to attack and the historical precedents within the Mission's Area of

“ Each resolution of the Security Council concerning a new peacekeeping operation is nothing but a compromise among the fifteen members of the Council ”

Responsibility.

Applying these rules in a correct way is one of the most daunting tasks for the Commander and his unit and may determine the success or failure of a mission. Every incident involving peacekeepers and their excessive use of force may quickly run counter to the aimed outcome of a peacekeeping operation. It cannot be emphasized enough that applying the rules means learning the rules first. Unfortunately, recently a newspaper interview held with a 19 year old peacekeeper revealed an almost incredible perception of that soldier on the use of force in self-defense.

The soldier indicated that he was told to wait until a shot was fired at him and then could respond. Moreover, if a hand grenade was about to be thrown at him, he was supposed to aim at the grenade, not at the opponent.

THE USE OF FORCE IN THE CONGO

The Democratic Republic of Congo has roughly the size of Western Europe. MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo) is, with 16.500 peacekeepers from over 50 contributing countries, the largest UN operation today. The challenges faced by the soldiers on the

ground are manifold, and must deal with very risky situations.


Though thousands of militia members have been disarmed so far, the situation on the ground remains volatile and unpredictable. Increasingly, MONUC is developing pre-emptive tactics to stay ahead of militia and spoilers. Key is actionable intelligence and the capacity to evaluate and analyze the information. Helicopters have also proven to be a successful tool when it comes to deterrence. Demonstrations and low flying missions have given a clear signal of this.

In peacekeeping operations, necessity and proportionality are key principles when force is applied. This implies that using attack helicopters as a weapon is a means of last resort, as it inevitably could come with certain risks of collateral damage and alienation of the civilian population.

Rwandan Hutu rebels, known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), have operated in Eastern Congo and many of them took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, during which 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. After a decade of preying on Congolese civilians and following a series of massacres in Eastern Congo this year, they are under increasing pressure to fulfill a promise to disarm and go home. MONUC Eastern Division has launched a series of operations to pressure gunmen to lay down their weapons and return home peacefully. During these operations, rebels are searched for weapons and their huts are subsequently torched in an attempt to deny renewed use of the bases by returning rebels. In these actions, attack helicopters routinely back-up advancing ground troops and provide close air support if need be. The Congolese villagers have been happy to see the arrival of the peacekeepers. At the same time there is concern that the Rwandan rebels may react by stepping up operations against the UN by targeting civilians.

TO MAINTAIN PEACE, SOMETIMES IT IS NECESSARY TO ENFORCE IT

MONUC is authorized to use up to deadly force to protect civilians under imminent threat. But how imminent is imminent? Should it be instant and overwhelming or do we need to wait for the "smoking gun"? The answer will have to be given



The distribution of food in villages and cities requires remarkable economic and organizational efforts.

"It is an accepted practice that the UN peacekeepers defend themselves from hostile acts or intentions. Complications arise when they are threatened by child-soldiers"

by Commanders on the ground as the situation develops, in line with the overall mission strategy and the Mandate, worked out in operation plans and in line with the Rules of Engagement. If, for instance, intelligence reveals plans and credible evidence that militia is mounting an attack on civilians two miles down the road, the Commander will maintain that the threat is imminent. No time should be lost at that stage and the militia should be engaged, if necessary by using deadly force.

Rebel-controlled radio stations, broadcasting inciting language and ordering violence should be stopped as well. This may eventually include the use of force, proportionate and necessary. When information reveals the location of weapon caches, Commanders are supposed to act and not wait until the weapons are distributed and used against the population. Although nowadays approach may deviate from UN operations a decade ago, the mandates and rules have not changed that much. The authority to act is in the resolution and the permission to use force is in the RoE. What is new is the awareness at both



A "Hind" Mi 24 combat helicopter.

political and military levels that peacekeepers cannot stand idle when civilians are threatened. Soldiers and their Commanders increasingly realize that it is better to fight and die than to survive and revive images of slaughtered and burned mothers and children.

It is standard practice for UN peacekeepers to defend themselves against hostile acts or hostile intents. Complications are to be expected when peacekeepers are confronted with threats from child soldiers. Peacekeepers should realize that armed children could be more volatile and unpredictable than adults. They are poorly trained, often forcefully recruited and some may be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. When child soldiers use force, peacekeepers will be authorized to act in self-defense. As is the case with all engagements, the response should be proportionate to the threat. At the same time, peacekeepers will have to cope with the personal trauma and public reverberations from child casualties. Failure to act adequately and appropriately may also result in extreme reactions both in the Mission area as well as from public opinion.

TURNING ANOTHER PAGE

In Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi and Liberia, peacekeepers are turning another page in UN peacekeeping history. It's a farewell to "western boots on the ground". Increasingly, developed Countries are turning their back on peacekeeping in Africa. With the exemption of a few Countries like Ireland and Sweden, the others are generally

trying to camouflage their absence by pointing to their financial contributions and commitments in UN-mandated missions elsewhere, led by a Coalition or a Regional Organization. At the same time, EU and NATO are scrambling to offer logistic support to the African Union mission in Darfur. The dilemma of absence is partly an issue of solidarity: the UN Charter demands a collective response to threats against international peace and security. "Collective" however should also be seen as an equal share in taking risks on the ground. The absences result in a lack of quality-impulse in UN operations. While our top-ten troop contributors are experienced fighters for the most part, the dynamics of multi-dimensional situations require a right mix of troops and force enablers and highly trained professionals (management, technology and language skills are the key) at sector, divisional and force Headquarters level. These staff Officers should be capable of communicating effectively with all actors, and work shoulder to shoulder with highly qualified civilian staff, adapting plans when the situation on the ground changes. They must be able decision makers, understanding the ramifications when things take a turn for the worse. Both dilemmas are troublesome for all missions and should be solved by developed Countries, bringing in troops, force enablers and staff.

THE UN STRATEGIC RESERVE

Currently, the only way to react to an emerging crisis in a mission area is through an ad-hoc decision on a new mandate with an expanded force, or to request external assistance from the international community. The political and force generation process required to deploy additional units can take too much time to allow a reaction in the critical early stages of a crisis. As a result of this delayed reaction, crises often deteriorate, risking mission collapse and requiring an even larger or more capable force.

The lack of a reliable reserve or reaction capability for responding to crises remains a major obstacle to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. In order to fill this gap, peacekeeping planners have developed the concept of a Strategic Reserve (SR), a mission-specific, pre-planned and rapidly deployable "over-the-horizon force".

The Strategic Reserve would be held in a contributing country with prior agreement to deploy to certain specific UN missions. It would be deployed on the recommendation of the Secretary-General and under Security Council authority for a specific task or duration. The SR

must be equipped, trained and prepared to deploy in Chapter VII environments. Once deployed, the reserve would be placed under UN Command-and-Control and Rules of Engagement.

Potential tasks could include: respond to crises situations beyond the capacity of existing mission resources, deter new or evolving hostile elements in a mission area, reinforce sectors in case of increasing hostility, intensify tactical activities in one or more sectors, increase visibility of force, replace or reinforce the committed operational reserve, protect key facilities or establish a new sector. The SR would be made up by a number of task forces of about 1,250 soldiers on short notice to move. Each task force, with the nucleus of a mobile infantry battalion with adequate combat and service support elements, would have a composition which provides the capability to react to different scenarios in a hostile environment. Duration of deployment is expected to be no more than six months. Peacekeeping Planners are currently exploring the modalities of such an initiative with Member States, and have formed a working group that will address a broad spectrum of concerns and will be utilized to further work out the details of the initiative.

CONCLUSIONS

Costly peacekeeping lessons have been learned during the last decade. In particular on the use of force, peacekeepers have come to realize that the main purpose of them being, well armed and equipped, in that war-torn Country, is to provide stability and to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Efforts are made at various levels to guarantee preparedness of troops. This includes visits to contributing countries, pre-deployment training and in-mission training programs.

Use of force remains an issue entangled with policy, legal and operational restraints. The Rules of Engagement aim to provide clear and unambiguous directions on when and how to use force. Commanders and soldiers do realize that reluctance to use force may result in loss of life of fellow peacekeepers or innocent civilians. At the same time, they are aware that excessive use of force may result in the alien-

The opinions expressed in this article represent exclusively the thought of the Authors and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of the Peacekeeping Operations Department or the United Nations.

ation of the civilian population. It is this fine balance that creates challenges for peacekeepers on a daily basis.

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NOTES

(1) UNOSOM (United Nation's Operation in Somalia) was established as a humanitarian mission with the Security Council Resolution no.751 (1992). The Security Council accepted the U.S. offer to contribute to the creation of a safe environment for distributing humanitarian aid in Somalia, and authorized, in line with Chapter VII, the employment of "all necessary means". President George W. Bush responded to the resolution by deciding to start operation "Restore Hope", whose unified command

would be assumed by the U.S. (UNITAF/ Restore Hope, Security Council Resolution no.784-1992). After a transition period, UNISOM II was constituted according to Chapter VII (Security Council Resolution no.814-1993).

(2) Security Council Resolution no.1542 of April 30, 2005, Haiti (...) in order to protect the civilian population threatened with physical violence, within its capabilities and the deployment areas...Security

Council Resolution no.1565 (2004), Democratic Republic of the Congo...in order to assure the protection of the civilians, including those in charge of humanitarian operations, when threatened with physical violence (...).

(3) Security Council Resolution no.836 (1993), Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, Para 5: ...to prevent attacks against protected areas, control the "cease fire", further the withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces not under the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina, and occupy some key point on the ground...Para 9:...in implementing the mandate defined at the preceding Para 5, acting in self-defense, take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in response to bombings conducted by one of the factions against the protected areas, or (in response) to armed raids within such areas, or when deliberate obstacles are set against the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or protected humanitarian convoys, both inside and in the proximity of such areas.

"The use of force is still an issue with political, legal and operational limitations. The Rules of Engagement aim at providing clear and precise directives on when and how to apply it"



REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN





REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN

Our Army's commitment

Managing peace is much harder than managing war. In a country absolutely collapsed, the rebuilding work can only happen in a frame of stability and security. It's not an easy task, but rather a complex challenge that requires a large expenditure of resources and energy.

In April this year the Consortium Military History Working Group, of PFP, to which various Institutes of Strategic-defence Studies, not only in Europe, and Historical Offices of a few Armed Forces adhere to, met in Bratislava (1) to study and discuss, with the help of examples from the past, the new tactics put into place to "exit" from recent conflicts, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The conclusions of the analysis from the experts, are in short the following: obviously this is a problem whose current solution is *in itinere* and subject to remarkable changes, as many factors vary, at least on paper, from what has happened in the recent and distant past. They were and there are various scenarios for exiting a war. First of all remember that before a war is a military act it is a political act, that utilises conflict as an instrument to achieve its objectives, for example the stability of an important strategic area, when other means are deemed insufficient. And it is also an act that is with various economic consequences of many types, but the biggest impacts are on the life of the territory where the conflict takes place and on the States which have participated.

The "exit" from a conflict implies the management of peace, perhaps a thing even more difficult than conflict, for the victors and the defeated. Who can't remember the serious social, economic and political problems from the demobilising of troops in Europe after the First and Second World Wars? And what can be said about the return, after long periods far from familiar places, of the prisoners. Equally as complex is the return of ethnic groups previously expelled from their countries of origin.

The peace can be a peace imposed, for instance, by the victors: in this case, for those who are subjected to the peace it is often an even bitterer finish to a conflict; the peace can be imposed by an international organization and in this case the difficulties which follow can be lighter because in this scenario the humanitarian concerns are treated as a priority.

Then there is the "exit" from war or from military intervention, based on the consent between the victors and the defeated, without the populace being totally in favour of the "agreement".

How is it possible to manage the peace in a collapsed state where the first thing is to provide the basic services (water, electricity, food distribution) and simultaneously restore state structures or create *ex novo*, imposing the so-called *governance*, which is the idea of the authority of the State?

The end of a conflict implies severe economic consequences, essential for the rebuilding of destroyed property, where the humanitarian "vocation" and

national or regional interests are tightly intertwined.

The rebuilding needs stability and security: because only in this way can it proceed to a reconstruction that activates the financial markets and attracts a sizeable volume of big and small "businesses", that can guarantee both a stable society and an economy based on legal foundations.

The complex era in which we are living is undoubtedly also an "exit" from a war, the "cold war" of the two bipolar superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. At the end of the "cold war", we are faced with a multipolar "humanitarian vocation", that doesn't forget

“The end of a conflict implies means severe economic consequences, essential for the rebuilding of destroyed property, where the humanitarian "vocation" and national or regional interests are tightly intertwined”



national and supranational security, stability and possible markets interests.

This period is based very much on international cooperation, be it based on fixed coalitions or multinational coalitions formed for specific objectives, with at times some problems with the unit of command or at the level of tactics, that could eventually compromise the political and diplomatic decisions from the top, making it even harder to return to a normal stability.

If the peace in Iraq today seems unmanageable then the situation in Afghanistan seems, at least for the moment, relatively more promising and receptive to the efforts of the international community.

A LAND OF SECULAR DISPUTE

Afghanistan, an enclave State (with all the weaknesses of being an enclave) has always been a land of "interposition", almost a *buffer zone*, between the expansionistic vitality of the czarist empire towards the Indian Ocean, India and China, and that of the British, who spread out from India east to China, Burma and Tibet and west to modern day Pakistan, Iran, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia and the Gulf: a geopolitical situation termed the Big Game. At the end of the First World War Afghanistan managed to get real independence, trying also to modernize society and the government structures. It was a quite short period. After the Second World War,

Title pages.

Afghan servicemen in rock-climbing training.

Above

A joint project between Italy and Afghanistan.

with the retreat of Great Britain from India and the beginning of the "cold war", that territory became, again, a region of highly significant strategic importance, especially because of its border with the "Imperial" Soviet. After the war the territory continued to be a territory in which a lot of pressure was applied, from Iran, from Pakistan, but above all the attempted soviet invasion, a consequence of the geopolitical vision of Moscow, inheriting the same hegemonic impulse as Czarist Russia to move forward towards the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. It is historically recognized that from 1978 on, the eve of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the end of the government of Daoud, which Zahir Shah had turned over with a coup d'état in 1973, the "Country system" was completely collapsed and there was no longer any managerial capacity from the local authorities. The withdrawal of the Soviet army and the following rise of the "Taliban" made it even harder in this land, devastating the population.

Then with the break-up of the Soviet Union five new republics were created, three of which share frontiers with Afghanistan territory; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: here it is worth noting that all the large ethnic groups are present in the



A group of Afghan women awaiting to attend a meeting called by the ISAF Command.

Afghani population. The structure of this state, in fact, has always been founded on the rule of the Pashto tribe over the other ethnic groups, Tagiki, Uzbek, Baluci, Turkmen note this how a Shiite minority can rise up from the mountains.

Afghanistan can actually be considered in a geopolitical point of view, the most central Asian state of all the states in the area. The Tagika and Uzbek Diaspora was very important and in the case of the solving of the Afghan problem based only on the affinity of the Pashto would mean a serious impact on the territory if there was a growth in Tagika or Uzbek nationalism.

The other Afghan frontiers, Iran, Pakistan and for 76km China, are very permeable, porous, just like those with the ex-soviet Republics: with above all a constant interchange with Iran, facilitated by the fact that Dari, one of languages neo-Persian used, is a variant of Farsi the Iranian language. At present, however, the frontier with Iran is not as open as in the past and workers who want to legally cross the border queue for the Teheran Embassy in Kabul to obtain a visa. Despite this, the religious influence of Shiites especially on the Herat area is remarkable, just as the Shiites exercise on the Dhi Kar area in Iraq: both these areas are in the zone of Italian responsibility.

It is not possible to forget the "Taliban" element, not completely vanquished, but actually still active in committing acts of civil disturbance and guerilla warfare. There were and there are sizeable potential risks all over Afghanistan, not only the backwardness of its society and the economy which negatively affects the development of the communication channels and oil routes in the direction of the south (to Pakistan and India). The

cultivation of poppy (papavero), with the large and continual drug traffic has important repercussions on neighbouring states as well as Afghanistan and the international economy.

Then we must mention the growth of cross-border terrorism, bound to Islamic political militancy. Besides it is clear that the population considers religion and nationalism the same thing and views religion as a part of the state, just as obligatory as following the prescriptions of Islam, the sharia..

Another element which threatens the sought after stability in the area is presence of the armed militia, from the various wars in the region: a secular tradition of being personally armed, not in the sense of a regular army, but of a militia, if not feudal certainly of a tribal or confessional style and its not easy to disarm them or force them to conform to the law, the rules of which result at times with are difficult to comprehend for men used to obeying a charismatic chief and not an imposed governing bureaucracy..

This territory was, and is still threatened with being, the ideal battlefield for the geostrategic rivalries in central Asia, above all for its ethnic heterogeneity and the still feudal structure (the New Big Game). In fact another important element which is necessary to take into account is the current Afghan social structure, moreover the difference between the towns and the countryside: while in the towns the conception of government authorities is in some way accepted, in the hinterland the only authorities which are recognized are

either those of the village chief or tribal chief (in the case of a mono-tribal village), elected with the consent of the local population or via religious procedures, and invested with a large moral authority even if the legal authority is lacking. Therefore the dialogue, outside of the towns has to be held with these individuals, and this is often as not done with much tact and ability by our soldiers; at times lacking the bureaucracy to help achieve the prefixed objectives, if they are not acceptable from the religious part, for instance, taking into consideration the above mentioned sharia as being an absolute *iuri corpus* to be followed.

A CHALLENGE TO BE WON

In this complex picture, with many volatile factors to be taken into account, are the Italian Armed Forces who must operate and be effective within the framework of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2). Bearing in mind the comprehensive article from Colonel Sperotto, then commander of PRT in Herat, citing his own words, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the current means to "exit" the conflict, are a mixture of civil and military personnel with the remit of augmenting the authority of the central Afghan Government, of promoting and strengthening security and of facilitating the channels of humanitarian aid and of assuring support to the rebuilding activities by national and international organizations working in the area. Complex tasks, above all for a nation which has the leadership and thus the responsibility of an area, and assuming the coordination (Regional Area Coordinator - RAC): the NATO strategy that aims that ISAF expands its responsibility to the whole Theatre, to help the Afghan government in the work of consolidation of its authority on all the territory, through a process articulated in four Stages that, moving anticlockwise starting from the north of the country (already in operation) to all of the Afghan territory. the objective is to create a foundation of stability and security which can be the base of the subsequent possible and sustainable reconstruction, and that gives support to the local institutions, freely elected so that they obtain and keep the authority necessary for governing the Country.

Italy, which from last August until May 4th of this year, had the responsibility for the whole of ISAF,

“...to create a framework of stability and security at the basis of any possible and sustainable reconstruction, and support the local institutions...”



The Chief of a village.

having been entrusted with the role of Commandant del NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, as well as Italfor (4) and thirty soldiers from the Kabul Multinational Brigade, it has assumed coordination of PRT in relation to the Herat area: RAC-WEST, one of four expected Command posts, the other three being near the capital Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar.

It is certainly not a brand new method for rebuilding and guaranteeing security in a country, as highlighted by Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi in his article in S.A.S. on PRT (5), what is being carried out in Afghanistan has some characteristics in common with other reconstruction attempts, but in contexts completely different and in situations with special factors, truly derived from the Country's individual structure and history.

In the context of Stage II of the NATO/ISAF mission, Italy took the responsibility of the Herat PRT with the following mandate: "... help the Afghanistan Government extend its authority with the purpose of facilitating the creation of a stable and safe environment within its Area of Operation and support, using



The opening ceremony of a school.

a military presence, the correlated activities as per the program Security Sector Reform (SSR) (6) and the process of rebuilding of the country..." In this task PRT is composed of civilians (the Civil Office of PRT, *l'Ufficiale Civile del PRT*) from the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (*Ministero degli Affari Esteri MAE*), in various projects in which professionalism, technical *know how*, military competence and the CIMIC (*Collaborazione Civile Militare*, Military Civil Cooperation), whose work is already well known in other countries, are all injected.

To talk about concrete activities, above all from the humanitarian point of view (7), PRT/CIMIC, in the framework of Operation Quick Impact Project (Projects completed in quick time, but that have a big impact on the local community, reinforcing among the local populace confidence in the foreign civilians and military who are responsible for their primary needs) has completed for example the following(8):

“...what is being carried out in Afghanistan has some characteristics in common with other reconstruction attempts, but in a completely different context...”

- o in the town of Herat, in the sector of Police and Security Forces, it has arranged the supply of vehicles, motor-vehicles, radio equipment for telecommunications, gasoline and Police uniforms. The purpose of the project was to provide the Police in the province of Herat with an operations room for the management of emergencies (elections, floods, fires, earthquakes), providing the telephone connections, the motor vehicles and the relevant equipment for the purpose of allowing the development of activities of control and security, important issues for the realization of a sustainable stability in the territory, and achieved by the same Afghans.
- o in the town of Herat, in the area of health, it supplied the Emergency Ward with suitable materials and instruments to guarantee its effective operating; it had purchased electrical radiators for the paediatrics and plastic surgery for the beds in emergency, it's waiting for a MAE project for the general restructuring of the heating for the same department; it has supplied support material for the Centre of Mental Disorders; it has developed cooperation activities among Afghan medical staff;
- o in the Shindand district, also in the area of health, it bought an electronic generator for the hospital and sanitary material of several kinds, with the aim of improving the functionality of the district health facility;
- o from a typically social point of view, regarding the weakest parts of the population, it donated nonexistent tools and equipment to help the in-patients centres for the "martyrs" and the invalids;
 - o in the sector of justice sector, in the town of Herat, it supplied the local court with furnishings; for the civil administration it gave the Government a secure internet point and paid the connection for five months; with the aim of helping to rebuild the local administration it began as quickly as possible to implement basic computerization; in the area of emergency prevention it supplied two Toyota pick-ups, for winter, with the purpose of allowing transport between the isolated villages in case of snow; it has also supplied materials and equipment to combat the cold;
- o still in the town of Herat, with regards to the so-called Social Deals (*Affari Sociali*), like the support to Women Affairs Department, for the distribution on the international day of women (March 8th) 180 bags containing various items of personal hygiene (soap, shampoo, nail-clippers, cloth, towel, toothpaste, toothbrush);



- o in the district of Qara Bagh, on completion of the project of rebuilding the local school building, it provided desks, chairs and desks, in such a way it could guarantee the school actually started life as a school

Another three projects are still going on at the moment:

- o for the Herat town, it is aiming to provide the municipality with 3 compacting lorries and 150 rubbish skips for rubbish, to start a urban street cleaning and refuse collection service
- o the purchase of two ambulances to ensure the speedy transport of the wounded from nearby villages to the regional Herat hospital;
- o it is completing the project of reorganization of several school buildings (eighteen) and, on completion of the structure, furniture and auxiliary items to help start the schools, is nearing completion.

Reading about the projects, for those who don't know the reality of Afghanistan would probably bring a smile to many when they consider how small the projects are, but they are excellent projects which can be completed rapidly and above all with identifiable objectives from the Afghan government itself; these are three clear guideline specification decided upon in meeting

An Italian soldier on patrol duty near the village of Pashtun-zargul.

held in London at the end of 2006, during which it was also decided upon a Provincial Development Committee that must act as body of Coordinator and the achievement of the construction of projects for ensuring security, with Military and Police training; ensuring that it starts with English governance terms, and so reinforces and strengthens the Afghan governing structures in the opinion of the population in general, an objective not particularly easy if one considers Afghan social structures. So to ensure that there is *rule of law*, that is the observance of the laws, the respect of human rights, economic and social development, through education, integration of women into the Afghan system, the development of infrastructure, the moulding of the managing classes and the correct use and development of water resources.

There are also some precise indications for individually requested projects: acceptance in terms of public usefulness and their sustainability in the future. The project validity is examined by an assessment team, experts that study and evaluate

the request according to those concepts. This team has recently rejected a project for the creation of 16 water wells on private land thus not falling into the category of "Public Utility". When a project is accepted, it must be agreed on by the local authorities, which must undertake to make efforts towards the realization of the project with the supply of tools.

As regards the activity CIMIC in Kabul, in the period February 2004–February 2006, between what was created it is interesting to remember that the following were built (9) 16 schools, two orphanages, two schools for blind and one for those deaf without speech: in total about 40 classrooms in masonry, 25 of wood and about 30 others were rebuilt with minimum costs, with the cooperation of local companies and the help of Italian military engineering. They distributed 1,600 desks; stationary (26,000 exercise books, 30,000 pens, 30,000 pencils, 30,000 erasers, 10,000 folders, 400 blackboards) for about 7,600 children. They gave a total of 20 computers, 6 water tanks and 2 small electrical generators. 29 water wells were built. About 3,500 sheep and oxen were treated by veterinarians. Also for the road network there have been projects; military engineers rebuilt three bridges (activities based on the indications of CIMIC) and other jobs were carried out in the road sector. There was the little tasks of water runoffs and minor maintenance programs in 12 neighbouring villages of the military compound and in the periphery of Kabul.

The health sector was given two dental studies for the local hospital and a sufficient quantity of medicines. There were also some military doctors' actions, among other things they founded, a little outside the remit of Italfor, the clinic "Hope" (derived from a Indian NGO project) for the treatment of leishmaniasis, very common in the population due to the promiscuity with animals.

For the University of Kabul two classrooms and a library were built in cooperation with the Faculty of Veterinary Science of the Universities Of Messina and Padua. To the poorest parts of the population, to the children in the orphanages, in schools for deaf without speech, the blind and boys in the juvenile jail; 3,000 kg of various foods, 7,200 pairs of shoes, 33,600 garments of clothing, 19,200 pieces of baby clothing and 6,300 toys.

40 Afghan students were brought to Italy, at the University For Foreigners Of Perugia, to learn and improve the knowledge of the Italian language.

Among many other performed activities, there

was the training of 40 Afghan soldiers in rock climbing, carried out by four Italian Alpine Officers at the Italfor camp.

CONCLUSIONS

A brief stay in Kabul and Herat allowed me the opportunity to evaluate on the ground some of the many initiatives which have been completed by the Herat PRT/CIMIC. I was present at an inauguration of a school about twenty minutes by car from Herat. The local Afghan authorities were present, it was a sizeable event, and the opening ceremony was heralded with words from the Koran. It seemed to me an important event that they were present, even if the men, children, girls and young women were separate; if the primary instruction is consented by local custom to the female sex it means that an important message has been received even outside the main cities, where traditions are more entrenched. The Village Head then invited "the Italians" to eat at his house. A symbolic gesture from the village and its notables who

were also present at the meal. It was a simple meal simple, but with the warm hospitality of one who recognizes, as in all the Middle East, the guest is a "gift" from the Divine One.

Another interesting moment was the visit to a school building in the Pashto–Zargul territory, about three hours from Herat: they are organizing two

toilet facilities, one for the males and one for the females, to avoid the double turn here (men in the morning and women in the afternoon). Another small but significant project; the construction of a restraining wall to avoid the possible wandering off of small rivers that could feed houses in small low populated villages in the Pashto area.

Also in Kabul and its surroundings the projects are often geared towards schools, like for example the school in the military compound built by the "Garibaldi" Brigade.

It is obviously not possible to outline all the completed projects but what appears clear is that the path undertaken by the international community, partly realized by the Italian Armed Forces, can be the only solution to bring Afghanistan out from a remarkable backwardness and a situation which has this territory like a drug and arms crossroads. It is significant that the "Taliban" tried to recently destroy a school in the north of the Country; education allows the population to begin to "think" and "evaluate".

“...to bring Afghanistan out from a remarkable backwardness and a from a situation where this territory is like a crossroads of drug and arms trafficking”



A commemorative plate on a building just reconstructed by ISAF with the support of local workers.

The challenge is hard, but they are on a good course, even if it is long and full of dangers, as shown by the recent attack on Camp Vianini in Herat: but the challenge must be overcome in order to give the next generations a greater security and international stability.

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NOTES

(1) "6th International Conference", Exiting War. Post conflict military operations, Bratislava 3-7 April 2006.

(2) Isaf and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the military mission led by the United States, have separate mandates and missions: ISAF must focus its action on the stabilization and security of the territory, while OEF will continue in its

established objective, the struggle against terrorism.

(3) The article was published in "Rivista Militare", no. 2/06, It. Ed., to which one can apply for more details. In the text, the objectives concerning our Armed Forces in the ISAF and PRT scenario are only briefly outlined.

(4) Composed, at the moment, of the 132nd Armoured Artillery Regiment "Ariete", the 7th NBC Regiment "Cremona", the 6th Engineering Regiment "Pionieri", the 4th Alpine Parachute Regiment, the 1st Communications Regiment and the Carabinieri as Military Police.

(5) QV "Rivista Militare", November / December 2005, It. Ed., pages 40-49.

(6) The SSR has five main objectives: anti-drug (Great Britain), judicial reform (Italy), disarmament, demobilization and reinstatement (Japan), training of the Afghan Army (United States), training of the Afghan police (Germany, which will probably finish at the end of the year. Italy has been asked to take over this objective).

(7) The following list is obviously not exhaustive about what has been or is being done, especially in connection with the cultivation and trafficking of drugs.


(8) Data provided by the PRT Command in Herat.

(9) Figures reported by the CIMIC ITALFOR cell in Kabul.



جسر
الشهيد فاضل عطية
الناصر

URBAN WARFARE IN CRO



LOGOS

URBAN WARFARE IN «CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS»

The reduced distances of engagement, the difficulty of telling the enemies from the population and the hostility of the environment stress the difficulty of putting into practice the training schemes. The recent experience of the "Ariete" Brigade in Iraq prompts its former Commander to make some reflections that could prove useful without altering a still valid and topical doctrinal body.

Sun Tzu, theoretician of the art of war, frequently quoted but rarely listened to, in one of its maxims states...*the worst policy is that of attacking the cities...attack only if there is no other possibility.* All the military Commanders have considered these words drops of wisdom, but indeed, also in recent conflicts, often the combats have taken place precisely in the cities. Actually the process of urban migration of the last decades has concerned a high number of megalopolises. In the not too distant past the only cities that neared the considerable dimension of ten million inhabitants were

“Urban fights seem to be changing the rules of combat, reducing the differences of the adversaries as regards equipment and preparation”

London and New York; now Cairo, Istanbul, Mexico City and Shanghai exceed these numbers. Therefore more and more frequently one is faced by very large urban contexts, which not only represent an important demographic concentration, but are also communication knots, economic and business centres, poles of development for the entire surrounding region. Therefore it is very difficult to achieve the control of the territory if one fails to get hold of

the important cities, which increasingly become the key elements that were once represented by mountains and dominant positions. Therefore, Sun Tzu's maxim, always inspired by common sense, does not lose its value. Nevertheless, at the present time, it is difficult to find alternatives to urban warfare.


On the other hand, urban fights seem to be changing the rules of combat, reducing the differences of the adversaries as regards equipment and preparation. As a matter of fact, any unit that finds itself involved in actions where the engagement distances appear extremely short, where it is difficult to tell the enemy from the population, where the whole environment appears hostile, can find it difficult to put into practice the schemes learned before. On the other hand, everything seems to favour an adversary, even if not militarily prepared, who can take advantage of a deep knowledge of the environment and moves unconcernedly among the population until the moment he chooses to hit. It is therefore normal that, particularly in CROs (Crisis Response Operations) one may have to face

Title pages.

Nassiriya: One of the bridges on the Euphrates.

Below.

A "Bersagliere" on surveillance duty.



armed militiamen, who choose to operate inside a town, in order to exploit its characteristics and make up for their insufficient preparation, giving more visibility and resonance to their operations, and trying to appear before the population as the "power holders".

The recent experience of the "Ariete" Brigade at Nassiriya, Iraq, leads to make some reflections that could be useful even if they do not intend to alter a doctrinal body still valid and topical. From these reflections we will see how, after all, the fundamental principles of training can also be applied in urban environments. One must only bear in mind the characteristic elements of such engagements and consider the environmental differences.

SURVEILLANCE

As in all military operations, also in urban combats it is essential to have a clear and precise

A patrol in "hedgehog" formation.

“As in all military operations, also in urban combats it is essential to have a clear and precise vision of the objectives”

vision of the objectives. But what are the possible objectives in a city? It seems a tricky question but actually it is not so. The potential groups of insurgents will undoubtedly take possession of some buildings that have symbolic and functional importance, which therefore will constitute the key elements of their organization, as venues of "insurrectionary movements", gathering places or anything else. These places are known in advance, precisely because of their importance and are therefore easily located. The other objectives are

those whose possession can hinder or paralyse the city life or the people's movement, giving the impression that the groups control the city: I refer to the seats of the local Administration, bridges, obligatory roads, Police Centrals. There are, on the other hand, the buildings that house the offices or the delegations of the Contingent and the Transition Authority. These are paying objectives for the adversary and therefore they must be carefully considered and included in the list that will have to be made.

Once the list is made, the elements identified will be highlighted on the city map and the strong





A "Centauro" heavy armoured car on patrol.

points and vulnerabilities (superelevation, proximity of other buildings, intrinsic structure of the construction, access and escape routes) carefully studied. It is important, moreover, to systematise such elements in order to see how the potential adversary will be able to move by exploiting some of them.

Once the map is obtained, one starts by putting such elements under surveillance, that from discreet can become more and more intense and evident as the events develop. In periods of operational standstill or relative calm, the points located can be subjected to a discreet surveillance by the intelligence and be included in the plans of the patrols that cover the city. Should the situation seem to deteriorate, it would be necessary to send teams of specialists (normally special-forces observers) who should put the concerned points under a continuous surveillance with optical and electronic equipment, during daytime and night-time. However, it should be remembered that this intense observation is very onerous for the units and therefore cannot be continued for long periods. Therefore, if the situation worsens the surveillance must be maintained at all costs, but if it improves one must go back to a discreet surveillance as soon as possible.

This type of observation can be complemented with unmanned aircraft (UAVs), which by operating without exposing the personnel, prevailingly at night-time, permit to have views from different angles and thus complete the knowledge acquired by the operators on the ground. However it must be remembered that such aircraft, flying at low altitude, are visible and often also very noisy. Therefore it should be considered that the adversary would immediately notice their employment. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a negative factor. In fact, if the situation is already pre-conflict, and there is nothing to lose in making clear that we want to have a constant surveillance from the sky. Moreover, such means are an evident signal to everybody that the Contingent is watchful and prepared for any occurrence and it continues to keep under control the nerve-centres of the city.

Another essential element for acquiring a complete picture of the situation is environmental interception, which does not so much concern radios, for which the units are prepared, but cell-phones. The insurgents, in fact, are unlikely to have radios, while the use of cell-phones is widespread, also in the most backward countries. During the Nassirya fights, personal phones were employed also for surveys and for adjusting mortar fire. Such interceptions require equipment and techniques that are more commonly

employed by the Police than the Military. Nevertheless it is necessary to be prepared for meeting a threat that is becoming more and more diversified and specialized. Often the user of cell-phones does not think that military units can overhear him, because he thinks that they are not prepared for such function; therefore he may give out important data about the preparation of possible offensive actions.

This observation function is essential in order to carry out any type of action in a city, but is unlikely to give complete situation data. The adversary, in fact, moves about naturally, hiding weapons under his clothes or other materials, and it is very improbable that he will clearly show his intentions in advance. Therefore, while the people that are building barricades are supplying unmistakable elements to be considered in one's planning, it will be very difficult to determine how many people are going to occupy the barricades, or what functions such obstacles will have in urban warfare. Thus one can say that it is very difficult to conduct a urban combat without previously carrying out a good surveillance, but on the other hand, the latter alone is not sufficient to ensure good possibilities of success.

OPERATIONS

Operations carried out in a city environment cannot be included in the traditional subdivision of "attack" and "defence". The outline of the two types of manoeuvre is vague and intermingled. It is in fact very common to move, in order to occupy a building that represents an important defensive element, and be fired at when getting near it, and for that reason decide to go on with the action and "dislodge" the occupying insurgents. Everything depends on the perception and initiative of the lower-level Commanders, who must judge and decide accordingly, without being too restrained by rigid schematisms. Thus, the planning of an operation must be doctrinal when carried out at the highest levels (Brigade/Division), since doctrine can be correctly applied also in urban fighting. On the contrary, it must be very flexible at the lower levels, leaving ample initiative to the subordinate Commanders, so that they can adapt the directives to a situation that is clear only on the ground. Planning at the highest levels, besides determining all the objectives to be reached, must subdivide the areas of intervention and the forces available, but must not expect to manage details such as the

“ In an urban environment, operations cannot be included in the traditional subdivision of attack and defence ”

position of the unit's weapons, which only a platoon leader can decide. It is therefore very sensible to divide the area into "Deep Battle", "Close Battle" and "Rear Battle", assigning to each of them the forces necessary to achieve the specified objectives, but it is essential to bear in mind the maxim "Never come down from your Command level", expecting to teach an NCO, leader of a platoon, how to arrange his forces. One should trust his men: the NCO was deemed fit for that task and he will certainly be able to carry it out. To appropriate somebody else's responsibilities in a situation liable to sudden changes can have tragic consequences.

Any plan for manoeuvring in urban environments should not overlook the need to isolate the combat areas. As a matter of fact, the insurgents have a limited number of forces and rather rough logistics. Therefore if one succeeds in preventing them from receiving fresh fighters, weapons, munitions and food, very soon their action will dry up "motu proprio". Obviously this is true only if one has the favour of the population and if the people's liking does not go, on the contrary, to the insurgents. In this case, the town itself becomes a supply centre for the enemy. This is very important and will be examined later on. To isolate the combat area could mean to surround a district or the entire city, according to the extent of the fight. However, in order to obtain this isolation, it is not necessary to

deploy the units side by side, also because this would be impossible, considering the availability of men: it will be sufficient to control the main routes with check points and watch the intermediate ones with patrols or UAVs. One will not obtain a total closure, but a

control sufficient to reduce the supplies a great deal. On the other hand, a civilian truck overloaded with ammunitions would find it difficult to drive on a road full of holes.

Once the area is isolated, the manoeuvre must be aimed at protecting the previously identified key points, preventing the enemy from taking them. One should remember that its purpose is to show to the world and civilian population that it has achieved full possession of the town by occupying its most important parts. If it does not succeed, the enemy is discredited before everybody's eyes and fails to attain its goal. Therefore there is no need to drive it out of its hideouts. The Contingent has nothing to demonstrate, while the adversary has to subvert the established order and show that he is the strongest. If he does not reach its aim very quickly, the population will leave him to its destiny and the action will rapidly end.

"Door to door" mop-up operations may be necessary in certain situations and must be carried out carefully, and only in restricted and well delimited areas, because it can cause not only a high number of losses to the attacker, but raises the level of the fight and makes it necessary to employ highly destructive weapons, such as bunker-booster rockets, demolition charges and grenade throwers. What is more, in this type of operations it is difficult to ensure the protection of the population, as it is very unlikely that the adversary will have evacuated civilians from the occupied buildings, as provided for by the war laws. In such close confrontation, civilians will risk not only their safety, but also their houses and possessions. Much as one tries to avoid risks for the civilians, the most likely result is that the population will turn its back on him. In a confrontation at a distance, on the contrary, it is easier to control the shooting and avoid collateral damages.

The employment of armour and airmobile units in urban contexts deserves a special note. In fact, for a long time there has been the idea that armoured units were not suited for this type of fight. Real situations showed just the opposite. Those who are against this employment maintained, not without reason, that in a town the fields of vision are reduced and, while the threat posed by rocket launchers increases also at short distances, it is impossible to take advantage of the vehicle's weapons. Actually, in many cities there are wide avenues, public parks and open areas where one can manoeuvre with tanks and use weapons of the appropriate calibre to confront the threat. The size of the armoured vehicles permits the easy removal of road barriers and gives the crews an incomparable protection, well above our expectations. None of the members of the crews of "Centauro" armoured cars was wounded at Nassirya, although the vehicles were hit by several antitank rockets.

As regards airborne operations, on the contrary, one should bear in mind that urban contexts permit to easily hide portable anti-aircraft rocket launchers, which, considering the continuing high vulnerability of helicopters, can achieve devastating results and be easily found on the black market. Twenty-one of these rocket launchers were confiscated during the period of the activity of the "Ariete", at Nassirya. In view of the effectiveness and easy use of these systems, there is a risk that a shooting down, which is very possible in the delicate landing

phase, could have shocking effects. Furthermore, the unit must carry bulky, heavy weapons and, considering the limited availability of transport helicopters, this reduces their number and therefore the possibility of success. In fact, these operations reach their goal only if everything is sent in a single wave, since it is very unlikely that the enemy will allow a second journey. Besides, any operation that inserts an isolated unit in any context must guarantee its recovery or its contact with a friendly unit within a well-established time. It is difficult to obtain these guarantees, given the ever-changing nature of the urban environment. For all these reasons airborne operations have often been planned but never carried out.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

C2 operations in an urban context are very intricate, both for the considerable subdivision of the environment and for the changeability of the operational situation. Thus it is fundamental that the Commanders at all levels receive clear data on the situation and fully understand the intentions of the

Commander of the Major Unit during the preparatory phase of the operation. Once the mission and the development lines of the operation are well understood, all subordinate Commanders will be able to adapt their

orders to the situation, in order to achieve the objective assigned. A detailed planning at the lower levels should be avoided, since not everybody will understand it. Furthermore

it will probably be impossible to implement it at the moment of the action and control its conduct once the operation has begun. Maximum initiative should be left with the Commanders at lower level once the objectives have been fixed, so that they may be achieved without harnessing them within schemes conceived at higher levels. Some could be surprised to see how subordinate Commanders (not only Platoon Commanders but also squad and patrol leaders) will cope with the situation with determination and spirit of initiative. Obviously a preventive and effective training is necessary; all elements of the chain must know and trust each other well and have the feeling of belonging to a single team that works for a common goal.

One should resist the temptation of "overcommanding" one's units and, similarly, that of reacting emotionally to the situation. In the excitement

“ It is fundamental that the Commanders at all levels receive clear data on the situation and fully understand the intentions of the Commander of the Major Unit during the preparatory phase of the operation ”



Italian servicemen keeping watch over a market.

of the fight, the data arriving to the operation room are often incomplete, distorted or exaggerated, when not entirely wrong in their basic parameters. Therefore one should avoid making decisions, even when facing very dramatic situations, before getting a sufficiently clear picture of the situation itself. One should not expect a complete pattern, because this would entail a tardy decision, but at least a picture with essential and verified data. To make rapid decisions on the spur of emotionality or without due reflection can increase the risks for the units without giving them any advantage.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

As in every type of operation, logistic support is fundamental in order to enable the units to carry out their mission. The main activities that deserve our attention are supplies and medical support. In fact, other activities, such as maintenance, are less significant in combats with limited possibilities of manoeuvre.

Supplies are essential and one should bear in mind that, in action, the consumption of certain materials, such as ammunition, can be very high. And he who fires to defend his life is very unlikely to spare shots. Training is obviously very important also in this sector, because well-trained personnel know how to ration their bursts, while the unskilled ones tend to shoot all they have as soon as they feel fired at. Obviously, also in this sector, the supply of ammunition must be regular and punctual, otherwise it is difficult to fight an enemy that seems to have always unlimited supplies at its disposal.

Also food and water supplies should not be neglected, because the fighter, as capable as he may be, has the same needs as anybody else, and if he is left without water and food for long periods, no matter how high his determination, his efficiency will irremediably decline. One should underline the importance of water, because on conditions where temperatures easily reach 50° outside temperature, water becomes a conditioning factor of a man's resistance. One should not overlook these things, which seem commonplaces, because the unit's capability of carrying out their mission depends largely on them, irrespective of the men's valour.

An efficient and timely medical assistance is also of fundamental importance, because it conditions the fighters psychologically. In fact, if a man knows that, if wounded, he will be speedily taken to an efficient and clean hospital, where a surgical team can promptly assist him and, in case of complications, can be taken home within a few hours, he will do his best in any circumstance. It is also important to diffuse information about self-help and mutual assistance, because an immediate intervention of the colleagues in critical situations helps the medical personnel in the performance of the successive operations. This does not presume a detailed clinical knowledge but only elementary notions: what should be dressed, where to tighten, how to lay down a wounded man. These fundamental precautions can save a life. Here again we see the importance of preventive training.

Both supplies and medical evacuations have an element in common: they will probably be carried out under enemy fire. Also the militiamen know the inflow and evacuation itineraries and along these roads armed insurgents will frequently materialize and start shooting against the oncoming and outgoing vehicles. Thus supply columns must be escorted and armed with heavy weapons and, if possible, ambulances should be armour-plated. As a matter of fact the Red Cross, instead of being a safe-conduct, becomes an attractive target for the rebels.

THE POPULATION

It is the primary component in urban warfare. Its attitude can decide the outcome of the contest. Therefore it is important to alienate psychologically the population from the fighters, who often do not care for the civilians' needs and have no consideration for their safety. Actually if the insurgents move easily about a city environment, this does not mean that its inhabitants share their motivations. On the contrary, they often have different political and religious ideas, and happen to be involved in a violent situation that has incomprehensible purposes, often very far from their feelings. If the Contingent has been working well, meeting the people's needs, it earns esteem and consideration, which do not vanish when the first shot is fired.

This does not automatically mean that if the civilians are in favour of the Contingent they will pick up their guns to defend it, since we cannot think that they will suddenly become fighters, however great their esteem, especially when the combat takes place around their homes (at

Nassirya, however, some episodes of this kind happened). In any case it is essential that the locals do not support the insurgents but, on the contrary, they do their best to deny them shelter and food supplies, and hamper their movements. The insurrectional structure, very vulnerable on these points, will immediately feel this lack of support and the insurgents will find it difficult to sustain the rhythm of a protracted combat.

THE MEDIA

Having established that the favour of the population is an essential factor, we must talk about the media, the most important element for acquiring and maintaining such favour. In any Country, even the most backward ones, there are communication systems: newspapers, magazines, radio, television and the Internet. In Countries with a low alphabetisation index, they tend to concentrate only on television. Actually this is a relatively cheap means, which is attractive for the variety of programmes it offers. It is widespread in all Countries and often one can see forests of satellite aerials standing on the roofs of rural homes in poor areas.

This situation is so well known that one of the first objectives of urban insurrections are precisely TV stations, from which the dissenters broadcast programmes artfully prepared to manipulate information and influence public opinion. Thus it is important to know that such stations are important objectives to be

defended during urban combat.

As regards the relations with the local media, the fundamental activity is to give them transparent information, acquainting them with all that is being done in favour of the population, avoiding boasting and self-celebrations. If the Contingent has been working well, everybody will clearly see it, because the witnesses to the events will confirm the communication. The population, therefore, can be brought up to date about the progress made, and will certainly know the difference between those who work for them and those who have their own purposes.

The attention to the media must also include a correct analysis of the enemy false information. At times the insurgents are in a position to introduce in the information circuit (satellite TV, the Internet) false or doctored news, which can even be integrated with rigged films in order to discredit the Contingent. Since a neglected or non-denied piece

“If the Contingent has been working well ... it has earned esteem and consideration, which do not vanish when the first shot is fired”



"Lagunari" on the bank of the Euphrates.

of news gives the impression of being true, one must pay great attention to these communications and deny them as soon as possible, using the support of reality. However sophisticated the manipulations may be, the reality of facts will be soon evident to one and all.

CONCLUSIONS

These notes do not claim to be exhaustive and give all the answers about a complex operational situation, such as urban warfare in "Crisis Response Operations" (CROs). Some remarks may even seem obvious and so could the proposed solutions. But the experience gained in operations leads to believe that even the most obvious things may not seem so if one has to make important decisions under the rush of the events.

As a conclusion to this short observations, what should remain clear is that in urban combat, as in any type of military operation, the fun-

damental element is the fighter. A well trained fighter, skilled and aware of his capabilities and limits, but above all a fighter who trusts his superiors because he knows that he is not just a number, an entity in a mass, but an important individual, on whom everything could depend. A fighter who knows that orders are conceived so as to achieve the goal while reducing the risks for him. A man who knows that while he is fighting someone is ready to supply him with everything he needs and that, if wounded, everything possible will be done to save him. If one manages to obtain such a body of soldiers, these will be able to perform incredible actions, well beyond what is asked of them. Because they are conscious of being men, and as such they will respect the adversary, who is never an enemy to hate, and the civilian population, which has already gone through many hardships and should not be subjected to further trials.

Gian Marco Chiarini


Major General,

*EUROFOR Commander in Bosnia,
former Commander, "Ariete" Brigade*



A photograph showing a person in a full white protective suit, including a hood and mask, standing on a tarmac. Next to them is a soldier in camouflage military uniform, also wearing a mask. In the background, a military helicopter is visible, with the number '56' on its side. The scene is set outdoors on a paved surface.

THE TERRORISTS' NEW WEAPONS



THE TERRORISTS' NEW WEAPONS

Their use in future attacks could open the doors to the most dangerous era in the history of mankind

The acts of terrorism that occurred in Japan, Israel, United States, Russia, Spain, and Great Britain have alarmed the world with the serious danger that hangs over it because of the remarkable escalation of this form of cynical, savage and determined conflict. The horror provoked by such events has made it clear that the intention of these terrorist groups is to strike in indiscriminate ways just to achieve their objectives, without excluding any means of conflict, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. The origins of terrorism is lost in the mists of time; in fact, there is evidence of this phenomenon since the very beginning of humanity. Neither men nor

Gods have been revealed as immune from the temptation to strike the opponent from outside of 'The Rules'. The use of potions, philtres and poisons dates back to classical times as well as the calamitous events and unrestrained epidemics from some angry divinity against a mortal community tainted with faults, impiety or something other. However interesting

a short historical survey of terrorist activities across the centuries could be, it is not possible here to dwell on them, as the aim of this piece is to look at the terrorist activities in relation to the employment of non-conventional arms. Attacks, murders and fanaticism are the accompaniment to the 'old-style terrorism'. These acts, however dreadful, in the past have never had an important political value, perhaps because they were only carried out with traditional weapons of limited effect. The situation changes when in place of the conventional weapons, one makes reference to 'cyber weapons' or even to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The explosion of terrorism in the last ten years, the alarming speed with which the phenomenon has also spread into zones considered 'immune', has produced in our psyche a deep anxiety, enough to make us believe we are truly living in the 'age of terrorism', with the nightmare, on a wave of sudden

and arbitrary violence, of a recourse by modern terrorists to new arms which are ever more difficult to pigeon hole and defend against.

Unfortunately the weapons that could be useable in future attacks could open the doors to the most dangerous era ever in the history of mankind.

MOTIVATION AND PSYCHOLOGY

It is not easy to trace a line of demarcation between how much could be included in the rationale of terrorist action and what should be considered as an inadmissible crime, and with

“These acts, however dreadful, never had an important political value, perhaps because they were only carried out with traditional weapons of limited effect ”

regard to these forms of conflict it's a question that would be very difficult to resolve. Typology and terrorist's psychology are not easily definable, in spite of the attempts already carried out; too many factors can influence the spirit and the mind of a person who decides to sacrifice himself for the triumph of a cause

and for the creation of a society that matches their imagination, purified of men and doctrines which they automatically refuse to be admitted. Cesare Lombroso, the father of modern criminology, reduced criminality to essentially a question of genetics, but the yardsticks used by the illustrious teacher has not been enough to give adequate answers when we note that the terrorist is not the classical criminal but he is made from a conscious decision of that it would seem to make the world a better place; it remains difficult for us to accept the idea that, for the doing of good for the community, it would be possible to perpetrate in cold blooded determination horrendous massacres to defenceless populations such as those Algerian communities, in which women and children have paid the ultimate price. Therefore if we exclude personalities with extreme psychological disorders, of which history has supplied us with many examples, who turn to slaughtering oth-

ers as a way to draw attention to themselves, or to be remembered by mankind, it is not easy to define the personality or the motives which turn a normal man into a terrorist. The continual surfacing of terrorist activity compels us even more to search for motives and to turn to the help of psychology, psychiatry and anthropology, to explain how much violence and aggressiveness can the human being be predisposed to have, or as a result from a psychological issue. Situations which induce a right-minded and intelligent person to unleash an unheard-of level of ferocity or submit themselves to 'leaders' from a desk or pulpit, of scant intelligence, modest education or even 'lunatics' such as Asahara, David Koresh or Jim Jones of the People's Temple. With regard to the terrorist backdrop, frequently a common matrix doesn't exist; because terrorist acts can be inspired by many motivations, from politics to religion, terrorism of the environment or against the state, from narco-terrorism to transnational organised terrorism, from psychological warfare to psycotronic warfare, just to mention some terrorist typologies that can provoke more anxiety and dismay, of which those last ones represent unfortunately some of the weapons to be adopted by the terrorist of the future. In the wide range of possibilities available to a terrorist group to plan an attack, the choice of employing weapons of mass destruction represents without doubt the worst option for a ferocious strike against humanity.

A PLAUSIBLE DEFINITION

After decades of academic studies and in the light of the numerous terrorist acts in modes more dramatic from the 1960s until September 11th, 2001, a common interpretation of the phenomenon of 'terrorism' has not been reached. One scholar was able to collect more than 100 definitions and, having synthesized the quintessence of them, tried to summarize them in one more or less exhaustive definition, as 'a random attack by subversive elements against innocent individuals, aimed at causing fear, death and destruction, in order to obtain recognition on the part of organizations or people who were not subjects of the attack'. Truth or heresy, this affirmation was at once attacked by critics who saw it as one sided. Some have considered it right to define terrorism as 'the weapon of the weak', while others considered it a 'social evil'. In the wake of definitions and philosophical interpretations, one notices, in spite of the ever growing list of victims, that the phenomenon



Title pages.

Afghanistan: Collecting samples for analysis.

Above.

Training a terrorist on the use of weapons.

remains quite immune from the countermeasures launched by the various governments interested in handling the phenomenon.

Also taking care not to jump too quickly on the 'bandwagon of antiterrorism', we notice that only recently has terrorism started to be taken into consideration, it still has to be ranked as a global problem of the first rank. The vagueness which surrounds the defining of terrorism cannot be destined to procrastinate much longer, all the while a valid solution to the problem stays out of reach, not managing to reach a valid one, it's true that such forms of conflict could be forced to undergo a serious reduction if the root of the problems are tackled with courage and clarity, finally surpassing those lines of thinking that want 'optimistically' to reduce the resolution of the problem to the elimination of the 'roots of injustice', or those theories that point out that hard hitting ways and radical manners



The North Wing of the Pentagon destroyed by the terrorist attack.

are 'the best cure' to cut problem at the root. The roots of terrorism go too deeply to be easily reached and eradicated.

THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

The first point to be examined before entering the subject is the definition of the term concerning the discussion. We have several definitions at our disposal: mega-terrorism, super-terrorism, terrorism with weapons of mass destruction, or more generic, catastrophic terrorism. Not conventional terrorism would seem to be the most adequate terminology to define in an appropriate way the use by terrorist groups of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons banned by International Treaties and Conventions.

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

By biological terrorism is meant the use of biological and related toxic agents used by terrorist groups for the purposes of provoking epidemics or poisoning even, if not necessarily, lethal, against a large number of people, animals, plants and the ecosystem in general. Which are the biological agents most suitable for a bio terrorist attack? Lists of potential usable bio agents for starting a 'biological action' are accessible to anyone. It is sufficient simply to search for them on the internet to find biological agents, viruses, toxins, bio regulators, if not even the highly pathogenic and/or lethal prionic proteins suitable for such a purpose. The use of minor or slightly pathogenic biological agents must not be overlooked however, because 'in the perverse game of the biological event' every germ, opportunely prepared, could be used for the purposes of starting an even more severe epidemic or to provoke a psychological effect that, even in the presence of

scarce symptomatology, can be attributable to terrorist action. Modern biotechnologies offer a full range of possibilities of making the germ, conveniently 'treated' in a laboratory, almost invulnerable to the environmental difficulties and various antidotes.. The most important features a biological agent must necessarily have to be employable for the purposes of war/terrorism are; rate of infection (capacity of a biological agent to enter, survive and multiply within the host living organism); virulence (represents the most serious clinical issue for victims, with respect to one micro organism compared to another); lethality (capacity of a biological agent to inflict death in people infected); pathogenicity (capacity of a micro organism to cause an illness to people exposed to the contagion); period of incubation (time which exists before the symptoms of an illness are visible in an infected person); stability (possibility a micro organism has for surviving the action of the environment factors). Not less important is the resistance of a germ to antidotes and chemicals, so called 'modified' strain, so much of which is unknown to the community undergoing the attack. Based on the above-mentioned features and the augmentation of danger via laboratories, three high-risk categories were identified as follows:

- category A (**high priority**) Variola major (smallpox); Bacillus anthracis (anthrax or carbuncle); Yersinia Pestis (plague); Francisella Tularensis (tularemia); Botulinic toxin; Filovirus (Ebola, Marburg); Arenavirus (Lassa, Junin or hemorrhagic fever);
- category B (**priority 2**) Coxiella burnetii (Q fever); Brucella species (brucellosis); Burkholderia mallei (glanders); Alfa virus (Venezuelan horse encephalomyelitis of the east and west); Epsilon toxin (Clostridium perfringens); Enterotoxin B - Staphylococcus; the 'sub-set' of this category also includes usable biological agents for contaminating food and water of the Salmonella variety, Shigella, Escherichia Coli 00157; H7, Cholera, Cryptosporidium parvum.
- category C (**priority 3**) Virus Nipah; Hantavirus; Encephalitis virus; Hemorrhagic fever; Yellow fever virus; Tuberculosis (biological agents resistant to chemicals).

In addition to the bacteria and virus, man and terrorist have at their disposal, as already outlined above, 'other types' of biological weapons, whose nature must still be studied in a definite way, for an eventual listing on the CBW lists: these new weapons are represented by 'bioregulators' and 'prions'.

“The bioregulatory are molecules produced by the cells in one or more parts of the organism which have a specific and marked effect on the regulation of the biological processes”



A photo of the attack on the Twin Towers that was seen around the world.

With the term 'bioregulators' is meant those molecules produced by the cells in one or more parts of the organism, which have a specific and marked effect on the regulating of the biological processes. 'Modified' forms of the original bioregulator molecule, obtained for chemical synthesis, are defined 'analogous' and can have a competitive action when they bind to the target receptor, causing a response similar to the original bioregulator original, or an opposing action when

the 'analogous' is able to bind to the target receptor and block the original bioregulatory action. The exceptional number of 'peptides' recently synthesized that are able to control biological



An Italian patrol on surveillance duty.

activity have increased the dread of being possible biological weapons for exploiting the capacity they have to interfere/change hormonal secretions and therefore the metabolic/physiological activities, if not neural (neuropeptide and neuroregulators) in an organism.

We owe Stanley Prusiner, with the discovery of the 'prion', the merit of having enriched medical science with a new concept of replicative infection, no longer reserved exclusively for the structures containing genetic codes (DNA-RNA), onto which the structure acts like a virus and bacteria, but also molecular structures without genetic material, like protein molecules, which can replicate themselves and infect an organism until a disease sets in. The term 'prion' can be considered an acronym where PR is for protein, the I for infectious, ON for particle. The prionic protein Pr^{Sc} is normally present in the nerve cells and seems to take part in the transmission of nervous impulses. The epidemic of 'bovine spongiform encephalopathy' (BSE) better known as 'mad cow disease', has also raised the alarm, and forced researchers to examine in detail the studies on prions, and formulate a series

of hypothesis on the origin of the slow but inexorable neuropathology caused by them, without unfortunately however coming to any definitive or encouraging conclusions.

At the moment no one is in the position of being able to inform us about the 'identity' of prions; no one can explain the large resistance of this 'entity' on a protein basis to ultraviolet rays, on the capacity to replicate himself in absence of a genetic code and the fact of being able to trigger genetic mutation processes in the protein present in all mammals. Therefore the reasonable doubt remains that this molecule, neither virus and less so bacterium, can be used also as a biological agent for war/terrorist purposes, since medical science is not yet able to block the transformation of the normal prion in pathologic prionic forms as was the case with BSE, but it is also true that a lot of progress has been made on improving knowledge about prions. At least 12 illnesses have been identified from prions both in man and animals; it was demonstrated the activity of certain antitumoral principles in the halting of the growth and spreading of the prions, and infection/transmission have occurred more frequently in those who have consumed the parts of the animal infected.

The fine tuning of the prion as a weapon can only be a matter of time. In concluding the overview of the risk of terrorism with biological weapons, it is useful to remember that the discoveries in the field of bio-technology could possibly enhance, even in a short time, 'genetic weapons' aimed specifically to strike certain ethnic or racial groups, in which the phenotypical construction is preset for certain diseases. Working with the possibilities of 'DNA mixing' for purposes of increasing germ resistance to antibiotics and environmental stability, could produce remarkable results, to a point where it would be difficult to identify any antidotes against their pathogenic effects. As a confirmation of this, it is worth remembering that scientist Andrei Pomerantsev of the Microbiological Scientific Centre of Obolensk (Moscow) revealed how vaccinal prophylaxis and antibiotics used to immunize the United States soldiers against anthrax in the gulf war would have been fruitless if any 'strains' dispersed by Iraq had been previously treated in a laboratory to enable them to produce the toxin (CEREOLISINA) that would have made the anthrax spores resistant to the prophylaxis and treatment mentioned above.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

By consulting 'The Non Proliferation Review' (Summer 2000, vol.7 n 2)

it is seen that the WMD Terrorism Data Base cites 175 incidents with various agents; Biological (95), Chemical (65), Nuclear (5), Radiological (n. 5), Unknown (n. 5). There is, also, a comparison between the 687 'accidents' registered from 1900 until February 2000 and those from January 1999 to February 2000. The ones that happened in this last short period represent over 25% of the total observed in the last 100 years. Examining all together the set of verified accidents in the time period, it emerges that those with chemical agents are the most numerous; taking into account the wide range of available toxic chemical mixtures, the low cost and the relative easiness of transport and 'release' it's evident why it is preferred by terrorists. Historiography provides infinite examples of recourses to the use of chemical weapons for war/terrorist that, as already mentioned, are not discussed here. Which are the most dangerous chemicals weapons used by terrorists? It's not easy to provide an adequate answer given the wide possibilities available by

research and chemical/technological development which continually stretches the list of toxic substances and the related means of offensive options.

It is worth, however, listing some of the most dangerous toxic substances, among which there are some which have already been used in acts of terrorism and are available to terrorists on the 'death market.'

Neurotoxic

Tabun (GA); Sarin (GB); Neurotoxic Soman (GD) or GF; Nerve VX; Tammelin Ester NOVICHOK.

A lethality is attributed to the above listed toxic substances far higher than to the other chemical substances war usable in war/terrorism. The nerve based ones cause quick death by a neuromuscular block. These, discovered by German scientists at the eve of World War II were termed 'German Gas' but were never used, probably for fear of reprisal. They were however perfected in the post-war years with increased lethality with the discovery of VX or Amitone or Novichok, chemical weapons developed by the ex-Soviet Union and of which little is known of their real chemical nature and therefore of their eventual resistance to normal antidotes used for the poisoning of nerves (atropine, ossime, piri-dostigmina).

Blood poisoning

Hydrocyanic acid, cyanogen chloride are compound chemicals used for the executions in gas chambers, they have a very low survival rate in the outside environment, and cause death by asphyxiation.

Choking

Phosgene, Difosgene and Cloropicrina are chemical weapons that were largely used during World War I. They act on the respiratory system causing death by pulmonary oedema.

Vesicants

Mustard gas and lewisite, are the definite progenitors of modern chemical arms.

Discovered and studied as early as the 19th century, they have been used in various conflicts,

“Examining the attacks carried out up to now, it emerges that those with chemical agents are the most numerous”

(Mustard gas, in particular). Death is caused by chemical burns.

Irritant and Incapacitating

Of smaller intensity but with a wider use, especially as antirising agents and with possibilities of being associated with other aggressive chemicals to enhance any toxic features, the noteworthy ones are the Irritant Weapons (Sternutatories, Vomitory, Urticant, Lachrymatory), Psychochemical or Incapacitating (BZ, LSD, Psilocybin, Mescaline) which are substances that are able to affect mental and behavioural functions.

Observing the list of chemical weapons and their toxic characteristics described above all possible terrorist uses, the first impression is the heavy risk of two factors coinciding; impossible traceability and the difficulty in identifying and putting in action countermeasures. For a larger clarification we can take for instance, among others, 'the incident' in the Tokyo metro to highlight how easy it can be to carry out a neurotoxic attack, here it was luckily less dangerous than the classical chemical war weapons and more difficult to handle and transport, but it could have had an effect much more severe and serious. Helping to aggravate the relative problem of risk of terrorist attack with chemical weapons, is the psychological impact and the uncertainty of the recourse to unknown 'new mixtures' unknown and heightened lethality. In addition at times the press constitutes a source of worry as it divulges news regarding the possible use of chemical weapons of unknown types, whose effects seem to exceed the imagination of science fiction stories. In this context it is worth remembering the mystery which surrounds the 'forgotten of Kaluga' in Russia, the 17 people who, disappeared suddenly then reappeared after about 20 days, with, on the temples, suspicious signs of electrode application, while at mental level visible damage to that area of the personality regarding affected memory, professional identity and day to day functioning. According to the chief of the health facility of Kaluga, Alexander Livschitz, these subjects were used as guinea pigs for experiments, while the Russian scholar Lev Fiodorov asserts that they could have been subjected to psychotropic substances to manip-

ulate the mind, and possibly be employable as 'crews'.

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Though the statistics would imply one to think that recourse to the use of 'nuclear' arms for terrorist purposes represents a not very practical hypothesis in consideration of the scarce number of 'registered events' stated above and above all to the difficulty of the management of radioactive material, we notice, however, a growing concern to the possible utilization of radioactive material by those, who in extreme situations, are ready to run the risks of using nuclear means. The most realistic worry, at the moment, is not a nuclear device being detonated, but the hypothesis of sabotage at nuclear systems and deliberate environmental radiological contamination (such as aqueducts, food etc) such hypothesis are credible whereas if one thinks about the trafficking of contraband nuclear material from such areas as the ex Soviet Union where the emerging Russian democracy has not been successful to control yet. To strengthen the practicality of the thesis of radiation use by terrorists, it is good to keep in mind that since the 1970s 'acts of sabotage' have been registered, perpetrated by groups ranging from 'radical ecologists' (the occupants of the Atucha nuclear plant - 1973), to attacks from ETA against the plants and systems of Lemovitz, San Sebastian, Pamplona, Santander.

“... a growing concern is the possible utilization of radioactive material by those who, in extreme situations, are ready to run risks...”

In the 80 years that there has been registering of attacks there have been attacks at nuclear plants South Africa, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and the Philippines. Omitting the 'Chernobyl incident', which does not seem attributable to terrorist action, but which clearly highlighted the consequences of the nuclear accidents anyway, we cannot forget, as regards the ex Soviet Union, the threat at the time by the Chechen leaders to strike Moscow (1996) with nuclear waste easily, claiming to own radioactive material left in a quarter of the town. The examples cited above reflect how the terrorist threat with radioactive material hangs over all and how important it is to have a security curtain around reflecting back the fear of reprisals with a boomerang effect back onto them, even if it is common opinion that a nuclear accident could more

probably occur during a regional war than as consequence of an attack on a nuclear plant.

CONCLUSIONS

The wide options at the disposal of the terrorists to carry out attacks with weapons of mass destruction, induces a need to consider the gravity of this type of risk in consideration of the relative easiness of finding of these 'weapons' both on the 'used' market, aimed at the autonomous production, and the possibility of homemade laboratory production with little resources in the basement of a house.

The 'episodes' in the metros of Tokyo and more recently, of New York, Madrid and in London certainly contributed to increase anxieties and fear as they offer obvious demonstrations of the potential capacity of terrorists to perpetrate attacks never seen before.

The difficulty in recognizing NBC weapons in due time, the lack of specialized personnel, and consequently, the lack of intervention of personnel until the final moment, like in the case of Tokyo, the inappropriate response of the community to put in place logistic and sanitary resources, show the diffuse lack of preparation in facing this type of eventuality. As regards public and private health, it must unfortunately take an act that breakdowns such services in the light of such an NBC terrorist attack – when the system is not prepared to face this type of problem as an everyday event – for it to be taken seriously. The increase in the number of attacks with non-conventional arms and the correlated problems induced the World Health Organization to review and bring up to date the publication 'Sanitary aspects of the use of NBC weapons' in order to give bigger prominence to the fundamental concepts of facing any health emergency from an attack with weapons of mass destruction of all types. The publication recommends the strengthening of the cooperation of the various national structures interested in the prevention and discovery of NBC weapons and the countermeasures to be put in place and points out the importance of international assistance both internationally and from those organizations that are against the supply the chemical arms in favour of a community against chemical attacks. Finally, with regards the European Union strategy, the problems were discussed in the European Parliament which expressed stiff condemnation towards terrorism, with the invitation to carry out the 'Plan of action of struggle against terrorism', recommending, anyway, the maximum attention so that the answer to this struggle is never out of proportion and always inspired by the principles of 'multilateralism' which must remain the



Osama bin Laden broadcasting one of his delirious messages.


dominant principle in the perspective of developing a common approach in regard to global security in which the United States and the European Union proceed with equal and balanced positions.

The task of identifying the deep causes of terrorism and the struggle against violations of human rights only represent some of the fundamental on which pivots the EU foreign policy, together with the efforts for the solution of the conflicts of the Near East where the terrorist phenomenon have assumed worrying dimensions.

International cooperation is the only way today to stem the 'terrorism phenomenon' which *with its new and terrible dimensions has meant the distortion of the world religions* (John Paul II – November 14th, 2002).

Ulderico Petresca
Captain, Italian Navy,
General Directorate
for Political Affairs and Human Rights,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



A black and white photograph of a military helicopter, likely a UH-60 Black Hawk, in flight. The helicopter is shown from a low angle, with its main rotor blades blurred due to motion. It is flying over a grassy field. In the background, there is a large hangar and other vehicles. The sky is clear.

PLANS AND RESOURCES

PLANS AND RESOURCES

The Army's point of view

Since the early eighties, the Italian Armed Forces have been operating in every corner of the globe (East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan) in peace-support and humanitarian missions, of a size and duration never experienced during the whole Cold War. Together with the increasing commitments abroad, the Italian Defence, in the last twenty-five years, has carried out a slow but unceasing process of transformation of the existing Military Instrument into a new, relatively smaller, highly projectable and fully professional organization. Whether this historical process is about to end, or if the tendency towards a further quantitative reduction accompanied by a more marked force integration is likely to continue, is the subject of a lively debate.

Title pages.

An NH-90 Helicopter taking off from Viterbo Army Aviation Training Centre.


Since the end of the Cold War the concept of national defence has been changing significantly, especially owing to the impact of globalization on the world geo-strategic situation.

Globalization, understood as the end of the US-USSR bipolarism, has in fact reduced the need to defend militarily the national territorial integrity of the land, sky and sea frontiers from a large-scale attack. On the other hand, such term, meant as increase of the interdependence of a Country's welfare with the events that occur in remote areas of the world, requires today an active commitment, going as far as employing also the Military Instrument in order to help increase the stability in the geographical areas still unconnected to the international system. Finally, globalization seen as an easier access to materials and technologies that can be employed also in destructive ways, has widened the range of the threats, to the point of allowing the transnational terrorist organizations to achieve effects of mass destruction and carry out non-conventional attacks against the Western world.

Within this highly globalized

environment there has been a growing necessity to be able to implement an in-depth defence, projected towards the exterior, also in distant and hardly accessible areas. In substance, what is needed is a proactive approach, because security in the new international scenario cannot be based only on the principle of dissuasion, but must try to prevent some types of threat that, once they are carried out, can become highly destructive and difficult to control, owing to their intrinsic characteristics.

If it is true that the initial incentive to transformation originated from the inability of the Military Instrument, shaped on the requirements of the Cold War, to meet the new challenges to security, typical of globalization, is equally true that many measures of the reforms of the Armed Forces,




always implemented in a reductive sense, are more imputable to a growing inadequacy of the financial resources available for the Defence Function (1) than to an effective operational logic.

In the new operational context just outlined, the present "vision" of the Defence Staff finds strength and value. The idea is to consider the Military Instrument no more as a sum of separate and independent Services, but as a *unicum*, where the various components synergically contribute to the achievement of the common good, within the same joint strategic design. According to this vision, the requirements of the employment dictate the priorities of the investments of Defence and therefore define the boundaries within which each Service can develop its programmes and highlight its peculiarities. From the legislative viewpoint, the mentioned "Summit Law" has coherently conferred to the Defence Chief of Staff not only the responsibility of the "planning, preparation and employment of the Armed Forces as a whole", but also the task of preparing, having heard the opinions of the Chiefs of Staff of the Services, the general financial planning and the joint operational plans, defining the consequent technical-financial programmes. This law wanted to put an end to "a budget for each Service", that is, the allocation on a percentage basis (quota) of the budget of Defence to each component of the Armed Forces, and introduce a centralized administration that assigns the resources of Defence directly to the single programmes, approved at interservice level.

The implementation of the "Summit Law", carried out gradually, this year has reached a fundamental goal with the conclusion of the first Cycle of Defence Planning and the draft of the final document, the so-called "Blue Book" (2) or "Compatible Model". A document with a time horizon of 15-20 years, which will be reconsidered and updated every two years. The methodological process developed by Defence for facing these responsibilities envisages singling out the Force Objectives (capabilities to be acquired) and the connected action programmes (what to acquire and how), starting from the missions assigned to the Military Instrument and proceeding by successive steps, respecting a series of reference parameters.

It is a significant conceptual evolution compared to the times when the general planning




was developed in parallel by the single Services, each of which tried to prove that its assets were more important for the interests of the Country vis-à-vis the others': of whichever nature these interests could be, prevalently continental or maritime. It seems useful to point out that during the fifty years of the Cold War, the old contraposition between the "continentalist" inclina-



tion of our Country and its "maritime" one, has remained somehow "frozen" by the potential threat, embodied by the Soviet air-land forces launched to attack the threshold of Gorizia, employing the combat systems typical of the mass production of the industrial era. Can this comparison between "continentalist" and "maritime" still exist? Or, on the contrary, is it a contraposition out of date, because the requirements of the Country that the Military Instrument is called to meet can no more be classified in terms of

"means" (land, sky or sea) where one operates and therefore of air or land platforms, but rather of "effects that one wants to achieve"? It is undeniable, in fact, that the national interests have become global and hardly detectable, and the ability to attain the wanted effects in the desired ways and times is less and less connected with a fixed typology of platform, be it an air, land or naval one.

During the analysis of the missions assigned to the Military Instrument (3) the Defence General Staff states that they are "laid down in order of strategic priority, which does not necessarily reflect the priority of occurrence of each mission". It is a key statement, because it introduces a basic distinction between the absolute importance of a task (e.g. the supreme duty of defending the integrity of the national territory) i.e. its strategic priority and the relevant probability of being called to carry it out (in this case, that of having to fight within the national borders against an invader/aggressor), that is, its priority of occurrence. The planner that has to integrate the abovementioned parameters must often employ the concepts of "worst-case scenario" or "most demanding operation" and "most likely operation", which can be compared, respectively, to the macro-scenario that absorbs the totality of the resources available and to the scenario most likely to occur. The configuration of the Military Instrument should be theoretically gauged on the most dangerous/onerous situation realistically foreseeable (the "War of the Worlds" (4) is out of the question), which, by definition can include all the others. It is obviously an unsustainable choice. Therefore one must consider a more pragmatic approach.



The first step for determining the possible scenarios of intervention is the definition of a strategic picture shared at interservice level, which should be a coherent technical-military translation of the lines of the national strategy sanctioned by the Government. In a historical moment such as the present, there can be two very different strategic views, based on diametrically opposed approaches.

On the one side there is the approach that we could define as "antagonizing" (from a continuous looking for, waiting for or imagining an antagonist on an equal level), according to which conflicts occur cyclically and new symmetric adversaries arise periodically in some part of the world. On the other, there is the "pragmatic" approach, which is concentrated on the challenges of the present, essentially on a sequence of minor/regional conflicts that can be set within a picture of security destined to evolve progressively towards higher and higher levels of global stability.

Between these two positions, clearly extreme and therefore difficult to share "in toto", one should look for the starting point of a route that could permit to find a sufficiently realistic strategic picture. It is not a merely philosophic problem, because the strategic vision adopted will have direct consequences on the concrete definition of the most effective Military Instrument: the more one moves towards a strategic vision of a cyclical type, the more one tends to favour a highly technological military instrument with a strong combat capability, investing in the acquisition of very high-quality platforms. On the contrary, a vision of a more evolutionary kind will induce to dimension the Military Instrument on the requirements of the present, introducing the technologies according

to a bottom-up approach and ensuring a sufficient quantity of resources for simultaneous interventions in a number of peace-support operations, or in operations in response to a crisis in medium-low intensity conflicts. Be it either "antagonizing" or "pragmatic", neither strategic vision in itself favours one or another Service: the discrimination, in case, concerns transversally, on the one side high-cost, single-function, highly technological systems, optimised for high-intensity employment and, on the other, less expensive, versatile systems of limited technological contents.

Once the reference strategic picture is defined, it will be possible to identify the results that the Military Instrument as a whole is, and will be, called to achieve and then combine the wanted effects with the likely scenarios of intervention, appraised according to dangerousness and probability, in order to ascertain which "deliverers" are the most effective in terms of cost/effectiveness and ability to obtain the mentioned effects. During this process one should consider that, in selecting a specific platform, one must not merely adopt criteria of capability and cost/effectiveness but will also have to make an evaluation between the need to protect his forces and that of reducing the collateral effects to a minimum, be they physical or perceptive.

According to the most recent doctrines on the so-called "Effect Based Operations (EBO)" (5), by "effect" one means the physical or cognitive consequence of one or more military actions. The precise definition of the effect to be achieved is verified by answering the questions "Where?" "What?" "When?" (in terms of time available and timeliness of the request) before being able to establish "Who?", also with regard to the responsible Service.

There are conflicting opinions on "where" the Military Instrument will be called to operate in the coming years. Today, one of the most reliable theories is that there is an area disconnected (isolated) from the rest of the world, which spreads from Africa to South East Asia, going through the Balkans, Central Caucasus and the Middle East, where the "globalized" Countries will have to intervene more and more frequently in order to progressively reduce the areas that are a residual source of international instability.

In the general planning of forces, one starts from the EFFECT to be obtained and not from WHO should achieve it.

WHERE?

WHAT?

WHEN?

and only afterwards one considers "WHO?"



Irrespective of the theory followed, the focus of the interventions, today and in the near future, is decidedly centred on land. This does not mean that there will not be threats from the sea or from the air, but rather that the era of the battles on the sea between opposing fleets, or that of air battles, seems very improbable in the period we refer to. If from the "where" point of view the most important scenario (6), i.e. most onerous and demanding, is that of a non-permissive entrance in an area with no access to the sea and with no airport infrastructure, at this point the sea becomes a strategic doorway into the battlespace and an area of operational deployment rather than a battlefield in itself.

Having accepted that the "where" will be mainly the land, we can now proceed to the evaluation of the "what" and ask ourselves what effects we will be called to achieve: to destroy or to build, just to mention two explanatory extremes? Probably both, in a controversial context marked by high-intensity islands, by the presence of opposing factions, defenceless citizens, hostile elements and very variable threats in terms of degrees of symmetry and recourse to non-conventional weapons. In this scenario, whatever the effect pursued, the presence of man will be vital, both the physical presence, i.e. the so-called "boots on the ground", and the logical one in every decision-making process, i.e. keeping the so-called "man in the loop".

The last question that we have to answer in order to complete this analysis of the effects is "when". One must ask within what times should we be able to intervene? One hour, one month, one year? How long shall we have to exert the effort? In this case the answer is not univocal. Reasonably there is the need to have a capability of intervention that may

be graduated in time and duration. The fundamental novelty is that the speed of the answer is no more as important as the ability to achieve the wanted effects at the wanted moment; in other words, the very concept of readiness as defined in the NATO handbooks has changed after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Keeping all the assets on the alert is no more as fundamental as to have the proper assets for the widest range of interventions at the right time. Hence the need to launch an attack with special forces against a terrorist structure within a few hours from its detection, or to conduct a continuative, months-long air campaign, started only after the methodical deployment on the ground of the necessary assets, or to engage for years in a mission in a depressed area, rotating the contingents every four/six months.

Once the appraisal of the effects is concluded, one can draw a first series of conclusions which synthesize the vision of the Army as regards the future national Military Instrument: versatile, polyvalent, projectable, prevalingly "land-and man-centric". Many of the characteristics pointed out could seem aimed at emphasizing the land systems: this is only partially true: actually they keep their meaning even if referred to the Navy or the Air Force. That is, once again we do not want to refer to the characteristics of a single Service, but to the comprehensive characteristics of the instrument. Actually what we maintain is the need to develop capabilities and assets, easily projectable, optimised so as to achieve effects on the ground and able to carry out the widest range of possible tasks in the most diversified environments.

The ample recourse to technology should not jeopardize the centrality of the soldier and his ability to give a sense of humanity to often -inhuman situations.

Besides obvious considerations about the ability to achieve the objective (the stand-off weapon could be the only available) and the safeguard of human lives (in the sense of not uselessly exposing one's men to risk), the remote intervention is usually perceived in such a negative manner by the population living in the area of the operations and by public opinion at large, that it has repercussions on the entire mission and on the very security of the units that sooner or later will have to operate in the Theatre. On the contrary, an effect achieved through a contact intervention, albeit tactically more complex, has more probabilities to be met with a "good degree of acceptation", for it offers the image of human beings who act in a "human" context and not machines operated from a distance, and therefore "inhuman".

Once completed the examination of the effects to be achieved for each of the scenarios identified

in the geo-strategic picture of reference, we must now obtain an ideal mix of capabilities and compare it with the financial resources available, according to three fundamental parameters: acceptable risk, significance and occurrence. In this delicate phase the guiding criteria of the evaluation will have to be those that reward the poly-scenario capability, reducing the mono-scenario ones to the indispensable minimum and, above all, avoiding the duplication of the assets that express the same capability. It is a "painful" process, because it tends to limit the internal flexibility of each Service, making it actually dependent on the others, but it permits to obtain a real economy of the forces and adopt an authentic interservice approach to the operations.

And it is at this point that a first-class independent variable enters triumphantly in the world of "pure" planning: the assumed budget of Defence. The availability of financial resources for the length of time considered by the planning introduces an element of strong realism and compels to assign a priority to each programme of action, in order to maximise the entire result of the Military Instrument and not the effectiveness of its single components. In short, the bodies most interested at Army Staff level, are the General and Financial Planning Division, and the General Office for Planning, Programs and Budget for the General Staff of Defence. The comparison between requirements and possibilities should consider the scarcity of the resources (possibilities), which brings about a strong competition among the programmes, and the centralization of the authority for general financial planning and technical-financial programmes on the Defence Chief of Staff, a fact that has actually shifted the competition for such resources from within each Service to an interservice level. If one considers, moreover, that many programmes must have a long-term development, owing to the amount of investments required, one understands how the competition can become more and more complex.

With the interservice centralization of the financial planning, it could appear that the Army (like the other Services) may have become a mere Expenditure Planning Body; actually the propositional function recognized to it by the Summit Law (7) still requires that it should do its utmost to promote the approval of the programmes deemed essential for the preparation of the land component and demand an equitable application of the planning standards, once they have been defined by Defence. It is a matter of performing not only a legitimate but a rightful function, for it does not go beyond the limits assigned to Defence but safeguards the central



An Alpine paratrooper in Afghanistan.

capabilities (the so-called core business) of the organization. Hence the request of the Army to do away with any residual discrepancy between today's scenarios of employment, and those foreseeable in the medium-long term, and the allocation of significant financial resources for the acquisition of the weapon systems most suitable (for quality, but especially for quantity) for fighting high-intensity symmetrical conflicts, whose occurrence, in the next 15-20 years, is considered low.

The Army deems it appropriate to adopt a pre-vaillingly pragmatic strategic vision, which should lead to gauge the military instrument on the scenarios of intervention most probable in the coming 15-20 years, which most likely will be very similar to the present ones. Wherever the threat is today, and wherever we envisage it will be tomorrow, we must intervene with the most suitable instruments. Vis-à-vis this conviction, for various reasons, among which the parochialism of the single Services, the complexity of the system of long-term investments and the requirements of the Defence industry, the true competition about the resources available is very often developed for a type of threat scarcely coherent with the foreseeable scenarios. The principle of coherence as key-stone in the realization of the Military Instrument, must take into account not only the structural coherence between the resources and the configuration of the instrument and of the internal coherence between quantitative and qualitative dimension, but it must also consider the coherence between the scenarios assumed and the typology of the capabilities to be developed. This principle finds naturally its application both in the

ambit of each Service and in the comparison with the other Services, and permits to avoid two typical excesses of the military institutions: on the one hand, that of dimensioning itself on the present, ignoring the possible future and on the other that of dimensioning itself in a self-referential way, according to a vision of the future not supported by the available indicators.

The Army's policy of general planning is therefore that of investing the resources available according to a vision more "pragmatic" than "antagonizing", so as to overcome any rigid division into compartments of the Force and critically appraise every programme in terms of polyvalence of the capabilities and significance of the employment.

Giuseppe Maggi,
Major General,
Chief, General and Financial Planning
Division,
Army General Staff.

NOTES

- (1) The Defence Budget is divided into four "macro-items of expenditure", the actual Defence Function, the Police Function, the external Functions and the Provisional Pensions.
- (2) Envisaged by the directive SMD-PG-001, the "Blue Book" of Defence translates the politico-military and strategic-military plans into programmatic objectives of force and into action programmes for the configuration of the Military Instrument.
- (3) The missions of the Military Instrument are: "Defence of the State", "Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Spaces", "Contribution to the realization of peace and international security", "Support and specific tasks" (Strategic Concept of the Chief of the Defence General Staff).
- (4) "The War of the Worlds", renowned sci-fi novel by Herbert George Wells published in 1898, where Earthlings must fight against Martians who, thanks to their futuristic lethal weapons, start a real extermination of mankind.
- (5) EBO: Effect Based Operations.
- (6) Relevance is a parameter referring to the technological, training, readiness and capability levels required for carrying out a mission.
- (7) The Service Chiefs of Staff propose the programme regarding their respective Service for the interservice general preparation.

From a presentation made in Venice on October 6, 2005 by the Chief of the General and Financial Plans Division of the Army General Staff, during a symposium organized by the Italian Navy on the subject "Italy: its maritime character and the naval dimension of the military instrument".



EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

ISAF





EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

Easy victories between dream and reality

A strategic-operational methodology is the subject of exhaustive and debated studies in the international context. Here we report its main points, underlining some aspects that could limit its full applicability.

The solution of crises, increasingly characterized by asymmetric situations and the inevitable consensus of the media and the international community, has led to develop a methodology that promises success by relying on the attainment of effects (effects-based) rather than on the traditional annihilation of the enemy's operational capabilities (destruction-based).

This was the opinion of David A. Deptula, one of General Norman Schwarzkopf's planners during operation "Desert Storm", thus launching the fortunate concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), which today is the subject of exhaustive and debated international studies. Although acknowledging the substantial soundness of an approach aimed at overcoming asymmetric operational situations, where skill opposes will, where different – if not diametrically opposite – basic values clash, with this writing we wish to contribute to the present discussion, pointing out some aspects, which, in our opinion, could limit its full applicability. In fact, if this methodology is effectively confirmed at strategic level, some doubts emerge on the operational plane, and especially on the tactical one, where the causal relation between military action and effect is often indirect and ambiguous. Furthermore, the professional background of the personnel in charge of the relevant evaluation process does not seem adequate and suited to the requirements, just as the absence of a standard and agreed-upon terminology, together with the multiplying definitions of the related concept, appears to hamper a unitary development. In this sense, the following considerations intend to pave the way for further

studies also in our Country, where EBOs are taking root with force in view of a future adoption by NATO, where, on the other hand, there are still several doubts. By also making recourse to recent military operations, in practice we will try to point out that this new conception appears to be much more mature than the technical and professional capabilities that would be necessary for its full and effective implementation.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

One should have on hand Armed Forces integrated from the intellectual, operational, organizational, doctrinal and technical viewpoint, capable of making the systematic use of effects the fundamental element of planning and carrying out military operations. Effects-Based Operations belong to this context and therefore could be defined as follows: "A process for obtaining a desired strategic result or effect on the enemy through the synergic and combined action of the

entire range of the military and non-military capabilities, at every level of the conflict". In short, the effect is the physical, functional or psychological event, or outcome, resulting from specific military and non-military actions. In substance the achievement of the effects is the result of joint military, political, diplomatic and economic actions carried out through the analysis of the goal, the available means and, in the final analysis, of the most effective manner of using those means for achieving the wanted ends. Such an approach necessarily implies the capability of understanding and representing the enemy as a

“The most recently formulated strategic conception for dealing with international crises is based on the need to have Armed Forces integrated from the intellectual, operational, organizational, doctrinal and technical point of view”

composite and evolving system, guided by complex human interactions, rather than seeing it as a simple whole of objectives. The aim is to focus the operations in a more coherent manner. The primary need is to know the enemy in its deepest essence through the analysis, among many others, of its culture, history, religion and its political, economic and social interactions and intergrations and of the size and operational capabilities of its Armed Forces. Only after this kind of introspection can the objectives be found and selected and, as a consequence, also the appropriate instruments for achieving the desired effects can be singled out.

According to this methodology, primary targets are not only the Armed Forces or the enemy power centres, but also all the other actors, GOs and NGOs, mass-media, allied and neutral Countries, which all act, directly or indirectly, within the context of the system. The combined and concentrated employment of all the forces on the field, different but complementary of necessity, the interdependence of the tactical and operational objectives for

achieving the strategic goal, could psychologically weaken the adversary from the very beginning of a tense situation, stopping or sapping its will to act, thus avoiding the use of force. Should this be ineffective, the subsequent actions would be simultaneously focused only on the vital points of the enemy system, hindering, paralysing or altering its reaction capabilities, shortening the length of the conflict and, as a consequence, reducing human losses and military expenses. Therefore, apparently, a decrease in risks and costs would benefit the economy in terms of necessary resources, which seem to be the factors that most influence the support and consensus of the "Country system" or the international community. In fact, these prove to be the predominant elements that such methodology intends to favour, albeit implementing the strategic directive that governs the military operation. In ancient history there are many examples of this approach. Many scholars of the time already theorized the plans and the conduct of military operations on the basis of the desired effects. Sun Tzu, the Chinese theoretician, emphasized that the use of force had to be the last resort: the capable ones in war subjugate the army of the enemy with no battle, and maintained that the best policy in war is that of taking an intact State. Likewise, Prussian General Von

Title pages.

A NATO Italo-French patrol in the Afghan desert.

Below.

"Ariete" combat tank.



Clausewitz, while stressing the significance of one's own military capabilities and the physical destruction of the enemy forces, still acknowledged the importance of being able to use every "element of power", and therefore not military force alone, to achieve the desired effects. In this sense, rather than concentrating on the destruction of the physical and operational capability of the enemy, the EBOs focus their attention on different and more important critical matters aimed at striking the heart of the enemy, making it perceive the incontrovertibility or the impossibility of opposing something invincible, or at any rate far superior, which does not leave room to even the most extreme resistance. Thus, numbers, availability of aircraft, ships and tanks lose importance and are replaced by the capability of selecting and striking the targets that will inevitably push the enemy to the limits at first, and then force it to surrender, permitting, in the final analysis, to achieve one's own military and political objectives.

Therefore it remains theoretically still valid Von Clausewitz' concept, according to which war is an instrument of politics, where the aim is to hit the key-points and the morale of the enemy rather than destroying its military capability.

EFFECTS IN PREVIOUS OPERATIONS

A first EBO-type approach can be found in the Anglo-American debate aimed at determining the best targets for the air campaign against Hitler's Germany in WWII. This occurred precisely during the planning of the bombings and turned out to be disastrous, leading to a series of mistakes that cost an unnecessary waste of energies and resources without achieving the fixed goals. In fact, the allied planners had initially decided to concentrate the bombings on the industries producing ball bearings, being convinced that this would impair the production of German combat aircraft and thus more easily obtain the wished air superiority. The air raids, on the contrary, turned out to be extremely costly and ineffective, forcing the Allies to concentrate the bombings directly on the aircraft factories, but also in this case the cost was very high and the desired End State was not achieved. Actually Germany reached its highest production of combat aircraft precisely in that period, and the Allies conquered air superiority only thanks to the experience and skill of their pilots. In sub-

An MG 42/59 in a patrolling operation in Afghanistan.



stance, Germany's productive capability and the laboriousness of its people were underestimated, making clear to the analyst's eyes how complicated could be to apply and EBO approach to an operational campaign of that size.

The present appeal of the effects-based operations is probably due to the recent technological developments, which could allow the electronic and satellite surveillance of the territory, the real-time continuous collection and process of information, and the adoption of aiming systems and "smart munitions" capable of intervening rapidly and without errors. Thus, technology would facilitate the detection of the enemy's vital or weak points, permitting a full application of the EBOs, i.e. to strike only where deemed necessary for achieving the effects wished by the plans. Furthermore, this would make easier to resolve military operations in a shorter time and considerably limit the loss of human lives and materials. Actually, the large-scale employment of cutting-edge technology not always did favour the attainment of the wished results, at least not in a relatively short time. During operation "Desert Storm" conducted against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait, Commanders noticed that their analysts were only able to assess the physical dimensions of the results but, on the contrary, found great difficulties in forecasting the psychological consequences.

Effects-Based Operations were also utilized in the military campaigns conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo, with "surgical" bombings carried out by the allied aircraft. Even though NATO was victorious in the end, there were remarkable problems in Kosovo, besides those caused by Milosevic, who was conducting a repressive policy. Three factors heavily influenced the planning of the conflict: the lack of a long-term strategy, the initial want of a clear idea about the targets to be hit and the political interferences in the decision-making process of the military. General Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the operations, on March 25, 1999 said that all had been carefully planned and the Serbian resistance would be subdued within three days of air raids, and Milosevic would be forced to yield to NATO's requests. Clark was clearly proved wrong by facts: as a matter of fact the operations went on for eleven weeks, showing the valiant resistance of the Serbian army, which had been undervalued. As regards the air offensive of the Coalition

against Saddam Hussein, the technological superiority of the United States was clearly shown from the very beginning. Nevertheless, on several occasions, the less costly – if not downright archaic – Iraqi countermeasures made things difficult for the sophisticated American technologic system, and the analysts had not foreseen this. In fact, the combined conduct of aircraft and missile attacks, not only on the Armed Forces but also on the strategically most valuable Iraqi targets, rapidly weakened the enemy, which, as a consequence, lost its strength and will to fight, but the campaign turned out to be extremely costly in terms of losses of materials and human lives. The extensive recourse to military technology was certainly the fundamental element of success, but the results obtained did not perfectly match the plans. Also on this occasion, the EBO methodology did not succeed in getting over the obstacles of the application of its schemes to real war situations.

A PROMISE OF EASY VICTORIES

The Officers of the U.S. Air Force were the main supporters of the EBO notion, which they defined as a process aimed at obtaining a strategic result on the enemy – the effect – through the synergic, multiplicative and cumulative application of military and non-military capabilities, at tactical, operational and strategic level.

In the concrete case of the war in Iraq, EBOs were precise and surprise attacks from great distances, with Cruise missiles and Stealth bombers, aimed at the "nodal points" of the enemy "subsystems" systems". This should mean: hit the heart and brain and paralyse the body of

the enemy, without cutting off beforehand the arm that defends it. Former Marine General Paul Van Riper was one of the protagonists of exercise "Millennium Challenge", which simulated an attack on Iraq, employing precisely the Effects Based Operations, testing the innovations theorized by the doctrine. Van Riper took on the role of "Enemy Commander" and with his traditional method immediately succeeded in sinking (theoretically) 16 ships of the U.S. fleet stationed in the northern waters of the Gulf, but during the exercise he was forced to quit, since the "U.S. Commander" refused to admit that his military campaign had failed. Van

“The current technological developments permit electronic and satellite surveillance of the territory, continuous gathering and processing of information in real time and adoption of sighting and smart-ammunition systems capable of intervening rapidly and without errors ”

Ripper claimed that all the innovations introduced by EBOs are only slogans or little more. In the development of these new employment concepts, one should consider the various conditioning restraints and focus on, and make the most of, the capability of producing "results" or "effects" essential for achieving the objectives. For this reason the military instrument must be doctrinally, procedurally and technologically prepared for the integrated employment of all the available means, so as to favour the attainment of the immediate effects, functional to the realization of the desired results.

With the promise of being a winning instrument in the conduct of military operations, the EBO concept is now the subject of intense studies by the international military community. On the other hand, Commanders and their staffs at operational level need more than a theoretical concept. They need a codified evaluation method that can be used during the execution of a military operation. Furthermore, it seems necessary to radically change a whole cultural and professional legacy that characterizes the Land Forces, consisting of terms such as destruction and neutralization, linked to the principle of "cause-effect", and therefore to the need of quantifying the results on the ground. The EBO concept, on the contrary, introduces new terms that define the effects in non-physical dimensions, such as, for example, to "persuade", "deceive", "threaten" and "influence". This terminology is not easily "digested" by the present Commanders and their staffs, who have shown a scarce capability in evaluating the effects, especially as regards the psychological dimension.

Obviously, without this capability the EBO concept is not adherent to the reality of the battlefield. A revision – if not a revolution – of the Cadres' training process is therefore necessary, or at least advisable, with a course of studies that give priority to the capacity of analysing a whole series of data, which belong not only to the military dimension but also to the social, psychological and economic ones. This is necessary for systematizing the whole batch of fundamental information needed to tackle the evolution of the evaluation process. Moreover, a complete osmosis with the government agencies cannot but favour the flow of the information needed in order to implement a successful EBO, but at the same time can turn out to be an obstacle to its applicability, considering the not always easy interaction with

these actors. Besides, we should not forget that an exhaustive intelligence activity never existed and probably never will; even if we could obtain a thorough knowledge of the battlefield we would never be able to fully foresee all possible countermeasures in the mind of our enemy. Finally, if one considers the objective difficulty that land operations have in order to develop as "surgically" as the air ones, the media's capability of influencing the masses, the instability of political interactions, the easily-influenced political actors and the unpredictability of international relations, it can be easily seen that the concept itself appears to be something still far from the present Armed Forces' reality. The new concept stresses the need to command Armed Forces reduced in number but faster, more flexible and more specialized and, while proposing a sharp reduction of the expenses for traditional weapon systems, envisages a parallel increase in investments for information-gathering technologies, telecommunications, sighting and precision ammunition. All this implies enormous costs and therefore, at least considering the resources allocated at present to the Armed Forces, it is difficult to realize.

If the most recent conceptions – and the EBO doctrine is the first among them – seem to provide the best solution to the strategic problems expected in the immediate future, they also present several risks. In this sense, if on the one hand the position of its supporters, who emphasize the military advantages, including the possibility of rapid success and limited damages in the widest meaning of the word, seems justified, on the other the necessary economic and human resources do

not seem to be sufficient at the moment, neither in quantity nor in quality. The Iraqi conflict is a significant example of how forecasts, infallible on paper, when it came to the crunch, turned out to be disastrous, and how hazardous was the estimate of costs and benefits. On the basis of the recent not exciting results, today's society is not willing to pay such huge costs. Even the American public opinion, which had accepted with patriotic spirit the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, is now

changing direction, after realizing how high and dramatic was the waste of money and human lives.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the promise of becoming an instru-

“A revision of the Cadres' training process is therefore advisable, with a course of studies that give priority to the capacity to analyse a whole series of data, which do not belong only to the military dimension, but also to the social, psychological and economic aspect”

ment for easy victories, the EBO concept is actually nothing new. If we look at the past, we can find countless examples of operations conducted following an approach that today we could define as EBO-type. Probably, already at the time of the Legions, the Romans planned and fought while trying to carry out effect-based operations. But recent history has also proved how difficult it is to fully apply this concept: there are too many unpredictable variables in a modern operational theatre, where the interests at stake are manifold and very different. In practice it is a methodology that goes well beyond the strictly military operations and implies recourse to every "element" of national power. It entails furthermore the ability to foresee, control and achieve the


desired effects and, at the same time, be able to adapt to the circumstances and seize the right opportunities.

Commanders and staffs at all levels must be able to think in an "effect-centric" manner, and not just try to understand the intention of the two higher levels but, on the contrary, they must have a clear vision of the strategic targets, such as national security or the military campaign as a whole.

Similarly, they must know all the facts necessary for assessing the effects, in order to clearly understand the reasons of success or failure of a given operation. The interdependent and integrated nature of the EBOs emphasizes the importance of its leaders, in the widest meaning of the word, who must be able to grasp, instantaneously and continuously, the general picture of the situation, and appraise the potential impact of a certain decision on the achievement of a planned effect. Furthermore, the Commanders and their staffs must be able to operate in situations of uncertainty, visualize and think in a dynamic, and not always steadfast manner, conceiving with continuity any possible prospect, making sure at the same time that the actions carried out for the attainment of a certain result do not cause unintentional and unforeseen indirect effects. Besides a revolutionary change of mentality, a solid "expertise" in national and international policy, diplomacy and economy, the military leaders need a training based mainly on the student rather than on the teacher, and must be capable of managing situations where complexity is immanent and not removed. Moreover, everything must be supported by a clear terminology and clear definitions, and by a Command-and-Control system possibly deriving from a structural reorganization and capable of managing this very complex process. In this sense, at present at least, the concept can find an effective application mainly at strategic level where, in practice, there are all the necessary instruments, albeit – to be really effective – they should always be employed in a coordinated, integrated and simultaneous manner. In conclusion, the EBO concept is perhaps more mature than the capabilities required to implement it, even though one cannot "a priori" ignore that to overcome the difficulties we just tried to outline may not necessarily be a "mission impossible".

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A "Bersagliere" on surveillance duty.





URGENT QUEST

TECHNE

URGENT QUEST

An important exercise in the United Kingdom

"Combat identification" is becoming the fundamental capability for conducting effective operations in modern scenarios, avoiding "fratricidal fire" and using at best the available weapon systems. In this rapidly developing sector, international initiatives and activities are multiplying, with the constant and active participation of our Service.



Title pages and above.
The "Dardo" infantry combat vehicle.

Exercise "Urgent Quest", which was conducted at the Salisbury Plain range in the United Kingdom from September 13 to October 10, 2005, has been a fundamental step towards the achievement of a concrete "Combat Identification" capability.

This apparently intuitive term describes a capability that permits to achieve the fast and accurate characterization of the forces on the battlefield, with particular reference to the so-called "friendly" ones. Therefore, it is not a matter of a single, particular technology (or combination of technologies) but includes doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) as well as training of personnel, in order to adequately exploit the capabilities pro-

vided by the identification system and to operate effectively in interservice/multinational coalitions.

The awareness of the complexity of the operational scenarios and the present lack of effective identification systems caused the reappearance (in alarming proportions) of "fratricidal fire" and prompted the international community and NATO to give a decisive impulse to the development of this capability.

A further boost to the development of "Combat ID instruments" came from the evolution of technology and doctrine, which created the need for capabilities aimed at realizing the situation on the ground (the so-called situation awareness), which should be conferred to the future digitalized forces, characterized by a significant increase in combat effectiveness.

Thus the programme "Coalition Combat Identification-Advanced Concept Coalition Combat Identification (CCID ACTID)" was born under the aegis of the NATO Allied Command for Transformation (NATO-ACT) and the US Joint Force Command (USJFCOM), and was joined by the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Sweden. The aim was to develop identification

technologies suitable for operational employment in interservice and multinational environments, with special reference to ground-to-ground and air-to-ground applications, characterized by a high number of losses.

Italy, in particular, joined with conviction this very pragmatic programme, in order to give concrete "answers" to the

"urgent questions" imposed by the repeated occurrence of incidents of "fratricidal fire".

The idea of carrying out a real exercise on the ground within the CCID ACTD programme was

“Italy joined with conviction this programme...in order to give concrete answers to the urgent questions posed by the repeated occurrence of incidents of fratricidal fire”

Active identification systems

BTID (Battlefield Target Identification Device): system of identification of "friend" vehicles, on millimetric radio waves, based on an "interrogation and answer" mechanism. A vehicle equipped with a BTID in a "transponder" version, if interrogated by another vehicle with BTID (in an interrogator version) produces an automatic reply of a "friend" type. Thus the crew of the vehicle equipped with the interrogator/transponder can discriminate a vehicle equipped with a similar system from one not equipped with the device. In case of interrogation of a vehicle not equipped with the BTID system, the automatic response is "Unknown". If a "friend" vehicle equipped with BTID system is within the range of the weapon system of the vehicle aimed at a potential target, the BTID indicates "Friend in Range".

The BTID produced by the various nations, albeit different from each other, have the characteristic of recognizing each other.

RBCI (Radio Based Combat Identification): technology developed in the U.S., based on a modified SINCGARS Combat Radio, whose software performs the interrogation – answer function. It can be either portable or vehicular.

RF TAG (Radio Frequency Tag): "air to ground" identification system, produced by SPECTRA. It can automatically answer the radar signal of an aircraft with a modulated signal in the Ku and X band, which appears on the radar display of the aircraft.

OCIDS (Optical Combat Identification System): optical identification systems based on an "Interrogator/Receiver device using an "eye safe" laser that can be mounted on the rifle of soldiers on foot or on vehicles.

Passive Identification Systems

JCIMS (Joint Combat Identification Marking System): "Combat Identification Panels" (CIP) thermal panels, and "Thermal Identification Panels (TIP) for "ground to ground" and "air to ground" passive identification (through night-vision systems) of land vehicles, and infrared lights for omnidirectional signalling of platforms and personnel (Phoenix IR Light).

thus born: it was to be "Urgent Quest" (the name is not casual), the key event of the whole programme, where equipment and forces of the participating nations, provided with identification systems, were to conduct joint operations, simulating operational and environmental conditions as realistic and demanding as possible (two-party exercises in real time and "live").

The objective of this exercise was to assess the "Military Utility" on the ground of the following solutions (technologies combined with procedures of employment) for Combat Identification (see Table):

- *Battlefield Target Identification (BTID);*
- *Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI);*
- *Radio Frequency (RF) Tags;*
- *Optical Combat Identification System (OCIDS);*
- *Visual Marking Systems: Combat Identification Panels (CIPs) and Thermal Identification Panels (TIPs), Phoenix IR Light.*


The exercise envisaged the employment of fire simulators for the weapon systems, both on vehicles and individual ones, as well as the provision of terminals installed on every tank, in order to monitor the progress of the exercise and send the position and mission data to the direction of the exercise so as to have them memorized and analysed with scientific methods.

In this way, in parallel with the pure and simple organization of a normal exercise, which, as is known, still presents several problems from the viewpoint of logistics, training and preparation of equipment and personnel, it was necessary to set up a mighty "machine", which involved Government Bodies, industries and research centres of the participating Countries, under the guidance of NATO ACT and USJFCOM, in order to:

- Provide "combat identification" technologies to be employed during the exercise.
- Take care of the preparation of equipment and personnel to employ the identification systems and all the additional technologies (the mentioned fire simulators for the weapon systems, both on vehicles and the personal ones) envisaged for the exercise.
- Contribute – under control of the apposite US Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT), consisting of analysts, expert in data processing and interpretation – to define the exercise scenarios most suitable for getting reliable and exhaustive data, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) to be employed during the exercise, together with the evaluation parameters to be considered for the final analysis of the results.

Therefore the various Nations were asked to make a remarkable work of organization, plan-

ning and coordination (at national and international level) to take part in the event, which envisaged very short times and imposed the qualified participation in ad-hoc Working Groups to cover all the logistic, technical, doctrinal and



Central unit of the BTID system in a "Dardo" combat vehicle.

analytical aspects of "Urgent Quest" and the execution of a number of activities, which (like personnel training and equipment instrumentation) had to be developed in cooperation with other Nations.

Italy, in particular, had decided to actively participate in "Urgent Quest" in 2004, singling out for the occasion a platoon-level mechanized unit with 4 "Dardos" (combat vehicle for infantry), equipped with prototypes of "Battlefield Target Identification Devices" (BTID), procured through a specific contract with the Selex Communication Company. These US-made BTID systems are an evolution of the same device employed by the US Army and the US Marines.

The efforts made in order to meet the obligations were rewarded and, with the signature of the Exercise Directive by the Chief of the Logistic Division of the Army General Staff, every aspect of Italy's participation became official"

After a very intensive phase of preparation of the "Dardos", the installation of the BTIDs and the training of personnel, which took place at Cosenza in August 2005, the Italian detachment, which included a platoon with 4 "Dardos" of the 1st "Bersaglieri" Regiment and other personnel and equipment (for technical/logistic support and data

analysis), was ready to enter the Salisbury Plain range, as Italy's representative.

The "Dardos" of the platoon had become technologically advanced platforms, on which the BTID had been mounted during the previous weeks. The vehicles were also readied for the installation, during the exercise, of the RBCI, RF Tag and Visual Marking systems (see Table) and the fire simulation system, used to simulate the effects of the weapon system during the exercise.

In particular, the BTID system mounted on "Dardo" consisted of:

- An interrogator system, mounted on only two vehicles (LUPO 1 and ETNA), made of a directional antenna firmly attached to the barrel, for sending out the wave form containing the coded interrogation message.
- An omnidirectional transponder antenna (on all "Dardos" involved in the project) employed for the automatic transmission of a coded reply ("friendly" response) to the query message.
- A central unit for the processing/management of all the BTID functions.
- A unit feeding system.
- A GPS sensor.
- A laptop PC for managing the following functions: visualization, on a digitalized map, of all identified "friend" systems, including those of the interrogated vehicles, which employ an additional function of the BTID, called DDL (Digital Data Link), in order to build a digital net in which the said vehicles transmit their

position data to the others through a transponder net; collection/management of the file containing all mission data recorded by the system (interrogations made and received; DDL position messages).

As regards its operation, the BTID is closely integrated with the weapon system on which it is mounted, in particular with the Laser Range Finder. When the gun layer in the turret moves the weapon system

in the direction of a potential target and operates the LRF, the BTID becomes active and, in less than a second, through the vehicle's interphone, provides the sight and sound indication of a "friend" or "unknown" vehicle. In the latter case, before opening fire, one must have the confirmation, visual or through other sources, that the vehicle is actually an enemy one. If a "friend" vehicle equipped with BTID is within range of a weapon system aimed at another potential target, the BTID produces the indica-

"The efforts made in order to meet the obligations were rewarded and, with the signature of the Exercise Directive by the Chief of the Logistic Division of the Army General Staff, every aspect of Italy's participation became official"



Pre-mission preparation of a "Dardo" at the "Motor pool" parking area.

tion "Friend in Range". Furthermore, it is also possible for the gun layer to query the sighted targets without operating the LFR system, to avoid being recognized.

The "Bersaglieri" of the 1st Regiment had been trained (also with help from US personnel) in the correct use of the system at their Caserta barracks, and tackled the job with the usual motivation but also with a certain curiosity deriving from the attraction of the special technology and the feeling of being about to participate in something unusual.

Actually, this impression proved to be correct from the very beginning. In the days following the "fateful" September 13, 2005, the arrival and settlement at the base of all contingents and personnel (civilian and military) was completed. The participating Nations were: US, Italy, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and UK. Altogether there were 800 servicemen, 200 technicians and civilian analysts representing firms, government bodies and important American universities (John Hopkins and Columbia), 94 land combat-vehicles, 9 fixed-wing combat aircraft, 3 helicopters and 130 identification systems.

In view of the 7 training missions envisaged (3 daytime and 4 night-time), many interesting and absorbing activities were carried out during the following days with a very tight schedule.

The various instruments and devices installed on the vehicles were controlled, set up and serviced in a special motor pool, where the Italian "Dardos" stood side by side with the most different armoured vehicles: American Abrahms and Bradleys, British Challengers and Scimitars,

The exterior of a Dardo's turret equipped with antennas and systems for exercise "Urgent Quest".





Above.
Italian servicemen practicing with British SA/80 rifles.

Right.
Training with NATO CITS.

and the positions of vehicles/personnel learned from the appropriate terminals mounted on the vehicles. This would permit to see in real time, during the operational missions, the development of the manoeuvre of the combat group and of the other elements on the ground (opposing



French VABs and many others) with their respective technologies, forming an assortment of vehicles that offered an unusual and almost shocking view.

The Command and Control structure was being organized under a "Coalition Exercise Group" - CECG - where all participating Nations were represented by their respective National Senior Representatives, whose task was to control the exercise, conduct the tactic-level functions of staff headquarter, direct the operations on the ground, solve all logistic/administrative and technical problems and gather/analyse data.

In a room called "Home Box Office" (HBO) the international analysts were going to receive the firing data (conducted/received engagements)

force (OPFOR), neutral forces, NGO) within the scenarios envisaged for "Urgent Quest" directly on a screen and locate the position and the engagements, conducted/received by each individual tank and man. In addition, through a special sw developed by the JFIIT, these data would be memorized and managed for analysis and successive evaluations.

The equipment of the personnel continued with the distribution of the simulator system for personnel on foot (it included a combat jacket with GPS and computer display) and of the SA/80 British rifle, given to the Italian platoon to simulate the effect of the individual weapon during the exercise. The training of the personnel in the envisaged ROE and TTP and in the employment of the "Combat Identification" technology was completed also with the support of a prototypic multimedia and multilingual software (called "NATO Identification Training System" - NATO CITS).

After a few days, for a final test of the systems and the verification of the preparation of the personnel in situations programmed on purpose (Situational Exercise Scenario - STX), the free-play operational missions commenced, with the first daytime operation (deliberate attack).

THE OPERATIONAL MISSIONS

A British-led Combat Group (Black Watch Battlegroup), formed by land elements and aircraft from eight different Nations, carried out the ground activities, under direction of a CECG.

A French VAB.





A French VBL equipped with the system of detection of the engagements received (in the red circle).

The Canadian-led company of the coalition, which included also the Italian component, consisted of:

- A platoon from the French Foreign Legion, equipped with VAB and VBL recce vehicles.
- A platoon from the 1st "Bersaglieri" Regiment, equipped with VCC "Dardo" combat vehicles.
- A platoon from the Canadian Army equipped with British "Warriors".

The Close Air Support (CAS) and air missions envisaged the employment of a Danish Army Fenner antitank helicopter and ground-attack F-16 aircraft from the Danish Air Force, ground-attack F-18 and F-15 aircraft from the US, a British Harrier aircraft and a British "Apache" helicopter, both for ground attack, variously equipped with systems for air-to-ground identification.

The opposing forces (OPFOR) consisted of a British company with modified vehicles, to

make the visual identification easier for the friendly forces.

Besides the forces involved in the exercise, on the ground there were "Observer Controllers" (OC) managed by the CECG, and Observers from the Nations that participated in the CCID ACTD programme but were not directly involved in the exercise with units of their own (Australia and Germany).

“A British-led Combat Group, formed by land elements and aircraft from eight different Nations, carried out the ground activities”

In the demonstrations (three daytime and four night-time) of the combat group, the "technologic" coalition, equipped with identification systems, simulated operations typical of a NATO task force called to intervene in operations for the maintenance of international stability, restoring the (imaginary) legitimate

Government of "Arnoria", threatened by forces of the state of "Mordovia" (represented by OPFOR).

The missions simulated different and very realistic scenarios, also with the presence on the ground of NGOs and elements of the UN; the first demonstration was focused on mobile defence, the second on attack and the third on PSO in inhabited centres (both in day- and night-time).



A "Bersagliere", equipped with a MILES simulator and armed with a British SA/80 assault rifle, during the Exercise.

Furthermore, there was a conclusive night exercise on a transition phase.

On the basis of the relevant Operation Order (OPORD) drawn up before each mission, and after control by the Direction of the Exercise, the Italian platoon was entrusted with all the tasks envisaged within the offensive, defensive and delaying operations (fixing, attack).

The so-called "hunting" activities against enemy tanks were particularly stimulating for the tank crews: they received orders (in English) by the Canadian Company Commander, applied the technology present in the vehicle and adopted employment procedures different from the Italian ones (employment of the VCC "Dardo" with a 6-men component on foot and a 3-men crew).

The prevailing situations were studied in order to produce the greatest possible number of "fratricidal fire" (an artificial village, Copehill, was indeed built in the Salisbury range, for operations in inhabited centres) in order to test men, vehicles and technologies to the utmost and get a vast amount of analysable data.

At the end of each mission, the "Observer Controllers" of the various nations, who had followed the action on the ground, were tasked to gather all data on the activities of their Units on a Pocket PC, questioning each Layer and Tank Leader on all the fire engagements received or

conducted, controlling the adoption of the right procedure and, in that case, if technology had really helped in the identification of the targets. This gathering activity was carried out simultaneously with the technicians, who unloaded the data recorded by the software of the technological sets mounted on the vehicles. Once acquired by the Observers Controllers, the data were compared with those obtained by the analyst team and assessed as a whole. In this phase, any possible event of interest (EOI) was analysed. For example, cases of "fratricidal fire", or instances where the technology had avoided them. The matter would be examined in depth during the post-mission debriefing, where the Layers and Tank Leaders that had been the protagonists of an event of interest gave all the explanations necessary to clarify the occurrence and ascertain whether the technology had been somehow helpful in the decision-making process for opening fire.

At the end of the daytime mission, and also at night, a conclusive debriefing was held, which summarized the statistical data relevant to the identification activities on the battlefield with the support of the abovementioned technologies.

MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE EXERCISE

Exercise "Urgent Quest" ended on October 13, 2005.

During the technological demonstration (opposing-parties exercise) it was possible to test the mentioned technologies for "Combat Identification", in connection with the following evaluation parameters:

- Functionality, i.e. whether the identification systems implemented by the different nations of the coalition improve the capability of detecting the presence of friendly, enemy or neutral units on the battlefield.
- Impact on the units, i.e. whether the identification systems lowered in a significant manner the number of victims of "friendly fire" and improve the effectiveness of the units during combat.
- Interoperability: whether the identification systems can be employed in multinational units working within the same coalition.

The training activity was carried out in perfect harmony with the technical activities relevant to

“On the basis of the Operational Order drawn up and controlled before each mission by the Direction of the Exercise, the Italian platoon was entrusted with all the tasks envisaged within the offensive, defensive and delaying operations”



A "Dardo" combat vehicle engaged in "Urgent Quest".

the preparation and setting up of the vehicles and the devices mounted on them, and with the data gathering and assessment after the mission, which, considering all we have said before, was the most important part of the exercise.

These data, obtained through the implementation of the training missions described above, will be used by the team of international analysts coordinated by the JFIIT, for preparing, from October 2005 to February 2006, the Final Report of the exercise, with an appraisal of the military effectiveness of the various technologies tested, on the basis of the mentioned parameters.

The exercise was very realistic thanks to the simulators, carried on vehicles or as personal equipment. In particular, the simulator envisaged several types of situations: a tank could be completely destroyed or only have its hull damaged and maintain the efficiency of the turret, or a rifleman could be killed or only wounded, or be in a

state of shock due to an explosion nearby. The situation of every single soldier appeared on a small monitor placed on his vest, where one could read, in English, what kind of injury or damage he had suffered.

These systems, although presenting occasional slight malfunctions, effectively contributed to make the activities very interesting, particularly for the Commanders at the various levels, who had to face situations where they could not employ a stricken tank or had to proceed to the rescue of a wounded soldier.

For the abovesaid reasons, the training on vehicles was very profitable, owing both to the extremely accurate simulations of real operational situations and to the opportunity of increasing the professionalism of our personnel, as well as to the necessary employment of technology, the comparison with different employment procedures and with crews and equipment of other nations. From this viewpoint, the Italian vehicles and personnel cut a fine figure, to the point of "deserving" the task of carrying out, almost always, the "main effort" during the missions.



An American AH-64 "Apache-Longbow" helicopter in a Close Air Support action.

As regards the specific BTID and DDL technologies, we can highlight some positive impressions, although any final judgment may be premature.

In particular, the BTID system and the DDL technology used by the Italian personnel and still in a prototype phase, proved in time to be generally reliable, without any significant malfunction.

The "Combat Identification" technologies proved to be easily and immediately employable by the crews of the "Dardo", which could always profitably employ the BTID sets and the other tested technologies within the assigned ROE, that could be easily and intuitively applied.

Within the very numerous risky situations that occurred during the missions (purposely programmed by the international organizers), there were no instances of "fratricidal fire" among Italian tanks. The occasional cases caused by Italian tanks always involved vehicles of other nations, and were almost always due to the lack of the BTID interrogator on the Italian tank concerned, or of the BTID transponder on the target.

The implementation of the DDL function in order to realize a net of data exchange/acquisition used for the cartographic representation of the vehicles equipped with BTID proved to be reliable. The DDL function, particularly appreciated by the personnel, always worked correctly, and permitted to acquire data coming from other vehicles (including those of other

Nations) equipped with BTID transponders. This was a great advantage for the "situation awareness", despite the uncomfortable position in the turret (sideways and higher than the Layer, and behind the Tank leader).

LESSONS LEARNED

Organizational structure, attending government/industrial bodies, number of participating Nations, vehicles/technology/personnel employed, characteristics and aims, made exercise "Urgent Quest" very different from other training activities conducted recently, also abroad, by our Service.


The exercise, in its different phases, was a challenge first of all, hard but exciting, which involved not only the whole Service, which made the greatest effort, but the entire Defence organization (Defence General Staff, technical-administrative area, industries).

In this sense, the participation in the event was essentially an important international "showcase" for the Italian Army, which could display the level of technological update of its materials and systems and the professional skill of its personnel who, on that occasion, certainly proved to be not inferior to those of the other Nations.

In the sector of "Combat Identification", "Urgent Quest" represented a fundamental experience,

"The Italian Army was able to display the level of technological update of its materials and systems and the professional skill of its personnel"

DDL visualization in a "Dardo" turret of vehicles identified as "friend" by the BTID system.



from which it will be possible to obtain, as a tangible result, a basic document (Final Report), which, on the grounds of objective evaluations, can be the foundation of the future developments of "Combat Identification" (in terms of acquisitions, investments, doctrinal and training implications).

From the standpoint of intangible results and lessons learned, the exercise gave equally important results.

In particular, there was the confirmation of the validity of the progress made by the Service in this sector, through the rapid development of a technology (BTID), which, albeit not yet fully mature, was considered valid by the personnel who employed it, using BTID systems as a useful support for the identification of friendly forces and for the effective conduct of the operations. The DDL function, with the visualization on a display of the position of the tanks of the coalition equipped with BTID transponders, could be particularly appreciated, provided that they could be relocated in a position for easier reading in the turret of the "Dardo".

The "Dardo" tanks prepared for the occasion were the first embryos of the future "digitalisation" of the Service's vehicles; in this sense, the exercise provided useful information on some fundamental aspects of technology-vehicle integration.

Finally, the human factor, which exalts technology and proves its value, emerged with all its importance. The boys of the 1st "Bersaglieri" Regiment, true to their motto "Ictu Impetuque Primus", and with a long experience on the ground, have brilliantly overcome the difficulties connected with the different language, doctrine, procedures of employment and use of technology, and competed as equals with the contingents of the other Nations, earning their appreciation not only for their good humour and the wholesome "Bersaglieri" spirit, but especially for their enthusiasm, skill and diligence, which made possible the great success of the Italian participation.


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THE AUSTRALIAN "TIGER"

TECHNE

THE AUSTRALIAN "TIGER"

The situation of the procurement programme

In the varied world of advanced weapon systems, helicopters must provide performances suitable for employment in the most demanding operational theatres.

The "Tiger", although winner of a tender for combat helicopters called by Australia, will still have to undergo important changes in order to meet the specifications fixed by the customer.



Title pages and above.

A "Tiger" in the configuration selected by Australia.

The ever increasing complexity of the weapon systems puts to a hard test not only the engineers but also, and perhaps mainly, those responsible for the management of the programme, on both the supplier's and the customer's side.

Technical problems, times, cost assessment, contract problems and other issues often have, as practical consequence, the delivery to the operational units of systems that do not conform to what was initially envisaged, or cause such serious delays at the entry into service that they impair the effectiveness of the military instrument.

The latest of these cases exploded at the beginning of May, when the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) published a report titled "Management of the 'Tiger' Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Project - Air 87". In the 105 pages of the

document are listed all the shortcomings that were pointed out not only by the producer but also by the Defence Administration; on the other hand, it is very clearly stated that "this report is not an appraisal of the supplier's behaviour but rather an assessment of the management of the Project by the Defence and DMO", i.e. by the Department of Defence and the Defence Materiel Organization.

Project Air 87 proposed to provide the Australian military instrument with a capability of armed reconnaissance in the third dimension: hence the name Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter - ARH. The new helicopter was supposed to replace the Army's fleet of 43 Bell 206B - 1 Kiowa and 25 UH - 1H Iroquois, and join the UH - 60 Blackhawk transport helicopters. The procurement plan envisaged the delivery of the first specimen in May 2003, in order to have a first group (eight helicopters) by June 2006 and a second one by December 2007. During the contract negotiations the dates were changed, scheduling the initial operational



A "Black Hawk" UH-60 of the Australian Army.

capability (IOC) by July 2007 and the full capability (FOC) by December 2008. The choice fell on the Franco-German "Tiger" aircraft and the contract for the supply of 22 helicopters was signed in December 2001. Eighteen of them were to be assembled in Australia. The initial worth of the project was 1.58 billion dollars (1.1 million for the aircraft and 411 million for a 13-year integrated logistic support). Later the cost went up to 1.96 billion dollars, owing to price increases, exchange rates fluctuations and other reasons.

A first difference between the Australian plans and reality was due to the delays in the acceptance of the aircraft by France, which was the first client. In fact, the Australians considered the programme as an "off the shelf" procurement of an aircraft already in service with two other nations, France and Germany, while in practice this did not occur. The delays in the delivery of the machines to the two nations that had started the "Tiger" project compelled Australia to be the first to accept the aircraft, with the relevant consequences. At the moment of the contract it was nevertheless evident that France had not yet certified and accepted the project, thus possible deferments could be imagined. These delays, in practice, transformed Project Air 87 into an experimental programme, increasing the risks connected with times, costs, capabilities of the machines and logistic support, even if a number of modifications, essentially concerning avionics, communication systems, integration of two voice recorders and of the US-made "Hellfire" antitank missile, envisaged a certain dedicated development activity. On the whole, out of 900 project requisites, the Australian requests led to change 14 of them. As regards the operational requirements, they were a lot more stringent than the Franco-German, ones since the Australian climate reaches much higher temperatures. There was moreover the request of the Australian Navy to be able to control the aircraft from its amphibious units with a

sea up to force-5: (Actually the Defence later declared to ANAO that it would be unlikely to carry out flight activities in those conditions).

The DMO accepted the first two specimens of the "Tiger", no.1 and no.2, produced in France, in December 2004. At that time, France should have already accepted its first "Tiger" in June 2003, eighteen months before the Australian contract, but in practice the French specimen had only passed the first level of the navigability certificate, granted in April 2004 by the French "Direction Générale pour l'Armement". This caused an excessive load of work for DMO. On the other hand, the Australian aircraft were accepted despite the fact that 25 testing and evaluation procedures had not been completed, because they concerned subsystems whose final delivery was envisaged after the acceptance date. Moreover, unexpected shortcomings appeared later, as shown at Table 1.

As can be easily seen, some shortcomings were due to the unmade tests while others, such as the insufficient power of the MTR 390 Step 0 turbines, were problems difficult to solve. Besides, a great part of the helicopter programmes born at the time of the Cold War (we should remember that a "Tiger" mock-up was present at the French-German exercise carried out in Germany in 1987, and that was one of the crucial moments in the strengthening of what was then the Bonn-Paris axis) suffer from a lack of power, having been designed for operations in Central Europe, while

today they must fly in theatres where high temperatures and altitudes erode the margin of power calculated for our climatic conditions. There is a dispute on this point, since, according to the report, an increased power of the propellers would produce a rise in fuel consumption and a consequent drop in the autonomy below the limits envisaged by the contract. According to the Defence, the tests continue to show that the engines are below

the envisaged power; the problem comes up essentially in flights with a single engine and, in particular, it is impossible to reach the climbing speed at full load while, and this is more serious, the problems of reduced performance in the torrid climate conditions of northern Australia remain unsolved. The manufacturer proposed a future update of the propellers at Step 1, with an increase in maximum power of about 7 percent (against the present 3 percent power deficit, but the modification, which involves essentially the software, would have an estimated cost of 2.5 million dollars for each turbine, for a total of 110 million). According to the last statements made by the maker, the problems seem to have been solved in collaboration with the producer of the propellers.

“Technical problems, times, cost assessment, contract problems and other issues have as a practical consequence the delivery to the operational units of systems that do not conform to what was initially envisaged”



A "Kiowa" OH-58.

The first helicopter assembled in Australia showed even worse problems, to the point of convincing those responsible for the tests to reject the aircraft, whose faults were bound to cause security problems during training. Nevertheless, since the first helicopters delivered were flying on the basis of a special air navigability certificate issued when the first two aircraft had been accepted, the DMO considered that, within the limits of this authorization, there were no security problems. The helicopter was accepted in June 2005. In October, after a 2-month extension of the special air-navigability certificate, the aircraft were granted the military certifi-

“The Australian aircraft were accepted despite the fact that 25 testing and evaluation procedures had not been completed”

cation with a 6-month delay, but with some limitations due to the incomplete conformity with the performances provided for by the contract.

Besides the described ones, other problems concerned the radio-localizer at extreme temperatures, the vocal recorder at the highest Gs, the tests on ground impact resistance and, for the first two machines, the capability of prolonged flight above water, due to the lack of verifications of the capabilities of escape from a submerged aircraft. Another difficulty was that in Australia the rules in instrumental flight require a more complete set of instruments, which will have to be installed separately or integrated into the avionics suite, thus needing a partial new development of the system. At the time of the report, the activity of the Australian aircraft was therefore limited to flight tests, instructor training, demonstrations and transfer flights. During these activities the helicopters could not carry out long-lasting flights above water, could not fly with anti-sand filters installed, could not fly at night with the support of NVGs, could not fly with the support of a radar altimeter, and could not conduct operations of take-off, landing and low-altitude flights above 5000 feet.

Another key point of the dispute concerns the delays in delivering the simulation system, but also in this case it is not easy to distinguish the faults of the

producer from the purchaser's. The latter, in fact, has changed many specifications during the manufacture. The simulation system provides for the presence of a mission simulator (which was to be delivered in February 2005), a cockpit procedure trainer (to be delivered in September 2005), a second similar system (July 2006), besides a number of train-

ing systems for specialists and the installation of a support to the software which should permit an autonomous capability of development of the system. The continuous evolution of the aircraft's software

A pair of "Tigers" in close formation.



Form left to right: a CH-47 "Chinook", a "Black Hawk" UH-60 and a "Tiger".



Table 1 Unexpected shortcomings of the first two aircraft delivered (December 2004)

System	Shortcoming
Turret 30 mm gun	Tests not completed. In November 2005, tests were completed and when the report was drafted the results were under evaluation.
70 mm rocket system	Tests not completed. In November 2005, tests were completed and when the report was drafted the results were under evaluation.
Maximum weight	Maximum weight 6.1t (French version) against 6.4t for the Australian version.
Propeller performance	The ARH does not respect the engine's highest performances envisaged by the contract.
Software	The software delivered presented many serious problems.
Radio-assisted navigation	The system was not fully integrated. In November 2005 the integration was completed but not yet accepted.
Maintenance management system	Awaiting the definitive system, an ad-interim system was employed.
Electronic Warfare System	The system's configuration was accepted in August 2005 and the delivery was expected by the end of the year.
Mission management system	Awaiting the definitive system, an ad-interim system was employed, which met the training requirements.
Spare parts, support and test equipment	The envisaged items were progressively being delivered.

Source: Analysis conducted by ANAO on the report of tests provided by Defence.

has deferred the freeze of the configuration, which was necessary in order to have a mission simulator corresponding to the real aircraft, without having to work hard on the system immediately after delivery. Furthermore, the Australian purchaser requested many changes that went beyond their adaptation to the configuration of the aircraft ordered; in particular,

Table 2 (Source: ANAO)

Capability	Aircraft	
Apparatus	Aircraft no. 1 & 2 (Dec.2004) Revised contract requirements	Aircraft no.5 (June 2005). Revised contract requirements
Operability at maximum weight	Yes	yes
Propeller performances	No	no
Software integration (a)	Yes	yes
Emergency radio-localizer (b).	Yes	yes
Operability of voice recorders at high number of G (c).	Yes	yes
Resistance to impact (d).	Yes	yes
Flight above water (e)	No	yes
Excessive alarms by the avionic system	No	no
Radio-navigation and altimetric systems.	No	no
30 mm turret gun.	No	no
70 mm rocket system	No	no
Maintenance management system	No	no
Electronic warfare system	No	no
Ground-mission management system	Yes	yes

a. On the entry into service the software version installed presented several problems that were known and being worked out. The supplier was trying to solve them in view of the successive release of the software.
b. The supplier still had to prove the correspondence to the envisaged military standards at 69° C, while the system had been approved for a temperature of 55° C, envisaged by the civilian FAR
c. There were minor shortcomings and all aircraft were equipped with vocal recording systems, but they did not correspond to specifications.
d. Defence noted that this difference from the contract standard is an approved permanent-type deviation.
e. Restrictions on flight above water are connected with an unsolved problem concerning the evacuation of a sunken aircraft. Defence is not satisfied because all tests and analyses have been carried out by the supplier, and therefore imposed a flight restriction.

the full mission simulator intended for operations in Australia will have better characteristics than the French-German ones. The Australians have not judged the accuracy of the visual systems of the latter good enough, also because in that nation simulation in training is much more used than in France or Germany. Moreover, for the in-flight Commander's simulator, six degrees of movement have been required. All these problems caused a delay of approximately 15 months, five of which were due to the modifications requested, but now the system has left Europe, is in the assembly phase in Australia and should become operational in the summer of 2006.

The integration of an American system in a European aircraft cannot but create some difficulties. The "Hellfire" system, purchased by Australia thanks to the "Foreign Military Sales", was no exception, especially when delicate data must be given to a potential competitor of the U.S. industry in order to effectively integrate the weapon system in the aircraft. Nevertheless, on August 9, 2005, with the first launching of a missile by an Australian "Tiger", most problems seem to have been solved.

One of the major economic problems seems to be the cost of the logistic support. Actually, the reasons for selecting the "Tiger" were precisely the savings in this sector for the 13 years following the delivery, which amounted to 410.9 million dollars and were about one third less than the competition's. The supplier, after a review of the costs, proposed an increase of 365 million, which was refused by DMO. Now the question is again under discussion and negotiations between purchaser and supplier are under way. Another problematic point is the support of the software, which, according to the supplier, is not fully envisaged by the contract. The purchaser rejects this and, therefore, there is contention also on this point.

The ANAO report ends with a number of recommendations to Defence and DMO on the procedures connected with the management of major programmes and the conduct of tests. It recommends moreover a better liaison between those responsible for the project and the Defence authorities responsible for the development of the capabilities, and more attention by the DMO in drawing up the contracts, in order to avoid possible ambiguities. Still, the Australian Defence is on the whole satisfied with the development of the programme. The Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson, answering a question in Parliament, underlined that the ANAO recommendations are in line with the reform of the procurement procedures and that the key factor for the greatest part of the problems that turned up is connected with the delay of the French programme, while the main worries concern the delay of the simulation system.

Paolo Valpolini
Journalist





THE MEDIA IN THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS

THE MEDIA IN THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS

A strategic resource

A close collaboration between the military and journalists may turn out to be a key factor in the success of a mission and the best way to report the events objectively.

... No big network aims to give us the world picture. Its sole purpose is not to be beaten by the competition.

On one occasion, the former Chief-of-staff of the U.S. Army, General Eric Shinseki, said: «We must speak on behalf of the Army, or else other people will do it».

This statement appears to be highly topical at the moment. The mass media have made the world become a «global village» and exercise a powerful influence on all of us.


Poor information management of some events concerning military operations had a huge impact on the outcome of the mission. In fact, massive media coverage of military activities can really hype up simple routine operations. On the contrary, an event which does not attract media attention will seem less important than it is.

Title pages.

An Italian patrol in the Afghan desert.

Below.

Also the Afghan Army contributes to the free circulation of the media in the territory.



Journalists report what they see without writing what the military thinks. However, soldiers want to express opinions about the actions they perform and need to make them know.

For this reason, journalists and cameramen should collaborate with each other as much as possible to give us a faithful reproduction of the reality. They represent a strategic resource thanks to which soldiers are able to give their opinions. In some circumstances, journalists can even collaborate closely with the Commander of Contingent.

Obviously, when a soldier is about to do an «out-of-area» mission, he has to know the rules governing the mass media and shape his way of thinking so that he will be able to deal with a continuous flow of information without being overwhelmed. He has to know journalists (it is necessary to clear up any problems before working with them in the Area of Operation) and what attitude he should adopt towards them; as well as a system of rules for the Commanders of whatever ranks, he has to know how to manage events and post-events and the fundamental rules governing the mass media system: how to give an interview, how to transmit messages, or «convey» messages as journalists say, how to handle emergencies and how to avoid certain messages and negative behaviour.

Andrea Angeli is an Italian official of UNO and has taken part in numerous missions of «the blue helmets» in different places of the world. He said: «Information management is becoming more and more essential as an instrument for the peace-keeper. If a good article is published at the right moment it can help to spread peace much more than an armed battalion».

WHAT IS NEEDED TO KNOW ABOUT JOURNALISTS

People say that journalists are not «friends» and, consequently, we should mistrust them. This is not true. It is not useful to divide journalists into categories, such as «friends» – «non-friends», because they would continue to carry out their own task even without the military's cooperation. The military should overcome any prejudices and negative stereotypes on the journalist figure in order to become a credible interlocutor and a privileged witness.

As out-of-area missions have demonstrated (Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq), when journalists do

not receive much information, they paint a distorted picture of the events giving us partial and incorrect information.

Journalists are always «on duty». According to this basic rule, journalists continue to work even during their coffee breaks. They work even while they chat with someone before going to bed. Therefore, journalists have to take a responsible attitude towards information in order not to give ambiguous messages. We should take into account some rules to avoid any possible misunderstanding: no one shall exert pressure on journalists (this could damage their professionalism); articles and reports cannot «be commissioned»; it is not convenient to grant a privilege to some journalists rather than others except when it is not possible to give information to everyone simultaneously (in this

“In fact, they become a strategic resource, thanks to which the soldiers directly engaged on the field are able to make their voice heard.”

case it would be better to confer a grant to those journalists who enjoy a good reputation so that they pass on the latest news to their colleagues). In addition, an event will be reported in the extent to which it is verifiable and gives us a comprehensive description of the reality. Obviously, as far as possible, it is advisable to prefer the latest news.

WHAT MUST BE CLEARED UP WITH JOURNALISTS

Soldiers must always take into account these basic rules. However, it is necessary to make it clear that even those journalists who work in the military world, especially in risky situations and straitened circumstances, have to acquire a suitable way of thinking.

Firstly, they have to become aware of any possible risks without magnifying the danger. Journalists often hesitate to get out of their safe vehicles because they are afraid of possible attacks from the enemies, even though safety measures which have been adopted are «attack-proof», as it were, thanks to the disposition of soldiers, equipment and armoured vehicles on the ground.

Before reaching a «risky» zone, correspondents must be alerted to the effective danger level and have to take the chance in advance, or else they could be a serious obstacle to the work of other journalists. Moreover, they have to have a complete knowledge of military questions, in particular political and strategic factors concerning the specific area where they work. They also have to be properly trained to cope with

any physical and mental distress during the operation.

Each intervention involves specific environmental, logistical and operational risks. Consequently, it is necessary to be well-trained to face any situations in the best way possible during the mission. Some journalists, at times, tend to underestimate risky situations concentrating on cultural and social aspects and are not able to assess the real risks accurately. This attitude could cause a serious danger to the military personnel.

It is wrong to make journalists believe that they are able to access any available information. From the beginning of cooperation it is necessary to make it clear that every single decision must be taken by the Commander of the Contingent and PI Officer who have to consider carefully what type of news they can report in accordance to safety requirements.

It is fundamental to guarantee not only the safety of current and future operations but also the safety of all personnel.

The Italian army has reached the same standard as the most modern European armies. For this reason, journalists should convey positive messages in order to reject common stereotypes about the Italian soldier who is defined as «mammone», «marmittone» and «spaghetti e mandolino».

In the collective imagination, professionalism, efficiency, determination, up-to-date equipment and advanced technologies must replace negative stereotypes, such as spaghetti, «shoes made of cardboard» and the isolation of the Italian army as inevitable result of a limited knowledge of English language.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS JOURNALISTS

In the past, on many occasions, journalists were treated with great suspicion. This attitude has recently turned out to be counterproductive especially when negative events happen.

In any circumstances, it is important to make it easy for the Commander to use such a powerful tool (to give an example, taking pictures and shots must be allowed in accordance with basic safety rules). It is not convenient to shut up like a clam or «demonize» any contacts with journalists.

Journalists prefer the direct approach by asking the military personnel some very straight questions to create a climate of open dialogue with them.

Each member of the army has to have communication skills. This statement is considered valid

only within the scope of their main tasks, with an obvious exception: the safety of operations and personnel must be guaranteed. Consequently, each soldier can develop a deep interest in communication. To be precise, he has to perform an important function of communication observing the two basic rules cited above and establishing contact with journalists.

The message that must be conveyed is another important factor. Initially, only the most interesting information has to be given. In fact, psychological studies have indicated that the public tends to remember much better and for a longer time news that they hear or receive first. In addition, from a practical point of view, journalists have to wonder whether there is enough space on the newspaper or not. Obviously, if they have to cut some information, they will eliminate what has been recorded or heard later. There is another fundamental question. The lexical aspect of an

article can create considerable difficulties. The language is often rich in technical terms and abbreviations which lead to the emergence of a world that is completely different from the rest of society. As well as a set of rules, it uses rather specialized terminology that remains totally incomprehensible to anyone.

Consequently, acronyms, abbreviations, telegraphic names of institutions and anything incomprehensible to civilians must be avoided in order to make a text clear and understandable. To give an example, think about what would happen if the military used technical terms to explain some important issues to a journalist who does not have any military knowledge (it is always preferable to talk about delivery notice instead of ToA, zone of operations instead of theatre of operations and Area of Responsibility instead of AoR; it is not wise to use abbreviations such as J3 OPS, CJTF, OPS and NCC; it would be a waste of time to talk about the approval of materials used in Costamareo airdrops). Moreover, it is not advisable to distort the reality because journalists will discover the truth. The more curious journalists are, the more the truth will come out. Obviously, their curiosity depends on the relevance of the events that must be reported. The real professional of the information, according to professional ethics and duties, makes a comparison between items of news, seeks confirmation or denial of certain

“At times some journalists tend to underestimate risky situations and, concentrating on socio-cultural aspects, do not accurately assess the potential risks”



In "out of area" operations, children often put the military in contact with the population.

details of the story, aims to clear up any doubts or satisfy his thirst for truth by exploring any levels in the military hierarchy (he fulfils this purpose in the majority of cases). The golden rule forbids the distortion of the truth or the omission of important information in order to ascertain the facts. This is extremely important: it is better to be honest enough to admit a scarce knowledge of the facts. In this case, journalists should report only what they really know which must be true to be divulged. Even the most traumatic event can offer some positive aspects: it is necessary to consider and emphasize them.

A successful film that was produced by Disney and entitled «Pollyanna» at the end of the Sixties provides us with a perfect example of this. Pollyanna was an extremely unlucky little girl struck by the most terrible tragedies, such as the death of her favourite animal and the loss of her father. Nevertheless, she was always happy and all people who came into contact with her were fascinated by her lovable character which set a great example to all of them.

Any soldier should focus on positive aspects of a «grim» reality. Even when things go badly, it is important to try to look on the bright side because within this Institution there are mechanisms and people we can regard as highly positive. For instance, when incidents arise out of a delicate situation, they always carry out an extensive and thorough investigation in order to establish what has really happened.

RULES FOR COMMANDERS

The first rule (which cannot be derogated) says that each Commander is responsible for the communication of the Contingent during the operations. In other terms, the Public Information is linked with the Command. The major consequences that follow must be analysed thoroughly: any type of communication (verbal, non-verbal, written, interpersonal) is managed by the Commander. It is necessary to follow some practical rules in order to avoid media incidents.

Firstly, it is important to trust journalists and have a complete knowledge of communication and its rules (in particular, the rules governing the training of journalists and setting universal

standards of professional conduct: a code of ethics, a professional association). Secondly, building harmonious relationships with journalists is essential. This is of crucial importance even for journalists because an effective collaboration can turn out to be fruitful in moments of crisis. In practical terms, the Commander should establish close contact with journalists and try to draw their attention to the military activities, raising burning issues and acquainting them with military actions (obviously any information given during the interview must be treated in the strictest confidence). In this way, they feel like being part of that system. They make a valuable contribution to the mission enhancing its quality. Another important rule concerns the mutual trust between the Commander and his PIO which is the «alter ego» of the Commander. In the Commander's absence, he issues the same statement that the Commander would issue by using other words. This aspect is particularly evident when there is a basic and great trust between the Commander

and PIO as well as a relationship based on mutual and deep respect.

HOW TO MANAGE THE EVENT AND POST-EVENT

What we have said finds confirmation in the way we deal with the event and the consequent post-event. Considering an event (it does not matter whether it is positive or negative), we should focus on the guidelines of the media action and try to follow these instructions. Timeliness plays a key role in this context. Reporting the event immediately (even if you have just fragments of information) will produce a good result and bring out the effectiveness of the information making it much more reliable in journalists' eyes. Consequently, journalists will place much more trust in the Commander and personnel of the Contingent.

As well as timeliness, it is necessary to com-

The wild nature of the Afghan territory is an obstacle to the control of the territory.

“...in operations, each Commander is responsible for the communications of the Contingent. In other words, public information is a Command function”



USEFUL RULES FOR THE MILITARY DURING OPERATIONS

- Remember you are Italian.
- Do not show a pathologic attachment to your mother and do not express self-pity.
- Do not make a comparison with other Contingents.
- Do not make foolish comparisons (the Paratroops are better than the Alpine troops and worse than the Marines).
- Project an image of efficiency and professionalism (professional competence) with a sense of decorum (the way you wear the uniform; the equipment).
- Preserve your dignity (a soldier will overcome his fears with training and bravery).
- Do not fear to say that you receive indemnities. In the western countries indemnities are indicative of unquestionable professionalism.

municate. This means spreading the news of events which occur or have just occurred. The spread of news is gradual and slow. Sometimes, there is the real risk of the so-called «gap in the communication»: when something important happens, journalists have to report it even if they do not have any information about the event. In any situations, they have to give some news in order to justify their presence in that particular place. In other words, they have to fill that gap mentioned above.

In the absence of information, which is usually given by the Command, they tend to gather news wherever and whenever they can, which means asking the first person that happens to come along.

Anyone can be regarded as reliable source: a Corporal who has just gone off duty or a Captain who is flattered because he has just been asked to issue a statement before the cameras, but anyway they could be entirely in the dark about policies, what language should be adopted, how the event happened.

Once they have become aware of the relevance of communication, they have to realize how useful it is. They have to dispel any doubts and suspicions in order to convey positive messages of the Contingent and Armed Forces in an effective way. Journalists are able to pick up the slightest nuance of

their behaviour and assess the relevance of a deeper analysis according to the institutional purposes. The public opinion has the right to know what happens. This is the main purpose of journalism and must be taken into consideration in order to make the action effective.

Journalists are fully aware of having undertaken a noble task: they guarantee a constitutional principle. They take advantage of it whenever they regard it as essential in order to carry on their work. At

“In absence of information, usually given by the Contingent Command, journalists tend to gather news where and how they can, i.e. asking the first soldier that happens to come along”

In operational theatres journalists are always on duty.



MESSAGES TO BE GIVEN DURING AN INTERVIEW

The role of the military force: a good illustration of this role is fundamental in order to take an effective and positive media action.

Internationalism: this aspect is indicative of a full integration of the country into international contexts (OTAN, UNO, *Free coalitions*).

The importance of operation: recognizing the importance of an operation means being aware of one's duties; this highlights the figure of the professional soldier who is aware of his role and tasks.

Uniqueness of the Command: it is a central aspect of a military structure and guarantees efficiency.

Cooperation: it is the ability to adapt to contexts in which contingents operate by using procedures which can be different from national ones.

Inter-collaboration: this concept derives from cooperation.

The military force is not an occupying force: apart from juridical discussions about the Geneva Convention (of 1947 and additional protocols) on Human Rights and on Armed Weapons, it is necessary to stress this point very strongly.

Integration with International Organizations: the military Contingents operate with international, government and non-governmental organizations (for example, UNMIK in Kosovo). This integration shows a clear sign of professionalism and proves the competence that the Armed force has acquired in the last five-year periods.

Humanitarian tasks: it is important to draw a comparison between humanitarian and operational tasks. Humanitarian aid given by Italian contingents has been universally recognized as efficient and fruitful, but this aspect does not have to overshadow their military actions.

Impartiality: it is a fundamental and basic principle of communication: a military contingent plays an important role in bringing peace to war zones.

Professionalism and motivation: are the cornerstones of the Army. They must be regarded as effective and appropriate channels for communication.

The importance of logistics: in the light of recent missions this sector must be highlighted. In fact, it has been always overlooked. Today logistics is an essential part of the "manoeuvre" that is performed in the "Theatre" and serves an interservice function. Logistics is the practical arrangements that are necessary to deploy troops in the war zones in due time and operate according to the plan.

times, they tend to abuse this «right» because they desperately want to overcome any reluctance to give information. Nevertheless, the basis of the logical and legal procedure is indisputable and must be observed. The last aspect to consider concerns time limits that change according to the type of means of communication. Once news has been gathered, it must be spread and published and time limit is very strict.

It is necessary to receive the news on time before the magazine goes to press otherwise it will be published in the following issue. In the same way, a news item will be broadcasted on the evening news only if it arrives on time. This must be taken into consideration in order to enhance the effectiveness of communication and improve the news service significantly in the Contingent's interests.

HOW TO CONDUCT AN INTERVIEW

It is the most frequent activity in this specific context. There are two types of interview: press interview and radio or television interview. Giving an interview is like entering into negotiation with someone else. It is important to make journalists understand that it is necessary to gather information before starting. In these cases, it would be useful to wonder what consequences that report could have for the Unity, the mission and even for the Armed Forces. In order to discover what the journalists' point of view is, the military ask questions such as: «What does this report concern?». In fact it is important to know what aspect of the news they want to highlight and whether they have just talked about it with someone else. Sometimes journal-

ists are forced to ignore information given by soldiers they know well. Are journalists well-informed about a specific topic? What do they know about the military? Providing the professional with «military education» could turn out to be necessary. What type of articles do they usually write? Are they critical of the military, war and, in general, military operations? It would be better to gather information about their professional precedents.

Therefore, any soldier who has to do an interview must be informed about the interview procedure and its aims. He should adopt the following suggestions:

if possible, he should be informed in advance about the questions he will be asked. In addition, if he enjoys a friendly relationship with journalists, he can try to ask them to arrange at least some of the questions in order to meet the needs of both of them.

he should formulate an answer according to how much time he has. At times, a long and detailed answer is not recorded and properly understood by journalists who, consequently, will have difficulty making the topic clear when they write an article for a newspaper. Another problem concerns television reports. As far as news report is concerned, they could have to edit some images out. They should remember to give immediately the information that they intend to spread.

Knowing the general rules governing the language is essential for the safety when an interview is given. Whoever wants to do an interview has to learn the appropriate language that must be adopted; anyway, it would be better to educate people who are not expert in communication. The Commander and Officer PI should take on such an essential task.

During the interview, it is advisable to concentrate on the answer instead of the question (which nobody is able to hear and remember). It could seem like a contradiction but when a question is formulated clearly and precisely (and this acts in the interest of journalists) it is much better to think about what to answer carefully, even if this attitude means «leading» the journalist's intentions. The public usually do not love seeing on TV someone who answers like a robot and repeats the same phrases like a recording tape. Consequently, it is necessary «to launch» the message, or at least the most important one. When a soldier is interviewed and has to issue statements on his tasks, he acts as an intermediary between military and

civil society (maybe only because he wears a uniform).

This moment must be regarded as a golden opportunity in order to convey important messages. The military of whatever rank is seen as a spokesman (but not in a technical sense) and witness to the Armed Force.

The message must be supported by facts, circumstances, reference points, information, statistics, explanations, citations and anything useful in order to get that message across to national and international public opinion.

It is self-evident that good education and instructional material are needed in order to achieve this aim.

In order that an interview can turn out to be incisive it has to catch the public's attention. It is necessary to stir up people's emotions. The public finds more interesting someone who describes and shows their professional commitment and expresses absolute loyalty towards the Institution: in this way, they catch the receiver's attention gaining his affection.

In conclusion, we have to remember an important rule: the military has to learn how to manage an interview. During an interview, he has to highlight tactfully and kindly what he wants journalists to highlight making it interesting and necessary even in journalists' eyes. To give an example, we should consider the following sentences: «in the first place,

let's make the facts clear..., let's focus our attention on what is really important». When these sentences are uttered with emphasis, they make people feel compelled to follow every word of the interview.

HOW TO MANAGE EMERGENCIES

According to the principles mentioned above, an event that has had negative consequences for the Contingent involves good communication. Even in this case, we can establish a set of rules which should be followed in order to maximize the effectiveness of communication:

- transparency: a genuine relationship leads to pursue the same objectives and foster a sense of solidarity among the journalists who are usually willing to collaborate actively with them in order to handle the crisis, making news filter out and controlling the flow of information which must be spread;
- huge media campaign: the Command of the

“ Knowledge of the general rules of the language is a fundamental prerequisite for giving an interview in all security ”



A "Centauro" armoured car and a VM 90 on patrol in the desert.

Contingent should give regular updates on the current crisis in order to guarantee objectivity and transparency;

- synchrony with the operating sector: the news given to the media must be in line with the operating sector which controls the flow of information concerning the actions which are performed by the Contingent;
- taking firm stands on some issues in accordance with what has been decided in their own country. In these circumstances, consistency and univocity always repay you;
- the use of a simple and everyday language, especially in case of emergencies or crises;
- information must be given gradually: in case of serious accidents involving the personnel it is important to consider carefully how to give information. A special attention must be paid to how to inform a family of a tragic event. Under

“It is necessary to give an objective description of the events, both good and bad, before others provide the media with distortions or disinformation”

no circumstances should they receive the news of the death of a relative from the media;

- providing journalists with a simple and objective description of how events have unfolded making no reference to political issues which are beyond the scope of the military. In addition, statements such as «no comment», «nothing has happened», «we don't know anything», should be proscribed. Absence of communication must be avoided. A golden rule is to be genuinely humble and willing to face up to your responsibilities.

CONCLUSIONS

The relationships between the mass media and the Armed Forces represent a long-standing problem, as the english *lessons learned* about the Falklands War have illustrated. For a long time journalists have had difficulty gaining access to military information. There are two probable explanations for this:

- by its very nature, the military forces do not dis-



For journalists, the soldiers' return to base is a good occasion to get and verify information.

- close confidential information to the enemy;
- journalists are regarded with great suspicion. They are seen as antimilitarists and being able to influence the outcome of a conflict (e.g. the Vietnam War).

Up until a few years ago (during the Gulf War, for instance) the Commands exerted a strict control over the flow of information and they passed on a small amount of information to the press. Subsequently, the military world of the West realized that it was impossible to hide the truth, hor-

rible or shocking though it was, from the public opinion.

In the nineties, the primary goal was to establish a contact between the military forces and public opinion, striking a reasonable balance between the necessity of letting people know what happens and the duty to respect the confidential nature of some information. This has been achieved thanks to the constant and strong presence of journalists in the army bases.

The media coverage of military operations affects the public perception of the events and the public opinion can influence the duration and cost of a conflict. So there is a growing awareness of the importance of good information. It is necessary to give an objective description of the events before other people provide the media with a gross distortion of the truth. Journalists have to describe events concerning the Armed Forces. These journalists are called «embedded», which means «becoming part of a specific unit in operation». This figure originates in Afghanistan where journalists are allowed to visit those places in which the military live and operate and to follow the Units during military operations. In this way, they are able to tell stories about soldiers, how they live, what they do, who they are, how they think: it is the soldiers who speak.


There is still a lot to do but «a friendly relationship between the media and the army paves the way for a fruitful collaboration and during the operations the communication increases the visibility of the military and helps the public opinion know and acquire greater familiarity with military activities».

In Kabul the American forces seized a letter which Bin Laden had addressed to Mullah Omar. He wrote: *it is obvious that the media war is one of the most powerful tools to use to win the decisive victory. Media bombardment will represent 90% of our battles* («Panorama», March 9th 2006). It is important to reflect on these words in order to become fully aware that establishing a relationship with media people is much more complicated than we can expect.

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ETHICS AND MOTIVATION

ETHICS AND MOTIVATION

The way a soldier feels during a fight

The soldier engaged in combat is pervaded by a tumult of feelings, often in contrast with each other. Conflicting feelings where passion tends to overcome reason, motivation and sense of ethics. An alternation of rational and irrational predominance, which involves also the Commanders, compelled to live through even more explosive and stressing situations.

THE SOLDIER

The figure of the soldier has been socially recognized since the dawn of civilization. He distinguished himself by his strength and aggressiveness. He stood out from the rest of the group because he was able to defend the territory and food supplies and take food away from other groups. He was the «prince of survival» and, for this reason, the community praised him but at the same time it stood in awe of him. As Plutarch wrote in «Life of Lycurgus», in the 8th century BC Lycurgus aimed to create a new Spartan society whose members were invincible warriors. They had to be untouched by «the superfluity and vanity»: this basic general rule operated in Egypt where the soldiers were kept quite separate from civil society. For many centuries, Spartan society held great fascination for all Greece and inspired Plato when he idealized «his State» in the «Republic». According to him, society was divided into three groups depending on the nature of each individual: philosophers, warriors and citizens (farmers and craftsmen). Obviously, slaves were not mentioned.

Philosophers and warriors have to lead the utopian State of Plato. Philosophers are seen as the source of all wisdom: they know what is good for all the city (they know the truths of life more than anyone else in the world). Warriors have the virtue of bravery (the military must ensure that people obey the philosophers' will and they have to defend their territory against enemies). These two classes rule the lower ones which consist of craftsmen and farmers who produce goods for the community. The ruling classes have to worry not only about their own well-being but also about that of the entire community. All these groups have to have two important virtues: justice, which means performing one's particular functions, and moderation.

Contemporary society, technology and new ways

of looking at the military world enable us to draw an analogy between these two Platonic virtues and those virtues that lead the soldiers during peace and through war. The military draws on its strength in the fighting and aims to win. However, his strength can act as a powerful and effective deterrent when it proves to be potentially destructive and winning.

Fighting means being able to use violence in a sensible and effective way, killing only if necessary and allowing for the fact that one can be killed. Winning means being the ideal instrument for neutralizing attacks against the community/State.

Neutralizing implies aggressiveness of military spirit and moderation in order to achieve one's goals without going beyond humanitarian limits. Soldiers are expert in the use of force and have to use it avoiding any excesses.

It is widely believed that in wartime everything is allowed (*inter arma silent leges*). Actually, there is nothing more dangerous than holding an opinion like that, not only from a «civil» point of view but also in military terms. As General Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) said, war is famously «the continuation of policy by other means». By nature all human beings surrender themselves to *pathos* (passion) rather than to *logos* (rationality) and *ethos* (ethics and morals). In particular, during the fighting human beings reveal their real nature and can cause irreparable damage. For this reason, the civilized society calls for ethical behaviour and principles which are transformed into regulations and guarantee humanity and justice. This process provides an effective safeguard against unjust wars. In fact, we can question the legitimacy of a war in case the way it is fought violates the basic human rights (the rules of *ius in bello*), the principle of proportionality (it concerns the damage inflicted) and the principle of discrimination (between fighters and not fighters): «however just a war is, it will turn out to be unjustified if to win it the two important principles of *ius in bello* are violated (it does not matter how much and how often)».



THE SOLDIER, FROM INSTRUMENT TO ACTOR

We have to confront the dilemma about whether soldiers are just pawns in the government's plans or rational agents within «that military continuation of policy».

If we regarded soldiers as mere instruments for attaining political objectives, lifting the burden of making important decisions from their shoulders, this would make their tasks much easier. Choosing this option means transforming a fighter into a mere war machine which is built to win and is based on training, discipline and leadership.

If we saw them as real protagonists of the war and able to solve knotty problems and make key decisions affecting national objectives and policies, they would be in a very delicate situation. In this case, in fact, they are no longer free to operate in accordance with international rules governing the military operations (*ius in bello*), which are fundamental part of their doctrine. In addition, they are at the mercy of the public opinion and, consequently, they are burdened with responsibilities they would prefer not to have.

Title pages.

Iraq: A "Lagunari" patrol in action.

Above

Afghanistan: "Alpini" on surveillance duty.

Considering the soldier a «thinking» being means recognizing a change of his role: from pawn to actor, «from simple cause to intelligent cause»; he can be seen as «a cause able to produce good and bad things» and not «something produced by another cause without order and objectives».

This changes the meaning of the term «soldier».

In peacetime the soldier is only «potentially» engaged in military operations and fighting. Consequently he is able to plan his work according to his primary objectives and taking into account the effects that have been produced by his own actions. (Effect Based Operation).

However, we have to consider carefully different theatres of operations in which a soldier can operate. In fact, he could show a very rational or aggressive disposition according to the context. It is clear that

our analysis is much simpler if we take into consideration the theatre of operations in which the «thinking» and «instinctive» part of the soldier comes out.

WHO THE FIGHTERS ARE

Training and discipline pull soldiers in a particular direction in the battlefield (*Combat Motivation*). In the sudden quiet that follows the fighting they stop to think about the results that have been achieved and the major objectives that must be pursued and they assess the whole situation. In this phase reason prevails (Military Ethics) and soldiers are able to make important decisions taking into consideration their humanity and, at the same time, the need to win.

All soldiers go through alternate periods of rationality and irrationality. The graph on the next page shows the extreme levels of these two mental conditions: Military Ethics and *Combat Motivation*.

As second figure, the Commander of Large Units who is able to operate without getting physically involved in the fighting. The responsibility of the mission and his own troops and the respect of law require a great deal of energy. In addition, he feels a surge of pure adrenalin during the battle because he would like to be in the front line together with his soldiers; to fulfil this onerous task he has to get the maximum benefit out of «his inner resources»: *Combat Motivation* and Military Ethics. The Commander, whose soul often surrenders to the *Combat Motivation*, becomes very close to his soldiers through this emotional involvement (*pathos*), and extremes meet. This makes the structure of the Army solid and all these elements make it an organic whole.

The third and last figure we can see in the virtual battlefield shows the soldier of *staff*. He works for the Commander in order to transform every single decision into action in accordance with the task and law (*ius in bello*, Military Ethics). He works in a context where there is little physical and emotional involvement and where he is able to act reasonably and responsibly following «the rational path» of his heart.

WHAT LEADS THE SOLDIER

Soldiers are driven by their instinctive part which pushes them to act to pursue specific aims. This is referable to the Military Ethics and *Combat Motivation*. The Military Ethics is a set of rules governing the public and private conduct of the military. It consists of fundamental values such as Country, Discipline and Honour.

In short, the Military Ethics reminds soldiers of «what they have to do and for whom». Circumstances affect our choices, but anyway a soldier cannot let this happen during his work. He gets round this following the rules governing the army, trying to predict the consequences of his actions during the mission, treating his comrades with great respect and taking into consideration the current situation. Acting like that means adopting a morally correct attitude.

The *Combat Motivation* can be explained by offering a precise definition of both terms. Motivation derives from a Latin word *motivus* which means «able to make something move», that is to say a conscious or unconscious stimulus to the action. If this stimulus refers to the individual, it can be described as «a dynamic factor of human behaviour which leads an organism towards a goal». As far as the adjective «combat» is concerned, it refers to the individual aggressive behaviour. It is a phenomenon emerging from the state of war, it is not a feature of people who justify it. Soldiers are driven by this instinctual impulse which enables them to overwhelm the enemy with determination, after having received an adequate training and under a good leadership in an ideal comradesly environment. The *Combat Motivation* regards the individual and the group at the same time. As far as the soldier is concerned, it appears to be a willingness to win and survive. Instead, in the group it shows itself as cohesion, which is «something that relates members of an organization to each other so that all members display willingness and honour their own commitment to themselves, unity and objective».

CONCLUSIVE ANALYSIS


What I have described by referring to the following figures: «soldier-fighter», «soldier of staff» and Commander is just abstract theory, whereas the reality is much more complex than it seems. A soldier does not have to see himself as a war machine; a Commander should not expect him to take decisions or make choices about simple and ideal situations.

During the battle he fights bitterly and hard against the enemy and he moderates his aggressiveness adhering to simple and essential ethical principles. These principles must be easy to remember and comprehensible.

To give an example, in the «Soldier's Creed» the American Army has outlined the so-called «Warrior Ethos»: «I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade».

Soldiers driven by their instinct and principles of honour and comradeship are able to persist in their actions even in bad conditions trying to win

PREVALENT EMOTIONS IN A COMBAT SITUATION




the battle no matter how difficult it is. In this case, persisting in doing something is not a mere courageous action. It is moral courage; it is not only an energy that pushes them to take risky and definitive decisions but it is an «inner energy» which enables them to summon the will power to fight.

The US Army «Soldier's Creed» mentioned above stresses that the modern armies tend to make the motivational aspect prevail over the ethical part of the soldier although they recognize the need to morally respect the enemy and the rules of war. Referring to the graph of previous page, in fact, we could move the parabola of *Combat Motivation* to the top of the graph (or to the bottom) depending on whether the army aims to have (especially in the front line) soldiers driven by *pathos* rather than by *ethos*.

A useful comparison will show an important point: the American Army demands a lot of its troops in terms of results. The policy adopted by our Armed Forces is quite different. As a consequence, American soldiers put a great emphasis on the objective that must be obtained whereas Italian soldiers lay particular emphasis on how to achieve it. This allows us to notice the different degree of trust placed in the single individual. Outlining just a few

principles in the detailed check lists is symptomatic of an organization that does not exert a strict control over its members and allows them to operate free within limits. This makes them feel much more involved in the pursuit of their goals and urges them to devote themselves to the operation even taking the initiative if necessary. On the contrary, enunciating lots of principles without classifying standard operative procedures according to their features could make the single individual feel confused and bound to comply with instructions that are given by people who have the power to decide.

Until today, this attitude towards operational problems has turned out to be able to achieve good results and it has been considered to be a good quality of our Armed Forces in the peacekeeping missions because it has allowed them to fulfil essential and strategic aims, earning universal praise. In future, this quality could transform into a serious handicap. The Minister of Defence said: *a peace-keeping operation does not have to impose limits to the military functions since «the combat features» of an army must be distinctive*. These words warn the military against any misinterpretation of what the battlefield is: a place of violent clash with the enemy.



I HAVE BEEN WHAT OTHERS DID NOT WANT TO BE
I WENT WHERE OTHERS DID NOT WANT TO GO
I DID WHAT OTHERS DID NOT WANT TO DO
I NEVER ASKED ANYTHING OF THOSE WHO NEVER GIVE ANYTHING
WITH RAGE I ACCEPTED TO BE EMARGINATED AS IF I HAD MADE A MISTAKE
I SAW THE FACE OF TERROR
I FELT THE STING OF FEAR
I REJOICED AT THE SWEET TASTE OF A MOMENT OF LOVE
I CRIED I SUFFERED I HOPED...BUT MOST OF ALL I LIVED THOSE MOMENTS THAT
OTHERS SAY WOULD BE BEST FORGOTTEN
WHEN MY TIME COMES I WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT I AM PROUD OF WHAT I WAS
...A SOLDIER.

(George L. Skipeck)

Once again our attention is drawn to the concept of warrior defined by Plato in «The Republic». This concept is valid even in the contemporary society because it clears up any doubts about what view the Armed Forces have to hold on the figure of the soldier in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding about some fundamental concepts whose meaning is often twisted.

Peace considered as absence of military conflict cannot be guaranteed for ever. This resource must be safeguarded constantly adopting an adequate policy of security, that is to say an appropriate use of force which should be used only if necessary.

Desktop image on the computer of the AVES component in Operation "Antica Babilonia".

The equation security-inability to communicate-violence represents the cornerstone of being warrior. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, when the military operates in peace-keeping missions they should face them with its usual military mind supported by adequate professional training and moral creed.

Former American Secretary of Defence Les Aspen said: *We have to carry out a mission, we have to fight*

THE FIGHTER'S TEN RULES

- Act as a disciplined soldier. Disobedience of laws of war spoils your unity and yourself and causes you unnecessary suffering which does not discourage the enemy but pushes him to seek revenge.
- Fight only against your enemy and military objectives.
- Do not cause major damage when you are performing your tasks.
- Do not fight the enemy who has surrendered or has been knocked out. Pick him up, disarm him and hand him over to senior officers. Protect and treat the survivors of plane crash and shipwrecked people with due respect.
- Treat all the enemies and civilians who are under your authority humanely.
- Pick up and provide all people (enemies and friends) with care during the fighting or at the end of the war according to your Commander's orders.
- Do not take anyone hostage and do not perform acts of revenge.
- Respect people and things marked with symbols of Red Cross, preservation of cultural heritage, civil defence and the white flag of Parliament.
- Do not steal property from other people.
- Inform a senior officer of any hostile acts.



Rangers of the 9th Assault Paratroop Regiment ready to depart for a mission in Afghanistan.

and win the wars of our Nation. For whom do we do it? For the American population. This «twofold ethics» justifies the American Armed Forces (...). Since we are able to fight and win all the wars of our Nation, we are much more capable than others of facing different kinds of mission such as peacekeeping and relief operations (...). Soldiers must be regarded as «combat ready» instruments, they are trained and equipped to further strategic aims.

However «we cannot give a weapon to anyone. Consequently, a well-chosen selection and a rigorous moral and disciplinary training of people who pursue a military career are needed». An adequate moral «training» must be considered unequivocal point of reference in all situations, when they are on garrison duty or during a military operation, when they undertake a combat or a peacekeeping mission.

To meet this objective it is necessary to explain simple and basic principles to the soldier concerning the figure of the fighter. They must be regarded as consistent and clear principles, to give an example:

- I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills (US Army, Warrior Ethos);*
- I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the U.S.A. in close combat (US Army, Warrior Ethos);*
- ...the ethos of the Army is sustained by all soldiers doing their duty with an implacable will to succeed; accepting their grave responsibility and legal right to fight and kill according to their orders and their unlimited liability to give their lives for others; confident that in return the nation will look after them and their families (British Army);*
- In combat: you will act without relish of your tasks, or hatred; you will respect the vanquished enemy and will never abandon neither your wounded nor your dead, nor will you under any circumstances surrender your arms (The French Legionnaire's Code of Honour);*

- A mission once given to you becomes sacred to you, you will accomplish it to the end and at all costs (The French Legionnaire's Code of Honour).*

This is important to face the difficult situations of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At strategic level, the Commander has to face delicate and controversial questions. This requires a higher standard of competence.

The shift of «organizational leadership» towards real «strategic leadership» involves the development of new abilities and habits. At an organizational level, tasks and objectives are really clear and this requires specific competence. Consequently, tasks and standard of performance must be clear and easy to understand.

The Commander finds himself in a difficult situation because he has to manage the most delicate resource which is the matter of ethics. He has not to adopt an immoral attitude towards the enemy, because he is a human being and has power to think logically. In other words, he has the ability to think in an intelligent way because reason is peculiar to man. He realizes that everyone is born equal.

His behaviour will be ethically correct if he considers the enemy exactly like him. His behaviour will be immoral if he views him as an instrument to serve military interests. The «principle» must be independent of specific goals everyone strives for. In this way, it is universal and ethically valid.

The Commander always finds himself in a delicate situations which could affect his soldiers and civilians' life as well as success and failure of strategic and political objectives of the nation. In addition, these situations are surrounded by an aura of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Commanders do not play a key role only in saving others' life but also in «guaranteeing deterrence». They have to be ready to conduct military operations involving the killing of people and destruction of property. Since soldiers have to face difficult situations in many cases, the Commander is not allowed to be in a state of inertia and paralysed with fear. A Commander could make mistakes when he takes decisions, which are often subjected to revision. However, this possibility does not have to inhibit him. On the contrary, he has to give much more vigour to his conduct and adopt an attitude that seems to be wise and correct in that particular situation.

In any case, taking an ethically wrong decision means increasing the number of choices that they will have to face, as well as the future impact of those choices. A bad ethical decision could catch the Commander in a trap showing him the wrong way.

Massimo Scotti
Captain,
Modena Military Academy



A black and white portrait of a man in a military uniform. He is wearing a beret with a star emblem and a uniform with epaulettes and a star on the collar. The image has a grainy, high-contrast appearance.

MAURIZIO AND FERRANTE GONZAGA

MAURIZIO AND FERRANTE GONZAGA

Two unknown heroes

Few people know the extraordinary epic deeds of Maurizio Gonzaga and his son Ferrante, Officers of Italian Army, who fought the two World Wars earning Gold and Silver Medals. There is a surreal dimension to their deeds. Their figures exude a magical and legendary aura of antiquity and magnificence.

A faint and emotional atmosphere pervades it, making people perceive that something great happened. Gazing at Mount Vodice covers the whole gamut of emotions. It evokes the indelible memory of an important event and bears the imprint of history, which is slowly disappearing into the intricate maze of legend. History becomes legend and legend creates the myth. The fleetingness of historical experience and the remarkable persistence of memory. The atmosphere of this place leaves an indelible imprint on our memory. Mount Vodice is situated in the Julian Alps, in former Yugoslavia, on the left bank of the Isonzo. During the First World War it was the stronghold of the Austrian defence, «incorporated» into the second line, organized around Gorizia. Its slopes were the theatre of bitter fighting, especially during the 10th battle of the Isonzo (May-June 1917). Although its peak was conquered in August 1917, it was abandoned the following October, after the disaster of Caporetto.

Events like these «colour» our books, giving us strong emotions.

Another important event of Italian history was the Resistance. This movement developed dur-

ing the German and Italian occupation of Europe. It has left a deep mark on our memory, maybe because it was exhausting, painful and even cruel. The decisive factor was a strong sense of solidarity among people, which made the enemy feel a distressing sensation of constant danger and isolation.

In Italy, the Resistance had unique features. It developed into an armed struggle after the dissolution of the Army, which had lost its leaders and Commands after the armistice of September 8, 1943.

Large and cohesive groups formed within the population in order to defeat the former-ally who had occupied the national territory and had committed horrible crimes against Italian soldiers.

“The First and the Second World War, history and memory, the battles on the slopes of Mount Vodice and the continuing fighting during the Resistance. These events remind us of the epic deeds of two brave soldiers who marked the military and political progress of our country, even though they lived in different periods of history”



Title pages.

From left to right, Major General Prince Maurizio Gonzaga and his son Ferrante, Brigadier General.

Right.

A second-line trench on the Carso.

The First and the Second World War, their history and memory, the battles on the slopes of Mount Vodice and the continuing fighting during the Resistance. These events remind us of the epic deeds of two brave soldiers who marked the military and political progress of our Country, even though they lived in different periods of history. Maurizio Gonzaga was the able Commander of the 53rd Infantry Division, which was called «La Ferrea», during the First World War. His son, Ferrante Gonzaga del Vodice, was a brave Brigadier General during the Second World War. Both of them left an indelible mark on the historical events of that period.

The celebration of these personages, whose heroism is largely unknown, marks not only their deeds, which took place in the battlefield, but also their striking personality. It is no coincidence that Maurizio Gonzaga has been the most decorated General in Italy. He was awarded two Gold Medals and three Silver Medals for Military Valour. His son was the first General to be decorated with the Gold Medal after the Nazi occupation of Italy. Actually, something of a mystery surrounds their figures. There is almost a surreal dimension to their deeds. Their figures exude a magical and legendary aura of magnificence and antiquity. Examining their deeds requires, first of all, referring to their origins. They came from the House of Gonzaga, a noble family that reigned over Mantova from 1328 by popular demand, and from 1433 with an imperial title until July 1708, when the small state was annexed to the House of Austria.

From the beginning, long lines of descendants originated from the secondary branches of the House of Gonzaga. The two Generals were descended from the branch of Vescovato, whose origins dated back to John (1525), son of Frederic I and brother of Francis II.

Their life, which was dedicated to the respect of military values and the safeguard of national integrity, can be regarded as an example of virtue and distinction. In every single deed there is something important and memorable, as well as unmistakable signs of greatness. They performed extraordinary actions on and off the battlefield and their behaviour was always exemplary; they had special virtues. Each aspect of two Generals reminds us of their noble origins.

MAURIZIO GONZAGA

Maurizio Gonzaga was born on September 21, 1861 in Venice, which is one of the most mag-

nificent and romantic cities in the world. His mother, Domenica Priamo, married Antonio Gonzaga, the only descendent of the House of Vescovato still alive. Although he came from a rich family, Maurizio worked very hard to obtain important results. His entire life was studded with success and remarkable achievements, thanks to which he was worthy of genuine admiration.

He was only 18 when he enrolled at Military School of Modena. After two years, in April 1881, he achieved the rank of Second Lieutenant and was assigned to the 44th Infantry Regiment in Alba. After two years, in July 1883, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant. This represented the first step towards the considerable success that he would achieve in his life. In October he married Ferdinanda Alliana. They had two children, Maria Giuseppina and Ferrante (who would follow in his father's steps).

On December 2, 1913 he became Commander of the Military Zone of Tobruk, where he distinguished himself for his great military and political skills. This is what earned him a challenging task. He was transferred to Benghazi, where he took the place of the Governor of Cyrenaica during his absence. From April 1914, he assumed the command of the zone of el-Merg (Barce) where he was able to defeat the rebels in Kasr Tecassis and Lezga. After attaining the rank of Major General, he won the battles of Gerdes and Bernia. During this fighting he showed a real charismatic leadership, which earned him the Knighthood of the Military Order of Savoy. In November, he assumed the command of the "Salerno" Infantry Brigade for a short time since the General Staff soon recalled him.

THE GREAT WAR

The political and diplomatic situation was getting worse in Europe. In fact, in 1914 the First World War broke out: a new event in the history of humanity. For the first time, all the states fought a global war. It was an air, naval and land war. New and powerful weapons were deployed. On one side Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the other Serbia, Montenegro, Russia, France, Belgium and England. Italy, which had entered into an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary with the Triple Alliance, declared its neutrality. It justified this decision by saying that the Allies had not consulted it about this important step and that the

“Their life, which was dedicated to the respect of the military values and the safeguard of national integrity can be regarded as an example of virtue and distinction”

war was extremely aggressive. The following year Italy went to war breaking off the alliance with the Central Empires and supporting the powers of the Entente. In April, Italy had signed the Pact of London. After having found that Austria had the intention of extending the negotiations, it repudiated the treaty of the Triple Alliance. Even if lots of politicians proclaimed their neutrality, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915 (but it came into effect the following day). Our country went through a terrible experience, which would lead to chaos and a complete lack of certainty as well as to catastrophic economic, political and social consequences.

Maurizio Gonzaga played a leading role in the conflict, showing military and political skills and preserving his human and moral values.

When Italy went to war he was appointed Intendant of the 2nd Army. On October 21, he rose to the rank of Commander of the 9th Mobilized Infantry Division. His charismatic leadership brought out the military greatness of the Prince. He solved extremely dangerous situations on the battlefield. It is an arduous task to explain how complex a military operation is, and it is even more difficult to get across how exceptional their deeds were. Human action is definite and limited. Only the brief perception of the event can lead us to grasp its significance and greatness. If the readers had lived through the deeds of Gonzaga they would have been able to understand. The historical narrative describes a particular event, takes a picture of a memory and provides us with a mere documentation. Instead, the art of poetry «ennobles» the event because it celebrates heroic deeds. Only immediacy makes us undergo the experience of reality in absence of which we can just use our imagination totally lacking in objectivity. We tend to regard Prince Gonzaga as a brave leader. Maybe he was much greater than history books have been able to convey. What happened in Podgora, Peuma and Val d'Astico, on the Trentine front, provides us with a perfect example. He was a fantastic leader of his infantrymen by exposing himself to the enemy in the trenches and giving people enormous help when a cholera epidemic struck in the winter. He was a real leader because he was able to set a great example to his soldiers: he always fulfilled their expectations.

During the same year he was decorated for brav-

ery because he distinguished himself during the fighting in the Plateau of Tonezza and Mount Cimone. Great military and interpersonal skills, demonstrated after «the punitive expedition» of Austrian General Conrad, when he was seriously injured in the conquest of Mount Vodice, earned him the first Silver Medal. On 1st June he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and was reappointed as Commander of the 9th Division. In January 1917 he was nominated Commander of the 53rd Infantry Division, which would be called «La Ferrea» because «it neither surrendered nor disbanded even after Caporetto» taking part in the military operations to conquer Mount Vodice. Since then Maurizio Gonzaga has passed into legend and his epic deeds have been memorable.

On 18th May, on the front of the 2nd Corps, the 53rd Division occupied the summit of Vodice, which was a well-fortified post of the Austrian defensive system. On the evening of the 16th May General Capello issued the following orders: *on the day of 17th May the 2nd*

Corps will have to take up its strategic position and will make its glorious advance towards Monte Santot on the 18th. General Badoglio ordered that the 3rd Division should occupy the mount at an altitude of 363 metres, north of Paljevo; the Brigade «Avellino» of the 60th Division should continue to

strengthen its position at an altitude of 592 metres; and General Gonzaga with his troops, on the night of 18th, should cover that part of the front occupied by Brigade «Avellino» in order to consolidate the operations of reinforcement and organize an effective defence between the south-facing slopes of Mount Kuk and the altitude 592. The following day, Badoglio ordered that the Brigade should take orders from the 53rd Division. He aimed to continue to stoutly defend the important stronghold of altitude 592 during the attack that the 53rd Division would have to launch against Mount Vodice. With the 53rd Division, the Command of the 60th Division was forced to give ground. Consequently, the front line of the attack of the 2nd Corps was under the 3rd Division Command, on the left side, from Globna to Kuk, and under the 53rd Division Command, on the right side, from the southern slopes of Mount Kuk to Mount Vodice.

General Gonzaga carried out the orders that the Command of the 2nd Corps had issued and in Zagomila where he had transferred his troops, at 7 pm on 17th May, he gave the order

“Maurizio Gonzaga played a leading role in the conflict showing military and political skills and preserving his human and moral values”

to conquer Mount Vodice. The Armed Forces consisted of the following Brigades: «Teramo» (241st and 242nd), «Girgenti» (247th and 248th) and «Avellino» (231st and 232nd), the 6th Alpine Group (battalions «Levanna», «Aosta» and «V. Toce»), two mountain batteries and all the field artillery of the 60th Division (one Regiment of field artillery, three mountain batteries and one battery of 105 calibre).

Although the 241st Regiment had suffered heavy losses during the attack of 16th May, morale was still very high and other troops were in good conditions.

The siege artillery of the 2nd Corps opened fire at 6 am and used 28 medium and large calibre batteries. After three hours, they made the range of the siege artillery longer and then it was supported by the divisional artillery. The left column encountered stiff resistance. For this reason, a company of the Alpine battalion «Val Varaita» reinforced it. At 5 pm it managed to conquer a part of trench but after a while it was forced to abandon it because it was counter-attacked by the Austrians. On the right side, even the battalion «Val Toce» had to stop because of the enemy

“Gonzaga had the merit of conducting the operations of May–June 1917 with great skill and bravery, repulsing the enemy counterattacks and spurring his soldiers up to the front line”

resistance but it was ready to try again as soon as the central column had reached the summit of the mount. At the centre, two Alpine battalions, «M. Levanna» on the left side, and «Aosta» on the right side, headed for the opening n. 5. Although they were under constant fire from enemy weapons, they were able to reach the opposite line of defence rapidly and stopped to be reorganized. At 1 pm, they conquered Austrian trenches, situated on the slopes of the mount, rapidly. After a few

minutes they succeeded in conquering the summit of Mount Vodice breaking down the fierce enemy resistance.


The tiredness of the troops and heavy losses did not allow them to complete the conquest of Mount Vodice. When the columns of the mythic 53rd Division, which aimed to conquer the Mount, started to perform their action, Austrian troops tried to occupy the altitude 592 by a violent attack. However, the infantrymen of the Brigade «Avellino» managed to prevail again and resisted the enemy attack. The following day, the 53rd Division was ordered to proceed to Mount Saint in order to cooperate with the 6th Armed Corps in the attack.

Gonzaga was able to conduct the operation of May–June 1917 with good skills and bravery by repulsing the enemy counter-attacks and by spurring all the soldiers. The bravery shown in the fighting and his military skills earned him the Gold Medal. In August, during the 11th battle of the Isonzo, the 53rd Division fought against the enemy on the top of Mount Kuk and was able to reach the slopes of the plateau of Bainsizza. On that occasion Gonzaga was decorated with another Silver Medal. During the retreat of Caporetto, the 53rd Division pushed as far as Stupizza, in Val Natisone, in order to stop the enemy advance. On 25th October, he was badly wounded during the fighting for the third time. A shower of splinters lodged in his body. He lost his right hand but continued to fight until his state of health enabled him to do it. In fact, he was soon taken to military hospital of Udine after he had been relieved of the Command and there he fought for his life. Then he was taken to Genoa where he spent a long convalescence.

The heroic episode of Stupizza earned him the second Gold Medal (until that moment he was the only one to have won two Gold Medals) and made him one of the most decorated Officers of Italian Armed Forces.

A monument to the Messina Brigade in a suburb of Gorizia. Its memorial plaque carries the inscription: «Mount Vodice, monument to General Prince Maurizio Gonzaga».





The Army Chief-of-Staff, General Cadorna, inspecting the Carsic front.

After his accident, he recovered very well and although he had been seriously disabled during that fighting, he was able to lead his soldiers into the final successful battle of Vittorio Veneto. On 28th August 1918 he went back to the front as Commander of the 14th Division which was mobilized in the zone of Grappa. During the last offensive, his military skills led him to excel again in the fighting of Mount Valbella. This earned him the third Silver Medal. What made Gonzaga a great General were not only his unquestionable military skills but also his extraordinary humanity that made him very popular among his troops. People say that on the top of Mount Vodice, which had been just conquered, Gonzaga wanted to listen to divisional music. He started singing the national anthems (such as «Brothers of Italy» and «the Anthem of Garibaldi») infusing courage into his infantrymen who succeeded in repulsing violent enemy counter-attacks.

An article, which was written in 1917 by a correspondent of «Gazzetta del Popolo», makes his

portrayal much more accurate: *This brave and famous man who bears a big name and had a great military success gives us an immediate good impression. It is like meeting an old family friend. He is not very tall but young and vigorous even though it is difficult to say how old he is. He has a tremendous spirit, which makes him much younger than he is. Gonzaga is good-natured and intelligent. He is still ginger-haired and has got thick eyebrows and moustache. The expression in his eyes is lively. In his look, exactly like in his behaviour, everything is indicative of humility, modesty and kindness. And they are unmistakable signs. A faded uniform «which smacks of storms»; a crumpled cap that he usually pulls over his eyes: it reminds us of that worn by the Bersaglieri; he keeps «the popular cigarette», which is always lit, in a note shaped like a tube, exactly like a man who smokes 80 ciga-*

rettes a day. He has lots of powerful cars at his disposal but he has chosen the smallest one by which he goes everywhere. When you talk with him, you realize how optimistic, loyal and kind-hearted he is. He seems somewhat old-fashioned in his attitudes. His big voice which makes us think of years of struggle in the streets, is mitigated by a slight regional accent and a fatherly tone in which he tells stories, explains and asks questions. Each word is spontaneous and natural. No word is difficult, no idea is complex: it is interesting because it makes us live through the reality and touches us because it discloses goodness of heart. There is a strong emotional streak in his character. He has got a son, who is Captain of Artillery and in charge of a Command that is situated next to him. However, he can see him rarely and he consoles himself by taking care of a filly that his son has entrusted to him. He gives fatherly advice even to his soldiers.

The poetry of Giovanni Bertocchi published by «La Domenica del Corriere» makes the figure of Gonzaga mythic and romantic and the art of poetry revives enduring memories of his deeds: *«O Prince leader, one day / when the sorrow of the heroic mountains, / towering above noble cities, / will be dispelled beyond the broad horizons, / with you I will return, / to Mount Vodice which I saw / still desirous of epic deeds, injured / by the barbarian lurking in the shelter»*. These are the first verses of a successful attempt to mythologize his entire life.

THE POST-WAR YEARS

After the First World War, Gonzaga became Commander of the Territorial Military Division of Genoa where he would stay for three years. During the conflict he had gained immense prestige. He was regarded as a charismatic leader. He used common sense and impartiality as powerful political weapons that would help him to cope with difficult situations successfully on many occasions. In 1921, for instance, he managed to prevent the Summit of Rapallo and Genoa from degenerating into chaos. Then, he was transferred to the Command of the Army Corps in Florence. Once again he demonstrated to be up to the task, he managed to calm people down after violent clashes that had led to the killing of some fascists.

In Florence, the land of art and culture, history and literature, he ordered to erect a Monument to Mother Italy, as a war memorial.

On 11th June 1922 he was appointed as Senator of the Kingdom of Italy and attained the rank of General of the Arms Corps.

From 20th February 1924 he continued to do his job as «a Disabled serviceman». During that period he came to contact with Mussolini, who was Prime Minister. The latter invited him to give favourable opinion about Di Giorgio's project concerning the reorganization of the Army, which was discussed in the Senate those days and about which all the Generals had given an unfavourable opinion. He worked for the Council of Ministers and was soon appointed as Commander of the Voluntary Militia for the Fascist National Security, as a substitute for General Gandolfo who had died suddenly. Gonzaga took a moderate attitude and, for this reason, encountered lots of difficulties in his work. In accordance with these rules and political and military values, he accepted the assignment only after the authorization of the king and General Armando Diaz. He tended to place military issues above political ones. His attitude clashed with strategies and plans of the regime. Soon he was relieved of his important position, but anyway this fact did not lead to the end of his relationship with the regime. The government had not wanted to treat him with contempt. This decision was just the inevitable consequence of a strict and authoritarian policy that was based on a rigid observance of the law. There was not any doubt about his human and professional skills. His heroic deeds were not forgotten. After being appointed as auxiliary because of his age, he was recalled on temporary service. On 29th December 1932, he was awarded by the king with the title of «Marquis of Vodice». On that occasion, as P. Crociani has highlighted, *the Presidency of Council paid the high tax concession (about 36 000 lire). In addition, the government gave Gonzaga two grants (about 200 000 lire) in December 1934 and in September 1935. Gonzaga received a generous salary even when he was recalled on temporary service after being appointed as auxiliary because of his age.* He was awarded other honorific titles such as: «Prince of the Holy Roman Empire», «Sir of Vescovato», «Patrician of Veneto», «Count of Villanova», «Count of Castelnuovo»; as well as with two Gold Medals and three Silver Medals he was decorated with the Officers' Cross of the Military Order of Savoy (and later of Italy) with the following reason: *«he was Major Commander during two years of war. He was able to lead his troops bravely in any dangerous situations achieving remarkable success»*. He was conferred the Badge of invalid and five Badges of injured. In particular, he had three serious accidents and faced up to the situation heroically: on 22nd August 1917 Gonzaga «was hit by a piece of shrapnel of a grenade in the central region during the fighting of Vodice»; on 23rd August «he was hit by shrapnel from bullets in the right mammary region when

he was fighting in the zone between Vodice and Mount Kuk»; on 25th October «he was hit by machine-gun bullets in the hand and right thigh, during the fighting that took place one kilometre away from Stupizza in Val Natisone». When he died on 24th March 1938 in Rome, people paid their last respects to him. In his will, he expressed his desire «to be buried in Mount Vodice where he had performed his glorious deeds in 1917». On the day of his death, the Senate paid tribute to the great General: *Today the Senate, the Army and the entire nation mourn his death. General Maurizio Gonzaga was one of the heroes of the First World War and one of the most representative brave figures of our country. They also paid tribute to his extraordinary deeds: [...] the conquest of Mount Vodice was memorable; it was an heroic deed performed with vehemence and bravery, during a month of blood and fierce fighting on the top of the mount which was desperately defended by the enemy. The strong courage shown by the infantrymen on the battlefield was fuelled by the remarkable example of the General. He was always present and vigilant on the front line although he had been injured twice during the fighting; after the conquest, the force of the attacks turned into an unshakeable resoluteness that enabled them to keep their defensive position in order to resist the enemy violent counter-attacks. Even in Mount Kuk where he was injured twice he distinguished himself by his bravery. His behaviour was admirable during those terrible days of October 1917 when his troops did not have to win a glorious victory, they just had to bar the enemy's way and stop their advance to combat national terrorism: this was a tough and thankless task without any hope of being rewarded. At the Stupizza Pass he directed his efforts towards the enemy and abandoned the battlefield only when he was forced to do it. In fact, he was seriously wounded by Austrian bullets and remained mutilated. It was the most terrible moment of the war. The strong defence of Gonzaga and his brave soldiers in that difficult period heralded the miracle of the Piave [...]. Just on the Piave, after the disaster of Caporetto in 1917, the honour of war was redeemed thanks to the heroic and brave deeds performed by great figures such as Maurizio Gonzaga.*

FERRANTE GONZAGA

When Maurizio Gonzaga died, amid sorrow and nostalgic memories of his deeds, his son

Ferrante was already Colonel and was going to become General of Artillery. Like his father, Ferrante embarked on a military career and devoted his entire life to his country and his patriotic duty. He graduated in industrial engineering and invented lots of devices, which would be used in Artillery. He was very young when he took part in the expedition of Fezzan, during the Italo-Turkish war, and he was awarded a Silver Medal for bravery. Even during peace he distinguished himself by his generosity and a deep sense of duty. He watched a submarine sink beneath the waves and managed to save the Commander's life. For his bravery, the Ministry of the Navy gave him the third Silver Medal.

In 1907 he went to the Military Academy of Artillery and Engineers where he attained the rank of Second Lieutenant. In 1912 he was made Lieutenant and went to Libya when war broke out. He was given the second Silver Medal and two Bronze Medals for his participation in the First World War. At the end of war he reached the rank of Major and attended all the courses of the

School of War. He served as Major in the Staff at the Big Units. In 1926, he was made Lieutenant-Colonel and after three years he became Commander of the Military Division of Genoa and later of Imperia.

In May 1936 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel and became Commander of the Army Corps in Rome. On 15th December 1938 he was appointed Chief of staff of the Division «Aqui» in Merano and during the Second World War he was entrusted with the Command of Artillery of the 13th Army Corps in Sardinia and later the Command of the 25th Army Corps on the Graeco-Albanian front. Once he returned to Italy, he put his professionalism at Ministry of War's disposal.

THE HEROIC END

On 26th February 1943 he became Commander of the 222nd Coast Division, which was situated in Salerno. As Commander of this Division he fell on 8th September 1943. He was the first fallen of the war of Liberation, the first national hero of the Resistance which would give future generations peace and freedom. On the evening of 29th July 1943, the king authorized Badoglio to separately negotiate a peace treaty. He did not know that Hitler had already decided to carry out four military operations aiming at destroying our Army



Wounded soldiers are rushed by ambulance to a military hospital in the rear lines.

and occupying Italy. When two SS German Divisions reached Italian borders, the risks our country was running became clear. A general strike brought Torino to a standstill. This strike, in support of a more intense anti-fascist action, the release of political prisoners and the peace process, took place on 17th August 1943. On 2nd September Italy signed an armistice with the Anglo-Americans who should have made it effective from 12th September. However, they did not honour the commitment and announced the armistice after four days. On the evening of 8th September the Germans mounted a treacherous attack

against our soldiers. An Italian Unity occupied the power plant in Mignano and a Company that had been sent there to re-establish the order was routed. During the night, as the Allied landed at the plateau of Battipaglia, the Germans occupied the port of Salerno and managed to disarm the 3rd battery in Vietri sul Mare. An Officer of Panzerdivision, Major Udo von Alvensleben, ordered Gonzaga to lay down his arms and surrender. The great General refused point-blank to obey. His heroic resistance was the cause of his death. He was killed by a rapid burst of machine-gun fire. Other Officers tried to resist the enemy and were killed instantly.

“ Like his father, Ferrante Gonzaga took up the military career and devoted his entire life to Country, duty and military honour ”

The Italian army was in a state of chaos and lots of soldiers were sent to the concentration camps. This was the darkest period in the country's

history. However, from this moment the situation changed radically. These terrible experiences urged people to win back their freedom and rebuild their national identity.

After his death Ferrante Gonzaga was hailed as a hero. On the evening of 8th September he performed an act of outstanding bravery that earned him the Gold Medal for military valour. It was the first Gold Medal of the Italian army after the German military occupation. He distinguished himself not only by his military skills but also by his communicative and interpersonal skills. His deep humanity and sensitivity never weakened his resoluteness and willpower. When everyone was in the dark about the negotiations with the Anglo-Americans, he wrote a letter to his sister Maria, in which he highlighted the imminent threaten of a German attack: *If they make a*

move, I'll open fire on them.

There is another example of his tenacity. On the evening of 8th September he revealed strong determination when he had to issue the orders that Badoglio had not had the courage to give. He ordered that his soldiers should resist all attacks on Italian arms. In fact, the 239th battalion (Salerno) and

the 162nd (Agropoli), which belonged to his Division, during that night, fought bravely against the Anglo-Americans, who were going to land, and against the Germans. It is no coincidence that referring to the armistice Paolo Monelli wrote: *If Gonzaga had been in Rome on that occasion, the history of Italy would have been different.*

The official news of his death came after several months. On 25th July 1944, Princess Luisa Gonzaga (she is still alive in Rome) received the official letter by which she was informed of her husband's death. The king and the army offered her their heartfelt condolences. Luisa Gonzaga replied to that letter in the following way: *Your Excellency, I would like to thank you for your letter that unfortunately gives me confirmation of my husband's death. His end was heroic exactly like his life. He never abandoned the battlefield and served the country faithfully. As well as intense pain there is great pride in my heart. I feel immensely proud of what he did. One day I will tell my children that their father preferred death to dishonour.*

CONCLUSIONS

A heroic death, an ineluctable destiny. His refusal to give up and lay down arms prevents

the enemy from inflicting an ignominious and shameful defeat. He had an «aristocratic» attitude which is typical of people who know what could happen to them and do not fear «to read the closing chapter of their life». No man can escape his destiny: a heroic end that made him pass into legend. He shared the same fate of his father whose life became legend thanks to his epic deeds. A typical example of history repeating itself. Both of them were charismatic leaders and did noble and memorable deeds. They loved facing death and were heedless of the danger but they always made rational and wise decisions. In addition, they had a kind and sympathetic attitude towards other people. Maurizio and Ferrante Gonzaga seem to be intimately related to each other. In actual fact, a

close and strong link connects all the great leaders who were able to do extraordinary deeds from the Middle Ages. The House of Gonzaga boasts a great many heroic leaders who changed the course of history. The princely title, which is sign of nobility and distinction, gives the deeds of Maurizio and Ferrante Gonzaga a different dimension.

The respect for tradition, the sense of duty, and their noble origins allow us to read their epic deeds in a different way. There is no longer objective and unbiased description of historical facts.

Their deeds assume new significance and inspire our imagination because they have become legend. It is difficult to distinguish between legend and reality when we talk about them. History becomes legend and legend creates the myth. The border between imagination and reality is often crossed. This depends on how much the reader's attention is captured. Their deeds are surrounded by a magical aura, which gives those events a particular fascination and does not obscure their historical relevance. They are two different ways to celebrate their magnificence. Narrating their deeds means emphasizing their military skills. Our history is full of these qualities and important messages and its aim is to hand down them to posterity. The deeds that are performed by great men like Maurizio and Ferrante Gonzaga are indicative of important values such as bravery, honesty and courage and give the concepts of Country and Nation enormous significance.

Their deeds remind us of the two World Wars, which, in the first half of the 20th century, covered lots of nations with blood spreading

“The heroic behaviour of don Ferrante in the evening of September 8 earned him the first Gold Medal for Military Valour awarded in the Italian Army after the German Occupation”



A regimental band on the front line.

hatred and violence across the world. They were the most dreadful events in the history of humanity and left a deep mark on the peoples' spirit. The consequent destruction and devastation are an enduring and horrific memory for people who lived through those events. The condemnation of those terrible actions performed by cruel and insane people must be unanimous. However, radical and abrupt changes carry out a useful and vital function in order to make the social structure develop. In fact, after violent conflicts a strong sense of cooperation prevails, people feel the need to pick themselves up to build something important and shape their own future. Loyalty, strong alliances determination, unity and cohesion take root when there is a common enemy to defeat. Determination and bravery play a key role in a battle. During the conquest of Mount Vodice and the heroic defence of Grappa and Plateaus, the strong desire to defend his Country and the loyalty to military values led to

remarkable achievements. The events that took place during the night of 8th September 1943 galvanized people into action. They wanted to redeem the honour of war.

“Great leaders like Maurizio and Ferrante Gonzaga were able to preserve our patriotic values by giving their soldiers considerable encouragement and setting a high example of virtue and wisdom”

Great leaders like Maurizio and Ferrante Gonzaga were able to preserve our patriotic values by giving their soldiers considerable encouragement and setting a good example of virtue and wisdom. Their determination prevented our Nation from succumbing and made the consequences of war less devastating. Paying tribute to them is right and proper. The noble and stern figure

of the leader is unrelated to foul deeds. The heroic deed obscures any possible tragedy and ennoble the military personage perpetuating his myth.

Sara Gregg
Journalist

OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE... ...THEY JUST FADE AWAY

Colonel Rosner leaves Italy

First of all I would like to extend my warm greetings to all the personnel of the Italian Army.

I ideally warmly embrace you all. Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Soldiers and Civilian Personnel, who, during these last three years have demonstrated the best one can imagine in terms

of professionalism, dedication and loyalty to their profession and their Country.

Much to my regret, this outstanding assignment as U.S. Military Attaché in Italy is about to end: I am going to leave at the end of June. I would like to take this moment to thank all those that supported me during this exceptional experience.

To the Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant Generals Ottogalli, Fraticelli and Cecchi, who opened all doors to me and made me feel part of the Italian Army, go my heartfelt thanks for having created the best work conditions for bringing together our Armies and our Countries. I hope that the commitment we shared in journeys, meetings and joint missions in the United States and Germany measured up to your expectations.

My assignment started in Afghanistan with Task Force "Nibbio", the 9th Alpini Regiment and its Commander, COL Claudio Berto. Before coming to Italy, in the Spring of 2003, I spent 14 days in Bagram and in Kabul - but especially at the "Salerno" Forward Operative Base, 14 kilometres from the Pakistani border - with the members of the Italian Contingent, whose commander was Brigadier General Giorgio Battisti.

I have warm memories of the time spent together, in between rocket explosions, which at night endangered our lives. I remember very well our patrols and especially the Easter lunch, with the traditional cake, the "colomba". In a Country at war we paused in order to appreciate something belonging to the Italian tradition.

I shall always be proud to tell everyone that I was in a combat zone with the Italian Army (Alpini, Rangers and Paratroopers).

I am a Paratrooper by profession and Special Forces qualified and, as such, my qualification jump with the 9th Regiment of the "Col Moschin" Special Forces Regiment in Pisa was very special. However, I also trained with the 15th Airborne Company of the 183rd Regiment at Grafenwoehr, Germany and observed the 185th RAO Regiment several times. Those who wear the maroon beret have something special.

Colonel Elliot J. Rosner.





The U.S. Delegation parading in Rome on June 2, 2005.

They know what it means to be well trained and ready to defend the Country. They know no limits; they can push themselves farther because they are airborne or special forces. You are all extremely good and I wish you nothing but soft landing zones and calm winds. Personally I have ten international jump wings, but the only one I wear on my uniform is the Italian military one.

To the gentlemen of the mountains, the "Alpini", I say: I feel part of you. You are the pride of the world. I skied with you in the Dolomites and the Alps, observed the CaSTA, visited the "Alpini" of Bolzano, Turin, Cuneo, Pinerolo and L'Aquila and I learned a lot from all of you. The "Black Feathers" are exceptional in everything they do. The Officers are too many and I cannot mention you one by one, but each one of you has a special place in my heart for all you have done for me personally and professionally.

To you, a toast with your index finger held high!

Among my best memories are the events in which I took part during my assignment: the Army celebrations and concerts, the three June 2 parades in which I marched, the Army 10-miler I ran and the RAP Camp I have seen. Above all I remember your kindness during the ceremonies which I had the honor to participate in, in every corner of Italy. Historical moments cannot be forgotten. I thank you and tell you that I was proud to be a soldier, particularly an American soldier, when taking part in all these events!

The job of Military Attaché in a foreign Country is not easy but with the help of many people – and I'd like to mention the Army Staff, the personnel of the Chief's Office and the Defense Staff – we worked very well together.

My warmest and sincere thanks go to General Claudio Graziano and to General Paolo Serra. You supported me in all my initiatives, showing a high sense of collaboration and friendship, especially on the occasion of visits from my countrymen.

June 30 marks the end of my career in uniform. I have been very fortunate in these last 30 years, having had the honor to command soldiers at every level: company, battalion and Brigade, and also served as operations officer from battalion to Division.

I could not imagine a better job than the present one to complete my career. I am the son of a Triestine woman and an American soldier who fought on your land during the Second World War. My father served in Trieste with TRUST (U.S. Troops in Trieste), Verona (LANDSOUTH), attended the War College in Civitavecchia and was also an Italian "Alpino" and Paratrooper. Now I have the privilege of concluding where I started: in the land of my origins.

Thanks for your friendship, comradeship and professionalism.

I shall never forget you. For me this was the most precious experience.

Elliot J. Rosner
Colonel, Military Attaché,
U.S. Embassy, Rome

I wish to thank Anna Maria Elmetti of the Public Affairs Office (U.S. Embassy) and Major General Giorgio Battisti, Chief of the General Affairs Division of the Army General Staff, for their valuable support.



Un nuovo ordine mondiale, di Carlo Jean (pag. 2).

Con la fine del bipolarismo viene rimessa in discussione la pace di Westfalia. Si assiste oggi a una affermazione di una visione globalizzante, contro cui ben poco potranno fare i suoi oppositori.

Naturalmente gli Stati Uniti guideranno questa rivoluzione, in analogia con l'ottica universalistica dell'Impero Romano.

Al-Qaeda, di Andrea Margelletti (pag. 12).

La sua peculiarità è nella capacità di rinnovarsi e adeguarsi ai contesti strategici e sociali nei quali è coinvolta. Non ha bandiere o confini. Nel suo «ombrello» ideologico confluiscono quei gruppi terroristici che, attraverso una strategia globale, intendono combattere i governi moderati islamici e i Paesi che ne supportano potere e autorità.

La NATO: evoluzione e prospettive, di Giuseppe Cucchi (pag. 20).

La lotta al terrorismo, le caratteristiche dei nuovi scenari operativi, l'integrazione dei Paesi dell'Est, la politica del dialogo con il mondo arabo e i Paesi del sud Mediterraneo hanno imposto alla NATO un radicale cambiamento che ne ha rafforzato potere e influenza.

La strada da percorrere, però, è ancora lunga, soprattutto quella che conduce alla piena cooperazione con l'Unione Europea.

L'ONU e l'uso della forza, di Patrick C. Cammaert e Ben F. Klappe (pag. 30).

Nel corso degli anni il volto del peacekeeping è profondamente cambiato. I caschi blu che una volta distribuivano cibo, oggi pattugliano le strade con il sostegno degli elicotteri d'attacco. Un diverso impiego che ha prodotto pace e stabilità. Pace e stabilità per cui vale la pena combattere.

Ricostruire l'Afghanistan, di Maria Gabriella Pasqualini (pag. 38).

La gestione della pace è assai più difficile di quella della guerra. In un Paese completamente

collassato, la ricostruzione può avvenire solo in una cornice di stabilità e sicurezza. Non è un compito facile, ma piuttosto una sfida complessa che richiede un notevole dispendio di risorse ed energie.

I combattimenti urbani nelle CRO, di Gian Marco Chiarini (pag. 48).

Le ridotte distanze d'ingaggio, le difficoltà di distinguere gli avversari dalla popolazione e l'ostilità dell'ambiente evidenziano il disagio di mettere in pratica gli schemi addestrativi.

La recente esperienza in Iraq della Brigata «Ariete» induce l'allora Comandante ad alcune riflessioni che potrebbero risultare utili, pur senza modificare un corpo dottrinale valido e attuale.

Le nuove armi dei terroristi, di Ulderico Petresca (pag. 58).

Quelle utilizzabili nei futuri attentati potrebbero aprire le porte all'era più pericolosa della storia dell'umanità.

Pianificazione e risorse, di Giuseppe Maggi (pag. 68).

A partire dai primi anni 80 le Forze Armate italiane hanno operato in ogni angolo del globo (Timor Est, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan) in missioni di sostegno alla pace e di assistenza umanitaria di dimensioni e durata mai sperimentate durante tutto il periodo della Guerra Fredda. In parallelo ai crescenti impegni operativi all'estero, la Difesa ha condotto negli ultimi venticinque anni un lento ma incessante processo di trasformazione dello Strumento Militare in uno relativamente ridotto, altamente proiettabile e completamente professionalizzato. Se questo storico processo di trasformazione stia per concludersi o se la tendenza ad una ulteriore riduzione quantitativa, accompagnata da una più spiccata integrazione interforze, sia destinata a continuare è oggi motivo di acceso dibattito.

Effects-Based Operations, di Maurizio Riccò e Giovanni Manca (pag. 76).

Una metodologia strategico-operativa oggetto di approfonditi e dibattuti studi nel contesto internazionale. Ne riportiamo i punti salienti, evidenziando alcuni aspetti che ne potrebbero limitare la piena applicabilità.

Urgent Quest, di Pierluigi Sticchi ed Enrico De Palo (pag. 84).

La «Combat Identification» (identificazione in combattimento) sta diventando la capacità fondamentale per operare efficacemente nei moderni scenari, evitando il «fuoco fraticida» e utilizzando al meglio i sistemi d'arma a disposizione. Nel settore, in rapida evoluzione tecnologica, si stanno moltiplicando le iniziative e le attività internazionali, che vedono la partecipazione costante ed attiva della Forza Armata.

Il Tiger australiano, di Paolo Valpolini (pag. 96).

Nel variegato mondo dei sistemi d'arma avanzati agli elicotteri sono richieste prestazioni idonee all'impiego nei più impegnativi teatri operativi.

Il Tiger, pur essendo risultato il vincitore della gara per un elicottero da combattimento indetta dall'Australia, dovrà subire ancora importanti modifiche per rispondere appieno alle specifiche del committente.

I media nei Teatri Operativi, di Giorgio Battisti e Gianfranco Oggiano (pag. 102).

Uno stretto rapporto di collaborazione tra militari e giornalisti può rivelarsi il valore aggiunto del successo di una missione e il miglior viatico per raccontare i fatti nel modo più aderente alla realtà.

Etica e Motivazione, di Massimo Scotti (pag. 114).

Il soldato impegnato in combattimento è pervaso da un tumulto di stati d'animo spesso in conflittualità tra loro. Sentimenti contrastanti dove la passione tende a sovrastare il ragionamento, la motivazione e il senso dell'etica. Un alternarsi di predominanze razionali e irrazionali che coinvolge anche i Comandanti, costretti a vivere situazioni forse più esplosive e stressanti.

Maurizio e Ferrante Gonzaga, di Sara Greggì (pag. 122).

Pochi conoscono la straordinaria epopea di Maurizio Gonzaga e di suo figlio Ferrante, Ufficiali dell'Esercito, che combatterono nei due conflitti mondiali meritando Medaglie d'Oro e d'Argento.

C'è una dimensione surreale nel racconto delle loro imprese, un'aura fiabesca e leggendaria che avvolge le loro figure, un retaggio di antichità e magnificenza.



A New World Order, by Carlo Jean (p. 2).

With the end of bipolarism, the Peace of Westphalia is again under discussion. Today we witness the success of a globalizing vision, against which its opponents will be able to do very little.

The United States will naturally lead this revolution, comparable to the universalist view of the Roman Empire.

Al-Qaeda, by Andrea Margelletti (p. 12).

Its peculiarity is that it can renew itself and adapt to the strategic and social contexts in which it is involved. It has neither banners nor borders. Under its ideological «umbrella» converge the terrorist groups, which through a global strategy want to fight the moderate Islamic governments and the Countries that support their power and authority.

NATO: Evolution and Prospects, by Giuseppe Cucchi (p. 20).

The fight against terrorism, the characteristics of the new operational scenarios, the integration of the Eastern Countries, the policy of dialogue with the Arab world and the South-Mediterranean Countries, have forced NATO to make a radical change, which has strengthened its power and influence.

The UN and the Use of Force, by Patrick C. Cammaert and Ben F. Klappe (p.30).

The nature of peacekeeping has changed along the years. The Blue Helmets that used to distribute food, today are patrolling the streets with the support of attack helicopters. A different employment, which has produced peace and stability, two values worth fighting for.

Rebuilding Afghanistan, by Maria Gabriella Pasqualini (p. 38).

The management of peace is much more difficult than war's. In a completely collapsed Country, reconstruction can only take place in a framework of stability and security. It is not an easy task but rather a complex challenge, which requires a remarkable commitment of resources and energies.



Urban Warfare in Crisis Response Operations (CROs), by Gian Marco Chiarini (p. 48).

The short engagement distances, the difficulty to tell the enemies from the population and the hostility of the environment put the implementation of the training schemes to a hard test.

The recent experience in Iraq of the «Ariete» Brigade prompts its former Commander to make some reflections which could prove useful, without changing a valid and topical doctrinal body.

The Terrorists' New Weapons, by Ulderico Petresca (p. 58).

The arms employable in future attacks could open the door to the most dangerous era in the history of mankind.

Plans and Resources, by Giuseppe Maggi (p. 68).

Since the early eighties the Italian Armed Forces have been operating in more and more remote areas of the globe (East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan) in peace-support humanitarian operations of a size and duration never experienced during the whole Cold War. Together with the increasing commitments abroad, the Italian Defence, in the last twenty-five years, has carried out a slow but unceasing process of transformation of the existing military instrument into a new, relatively smaller, highly projectable and fully professional organization. Whether this historical process is about to end, or if the tendency to a further quantitative reduction accompanied by a more marked force integration is likely to continue, is the subject of a lively debate.

Effects-Based Operations, by Maurizio Riccò and Giovanni Manca (p. 76).

A strategic and operational methodology, thoroughly studied and debated within the international context. We relate its main points, pointing out some aspects that could limit its full implementation.

«Urgent Quest», by Pierluigi Sticchi and Enrico De Palo (p. 84).

«Combat Identification» is becoming the basic capability needed in order to operate effectively in the modern scenarios, avoiding «fratricidal fire» and employing the available weapon systems at their best. The sector is undergoing a rapid technological evolution and our Service is

actively participating in the relevant international initiatives and activities.

The Australian «Tiger», by Paolo Valpolini (p. 96).

In the varied world of advanced weapon systems, helicopters must provide performances suitable for employment in the most demanding operational theatres.

The «Tiger», although winner of a tender for combat helicopters, called by Australia, will still have to undergo important changes in order to meet the specifications fixed by the customer.

The Media in the Theatres of Operations, by Giorgio Battisti and Gianfranco Oggiano (p. 102).

A close collaboration between military and journalists can turn out to be an added value for the success of a mission and the best way to report the events in the most realistic way.


Ethics and Motivation, by Massimo Scotti (p. 114).

The soldier engaged in combat is pervaded by a tumult of feelings, often in contrast with each other. Conflicting feelings where passion tends to overcome reason, motivation and sense of ethics. An alternation of rational and irrational predominance which involves also the Commanders, compelled to live through perhaps even more explosive and stressing situations.

Maurizio and Ferrante Gonzaga, by Sara Greggì (p. 122).

Little is known about the extraordinary epic deeds of Maurizio Gonzaga and his son Ferrante, Army Officers who fought in two world wars, earning Gold and Silver Medals.

There is a surreal dimension in the account of their deeds, a fantastic and legendary aura that surrounds their figures, a heritage of antiquity and magnificence.



Un nouvel ordre mondial, par Carlo Jean (p. 2)
La fin de la bipolarisation remet en cause la paix

de Westphalie. Aujourd'hui, une vision globalisante prend pied contre laquelle les détracteurs ne peuvent rien. Il va sans dire que les Etats Unis seront à la tête de la révolte, à l'instar de l'Empire romain et de son approche universaliste.

Al Qaeda, par Andrea Margelletti (p. 12).

Sa particularité réside en sa capacité de se renouveler et de s'adapter aux contextes stratégiques dans lesquels elle opère. Elle n'a ni drapeaux ni frontières. A l'abri de son idéologie se réunissent ces groupes de terroristes qui, à travers une stratégie globale, entendent combattre les gouvernements islamiques modérés et les pays qui en soutiennent le pouvoir et l'autorité.

L'OTAN: évolution et perspectives, par Giuseppe Cucchi (p. 20).

La lutte contre le terrorisme, les caractéristiques des nouveaux théâtres opérationnels, l'intégration des pays de l'Est et la politique du dialogue avec le monde arabe et les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée ont imposé à l'OTAN un changement radical qui en a renforcé le pouvoir et l'influence.

Toutefois, la route est encore longue, notamment celle qui mène à une coopération totale avec l'Union Européenne.

L'ONU et l'emploi de la force, par Patrick C. Cammaert et Ben F. Klappe (p. 30)

Au fil des ans, les opérations de «peacekeeping» ont vu leur physionomie changer profondément. Si autrefois ils étaient chargés de distribuer les aides alimentaires, aujourd'hui les casques bleus patrouillent les routes avec l'appui des hélicoptères de combat, contribuant ainsi à la paix et à la stabilité. Une paix et une stabilité pour lesquelles il vaut bien la peine de lutter.

Reconstruire l'Afghanistan, par Maria Gabriella Pasqualini (p. 38)

La paix est bien plus difficile à gérer que la guerre. La reconstruction d'un pays en ruines ne peut que passer par la stabilité et par la sécurité. C'est là une tâche ardue, un véritable défi qui demande un effort et des ressources considérables.

Les combats urbains dans les CRO, par Gian Marco Chiarini (p. 48).

Le rapprochement des théâtres de l'engage-

ment, la difficulté à distinguer l'adversaire de la population et l'hostilité de l'environnement sont autant de facteurs qui entravent la mise œuvre des schémas de l'instruction.

L'expérience acquise récemment en Irak par la Brigade «Ariete» a inspiré à son Commandant des réflexions qui pourraient s'avérer fort utiles, sans pour autant modifier un corps doctrinal valable et actuel.

Les nouvelles armes des terroristes, par Ulderico Petresca (p. 58).

Les armes utilisées dans les futurs attentats pourraient ouvrir la porte de la plus dangereuse des ères de l'histoire de l'humanité.

Planification et ressources, par Giuseppe Maggi (p. 68).

Depuis le début des années 80, les Forces armées italiennes prennent part à des missions de maintien de la paix et d'aide humanitaire dans des régions éloignées du globe (Timor Est, Afghanistan, Iraq, Soudan, Pakistan). La durée et la portée de ces missions n'ayant trouvé d'égal dans aucune des opérations menées pendant la période de la Guerre froide. Au cours de ces vingt cinq dernières années, outre les engagements croissants à l'étranger, la Défense a entrepris un processus, lent mais continu, visant à la transformation de l'Instrument militaire: celui-ci a été ainsi numériquement allégé, doté d'une capacité de projection accrue et entièrement professionnalisé. Reste à savoir maintenant si ce processus historique de transformation est arrivé à terme ou si, au contraire, il prévoira une ultérieure réduction numérique et une intégration accrue interarmées.

Effects-Based Operations, par Maurizio Riccò et Giovanni Manca (p. 76).

Il s'agit d'une méthodologie stratégique-opérationnelle qui fait l'objet d'études approfondies et débattues au niveau international. Nous en indiquons les points les plus saillants, tout en mettant en évidence les aspects qui pourraient en limiter l'applicabilité totale.

Urgent Quest, par Pierluigi Sticchi et Enrico De Palo (p. 84).

Le «Combat Identification» (identification au combat) est sur le point de devenir une capacité fondamentale pour opérer efficacement dans les théâtres modernes en évitant le feu «fratricide» et en utilisant

au mieux les systèmes d'armes disponibles. Dans ce secteur, qui connaît une évolution technologique rapide, on assiste à la multiplication des initiatives et des activités internationales auxquelles participent constamment et activement les Forces Armées.

Le Tiger australien, par Paolo Valpolini (p. 96)

Parmi les nombreux systèmes d'arme avancés, les hélicoptères doivent avoir des prestations appropriées à leur emploi dans les théâtres opérationnels les plus contraignants.

Bien qu'étant l'adjudicataire de la fourniture d'un hélicoptère de combat pour l'Australie, le Tiger devra subir d'importantes modifications pour être à même de satisfaire les exigences spécifiques de l'adjudicateur.

Les médias dans les Théâtres opérationnels, par Giorgio Battisti et Gianfranco Oggiano (p. 102).

Un rapport étroit de collaboration entre les militaires et les journalistes peut représenter la valeur ajoutée du succès d'une mission et le meilleur moyen pour raconter fidèlement les faits.

Ethique et Motivation, par Massimo Scotti (p. 114).

Le soldat engagé dans un combat connaît une multitude d'états d'âme, parfois conflictuels. Des sentiments opposés où la passion tend à l'emporter sur la raison, sur la motivation et sur le sens éthique. Une alternance de rationalité et d'irrationalité qui implique souvent les Commandants, lesquels sont obligés à vivre des situations parfois plus explosives et stressantes.

Maurizio et Ferrante Gonzaga, par Sara Gregg (p. 122)

Peu nombreux sont ceux qui connaissent l'extraordinaire épopée de Maurizio Gonzaga et de son fils Ferrante, combattants des deux Guerres mondiales décorés de médailles d'or et d'argent. Une atmosphère irréelle enveloppe le récit de leurs exploits, une aura fabuleuse et légendaire entoure leur figure : un héritage d'antiquité et de magnificence.



Eine neue Weltordnung, von Carlo Jean (S. 2).

Mit dem Ende des bipolaren Systems wird der

Westfälische Frieden wieder in Frage gestellt. Heute wohnen wir der Zustimmung zu einer globalisierenden Sicht bei, gegen die ihre Gegner wenig unternehmen können.

Natürlich führen die Vereinigten Staaten diese Revolution in Analogie zu der universalistischen Sicht des Römischen Reichs.

Al-Qaeda, von Andrea Margelletti (S. 12).

Ihre Besonderheit liegt in der Fähigkeit der Erneuerung und Anpassung an strategische und soziale Kontexte, in die sie eingebunden ist. Sie hat keine Fahnen oder Grenzen. Unter ihrer ideologischen Schirmherrschaft kommen jene terroristischen Gruppen zusammen, die mit einer globalen Strategie beabsichtigen, die gemäßigten islamischen Regierungen und Länder zu bekämpfen, die ihre Macht und Autorität unterstützen.

Die NATO: Entwicklung und Prospektiven, von Giuseppe Cucchi (S. 20).

Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus, die Merkmale der neuen Schauplätze, die Integration der Ostländer, die Politik des Dialogs mit der arabischen Welt und den Ländern des Südmittelmeeres haben der NATO einen radikalen Wechsel auferlegt, der ihre Macht und ihren Einfluss verstärkt hat.

Die Wegstrecke ist jedoch noch lang, vor allem die, welche zur vollen Kooperation mit der Europäischen Union führt.

Die UNO und der Gebrauch von Gewalt, von Patrick C. Cammaert und Ben F. Klappe (S. 30).

Im Laufe der Jahre hat sich das Gesicht des Peacekeeping tief greifend verändert. Die Blauhelme, die einst Nahrung verteilten, patrouillieren heute die Straßen mit der Unterstützung der Angriffshubschrauber. Ein andersartiger Einsatz, der Frieden und Stabilität gebracht hat. Frieden und Stabilität, für die es sich lohnt zu kämpfen.

Der Wiederaufbau Afghanistans, von Maria Gabriella Pasqualini (S. 38).

Die Handhabung des Friedens ist viel schwieriger als die des Krieges. In einem völlig zusammengebrochenen Land kann der Wiederaufbau nur in einem Rahmen von Stabilität und Sicherheit erfolgen. Das ist keine leichte Aufgabe, sondern eher eine komplexe Herausforderung, die einen bemerkenswerten

Einsatz von Ressourcen und Energie erfordert.

Die städtischen Kämpfe in den CRO, von Gian Marco Chiarini (S. 48).

Die verringerten Abstände der Rekrutierung, die Schwierigkeiten die Gegner von der Bevölkerung zu unterscheiden und die Feindseligkeit der Umgebung verdeutlichen das Unbehagen die Ausbildungsschemata in die Tat umzusetzen.

Die jüngste Erfahrung der Brigade «Ariete» («Widder») führt den damaligen Kommandanten zu einigen Überlegungen, die sich als nützlich erweisen könnten, ohne dabei den gültigen und aktuellen Theoriekorpus zu verändern.

Die neuen Waffen der Terroristen, von Ulderico Petresca (S. 58).

Die in den zukünftigen Attentaten verwendbaren könnten die Türen zu der gefährlichsten Ära der Geschichte der Menschheit öffnen.

Planung und Ressourcen, von Giuseppe Maggi (S. 68).

Seit Beginn der achtziger Jahre wurden die italienischen Streitkräfte in immer entlegeneren Gebiete gesandt (Osttimor, Afghanistan, Irak, Sudan, Pakistan), so in Friedensmissionen und zur ärztlichen Hilfe von einem Ausmaße und einer Dauer, die in dieser Form noch nicht einmal zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges durchgeführt worden war. Parallel zu den wachsenden Aufgaben im Ausland hat die Verteidigung in den letzten 25 Jahren einen langsamem aber unaufhörlichen Prozeß der Veränderung des Militärs vollzogen. Einerseits führte er zu einer selektiven Reduzierung sowie andererseits zu einer hohen Professionalisierung. Ob dieser historische Wandlungsprozeß am Ende angelangt ist oder sich zu einer weiteren zahlenmäßigen Reduzierung, die von einer erweiterten Einbeziehung der verschiedenen Korps begleitet sein wird, bleibt bis heute der Gegenstand einer heftigen Debatte.

Effects-Based Operations, von Maurizio Riccò und Giovanni Manca (S. 76).

Eine strategisch-operative Methodologie, die Gegenstand tiefergehender und umstrittener Studien im internationalen Kontext ist. Wir geben die wesentlichen Punkte wieder, und heben einige Aspekte hervor, welche die volle Anwendung begrenzen könnten.

Urgent Quest, von Pierluigi Sticchi und Enrico De Palo (S. 84).

Die «Combat Identification» (Identifizierung beim Kampf) wird zur grundlegenden Fähigkeit, wirkungsvoll in modernen Szenarien zu operieren, indem das «friendly fire» (Eigenfeuer) vermieden wird und die zur Verfügung stehenden Waffensysteme bestmöglich genutzt werden. In dem Sektor vervielfältigen sich aufgrund schneller technologischer Entwicklung die Initiativen und die internationalen Aktivitäten, an denen ständig und aktiv die Streitkräfte beteiligt sind.

Der australische Tiger, von Paolo Valpolini (S. 96).

In der verschiedenartigen Welt der fortgeschrittenen Waffensysteme bis hin zu den Hubschraubern werden Leistungen gefordert, die sich zum Einsatz an den anspruchsvollsten Schauplätzen eignen.

Obwohl der Tiger als Sieger aus dem von Australien ausgeschriebenem Kampfhubschrauberwettbewerb hervorging, muss er sich noch großen Veränderungen unterziehen, um den Besonderheiten des Auftraggebers voll zu genügen.

Die Medien an den Schauplätzen, von Giorgio Battisti und Gianfranco Oggiano (S. 102).

Eine enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen Militärs und Journalisten kann sich als Mehrwert des Erfolgs einer Mission herausstellen und als beste Ermunterung, die Ereignisse so lebensnah wie möglich zu erzählen.

Ethik und Motivation, von Massimo Scotti (S. 114).

Der an Kampfhandlungen teilnehmende Soldat wird häufig von Seelenzuständen aufgewühlt, die in sich konfliktreich sind.

Gegensätzliche Gefühle, in denen die Leidenschaft dazu neigt, den Verstand, die Motivation und den ethischen Sinn zu beherrschen. Ein Wechsel von rationaler und irrationaler Vorherrschaft, der auch die Befehlshaber einbezieht, die gezwungen sind, eventuell explosivere und stressigere Situationen zu erleben.

Maurizio und Ferrante Gonzaga, von Sara Greggì (S. 122).

Wenige kennen das außergewöhnliche Epos der Heeresoffiziere Maurizio Gonzaga und seines Sohnes Ferrante, die in beiden Weltkriegen kämpf-



ten und sich Gold- und Silbermedaillen verdienten. In der Erzählung ihrer Unternehmungen ist eine surreale Dimension vorhanden, eine märchenhafte und legendäre Aura, die ihre Persönlichkeiten umgibt, ein Vermächtnis von Großartigkeit und alter Zeiten.



Un nuevo orden mundial, Carlo Jean (pág. 2)

Al desaparecer el bipolarismo, se pone de nuevo en tela de juicio la paz de Westfalia. Hoy día se está consolidando cada vez más un enfoque globalizante contra el que muy poco podrán los opositores. Demás está decir que serán los Estados Unidos quienes encabezarán esta revolución, al igual que el Imperio Romano con su espíritu universalista.

Al Qaeda, Andrea Margelletti (pág. 12).

Su peculiaridad radica en su capacidad de renovarse y adecuarse a los contextos estratégicos y sociales en los que se ve involucrada. No tiene ni banderas ni fronteras. Bajo su «sombrilla» ideológica confluyen grupos terroristas que, a través de una estrategia global, luchan contra los gobiernos moderados islámicos y aquellos países que apoyan su poder y autoridad.

La OTAN: Evolución y perspectivas, Giuseppe Cucchi (pág. 20).

La lucha contra el terrorismo, las características de los nuevos escenarios operacionales, la integración de los países del Este y la política del diálogo con el mundo árabe y los países del sur del Mediterráneo le han impuesto a la OTAN un cambio radical que ha reforzado su poder y su influencia.

Pero el camino que queda por recorrer es aún largo, sobre todo aquel que lleva a la plena cooperación con la Unión Europea.

La ONU y el empleo de la fuerza, Patrick C. Cammaert y Ben F. Klappe (pág. 30)

A lo largo de los años, la fisonomía de las operaciones de «peacekeeping» ha experimentado una profunda transformación. Si ayer solían distribuir alimentos, hoy día, los cascos azules

patrullan las calles con el apoyo de helicópteros de ataque, contribuyendo de esta forma a consolidar la paz y la estabilidad. Paz y estabilidad por las que vale la pena luchar.

La reconstrucción de Afganistán, Maria Gabriella Pasqualini (pág. 38)

Gestionar la paz resulta con mucho más difícil que gestionar la guerra. En un país completamente destruido, la reconstrucción queda sujeta a la estabilidad y a la seguridad. No es tarea fácil sino un reto complejo que requiere ingentes cantidades de recursos y energía.

Los combates urbanos en las CRO, Gian Marco Chiarini (pág. 48).

La menor distancia de empleo, la dificultad de distinguir a los adversarios de la población y la hostilidad del medio ambiente son otros tantos factores que dificultan la implementación de los esquemas de adiestramiento.

La reciente experiencia en Irak de la Brigada «Ariete», ha suscitado en su Comandante reflexiones que podrían resultar útiles, sin modificar por ello un cuerpo doctrinal válido y actual.

Las nuevas armas de los terroristas, Ulderico Petresca (pág. 58).

Las armas utilizables en los futuros atentados podrían abrir las puertas de la más peligrosa era de toda la historia de la humanidad.

Planificación y recursos, Giuseppe Maggi (pág. 68).

Desde principios de los años '80, las Fuerzas armadas italianas participan en misiones de mantenimiento de la paz y asistencia humanitaria en regiones cada vez más remotas del mundo (Timor Est, Afganistán, Iraq, Sudán, Pakistán).

Trátase de misiones cuya duración y entidad no encontraron precedentes siquiera en todo el periodo de la guerra fría. En estos últimos 25 años, además del empeño creciente en operaciones en el extranjero, la Defensa emprendió un lento pero incesante proceso de transformación encaminado a reducir numéricamente la «Herramienta militar» y a volverla más ágil, con mayor capacidad de proyección y enteramente profesionalizada.

Ahora, queda por saber si este proceso histórico de transformación está por finalizar o si en cambio seguirá apuntando a una ulterior reducción numérica y a una mayor integración de las fuerzas. Es éste un asunto objeto de animados debates.

Effects-Based Operations, Maurizio Riccò y Giovanni Manca (pág. 76).

Una metodología estratégico-operacional objeto de estudios profundizados y debatidos en ámbito internacional. Damos a continuación algunos de sus puntos más salientes, evidenciando asimismo algunos de los aspectos que podrían limitar su plena aplicabilidad.

Urgent Quest, Pierluigi Sticchi y Enrico De Palo (pág. 84).

La «Combat identification» (identificación en combate) se está convirtiendo en un requisito fundamental para operar eficazmente en los escenarios modernos, evitando el «fuego fratricida» y utilizando de la mejor manera los sistemas de armas a disposición. En este sector, en rápida evolución tecnológica, se están multiplicando las iniciativas y las actividades internacionales en las que las Fuerzas Armadas participan constante y activamente.

El Tiger australiano, Paolo Valpolini (pág. 96)

Entre todos los sistemas de arma avanzados, a los helicópteros se les piden prestaciones adecuadas para su empleo en los más arduos teatros operacionales.

Aunque resulta ser el adjudicatario de la licitación para el suministro de un helicóptero de combate convocada por Australia, el Tiger tendrá que sufrir importantes modificaciones para satisfacer plenamente los requerimientos del cliente.

Los media en los Teatros operacionales, Giorgio Battisti y Gianfranco Oggiano (pag. 102).

Una estrecha relación de colaboración entre militares y periodistas puede representar el valor añadido del éxito de una misión y el mejor medio para relatar fielmente la realidad.

Ética y Motivación, Massimo Scotti (pág. 114).

Durante un combate, el soldado experimenta un tumulto de estados de ánimo, a veces conflictivos. Sentimientos contrastantes en los que la pasión tiende a dominar la razón, la motivación y hasta el sentido ético. Es una alternancia de racionalidad e irracionalidad que involucra hasta a los Comandantes, quienes se ven obligados a vivir situaciones quizás aún más explosivas y estresantes.

Maurizio y Ferrante Gonzaga, Sara Greggi (pág. 122)

Son pocos los que conocen la extraordinaria epopeya de Maurizio Gonzaga y de su hijo

Ferrante, Oficiales del Ejército en las dos Guerras mundiales, distinguidos con Medallas de Oro y de Plata. Sus hazañas cobran una dimensión irreal y un aura legendaria y fantástica envuelve sus figuras, dejando un legado de antigüedad y magnificencia.



Uma nova ordem mundial, de Carlo Jean (pág. 2).

Com o fim do bipolarismo volta a ser posta em discussão a paz de Westfalia. Assiste-se hoje a uma afirmação de uma visão globalizante, contra a qual bem pouco poderão fazer os seus opositores. Naturalmente, os Estados Unidos conduzirão esta revolução, em analogia com a óptica universalística do Império Romano.

Al-Qaeda, de Andrea Margelletti (pág. 12).

A sua peculiaridade está na capacidade de se renovar e adequar aos contextos estratégicos e sociais nos quais está envolvida. Não tem bandeiras nem confins. No seu «toldo» ideológico confluem os grupos terroristas que, através de uma estratégia global, pretendem combater os governos moderados islâmicos e os países que sustentam poder e autoridade.

A NATO: evolução e perspectiva, de Giuseppe Cucchi (pág. 20).

A luta contra o terrorismo, as características dos novos cenários operativos, a integração dos países de Leste, a política do diálogo com o mundo árabe e com os países do sul do Mediterrâneo impuseram à NATO uma radical mudança que reforçou poder e influência.

A estrada a percorrer, porém, é ainda longa, sobretudo aquela que conduz à plena cooperação com a União Europeia.

A ONU e o uso da força, de Patrick C. Cammaert e Ben F. Klappe (pág. 30).

No decorrer dos anos, o rosto do peacekeeping foi profundamente mudado. Os capacetes azuis que antes distribuíam comida, hoje patrulham as estradas com o apoio dos helicópteros de ataque. Um diferente emprego que produziu paz e estabilidade. Paz e estabilidade pelas quais vale a pena combater.



Reconstruir o Afeganistão, de Maria Gabriella Pasqualini (pág. 38).

A gestão da paz é assaz mais difícil que a da guerra. Num país completamente em colapso, a reconstrução pode acontecer apenas numa moldura de estabilidade e segurança. Não é uma tarefa fácil, mas é sobretudo um desafio complexo que requer uma notável despesa de recursos e energias.

Os combates urbanos nas CRO, de Gian Marco Chiarini (pág. 48).

As reduzidas distâncias de alistamento, as dificuldades em distinguir os adversários da população e a hostilidade do ambiente evidenciam a dificuldade de pôr em prática os esquemas de treino.

A recente experiência no Iraque, da Brigada «Ariete» leva o Comandante de então a algumas reflexões que se poderiam tornar úteis, mesmo sem modificar um corpo doutrinal válido e actual.

As novas armas dos terroristas, de Ulderico Petresca (pág. 58).

Aquelas utilizáveis nos futuros atentados poderiam abrir as portas à era mais perigosa da história da humanidade.

Planificação e recursos, de Giuseppe Maggi (pág. 68).

A partir dos primeiros anos 80, as Forças Armadas italianas têm ido operar em partes cada vez mais remotas do globo (Timor Leste, Afeganistão, Iraque, Sudão e Paquistão) em missão de apoio à paz e de assistência humanitária de dimensões e duração nunca experimentadas durante todo o período da Guerra Fria. Em paralelo aos crescentes compromissos no estrangeiro, a Defesa conduziu nos últimos vinte e cinco anos um lento mas incessante processo de transformação do Instrumento Militar noutro relativamente reduzido, altamente projectável e completamente profissionalizado. Se este histórico processo de transformação se estiver para concluir ou se a tendência a uma ulterior redução quantitativa, acompanhada de uma mais evidenciada integração inter-forças, estiver destinada a continuar, é hoje motivo de aceso debate.

Effects-Based Operations, de Maurizio Riccò e Giovanni Manca (pág. 76).

Uma metodologia estratégico-operativa, assunto de aprofundados e debatidos estudos no contexto internacional. Aqui reportamos os pontos salientes, evidenciando alguns aspectos

que poderiam limitar a sua plena aplicabilidade.

Urgent Quest, de Pierluigi Sticchi e Enrico De Paolo (pág. 84).

A Combat Identification (identificação em combate) está a tornar-se a capacidade fundamental para operar eficazmente nos modernos cenários, evitando o «fogo fratricida» e utilizando pelo melhor os sistemas de armas à disposição. No sector, em rápida evolução tecnológica, estão a multiplicar-se as iniciativas e as actividades internacionais, que vêem a participação constante e activa da Força Armada.

O Tiger australiano, de Paolo Valpolini (pág. 96).

No variado mundo dos sistemas de armas avançados, são pedidas aos helicópteros prestações aptas para o emprego nos mais empenhativos teatros operativos.

O Tiger, mesmo tendo resultado como vencedor de um concurso para um helicóptero de combate, anunciada pela Austrália, deverá ainda sofrer importantes modificações para responder plenamente às especificações do comitente.

Os media nos Teatros Operativos, de Giorgio Battisti e Gianfranco Oggiano (pág. 102).



Uma relação próxima de colaboração entre militares e jornalistas pode revelar-se o valor acrescido do sucesso de uma missão e a melhor via para contar os factos no modo mais próximo da realidade.

Ética e Motivação, de Massimo Scotti (pág. 114).






O soldado empenhado em combate é inundado por um tumulto de estados de espírito em conflito entre eles. Sentimentos contrastantes onde a paixão tende a superar o raciocínio, a motivação e o sentido de ética. Um alternar-se de predominâncias racionais e irracionais que envolve também os Comandantes, obrigados a viver situações talvez mais explosivas e stressantes.

Maurizio Ferrante Gonzaga, de Sara Gregg (pág. 122).

Poucos conhecem a extraordinária epopeia de Maurizio Gonzaga e do seu filho Ferrante, Oficiais do Exército, que combateram nos dois conflitos mundiais, merecendo Medalhas de Ouro e Prata. Existe uma dimensão surreal no relate das suas actividades, uma aura lendária e de fábula que envolve as suas figuras, um património de antiguidade e magnificência.



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The "PzH" 2000

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THE NEW LOGISTICS A PHENOMENON OF INTERDISCIPLINARY POLARIZATION

*by Lieutenant General Emilio Marzo
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army*



The Multi-Purpose Centre of Experimentation of Montelibretti hosted on the 27th June a conference on 'The New Logistics, the Phenomenon of Cross-Disciplinary Polarization', organised by the Army's Logistic Command and sponsored by AIOLOG (Italian Association of Logistics).

During the conference there was a simulation of 'Network Centric Logistics' (NCL) with the deployment of a Regimental Module integrated with 'expeditionary' elements of the industry, which put into practice some of the concepts being discussed.

The initiative is part of an ampler debate promoted by the Heads of the logistic organizations of the Service, together with AIOLOG, and is aimed at opening a reflection on the new logistics as a

A moment of the meeting.

phenomenon of cross-discipline polarization. The activity is of particular interest to the Army, because it represents the academic world, the managers of national companies and experts in information and communication technology (ICT), promoting the interchange of ideas and experiences in the field of logistics between different organizations and institutions.

This exchange of ideas is vital for the Army, which in the past ten years has started to go through great transformations, which had become necessary in order to go from an organization based on conscription to a professionalised



Above.

A medical team carried on the ambulance version of the "Dardo", engaged in an emergency-surgery simulation.

Right.

A truck-trailer unit carrying the turret of a "Dardo" on a special support.

Service ready to face continuous and deep changes in the geo-strategic picture.

In view of this, logistics has been able to respond with flexibility to the requirements, going from a static and territorial model to a dynamic and modular one, in a position to sustain with adherence and continuity the effort of the forces employed simultaneously in theatres very different as regards operational environment, distance from the strategic base, geographic and environmental characteristics and resources available in the *host nation*.

Today the Army must meet the challenge in the logistic field with a multidisciplinary approach, in order to deal with the ever increasing complexity of the modern operational scenarios, heavily influenced by the new geometries of the battlefield. This latter has in fact lost its past linearity and is now marked by asymmetrical threats that literally place the logistic units "on the front line" and require that they carry out additional tasks, which actually belong to the combat units.

Once again the answer to this challenge can only be based on the two factors that represent the added value of any military organization: men and technology.

The human resource is surely the main element that supports the entire system. The Army has long understood the strategic importance of training Commanders in logistics, in order to make




each one of them 'the man of the day before and the man of the day after'. The answer of the Army to this pressing need is a training procedure that envisages a continuous updating and a profitable confrontation with the academic and industry worlds in the field of management of complex systems.

Technology, the second pillar of this system, makes logistics an active container of several scientific disciplines; a large integrated system, into which flow information technology, management engineering, operational research and statistics, which permits to manage macro-activities such as procurement and supply in the widest acceptance of the terms, in order to send to the right thing to the right place at the right time.

The logistics of the Italian Army is thus really becoming a phenomenon of multidisciplinary polarization that can prepare itself for the future challenges in the operational scenarios, integrating with the defence industry and cooperating with the academic world in order to make the most of their potentials.



HOW THE UNITED STATES WILL CONFRONT IRAN



HOW THE UNITED STATES WILL CONFRONT IRAN

The thorny Lebanese situation and the unstable balances in the Persian Gulf can be traced back to a single asymmetric confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. The contrast takes place both directly, on the plane of international diplomatic negotiations and through the media, as well as at a distance, through an indirect conflict, involving Countries and armed politico-religious factions close to the two opponents. In this article, Edward N. Luttwak, the well-known political scientist, discusses the situation with us.

There is no public or secret evidence that the rulers of Iran instigated the deliberate attack of their fellow extremists of Hizballah against Israel, which started the Lebanon war of 2006. But there is no need of any secret evidence to prove that Iran fully supported the Hizballah, because they loudly proclaimed their approval.

What the rulers of Iran are doing, without any nuclear weapons to protect them, is already recklessly aggressive and very damaging to American interests. Nor are they just defending themselves from outside threats—they are driven by the purely internal dynamics of an intense competition between rival factions within the regime. That is why all the many attempts at conciliatory diplomacy, starting with Mitterrand of France in 1990-91 inevitably fail: as soon as one faction agrees to talk, another will accuse it of giving in to the infidel—and stage a provocation to abort the initiative. It would be folly to let these rulers acquire the shield of nuclear deterrence for their extremism.

Some advance the notion of mutual deterrence with a nuclear Iran. The proof of its imprudence is the failure of non-nuclear deterrence. US forces are present on both sides of Iran in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well to their south in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, Iran's own armed forces are outdated in structure, training and equipment. Nevertheless, instead of being deterred, the rulers of Iran feel free to attack US policies world-wide in the most violent terms, to form alliances with any and all enemies of the United States from Chavez of Venezuela to North Korea, and to foment actual violence against the

United States and its allies. They fund, train and arm the Mahdi militia of Moqtada Sadr which periodically attacks US and British troops, specifically supplying—to others as well—the triggering devices for the bombs that are causing most US casualties in Iraq. Under the banner of Shi'i solidarity, it was the Iranian regime that established the Hizballah of Lebanon which it has continued to train, arm and generously fund—to then give full support for the rule-breaking attack on Israel that has provoked the current war. This now directly serves the interests of the Iranian regime by diverting diplomatic efforts from the build-up to UN Security Council measures against its uranium-enrichment activities. Moreover, even though both the

Salafist Al Qaida and Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood hold that the Twelver Shi'is of Iraq and Iran are not true Muslims but apostates deserving of death, in a convergence of extremism the rulers of Iran are harboring

surviving Al Qaida elements, and also funding Hamas to support its refusal of any peace. It is therefore unreasonable to expect that the rulers of Iran would suddenly see the wisdom of moderation if they are able to assemble their own nuclear weapons.

It follows that if all diplomatic efforts to obtain a verifiable cessation of uranium enrichment fail, the United States must be ready to bomb the buildings that are likely to house critical processes and equipment. It is argued that Iran has many facilities in many places. That is true, but an air strike would not have to achieve total destruction—it is not a Las Vegas demoli-

“Iran's armed forces are outdated in structure, training and equipment”

Title pages.

A partial view of Teheran.

Right.

Satellite view of Natanz, presumable site of uranium enrichment.

tion contract – nor even partial destruction. While the enrichment process requires several functional stages, it is only necessary to destroy the buildings and facilities needed for one of them to stop the entire process. In itself, that result is likely to be short-lived, so an air strike would also target other buildings or facilities that are both critical and more difficult to replace. It would take something of an air campaign to destroy every single structure in every installation associated with Iran's nuclear program – the total might come to 1,000 aiming points, requiring some 500 sorties for the strike aircraft alone, assuming both a number of re-strikes, and no use at all of Cruise missiles, because of their smaller warheads and lesser accuracy. But to destroy selectively only the critical or hard to replace structures less than 100 aiming points would suffice, so that unless an exaggerated number of defense suppression and air superiority sorties were also flown (Iran's fighters are useless and its air-defense missiles obsolete) the combined total could still amount to a one-time air strike as opposed to more prolonged bombing.


That difference is of the essence politically. It is one thing to start a bombing campaign of unknown duration and scope, and quite another to announce that the previous night a number of buildings were destroyed. The negative political impact within Iran, within region and globally would be infinitely smaller. It would be most unfortunate if narrowly bureaucratic considerations or a rigid adherence to standard operating procedures were allowed to prevail over political priorities, increasing sortie numbers unnecessar-



“...to destroy selectively only the critical or hard-to-replace structures, less than 100 aiming points would suffice, unless an exaggerated number of defense suppression and air superiority sorties were also flown”

ily to over-insure against feeble Iranian air defenses, thus precluding a one-time strike. It would be imperfect of course, but then the purpose is not to solve the problem presented by Iran or even its nuclear program, but only to delay the acquisition of nuclear weapons as long as possible, in the hope that Iran will not want to provoke another attack by persisting in its efforts, or even that a better regime comes along—something that will surely happen one day.

All of the above presumes target intelligence of sufficient accuracy. That is not an unreasonable assumption. Iran is not North Korea. Its borders are open to visitors and are easily crossed illegally, both ways. There are a great many Iranians expatriates abroad – more than a million in the US alone— who travel back and forth and frequently communicate with friends and relatives still in Iran, and there are active opposition groups both formal and informal within Iran's educated classes,



over Iran, punishing measures could still be implemented to dissuade investments in Iran, to deny international banking services, and prohibit the travel of leaders broadly defined and their families to their favorite European destinations –it would not be a global travel ban, but Pyongyang is not Paris. In the meantime, the new Intelligence now available should be used to slow down Iran's nuclear program by finally, at long last, stopping exports of electron-beam welders, balancing machines, vacuum pumps, flow-forming machines and such, chiefly from German and Swiss manufacturers. For that was the startling discovery made by the IAEA inspectors: although Iran's nuclear program critically depends on equipment imported from Europe –a well known fact in itself – the Iranians had not even


bothered to remove the manufacturers' labels, complete with names, addresses and telephone numbers.

There is also something else that should be done most vigorously in the meantime, if only to keep faith with Western ideals of political self-expression, including the expression of freely chosen national identities. In the age of empires, national identities were everywhere suppressed but no more. Twelve nation-states and several more autonomies have emerged from the Soviet Union, four emerged from Yugoslavia with Kosovo yet to come, two from Czechoslovakia, and now Montenegro has separated from Serbia, even though both share the same language, the same religion and a long history of fraternity in arms.

It is now the turn of multi-national Iran to undergo the same transformation. Although Persians and those assimilated to them monopolize political power, although Persian culture and Persian-language is imposed on all, other nationalities account for almost half the population. Of these, the Kurds of the north-west and the Baluch of the south-east are already actively fighting for independence, from both

the cultural oppression of their Persian rulers, and Shi'ite discrimination against their Sunni faith —there are Sunni mosques in Rome, Tel Aviv and Washington, but none is allowed in Teheran. The Kurds and the Baluch, who account for some ten percent of the population deserve our sympathy, and discreet help. Then there are the Shi'ite Arabs of the south-west who valued Tehran's protection when Iraq next door was ruled by Sunni oppressors, but are now revolting against Persian oppression, and see themselves as naturally uniting with their fellow Arabs of Iraq just across the border.

These are all peripheral minorities and the Persian Shi'ite regime that rules Iran could probably continue to suppress them brutally, as in the past. But it cannot suppress the Azeris of Iran. They are Shi'ites and historically they too were glad to ally themselves with the Persians to protect their faith against the Sunni threat from the neighboring Ottoman empire of Turkey. But that threat is now long gone and forgotten, while it is the Persian suppression of their entirely different Turkic language and cultural identity that the Azeris bitterly resent: Azeri children are condemned to grow up as illiterates in their own language. This is no small minority than can be brutalized — there at least 16 million Azeris in the North-West. Iran (Iranians of Azeri origin in Tehran or elsewhere in the country are often entirely assimilated) as a compact population needs only cohesion to control the situation where they live. The shape of things to come was made clear by the gigantic demonstrations in Tabriz on May 11 of this year, during which the police, Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia of the regime did not even try to resist, even though banners were carried calling for an




Ethnic and religious distribution on the Iranian territory.

“The shape of things to come was made clear by the gigantic demonstrations in Tabriz on May 11 of this year, during which the police, the Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia of the regime did not even try to resist, even though banners were carried calling for an independent, united Azerbaijan,”

our own friendly regard and support, if only to facilitate their peaceful separation. That should be at the center of the three-year interim agenda for Iran.

Edward N. Luttwak
Political Scientist





FROM EUROPARTNERSHIP TO PROXIMITY POLICY

FROM EUROPARTNERSHIP TO PROXIMITY POLICY

Within a political prospect of integration and cooperation towards the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 is a strategic document for the European Union. But it is not sufficient for achieving concrete objectives, since these depend on political values that should be shared by systems and cultures very different from each other. The Union's proximity policy – started in 2003 – today is trying to re-modulate the possibilities of having a shared political space towards the South, counting on a progressive harmonization of the social and political values within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

The European Union, in its geopolitical position, is not a negligible element in the political and economic analysis of the Middle East and Mediterranean region.

The continental aggregation remains a political identity, which – besides its enlargement to the East and the possibility of a discussed opening to Ankara – implements its project of a widened community, envisaging an ampler Mediterranean, which involves Europe in the events of a "greater" Middle East. A political community characterized by the joint interests present in the area. A community that is a synthesis of very strong social and economic proximities. A region that is Euro-Mediterranean on one side and Middle-Eastern on the other. It is a synthesis between two geopolitical regions that interface and take turns in directing and conditioning the political action in the Mediterranean.

From the Balkan crisis onwards, in today's world of international relations, the role of physical-political hinge played by the Middle East represents a perfect example of junction line between different entities. A line along which the decline of the State as maximum system of political organization of one or more communities confers a particular political dignity to the minorities and the aggregate communities.

In this system, today more than in the past, politics and economy increase the importance of

a region characterized by a strong social dynamism particularly sensitive to the needs of the minorities, and meeting point of diverse and advanced cultures. The Mediterranean and the Middle East actually share very ancient cultures and interdependent economies, at least for the energy balance that the latter represents for the former. Nevertheless, the cultural similarity has difficulty in realizing a bond characterized by strong solidarity ties. The difficulty is caused by interests in the Middle East area that have never been shared, and by the wrong perception that the European Union and the United States have had about the strategic value of the basin, from the end of the Cold War onwards.

“...the role of physical-political hinge played by the Middle East represents a perfect example of junction line between different entities”

Nonetheless one can think that a position of politico-strategic centrality may have been taken during these last decades, especially today, after the start of the Oslo process and the West's sensitivity towards the critical state of the Middle-Eastern societies, which fear modernity and are a prey to terrorist violence. An old centrality that entrusts to the Mediterranean basin the role of an area where economic and exchange opportunities converge. An area that has renewed itself, owing to its ability to manage the resources, and this time not only the energetic ones. Exchanges that have as an objective the growth of the community, the stability of its institutions and the freedom from need. Exchanges that are indispensable for the cohesion of the communities of the enlarged region, in

order to take away space and human resources from destabilizing actors, whose logic is the erosion of the region's political capabilities so as to avoid the establishment of future scenarios of energy domination as expression of power objectives at the heart of the world, as China and Russia tend to do.

WHAT SOUTH FOR THE UNION?

There is one more question that pertains to the preceding analysis. What are the elements that connect the Euro-Atlantic Countries with those of the southern shore of Europe and the Middle East? In a certain sense, there is a Mediterranean tradition in the particularly anthropocentric customs and culture typical of the southern and Mediterranean regions. A human dimension, which, in a good or a bad way, characterizes the life style and relativizes the worship of organization, typical of the northern regions, promoted by ancient communities, which had already within them their own codes of conduct. Secondly, the presence of overcrowded metropolitan areas, where there is no possibility of any investment.

Nevertheless the southern region of the Mediterranean shows also a diversity in terms of social stratification. Namely, a widespread marginality of minority classes, due to the prevalence of scarcely tolerant dominant cultures, a low level of environmental protection and, therefore, a quality of life that lacks institutional support and spirit of private enterprise on the territory. A governance deficit which prevents its re-modulation, in terms of opportunities of access to the economic and growth resources. This insufficient capability of political leadership causes the lack of programmes and projects apt to progressively appease the social tensions inside the communities, especially in the Middle East and North Africa.

In all this, an important role is entrusted precisely to the transformation of the enlarged Mediterranean in a space of support to the economies that are developing in the area. An organized space, where a common governance can express itself, in order to avoid unidirectional thrusts that could ripen within partisan strategic choices, be they concerning the infrastructure programmes of the partner Countries or the reconsideration of the security policy of the area. A superficiality, which, especially in the face of the terrorist threat, would transform itself in a non-manifest proxy to regional ambitions, risking a drive towards a controlled economy that would not guarantee internal stability and the continuity of the energy supplies to the West.



Title pages.

The Mediterranean represents a convergence area of economic possibilities and trade exchanges.

Above.

Barcelona. A view of the EUROMED Summit (27-28 November 2005).

Therefore, the success of a Mediterranean security policy, as well as that of a common economic policy, depends also on the capability of the Western European partners of considering the region as a humanized space, extremely important for the political and economic stability of the continental States. More than yesterday, the Mediterranean becomes a real projection place of the West towards the South and the near East. A space, whose geographic importance is the result of historical circumstances, which along the times have given it the role of a hinge between different worlds and cultures, but whose destinies have intertwined in the past and are opposed at the present time.

But on what economic and social variables one shall have to intervene, in order to create a positive homogeneity of economic-productive organization, of shared political objectives, which should contrast and change the negative trend of marginalization of the Middle East from the typically Western model of development?

Certainly, demographic pressure is not a negligible factor. The process of urbanization of the coastal areas and the abandonment of the hinterland have produced an unbearable concentration on limited spaces and the migration of the small rural communities, with negative effects not only from the economic point of view, by depriving the territory of a homogeneous and integrated growth,

but also caused subcultural conflicts, with the ensuing difficulty in governing by employing forms of diffusion of representative, popular and decentralized power.

In view of this, and in a prospect of shared common security, possible and decisive, it would be wrong to propose for the Mediterranean a kind of doctrine of advanced defence of the West, and neither a "forward strategy" could represent the most useful defensive concept, without exposing the Euro-Mediterranean community – in a unilateral effort of reorganization of the world force ratios – to possible moments of crisis. In this perception of a complex identity to be restructured, the daily contradiction between West and East remains open. A contradiction that limits any possible effort towards a progressive levelling of the diversities. For instance, the Islamic communities believe that their societies must remain immutable and, on the other hand, the Europeans think that Muslims cannot be integrated. A paradox due to the radicalization of the much-exploited cultural confrontation and particularly to race mixing. In this confrontation, the effects of the globalization of the international relations have produced a not-negligible result. That is, a process of growing "culturalization", which, setting back the state as a lay political category, has caused, in the uncertainty that derives from such political relativism, the "sectarianisation" of the Mediterranean communities, which, instead of promoting an approach, risks to preclude all prospects of a dialogue, because of universal values not universally acknowledged as such.

Thus, immigration, human rights, women's rights, religious confrontation and inter-confessional relations are social and political phenomena which we have to deal with in the region. But they are also the most immediate results of the globalization process of human relations, be they economic or political. Phenomena that create a dilution of prospects, which can only present values of synthesis. A synthesis that should overcome the cultural conflict through the re-positioning of the lay function of the State in guiding the growth of the community and the encounter of the communities, especially those professing the Islamic faith.

In view of this, against an immanent request for security and stability, the emerging truth is that the dilution of identity, due to the permeability of the communities and the decompression of the ethnic frontiers, will necessarily require a revival of the Euro-Mediterranean approach. A new Mediterranean perspective, which can be useful, provided that one kept in due consideration another perspective, which is fundamental for looking between land and sea: the end of a symmetry in the

relations between the European West and the Atlantic West.

A good result is possible, and the success of any Euro-Mediterranean policy will be decided on it. This means that, in the face of a system oriented towards finding in the future its own balance in the alternation between unilateral models, the Mediterranean will stand as a region where any attempt at domination is diluted in a continuous, progressive comparison between models having a particular cohesion and, for this reason, hard to dominate.

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

From the preceding considerations one can infer that, today more than yesterday, politics and economy enhance a region characterized by a strong social dynamism, particularly sensitive to the requests of the minorities and meeting point of different and developed cultures. Cultures where a bond characterized by strong relationships of solidarity deriving from shared interests in the area is not easily created. Thus the Middle East and the South of the European Union redefine their geographical position, reciprocally exchanging their situation of being outskirts of the West and central places of the Mediterranean region. Two interesting positions, if one considers the basin as an area where economic opportunities and exchanges converge. As we have seen, this is an area that can renew itself due to its capacity of managing its resources, and not only the energy ones. Resources that can differentiate the supply of goods, creating the bases for a competitive market in the progressive internationalization of the life, not so much of the single States, but of the politico-economic communities. But what role can be attributed to security as a fundamental value for the economic growth of a southern West, capable of releasing the forces for the implementation of a European project for the management of the Mediterranean policies oriented towards the conquest of new markets? These are the challenges put out by the system of area relations. Clearly the slow, but essential, process of political liberalization of the market of Maghrebian Africa and the Middle East, exceedingly late if compared to the markets' tendency to globalization, with the exception of the oil sector, lead to this consideration. A consideration that derives both from the particularity of the political systems that govern the Mediterranean communities and from the difficulty of realizing an integrated production system and logistic layout linking the markets of the region. A system that implements an organized economic space that makes up for the absence of a Euro-Mediterranean aggregation that could guide the regional political choices, be they typically political or

economic. For this reason the European political and economic periphery cannot be left on its own, since the South is the geographic element that brings together different, reciprocally-related economic realities. In view of this, the geopolitical role of the peripheries, their being considered contact points with the rest of the world, changes the relation between the aggregation and the territories that comprise it, enhancing also the marginal realities. Those communities which, for their cultural proximity, permit the direct projection in the area of interest of the political and economic reasons of the respective national communities. In this sense, the Mediterranean, and therefore, together with it, the broader Middle East, may represent the political region which fulfils the ambition of satisfying the many interests that often overlap in a narrow basin, characterized on its edges by a particularly advanced cultural and ethnic-religious heterogeneity. In short, the conflict among cultures, and not in the paradoxical "Hungtingtonian" obviousness, shows how sensible it is to maintain a balance between worlds that are different, but very near to each other. Also, it shows that the possibility of securing a quality of life of a certain level is very much dependent on the external relations that one is able to create and manage with diplomatic actions, neither limited to umbrellas of power nor reproposable within contingent neo-imperial logics. The transition to a regional order and to an equal characterization of the relationships changes the scenario, entrusting to each individual politically organized community its own destiny. Also in this case, the acknowledgement of a new role of the West in the Middle East, the strategic ability to plan a Euro-Mediterranean partnership open to the Arab world becomes the conclusion of a new geopolitical order to be ascribed to the contiguity of the grey zone between the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A grey zone that coincides with Palestine, where the contradictions between the West and the Arab world clash in controversial terms that have become unbearable. This is a danger not represented by a determined, or determinable, enemy. A risk of a crisis considered within a possible evolution of peripheral unrest, brought about by conflicts of a socio-religious or economic-political character in the definition of the development levels, and of the terms of responsibility in the control of the strategic resources for the communities of the States of the Islamic area, as well as for the Countries of sub-Saharan Africa and of eastern Middle-Central Asia. The request for security is substantiated in all this. A security that expresses the need to be a necessary guarantee for the free and autonomous exercise of the government func-

“...a Euro-Mediterranean partnership open to the Arab world becomes the conclusion of a new geopolitical order...”

tions, which should ensure the functioning of the market and the safeguarding of resources, attributing a capability of international action that should integrate with the economic credibility of a mature region. This is particularly true for the Middle East. The utopia of a market characterized by exchanges based on comparative advantages being disproved, today a national economy reshapes itself on the pursuit of competitive advantages, finding economic security by virtue of the force of a State – or of a body of institutional entities, such as the European Union, for example – to make innovations in the space of a globalized market, which involves, in the whirl of the maximization of profit, social aspects and marginalities left to the political dynamics of confrontation. For these reasons, both the broader Mediterranean on the one side and the Middle East on the other, can be qualified as projection places of an interdependent and complex regional political reality in quest of minimum conditions of security. A regional system

aimed at supporting the endeavour to create a synergic and competitive market. A regional system motivated to realize conditions of security suitable for avoiding extremely destructive crises, given the delicate territorial balances, as the Israeli-Palestinian question and Iraq teach us. However, it is a matter of deciding, once and for all, and

meeting the obligations undertaken within the regional aggregations to which one belongs, how to find a balance that could permit to reorganize the production and service system necessary for the development of the Middle-East communities, and how to involve them in the relational dynamics of the region and of the international community. This involvement is necessary for an integrated economic space in a Middle East with large productive and supply potentialities and with a heavy strategic weight in ensuring the security of the States that form the Euro-Mediterranean heterogeneous patchwork. A space where energy, water, marine and human resources become a source of development, but also an extreme danger of conflict for their control.

SECURITY AND DIALOGUE

The problem of security is not only a political problem but also a necessity for a decisive economic development, as decisive as the stability of the institutional structure is for giving credibility to the economy of a Country.

Thus the establishment of a global and Euro-Mediterranean partnership aimed at transforming the Mediterranean in a common space of peace,



A digitised satellite image of Europe and the Mediterranean basin.

stability and prosperity through the strengthening of the political and security dialogue, an economic and financial partnership, as well as a social, cultural and human association represent the goals of a future to be shared in time. The final declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of Barcelona of 27 and 28 November 1995 is therefore still topical. Indeed, it regenerates in the formulation of the proximity policy, in a series of interventions meant not to export but to promote economic capabilities and juridical solutions in order to start a process that should lead to the constitution of a multilateral frame of dialogue and cooperation among the E.U. Countries and the Mediterranean third Countries. The Euro-Mediterranean declaration adopted in 1995 intended to define a multilateral picture that would strictly associate the economic and security aspects and comprise, moreover, the cultural, human and social dimension of a vital space that cannot lower itself on political and economic choices decided outside the area. The declaration aimed at resolving the dialogue not only among States but also in a transnational perspective, involving institutions and communities, overcoming a bilateralism no more consistent with the international dynamics that have characterized the Mediterranean policies of the single partners of the Union. The decision to realize a regional system based on equal relations

“...to start a process that should lead to dialogue and cooperation between the E.U. and the Mediterranean third Countries”

of globally shared cooperation should have favoured the multilateralism that, with due respect to the specificities of each partner, makes it an added value. In view of a possible participation of the Union, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona process, did not mean to replace the other actions or initiatives undertaken in favour of peace, stability and development of the region; on the contrary, it tried to be a possible synthesis among the three aspects on which the cooperative architecture of the region should have been realized. That is, the security and political aspect, aimed at realizing a common space of peace and stability (Political and Security chapter), the economic and financial aspect that would permit the creation of a zone of shared prosperity (Economic and Financial chapter), the social, cultural and human aspect, for developing the human resources, promoting the comprehension among cultures and exchanges among the civil societies (Social, Cultural and Human chapter).

The Barcelona declaration, in short, was a fundamentally strategic document, decisive, and perhaps ambitious, for the realization of a comprehensive picture of the policies to be followed in order to promote a progressive integration. Thus, in addition to the formulas of protection of the economic possibilities and of cooperative support – as well as those of reorganization of the credit system of each individual partner, as a measure aimed at creating the conditions for fostering the development of the national economies, guaranteeing equal access to direct foreign investments and lay the foundations for the harmonization of national legislations in

terms of democratic value and protection and guarantee of human rights – the security of the region has assumed a decisive centrality, since it has been entrusted with the stability of an area as a precondition for any further step forward. In affirming the liberty of the peoples, and their right

to self-determination, the Barcelona declaration also appeared as a solemn commitment. A commitment aimed at building relations among the Countries of the area, based on respect of the territorial integrity, of non-intervention in internal affairs, on peaceful settlement of controversies, on the common will and pledge to fight terrorism, organized crime and the scourge of drugs in all its aspects. These goals are to be achieved within a framework of regional security, and doing one's best in favour of chemical, biologic and nuclear non-proliferation through

the participation in, and compliance with, the regimes of non proliferation, both national and regional, as well as the accords on disarmament and control of armaments, creating a Middle East area free from weapons of mass destruction. The picture suggested by the Barcelona process could be considered almost complete if one pauses to think that the declaration ascribed, and ascribes even now, the success of any partnership policy to the concrete realization of a social partnership that draws the populations together. A partnership that should be the result of the best possible compromise between the existence, acknowledgment and mutual respect of the different traditions, cultures and civilizations on both shores of the Mediterranean and, moreover, laying emphasis on the common roots. A system of cooperation built on the importance of the intercultural and inter-religious dialogue on the role of the mass media, in order to achieve knowledge and mutual understanding among the cultures, on the development of human resources in the cultural sector, on cultural exchanges, on the knowledge of other languages, on the implementation of educational and cultural programmes respectful of cultural identities, on the importance of the medical sector and social development and on the respect of fundamental social rights. A complex architecture of human and economic relations, based on the necessity to involve civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and on the strengthening of the instruments of decentralized cooperation in order to promote the exchanges between the various sectors of development and security, from the cooperation in the sector of illegal immigration to the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and corruption. But, despite this, the Barcelona process has not been deemed sufficient. The process of progressive approach of societies, institutions and economies in the Mediterranean faces a very widespread and significant picture of diversities. The choice of a proximity policy, i.e. a neighbourhood policy, aims at correcting a hope which faded after September 11: to be able to realize, as soon as possible, a real cooperative and integrated partnership. The Mediterranean proximity policy, which re-invents the Euro-Mediterranean policy, intends to be a kind of complementary policy. Namely, as an effort to avoid the abandonment of a process *in itinere* but to re-modulate, to re-orient it, towards a possible model of harmonization, without affecting the international structures of complex and non-equal institutions of the Mediterranean States, especially of the South.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

At the end of this analysis, set between Europe and the Mediterranean, we could conclude that the overall political action will be decisive not so much for the economic opportunities of growth and development of the communities themselves, but for a political stability deriving from a shared security, considered an added value of the democratisation process that will have to be ensured on the South of Europe. In this perspective, the image of a possible conflict could come to mind. A kind of continuity with the not much historically credible theory based on the clash of civilizations. Now, if we were to believe Huntington also in the Mediterranean, we could certainly say that no region has suffered more from it.

But clashes, war, force itself, in the past centuries represented the action of the historical becoming, which puts diversities in contact, where the sanguinary reason of political and military violence has been replaced by the synthesis of culture, which prevails and does not annul, does not standardize the physically defeated culture, but makes the most of it in a multilevel system of dialogue. Alexander the Great, the Hellenistic culture, the Roman Empire and the Euro-Asiatic and Middle East events, after all, mark the historical evolution of a world made of diversities, where disagreements, if not clashes, between the single differences are inevitable, because inevitable is the diversity of the human community. There are no homologating formulas that can give stability to a system that reorganizes itself by re-determining the conditions of the relations between the communities that constitute it. Not even the force ratios, as well as the nuclear thermoregulation of international relations during the Cold War, succeeded in homogenizing the regional subsystems that characterized both polarities. In view of this, it is easy to see the connections between Europe and the Mediterranean Countries as a system of necessary relations. A system of relations that expresses itself in a region where there is no conflict between Christianity and Islamism, but which is heir to ancient civilizations, whose proximity promotes a comparison in exchange, in dialogue, in the inevitability of an age-old contact due to a geographical sharing of the same expanse of water.

Giuseppe Romeo
Expert in Geostrategy

The article was written before the recent events in Lebanon.



**THE ARMY OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF PAKISTAN**

THE ARMY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Backbone of the Country since the attainment of independence, today the Pakistan Army is the internal cement of a frail national identity and an instrument of pressure for the Country's foreign policy.

Between bloody clashes and dramatic migrations of populations – about ten million Hindus moved from Pakistan to India and seven million Muslims from India to Pakistan – the “Land of the Pure” declared its independence in the summer of 1947, after the British Empire divided India into two Dominions: Pakistan (with an Islamic majority) and the Indian Union (with a Hindu majority), despite the strong tensions connected with the definition of the borders. In particular, there was the vexed question of the sovereignty on the Kashmir region, which remains the subject of a dangerous military controversy between two Nations that are in possession of the atomic bomb.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

After the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885, the large Muslim minority living in India claimed right away the possibility of acceding to the new political institutions, with a different political weight in the social life of the Country. The claim was met with the firm resistance of the Hindu majority. This led to the foundation, on December 30, 1906, of the Pan-Indian Muslim League, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The aim was to safeguard the interests of the Indian Muslims in the Country. Instead, the result was a worsening of the rivalry between the two religious communities, which, in the twenties and thirties, saw an escalation of clashes, which, as regards violence and brutality, reached its peak in the last year of British colonial rule – together with the definitive breakdown in the relations between Congress and League – when in the “Day of Direct Action” (16 August 1946) promoted by the Muslim

League in the City of Calcutta, there were over 4000 dead and 10,000 wounded. And it was precisely on Ali Jinnah's pressure that the British Empire issued the “Indian Independence Act”, destining to the Muslim League the region of East Pakistan (a region that in 1971 became Bangladesh and was inhabited by a Bengali majority) and the region of West Pakistan. The two regions were separated by as many as 1700 km of Indian territory. During the massive exodus of the Indian Muslims to Pakistan (Mohajir) there were very serious disorders and bloody fights between the two communities, including real massacres on both sides, which caused over 300,000 dead, reaching the frightful number of one million victims in less than three years. At the shout of “Pakistan Zindabad” (Long live Pakistan), the first war between India and Pakistan had practically begun. Within the intricate programme of division of the two Countries, the British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten and his Commander in Chief Auchinleck defined the proportion of military personnel and equipment: 64% was allocated to India and 36% to Pakistan. It was a rather speedy operation, considering that it was completed in less than a month, from 3 to 30 June

1947. Pakistan was allowed therefore a lesser share vis-à-vis the Indian one, and the Pakistani Armed Forces were formed, on paper, by 6 mechanized Divisions, 8 Infantry Regiments and as many Artillery Regiments, in comparison with the 40 Divisions, 40 Infantry Regiments and 20 Artillery Regiments

assigned to the Indian Union. As regards Officers, the share due to Pakistan (about 4000) was seriously invalidated by the losses and the targeted attacks suffered during the violent disorders between the two religious communities, which reduced the actual number to only 2300 Officers. Owing to this dramat-

“...about ten million Hindus moved from Pakistan to India and seven million Muslims from India to Pakistan...”



Title pages.
Soldiers of the 67th Medical Battalion.

Above.
Storage of humanitarian aid on board a "Chinook" CH-47 helicopter.

ic situation, as many as 5000 British Officers – all volunteers – enlisted in the ranks of the new Muslim State, joined by some Hungarian Officers, to fill the vacancies in the Medical Corps. For the troops the situation was even more dramatic: 150.000 men, scattered in the various military bases in India, were transferred to Pakistan by train, but many convoys were furiously attacked by Hindu and Sikh militants, who, according to the reports of some witnesses, succeeded in massacring almost a fourth of the men, including the families that were travelling with them. However, it is still unknown the number of the survivors that managed to reach the "The Country of the Pure" and constituted the first effective core of the Army of Pakistan. In October 1947, at the beginning of the first war with India, the young State could count on 4 effective Divisions, deployed on the west and on the east, 10 Infantry Brigades and one Armoured Brigade with 13 tanks. Even if this unit – battalions included – could be considered a minimum force, the new Army could count from the very beginning on numerous adhesions of Muslims coming from South-East Asia, the Middle East and even from North Africa, who were carried by the emotional wave of the constitution of an entirely Muslim Army. For this reason – the new Pakistan had to be born under the wing of a military structure which could ensure the defence of the uncertain bor-

"...the new Army could count from the very beginning on numerous adhesions of Muslims coming from South-East Asia, the Middle East and even from North Africa..."

ders – already since 1947 the "Land of the Pure" had adopted Urdu as its official language; a mixture of Hindi, Persian and Arabic, widespread in the British Indies and, above all, in the Muslim communities of the area. The territory contested with India was Kashmir, in West Pakistan. During the British occupation this region was a kind of autonomous Princedom, ruled by a Hindu dynasty, but with a large majority of Muslim population. Since the "Partition" did not envisage the independence of the Princedom, but only their possibility to join one of the two Dominions on the basis of religion and geographic contiguity, the irresolute Maharajah Hari Singh did not decide immediately on the issue –

perhaps in the hope of obtaining the autonomy of his rich and fertile region – and in the delays of this stalemate, the pro-Pakistani tribes of the north west zone (North West Frontier, NWFP, one of today's provinces of Pakistan) entered into the Srinagar valley, with the support of the local Muslim militia. This paramilitary force – called AZK "Azad Kashmir", in

Urdu "Free Kashmir" – in a very short time overpowered the scant "regular" forces of the region, already deployed along the frontier only in order to resist dangerous terrorist raids in the territory but not an actual armed invasion whose goal was the conquest of the capital, Srinagar, like the one that was attempted between 22 and 26 October 1947. Even if the attack did not achieve the intended depth (regular Indian troops were immediately lifted to the region and successfully deployed in defence of the city) the help of the regular Pakistani forces – for the first time engaged in a direct military confrontation with the support of the British Officers – permitted to control important areas of communication in the Himalayan zone, while the continuous small-scale clashes in the valley brought no strategic advantage to neither contender. But for a better comprehension of the dispute still open on Kashmir, we must keep in mind that the intervention of the regular Indian troops was officially requested by the Maharajah at the moment of the invasion by the AZK (a request that was very welcome to Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who happened to be born in Kashmir) thus triggering a chain of problems on the sovereignty on the region, that are still unresolved to this day. In fact, according to New Delhi, Kashmir had always been part of India, not only owing to the "Partition" procedures, but essentially for the spontaneous adhesion of the ruling Prince (but we should also add that the dispatch of Indian troops to the rescue of Srinagar was probably an essential condition for the annexation to India) and for the unjustified invasion of the territory by the Pakistani troops. For the Islamabad government, instead, the parties signed the "Act of Accession" only after the entrance of the regular Indian troops and, therefore, the annexation was to be considered "forced" by an equally unjustified Indian military invasion. The ceasefire proclaimed on December 31, 1948 sanctioned, together with the end of the hostilities, also the wane of the aspirations of the independence movements of Kashmir and, in practice, the formal division of the region: 2/5 under control of Pakistan and 3/5 under Indian control. After the death of about 1500 men, for each deployed force, the resolution of the United Nations (UNCIP 13.08.1948) envisaged the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces (regular and paramilitary) from the zone initially occupied and allowed India to leave a minimal force in order to ensure and maintain order in the contested zone. Only in 1957 the entire region of the Jammu-Kashmir was officially transformed in a (federal) State of the great Indian Union. The ceasefire line of 1947, approved by both parties, became the "Control Line", i.e. the de-facto frontier between the two Countries, which remained unchanged until the war of 1971, which led to the independence of Bangladesh. Oddly enough, it was the only war not fought by Pakistan and India for the

control of Kashmir in the ambit of three wars broken out in the short space of fifty years. Like for other Countries emerged from a hard colonial experience, also for Pakistan the Armed Forces constituted from the very beginning the backbone of the young independence achieved, especially if one considers the serious problems connected with the borders of the State and the future discredit widespread over all the political and state institutions, while the Army has somehow managed to remain unscathed.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE YOUNG STATE AND THE AMBIGUOUS ALLIANCES OF THE BIG POWERS

In 1954, a first threat by an independence movement of the "Eastern Province" was put down by the regular Pakistani troops with the proclamation of the state of emergency and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. In 1956 an Army General was appointed Governor-General (Iskander Mirza) for the first time. He promulgated the new Constitution, transforming Pakistan into an Islamic Republic – still associated with the Commonwealth, even if it was no more a "Dominion" – while India decided to cancel de-facto the frail administrative autonomy of Kashmir, reinforcing its control with the dispatch of more troops. General Mirza, probably frightened by this sequence of difficulties, decided to proclaim "Martial Law" and ended up by fostering the first military coup d'état (1958) that brought to power General Ayyub Khan, former Commander of the Armed Forces, who restored the political normality through the so-called "guided democracy", promoting a policy of considerable opening to the United States. At this point, it is necessary to understand what role the U.S. actually played in the game started with the division of India and Pakistan in 1947, until the moment when the power passed into military hands. The father of young Pakistan, Ali Jinnah, sensed from the beginning that his Country would meet great difficulties (both financial and international) and did his utmost to obtain help from the United States, taking advantage of the temporary attraction that linked India to the Soviet Union. The strategic position of Pakistan – privileged observatory on the entire area – convinced the American Government to sign an agreement of mutual military assistance, officially an "Alliance Treaty". Soon after (1952), also India stipulated a four-year agreement with the U.S. in order to obtain funds destined to promote the industrialization of the Country, which was moving towards a certain political stability. But the subsequent and unexpected treaty signed with China (New Delhi, October 14) suddenly broke the relations with the United States, together with the blatant refusal of its protection, flaunted by Nehru in the name of a new foreign policy, inspired to "neutralism". However, Washington's military interests

remained decidedly oriented in favour of Pakistan: besides large military supplies, the U.S. granted a credit line of more than a billion dollar, all for military purposes (1954–1965), besides providing the military training of Senior Officers at the American and English Military Academies, and a concrete contribution to the entire organization of the Armed Forces, in exchange for the installation of several military bases along the border areas, in order to spy on the dangerous and cumbersome Soviet Union. The “frontier problem” has always been a constant in the Islamic Republic’s life. The “Durand Line”, traced out by the British in 1893 to divide the internal provinces of Afghanistan, with time has become the frontier between the two Countries, without considering the tear that would be created within the local Pashtun tribe, strongly motivated to remain united, and even with the ambitious project of forming a new State, Pashtunistan. The first incidents on the frontier line had already started in 1947 with the incursions of the Pashtun tribes and, in 1955 – in the face of continuous crossings of the frontiers – the Islamabad Government was forced to engage the regular troops in the Bajaur region. The peak of the tension – frontier clashes of a certain size, with many dead – was reached in 1961 when the respective Embassies were withdrawn. In the meantime, the United States – already involved in supporting Pakistan against Afghanistan, which was backed by the Soviet Union – was forced to provide similar arm supplies also to India, after the defeat with China, in order to check the Communist threat in the Indian sub-continent. Paradoxically, the United States found itself supplying arms simultaneously to the two Countries, which were continuously at war against each other. But the Indian Government – whose foreign policy was undefined in its essential lines – decided to send Prime Minister Shastri to Moscow (May 1965) to ask, and obtain, military and economic aid. The situation between Pakistan and India was degenerating again towards another military confrontation: to the New Delhi complaint of Muslim irregular troops trespassing into Indian territory (August 1965), India replied by sending regular troops on the Pakistani soil. This sparked furious fights in the Lahore area and only on September 22 of the same year the United Nations managed to enforce a truce between the two opponents, with the simultaneous “embargo” on U.S. arms supplies. Pakistan – having verified its objective military difficulties against the Indian Army – decided to turn its diplomatic attention towards India’s chief enemy, China, and managed to obtain a loan of 60 million dollars. The Pakistani succeeded in getting from China more than 900 tanks, some Mig-19s and the complete equipment for the 3rd Infantry Division, but obtained also an unspecified number of “Mirages” and submarines from France and as many as 100 T-55 Tanks and some Mi-8 helicopters from the Soviet Union (funny ways of internation-



Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf.

al diplomacy), before India’s protests stopped the military supplies. Meanwhile a popular movement arose in Pakistan against Ayyub Khan’s dictatorship. Its intensity was such that the strike proclaimed on March 25, 1969 induced the leader to resign. Another General, only a little more tolerant, Muhammad Yahya Khan, replaced him. But he was incapable of coordinating the relief, entrusted to the Army, for the populations of the eastern region hit by a cyclone of exceptional violence that caused the death of hundreds of thousands people, thus nourishing the separatist inclination, already prevalent in that area. In any case, even if militarily well supplied, Pakistan could not obtain important successes, not even during the war of 1971, where it suffered a bitter defeat. A widespread and pervasive campaign of civil disobedience started in the tormented region of East Pakistan, where it caused serious clashes in the city of Dacca, between the Territorial Militia and the separatist demonstrators. Sheik Rahman, relaying on the popular favour, formed a provisional Government and, on March 26, 1970, proclaimed the independence of the Country, which took the name of Republic of Bangladesh. Although there were a few defections in the Pakistani Army (the independence of the region was considered legitimate, like the separation from India) the troops loyal to Yahya Khan entered the territory of the new State and, after bloody fights, managed to regain a temporary control of the region. But India did not certainly stand idle (the Congress Party of Indira Gandhi had reconquered the absolute majority and hastened to sign a new accord of military cooperation with the Soviet Union) and sent its troops

in support of separatist Sheik Rahman, succeeding in occupying the entire region within a few days. The Pakistani troops acknowledged the shocking figure of 93,000 prisoners and, on December 22, 1971, retreated from Dacca giving the green light to the Government of the new People's Republic of Bangladesh, while in Islamabad President Khan resigned and entrusted the power to the leader of the People's Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But his arrival on the political stage unfortunately marked the beginning of a long period of violence and corruption, continued also during the following regimes, characterized by police brutality and continuous social abuse, whereas apparently only the Army took no part in this misgovernment, embodying for the Pakistani public opinion the nationalistic ideals that had inspired the birth of the State. With the coup d'état of General Zia ul-Haq (July 1977), the Assembly was permanently dissolved and the political parties banned, not without having sentenced Ali Bhutto to be hanged, despite the many popular protest demonstrations. After a short period of a slight political improvement, in 1986 President Zia ul-Haq reassumed full power and personally gave the police the order to shoot at the population demonstrating against the dictatorial regime, causing tens of dead and hundreds of wounded. Two years later, President Zia dissolved the Government in office and imposed the Islamic law as Supreme Law of Pakistan, which was maintained also after his death, due to an in-flight explosion of his aircraft, presumably because of an attack against him. After his death, Benazir Bhutto, the first woman at the head of the government of an Islamic nation, tried to start a process of democratisation in the Country. In the following decade, Pakistan went through a tormented period which ended with the electoral victory of Nawaz Sharif, the last democratically elected Prime Minister (1997), and with a fourth short war with India, for Kashmir as always, even if never officially declared, known as the Kargil War. Moreover, the disastrous situation of the economy was worsened by the international sanctions that followed the atomic tests carried out by Pakistan in response to the Indian nuclear experiments: in May 1998 India conducted five nuclear tests in the desert of Rajasthan – although the first Indian atomic bomb had been exploded in 1974 – and Pakistan answered with six nuclear tests in Baluchistan, followed by the foreseeable disapproval of the international community and the suspension of American economic aid to both Countries. And it was this environment that paved the way for a General – former Chief of the Army – who, with a bloodless coup on October 7, 1999, committed himself to promote the gradual

“...apparently only the Army took no part in this misgovernment, embodying for the Pakistani public opinion the nationalistic ideals that had inspired the birth of the State...”

return to democracy and restrain the process of religious radicalization in progress in the Country: Pervez Musharraf. Once in power, he arrested Nawaz Sharif, decreed the state of emergency, suspended the Constitution and dissolved Parliament and local Governments. In 2000 the coup was declared legitimate by the Pakistani Supreme Court and, in 2002, Pervez Musharraf saw his military regime and his personal power confirmed by a popular referendum called on April 30, where more than 72 million voters gave him an overwhelming majority.

THE MULTIFACETED AND CONTRADICTORY PERSONALITY OF GENERAL MUSHARRAF

General Musharraf is really an Indian (he was born in New Delhi in 1943 and emigrated to Pakistan with his family in that tragic 1947) and started his military career in 1964, with courses of professional qualification in Great Britain. He held the position of General Director of Military Operations during Benazir Bhutto's Government and, in 1988, became chief of the Pakistani Armed Forces. But what kind of Country did the new President find? Actually the “Land of the Pure” is in a state of total political and social decay. On the verge of financial bankruptcy, corruption has reached extreme levels and the economic situation is coming to a head after the end of the international financial aid – mostly coming from the United States – equal to four billion dollars on a yearly basis. Moreover, what kind of Army did he find? To better understand the intricate events connected with the Pakistan Army at the dawning of the third millennium, one should go back to the humiliating defeat suffered during the war of Bangladesh in 1971, a hard blow for the Country's entire machinery of war. After a military class formed by “cosmopolitan” Officers, coming from the prestigious British Military College of Sandhurst (during the period of President Ayyub Khan, 1958–1971 (by many historians regarded as the father of the modern Pakistan Army), there was a turnaround in the alteration of the ruling classes. The new generations of Officers, coming from the middle and rural classes of the Country, historically with more limited capabilities, proved themselves more sensitive to the call of Islamic extremism, which was encouraged by President Zia ul-Haq (1977–1988), who favoured its growth until he made a “privileged” class of Officers animated by the common ideology of (anti-Indian) nationalism and by the sharing of the new Islamic call, and with their dangerous concentration in the Pakistani Secret Services. Although characterized by a



October 2005: The crew of a Pakistani Mi-8 helicopter dispensing the first humanitarian aid immediately after the earthquake.

military regime, actually the Government does not really rule the entire Country, because local tribes that often fight each other control some areas. In particular, the frontier zones (like Peshawar, on the frontier with Afghanistan) are considered factual "Tribal Areas", led by guerrilla leaders much nearer to the Taliban demands than to the state system of the Capital. In view of this difficult internal context, some observers blamed on Washington the responsibility of having let Islamabad decide which groups to support for the resistance during the war in Afghanistan, favouring the extremist groups that catalysed the other paramilitary Islamic associations under the flag of the Jihad, the "Holy War" to be fought in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, the ISI Generals (Inter Service Intelligence) channelled the aid towards the more intransigent militant groups, like the "Hizbul Mujaheddin", instead of the more moderate elements of the Pashtun tribes, being afraid that the latter, once the war was concluded, would claim again their rights in the Pakistani province of the "Northwest Frontier", where there is a large Pashtun majority. The thesis upheld to persuade the American Administration to accept this choice was a rather elementary one: "the more militant the Jihadist are, the more fanatically they will fight the Russians and their Allies". This situation inevitably formed the humus suitable for the preparation of international terrorists of Islamic mould. Therefore it should surprise no one if Musharraf's coming into power was seen with suspicion by the western Community (president Clinton

"...actually the Government does not really rule the entire Country, because local tribes that often fight each other control some areas..."

condemned the coup, albeit with moderate words) until the definitive break - August 2001 - between the United States and that kind of "Taliban Emirate", because of the continuous American accusations of supporting the terrorist activities of Osama bin Laden. This was the right occasion for the new President: he offered to the United States the help of his Secret Services - with the precious competence acquired in neighbouring Afghanistan - and use of the valuable national airspace to wipe out the Taliban evil, believed responsible for the September 11 attacks, in exchange for the revocation (President George W. Bush) of the sanctions imposed in 1998 (President Bill Clinton) after the provocative nuclear tests, including a pledge of substantial help against international terrorism. With his backing to the United States, General Musharraf, even if fortified by the support of the two main political parties - the People's Party and the Muslim League - did not take into due account the growing anti-American sentiment that was spreading among all strata of the population, he preferred instead to obtain a strong alliance with the West, after the bloody attack of Islamic origin on the Indian Parliament (October 1, 2001) which caused the breakdown of the negotiations on Kashmir, the recall of the respective Ambassadors and the dangerous

concentration of troops and missile batteries along the frontier line. But the most careful military analysts point out that, in reality, the real problem of the new President is another General, his former right-hand man as Chief of Staff and today Commander of the strategic regions of Lahore, the influential General Mohammed Aziz. He is indeed the "éminence grise" of the coup d'état of 1999 and commands a good many nationalist and intransigent generals that are at the origin of the militant Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, exploitable objectives for the more ambitious military project of conquering India. In Islamabad the real power is in his hands. Before and after the Afghanistan war he controlled the activities of the Pakistan Secret Service and in that area he organized training camps on the frontier line, *Lash-e-Taiba* (Pakistani militia and Afghan members of the Taliban political police) and *Harakat-ul-Ansar*, infamous for hijacking to Kandahar, in January 2000, a civil airplane of the national Indian airlines. In any case, ISI has a great responsibility for distributing to extremist Islamic groups large amounts of arms and aid received from the United States. Although General Musharraf's coup was met with large popular consent, both for the fall of the corrupt Sharif government and for hopes that the military would return to power, the new President – who has always counted on the religious neutrality of his Army – was soon compelled to reckon with the fundamentalist pressure, which was by then widespread among the high ranks of the military structure, despite his policy of religious moderation, implemented through the programme known with the name of "The Seven Pillars of National Renaissance". In August 2003, twenty Pakistani Officers were charged with having maintained relations with terrorist groups in Afghanistan (and seven of them, including a Colonel, for connections with al-Qaeda) and in such a delicate moment – concern about internal stability and, at the same time, need to keep the American financing for relieving the deep economic crisis of the Country – an audio message by Ayman al-Zawahiri broadcast by Al-Jazeera (September 2003) urged the population of the "Land of the Pure" to remove their President, believed guilty of having betrayed Islam. In the month of December of the same year there were two attacks aimed at General Musharraf – some other sources maintain that there were eight attacks – in Karachi and in the protected citadel of Rawalpindi. The intelligence Agencies have advanced various theses (apparently the attackers did not really intend to kill Musharraf) but we cannot exclude the possibility that the Leader of a Muslim nation, in possession of the atomic bomb, may have been put under heavy pressure to let the most fanatical extremist groups have the coveted nuclear technology capable of making the so-called "dirty bomb", although the Pakistan nuclear bomb cannot really be considered an "Islamic bomb", but

rather a strong deterrent against the feared India. Nevertheless, exactly in that period the new "Ghauri" missile was presented in an official ceremony held near Islamabad, before General Musharraf. The missile, already tested in 1998, can carry a nuclear head up to a distance of 1500km (medium range, but able to penetrate into Indian territory) and bears the provocative name of a Muslim warrior who, in the XII Century, defeated Indian leader Prithvi Chauhan. Besides its "nickname", its official denomination is Hatf-V, with a payload of 700kg. Recently, on August 11, 2005, Pakistan perfected also the new ground-air cruise missile Haft-VII, which, despite its more limited range of 500km, with its ability to transport both conventional and nuclear warheads is equipped with a technology that can avoid radar tracking. This new technology has been studied not so much to surpass the "Brahmos" Indian cruise missile (290km range) as to offset the Indian acquisition of the American "Patriot" missiles, which have an advanced technology. Once the long sequence of problems connected with international contingencies was somehow overcome, Pervez Musharraf – probably on pressures from Washington – had to turn his attention to the thorny problem constituted by nearby India. The real hopes of peace opened during the talks between the respective Defence Ministers (June 19, 2004), who, by mutual consent, decided to institute a "direct line" of communication, to prevent doubts and misunderstandings in case of hypotheses of military attack, besides the possibility of averting the risks of nuclear involvement. But that was not the end of the problems for the General. In the night of December 21, 2005 a war broke out in Baluchistan, the tormented western region of Pakistan, rich in natural resources (natural gas and precious minerals) but inhabited by a Baluchi population, who has always been intolerant of the dominion of the Punjabi. In response to the launching of eight missiles against the Kohlu barracks during the President's visit to the city, the Pakistani Armed Forces launched a massive military retaliation (thousands of soldiers, heavy artillery, fighter-bombers and combat helicopters against the villages of the area, causing, according to the Pakistani authorities, the death of tens of thousands of people, mostly civilians. The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) believes that Islamabad's plan (the dam of Kalabagh on the Indus river) is to the advantage of the Punjab region, historically the "reservoir" of the elite of the Pakistani military regime, and claims the right to use the wealth of the region for the development of the local population, while no Pakistani Government – civilian or military – ever considered seriously the possibility of entering into negotiations on these subjects, preferring in any case a harsh military repression. While the relations with India were again deteriorating (the diplomatic relations between the two Countries had been contrasting since the U.S.



A Pakistani soldier directing traffic at a military airfield.

announcement, in March 2005, that it intended to sell as many as twenty-four F-16s to Pakistan. A fact that irritated India and China remarkably. The violent earthquake that hit the areas on the border with Afghanistan and India in the month of October forced General Musharraf to call upon international solidarity in order to try to relieve the dramatic situation, with an official count of 38,000 dead, 62,000 wounded and 3 million homeless. The Italian military contingent in Kabul (General Claudio Graziano, Commander of the Kabul Multinational Brigade) prepared immediately 3000 combat rations of food, 14,000 litres of bottled water and 100 blankets for a first aid, transported by C-130 aircraft supplied by the German Armed Forces, besides a more substantial aid provided by 250 soldiers of our Army with operation "Indus" (within the Atlantic Alliance) and, more in detail, with the assistance and reconstruction in the area of the city of Bagh (100,000 inhabitants, Northeast of Islamabad, completely razed to the ground), with the "Elefante" Task Force, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Giulio Biot of the Engineer Corps.

THE PAKISTAN ARMY: LOYALTY, RESPECT AND HOLY WAR IN THE NAME OF ALLAH

According to the western military analysts it is a strong Army, disciplined and well organized, consisting of one million men, in high favour with the civilian society. Shaped on the example of the British Army, the active force is formed by the: Army (620,000 men), Air Force (65,000), Navy (27,000) and "Paramilitary Forces" (288,000), besides a Reserve - in service up to 45 years of age - formed by 528,000 men, 513,000 of whom belong to the Army, 10,000 to the Air Force and 5000 to the Navy.

Therefore a "platform" of over 1,500,000 men that can be expanded, if necessary, to well over 2 million men, as there have been 1,969,055 males fit for military service (aged 16) recorded in 2005, without reckoning the availability offered by the group of those aged 16-49, still recorded in 2005, that counts 39,028,014 men. The "specialization" of the Army - called to defend the frontiers and the interests of the Country also within the framework of the recent international obligations - consists of the "offensive-defensive" military doctrine, i.e. in the preventive launch of an attack in enemy territory, in order to upset its strategic positions, and a simultaneous advance of the troops over the border, with the aim of moving the battlefield always on enemy territory (the first large-scale exercise was "Zab-e-Momim" in 1989, followed by subsequent improvements) and the development of reconnaissance-combat capabilities in desert and semi-desert areas, as far as earning the dispatch of specialists (Advisors) to the Armed Forces of African, Arab and South-East Asian Countries. The recruitment of the soldiers - at 16 years of age, even if they cannot be employed in combat until they are 18, and for a period of fifteen years - must take into account the rural extraction and the low level of literacy of the young recruits (compulsory instruction for the five to nine- years-old as been introduced only recently). Therefore the young recruits must start with a preparatory course of elementary education and teaching of the Urdu language, before starting a real military training. This period of 36 weeks has been defined as "paternalistic" by the duly accredited American military observers. Actually it has the task




An Islamic fundamentalist demonstration in Pakistan.

of developing the "sense of belonging" to the State that should replace the strong ties to the tribe or the village of origin. It is interesting, on the contrary, to note the level of qualification of the Officers Corps. To a procedure of highly competitive selection one must add a complete "education course" that lasts almost ten years, where the time at the Officer's disposal is equally divided between military training and academic studies, until obtaining a university degree or a doctorate, including fluent English, both spoken and written. The Pakistan Military Academies are considered among the best of the Asian world. They include – besides the traditional training schools – the University of Naval Engineering, University of Flight Training, Military University of Engineering, Army Medical University, besides the University of Military Personnel, where a course of ten months teaches the "governance of personnel", i.e. the management, the attributions and the assessment of the operational units. But the spearhead is constituted by the University of National Defence, established in Rawalpindi in 1978 for teaching high military strategy, obviously destined to senior Officers, but also open to civilians for specialization courses on the most important functions of national security. Already since the early fifties, the best students of the Military Academy were sent to Great Britain or to the United States for their specialization courses and, in 1961, this specific kind of training has been included into the wider international military programme of "Education and Training" (IMET). Around

"...a strong Army, disciplined and well organized, consisting of one million men, in high favour with the civilian society..."


the eighties, about 200 young Officers were sent every year to foreign schools (over two thirds to the United States), but the end of the American subsidies of 1990 coincided with the conclusion of the IMET programme in the United States – the Officers were detoured to Schools of the Commonwealth Countries. IMET was resumed only after the attacks of September 11, 2001, together with the restored "alliance" between America and the "Land of the Pure". The Officers, according to their rank, reach the retiring age when they are between 52 and 69 years old, usually not before having bought a small plot to build their own home (the military own the best land, both for exposure and farming), employing the loans granted by the Army, with extremely competitive instalments and interests compared to the market's. Moreover, almost all the retired Officers are placed in key positions of the civilian institutions (Postal Service, Railways, Sport Federations), not to mention university teaching and, in cases of higher professional importance, they are also appointed Ambassadors. The female presence in the Armed Forces is quite important. Initially placed in the sectors of Teaching, Health and Religious Assistance (in this case "Job Welfare", a kind of psychological support), today women are enlisted also in the Antiterrorist Forces, and it is interesting to note that Pakistan is the only Islamic



The Pakistan Flag.

Country in the world that counts also a woman, Shahida Malik, among its Generals. But surely the most interesting aspect is the role that the Army plays within the civil society. Some military enterprises, although born to provide food autonomously – like the dairy factories – have become real commercial undertakings that supply products that go from sugar to fertilizers. Furthermore, the “National Logistic Cell” ensures the transport of goods (food and non-food) within the whole Country, and the “Frontier Works Organization” has built the Karakoram motorway (as far as the Chinese border); the “Special Communication Organization” can ensure communications (Networks) to the most remote and impervious areas of Pakistan. Albeit helped by a favourable government policy, the development of the military and civilian production allowed the Army, born as the internal cement of a frail national identity, to play a determinant role in the progress of the Country, with a strong and acknowledged presence within the institutions and in society as a whole. Before examining in detail the structure of the Armed Forces, we should make a short summary of the composition of the various units, according to the “Pakistan Military Glossary”: **Corps**, generally consist of two or more Divisions; **Divisions** include three Brigades, with different compositions (infantry, artillery, engineers, signal and logistics); **Regiments**, in general, consist of 600 soldiers divided into several Companies. In 2005 Pakistan could deploy 9 Corps, 19 Infantry Divisions, 1 Artillery Division, 17 Air Force Wings, 2 Special Forces Brigades (with 5 Battalions), 3 armoured Regiments, 6 Mechanized–Infantry Brigades, 7 independent armoured Brigades, 9 Artillery Brigades, 1 Air Defence Command with 3 Groups and 8 Brigades, 7 Engineer Brigades and 2 Armoured Divisions. Of the 9 Corps, we find it suitable to analyse more in detail (Commander and location) five units that represent the Country’s strategic defence. Although the sources available do not always agree on the number of units, we can confirm

a “basic formation”, generally shared by the Western intelligence Agencies. The II Corps (1st Armoured Division, 2nd Artillery Division and the 14th Infantry Division) is stationed at Multan, Punjab, under the command of General Mohammed Yusaf. The IV Corps (10th, 11th and 40th Infantry Divisions) is located in Lahore, also in Punjab, and commanded by General Mohammed Aziz Khan, the “Islamic soldier”. The V Corps (16th and 18th Infantry Divisions) is quartered in Karachi, Sindh, and commanded by General Muzaffar Hussein Husman. The X Corps (12th, 19th and 23rd Infantry Division) is stationed in Rawalpindi, Punjab, under the command of General Jamashaid Gulzar, and the XI Corps (9th Infantry Division) is deployed in Peshawar, in the North West Frontier Province, under the command of General Ehsanul Hag. To the other units (I Corps at Mangla, XII at Quetta, XXX at Sialkot and XXXI at Bhawalpur) we must add the “Order of the Northern Zone” (FCNA), stationed at Gilgit and comparable to a Corps already since 1999, although the information on its present configuration is still discordant (there are recent reports on transfers from and to Peshawar). Actually it could be more akin to an infantry Division plus four independent Brigades. Against a considerable number of Main Battle Tanks (assessed at 2315 in 2005), a particular mention deserves the new “Al Khalid” – formally MBT 2000 – pride and boast of the Pakistani land forces. Produced by the “Heavy Industries Taxila” (COLPO) with a pilot project started in November 2000, this modern tank is actually the Pakistani version of the more experimented NORINCO MBT 100 tanks produced in China. In addition to the present availability of over 100 tanks, 300 more have been ordered by the Armed Forces, with delivery foreseen for 2006–2007. According to the Army Chief of Staff, this new system represents the “ideal integration of firepower, mobility and protection”, even greater than the Russian “T-90s” and the German “Leopard”, while the data available mention only the automatic system for target pursuit, thermal night vision with double magnification of the image and a ballistic calculation time of less than one second. What seems to be more interesting is the work done for reducing fuel consumption (the auxiliary functions can be carried out without exploiting the main feeding system of the engine) and for a better manoeuvrability of the vehicle (with a maximum weight of only 46 tons, it has an acceleration from 0 to 30km/h in less than 10 seconds, reaching a maximum speed of 70km/h. In any case – still according to the General Staff – the “Al-Khalid” is much better than India’s “Arjun” and therefore it makes Pakistan “invincible in a land war”. Another important project is now underway. It is the new “Al-Zarar” (about 100 of these tanks are available now – delivered on February 26, 2004 – and another 350 will be arriv-



Pakistani peasants.


ing in 2006–2007). The producer is again “Heavy Industries Taxila” but this time with the cooperation – actually, a real official joint venture – with China’s NORINCO and Ukraine’s KMDB. “Al Zhar” will gradually replace the Soviet T-59s (there are no less than 1200 of them) and the American M47/48s (presently 450 tanks in the AS version). To the 320 better-known T-80UDs acquired in 2000 – Ukrainian version of the Russian T-80, particularly suitable for operations in desert areas and equipped with sophisticated armament systems – we must add 225 T-85IIAPs (made in Pakistan under Russian licence), 250 T-69IIAPs (China’s updated version of the T-59), 50 T-55s (with the updated version of the 100mm gun) and 100 amphibious T-63s of the “60” series. As regards guided antitank weapon systems, the “Khan Research Laboratories” (KRL) started the production of the new “Bakter-Shikan– Green Arrow”, with a weight of 24.5 kg and a range of 3000 metres, under Chinese licence of the HJ-8 “Red Arrow” missile. The artillery has also the T-54 (400 pieces, 122 mm), T-60 (200 pieces, same calibre), M-101 (300 pieces, 105 mm), T-56 (200 pieces, 85 mm), M-198 (100 pieces, 155mm) and M-115 (26 pieces, 203 mm) for a total of more than 2000 guns. On the other hand, the classification of mortars is rather simple: 81mm (500 pieces), AM 50/60 (225 pieces, 120mm) and the recent Chinese made 63-1 (60mm), whose import number is “Restricted”. Also as regards the “Armoured Personnel Carriers”, the

Armed Forces asked the “Heavy Industries Taxila” to design and manufacture (only experimentally, at the moment) the new “Al-Talha”, the updated version of the well-known M-113 (850 vehicles), which is more used in comparison with the BTR 70 (169 carriers), the UR 416M (45 vehicles) and with the smaller “Scorpion” (35 carriers only). We mentioned the Hatf V (Ghauri) and Hatf VII ballistic missiles and their recent tests (2003 and 2005). We should add that the whole production of the missile arsenal is “officially” of a local nature (with the exception of the M-11, which uses liquid propellant and has a range of 300km and payload of 800/1200kg – imported directly from China) as regards the entire Hatf class (I, II “Abdali” and III “Ghaznavi”) and the more interesting Shaheen class, all solid-propellant missiles, with the basic model S/I (range 700km and payload 750 kg) and the new version S/II (range 2500km and payload 1000kg), not counting the project – still secret, but very interesting – of the S/III evolution, which should have a range of more than 3600km and a payload of over one ton. But as regards the real “paternity” of the necessary technology and the relevant production, many analysts believe that the contribution of China and North Korea has been fundamental. In particular, Selig S. Harrison – Director of the “Asian Centre of International Politics” – has given an interview to the “News Max” magazine (June 2003) maintaining that General Musharraf bartered the HATF/NODONG missiles with North Korea against the specific technology for enriching uranium, and that for transporting the missiles he used

“...the development of the military production allowed the Army to play a determinant role in the progress of the Country, with a strong and acknowledged presence within the institutions and society”

also the American C-130, given to Pakistan as military aid. Harrison added that the CIA holds indisputable evidence on the connections between the Khan Research Laboratories and the North Korean Changwong Corporation. As regards the Air Force, the presence of French technology is very important, with the powerful “Mirages” (Model III and Model V, both Mach 2.2, besides the Model

IIIOD for training and III RP for air reconnaissance, with the “Atlantique” for naval surveys, the SA-319 for search and rescue missions, and the AM-39 Exocet missile. Even if the real strategic role – nuclear capability – is exclusively entrusted to the three squadrons of American F-16s (together with the C-130s and Boeing 707/737s for transport, the T-37s for training and the P-3 Orions for naval recognition), a decisive contribution comes from China. For “combat” the Pakistani employ the Q-5 (Fantan) and the A-5 (derived from the MIG 19) for “defence”, together with the effective J-6 and J-7, derived from the more lethal MIG 21 MF. Also in this



case, Pakistan has an important project underway: the JF-17 "Tuono". It is a single-seater, "day-night" polyvalent fighter, a product of the cooperation with "China Aero Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC)" within the larger "Super 7" programme, which, besides exclusive co-production rights, envisages also the possibility of making substantial deliveries to the foreign market. The project, approved by the Government in October 1994, envisaged a cost of research and development of about 500 million U.S. dollars, financed by Pakistan to a maximum of 59%, besides 20 million dollars and another 20 millions at the beginning of the production. The prototype was completed on May 31, 2003 with the cooperation of China's "Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC)" and the Russian "Turbofan" RD-93 engine (already used for the MIG 29 and the Chinese FC1). Its first test flight (8 minutes) was made in September 3 2003 from the Chinese airfield of Wenjiang. Two Pakistani pilots conducted their first test flight (30 minutes) on April 9, 2004. Pakistan and China envisage to have at their disposal no less than sixteen JF-17 fighters, with mass production beginning in January 2007. Their foremost objective is the immediate construction of 150 aircraft for Pakistan and 200 for China. The situation is rather unhappy as regards the Navy, considered the weak link of Pakistan's "defence chain". In October 2005, it listed 6 "Tariq Class" Frigates (i.e. Amazon Type 21, U.S. and U.K.), plus 10 diesel-electric propulsion "Khaled" (1), "Hasmat" (2), "Hangor" (4) and SS-1 (3, still being delivered and of undeclared nationality) almost all purchased from

"Long live Pakistan!". A propaganda poster.

France. The only ones worth mentioning are the "Khaled" and the two "Hasmat", both derived from the better known "Agosta 90-B", designed by France's "DCN" with a licence recently granted to Pakistan. These three submarines - delivered respectively in 1994, 2002 and 2003 - are equipped with an "integrated combat system" (SUBTICS) which includes the "Exocet SM 39" missile that can reach the target at Mach 0.9 with an effective range of 50km. The Navy Aviation is at a similar level: only the Lockheed Martin "P-3c Orion" (a total of 10, but 8 delivered only in October 2005), the Fokker "F-27" (5, Model 200/400) and the Alouette (6, Model SA-316b) are worth mentioning.

But the first to parade in Islamabad on September 6 - Pakistan Armed Forces Day - are the men of the Special Forces ("Special Service Groups"-SSG) with their dark-red berets, camouflage jackets and light-coloured trousers. It is a special elite force (an independent "Commando" directly subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff, comparable to the famous American "Green Berets"; their total number is classified, an assessment made in 2004 mentions 2100 men divided into 3 battalions, although the most recent information refers to a formation of 4 Brigades, consisting of 3 battalions each. Born in 1957 as an "irregular" military unit, today this special force has its main bases in the towns of Cherat and Attock, besides a unit (perhaps 1000 men) stationed in Karachi and included in the Naval Forces (acronym:



A "Ghauri" missile.

SSGN) with functions of "non-conventional war" on board submarines. Its members wear a dark-blue beret with a qualification badge (a submarine) on the left breast-pocket, while on the right one they wear the symbol of a parachute. All members of these special forces must be qualified HALO/HAHO, besides the various traditional specializations (almost all achieved through special courses attended in the United States). Moreover, they are all experts in "Desert and Mountain Warfare". Thus the SSG seems to be destined to carry out those tasks deemed unsuitable for the regular Army, special missions included, (officially, the rescue of hostages) and undercover missions managed by ISI. At any rate, on the basis of our information, the first two Brigades are assigned exclusively military tasks (including the security of nuclear plants), the third Brigade is an anti-terrorism force, and the fourth seems to be permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia, for protection of the Royal Family. The Special Forces have been employed for the first time in 1964 (Jammu and Kashmir) in reconnaissance and sabotage operations against the Indian positions, but in the war of 1965 a Commando of 180 men - parachuted to sabotage three Indian bases - was intercepted and exterminated : only 20 soldiers were able to return home.

INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEM

The secrets of Pakistan's national and international policy are kept behind a high boundary wall, in the centre of Islamabad, along the Khayban-e-Suharwady Boulevard: it is the home of ISI. Although it was founded in 1948 by a British Officer - General Cawthome - in order to organize the Pakistani presence in Kashmir and in the eastern region, it seems that in practice the Agency has grown following the models of SAVAK (the Iranian Intelligence, trained by

CIA) and SDECE, the French Secret Service for "Foreign Affairs". According to the (scarce) information given by other Western intelligence organizations, ISI can count on a permanent strength of 10,000 men (between Officers, non-commissioned personnel and civilians), organized in seven Sections: "JIX" (the most important office - intelligence evaluations and countermeasures - which employs about 60% of the personnel available), followed by "FIOCCO" (political appraisal, with a special subsection about India), "JCIB" (surveillance of Pakistani diplomats abroad, with subsections for the Middle East, Southern Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Muslim Republics of the former Soviet Union), "JIN" (Jammu and Kashmir), "JIM" ("traditional" espionage in foreign Countries), "JSIB" (India) and "JUT" (the Technical Section, with particular reference to explosives and chemical warfare). They are all subordinate to the Prime Minister, but in practice they are controlled by the Chief of Staff (COAS). In any case, what happened to the "Nuclear Strategic Order"?

Pakistan's nuclear strategic system has always been strictly controlled by the military. Some analysts even believe, and they are probably right, that the system has freed itself of ISI control. The American asked some questions about the security of the plants, and President Musharraf declared to have established a special "Nuclear Strategic Order". His spokesman, General Rashi Qureshi, added that the nuclear weapons "are not kept in a deployed form", meaning that the sites that house the bombs are separate from the arming-systems depots. Besides, these weapons are controlled by "selected and well-disciplined soldiers, whose origins can be traced back to the times of British colonial rule". Nevertheless, although in Pakistan all agree with the security system adopted ("we have never had a loss and there was never a theft"), Michael Krepon - a nuclear expert and President of Washington's "Henry L. Stimson Center" - continues to be doubtful about the efficiency of the surveillance, adding that "the general security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons cannot be separated from the (critical) situation of the Country". Shireen Magari, Director General of the Government Institute of "Strategic Studies" in Islamabad, is quick to answer: "Pakistan is the first nation in the world to have the atomic bomb, despite the United States' attempts to prevent it". Within Pakistan this is a reason for real national pride. Glorified on the schoolbooks and exalted by the local press, it is even immortalized in the most important cities of the Country with monuments representing the "Chagai Mountain", the historical place where the explosion of the first atom bomb took place. The date of the event - May 28, 1998 - is still a national holiday, and Admud Khan, the Pakistani expert who produced the first centrifuge for the enrichment of uranium, is a "national hero". Besides, it should not



Pakistani and American soldiers during a cooperation activity.

be forgotten that nuclear power allowed the Country to achieve a strategic balance with India. In order to better understand the "disparity" always felt by Pakistan vis-à-vis its powerful enemy, suffice it to remember that India's Armed Forces are among the most numerous in the world (one million and two hundred thousand men, immediately after China and the United States, not to mention an unlimited reserve of conscripts) and is the best equipped Nation among the so-called "developing" Countries, even superior, as regards conventional armaments, to China itself. Pakistan can also deploy ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2500 km, very advanced fighter aircraft, two aircraft carriers and more than 5000 last-generation tanks, without mentioning 100/250 nuclear weapons. They are all warheads and, therefore, can be launched by airplanes. Pakistan's nuclear programme started in the mid-fifties – actually helped by the U.S. and Europe – and the first reactor was installed by Canada in the city of Karachi. From the seventies onwards China's help has been decisive. From three to six bombs are produced every year in the Kahuta laboratories, and apparently the technology acquired of late permits to miniaturize the bombs, so as to fit in the "Ghauri" and "Shaheen" missiles, which we have already examined in detail. Furthermore, Pakistan has a plutonium reactor in the town of Khusab. The plant has been ready since 1998 and therefore, presumably, today can produce plutonium weapons. Therefore the concern recently expressed by Tony Blair is quite understandable: *"These Countries are neophytes of the nuclear instrument, that lack therefore the principle of deterrence of the Cold War. Pakistan could have recourse to atomic weapons if it were to be defeated by India during a conventional attack".* Without going too deep into the operations conducted by ISI in the var-

ious wars against India and Bangladesh, we believe it would be more important to underline Pakistan's complex relations maintained with the American intelligence. As a matter of fact, these relations contributed to feed the criticism and the contrasting interpretations of the joint work of the two Agencies.

Today Pakistan's future depends mostly on the development of the situation in Afghanistan, just as the strategic decision made by General Musharraf to formally support the U.S. must still be accepted by the people of "The Land of the Pure", an explosive mixture of poverty and social alienation, of ethnic instability and nuclear arsenals. The President has recently given an interview to "Time" (Int. Ed. October 3, 2005) stating that his Country has started a diplomatic approach to Israel – Pakistan's Foreign Minister Muhammad Kursheed Kasuri and his Israeli counterpart Silvan Shalom met for the first time at official level on September 1, 2005, in Istanbul, in the presence of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan – sparking off foreseeable polemics from many political circles about the advisability of the approach. Beyond the strong religious component, the event represents a hand held out to a Country that up to now has been a strong ally of India, Pakistan's historical rival. But Musharraf cannot but take into account the new balances ("Arms and Business") developing in the Indian subcontinent: "Lockheed Martin" sold F-16 and P-3C aircraft to Pakistan and at the same time obtained an order from India for the flight software of the new "Light Combat Aircraft", just as "Motorola" delivered some components for the P-3C for detecting submarines and, at

the same time, signed several important contracts on telecommunications with India. The thaw between Pakistan and India could favour the construction of a network of gas and oil pipelines between the two Countries, with an envisaged expenditure of 5

billion dollars and a length of 2600km with important branches in Pakistan territory. This, besides the energetic advantages, would bring 70 million dollars a year into the coffers of the State for transit dues. If General Musharraf succeeds in keeping the political control and moral cohesion of his Army – a crucial factor for the stability of the whole region – the forecasts made by Benazir Bhutto in 1995 could indeed come true: "Pakistan is a moderate, democratic and Islamic Country, strategically located at the junction of Southern Asia, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea: a region of political instability, but also of great economic possibilities.

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"Pakistan's nuclear strategic system has always been strictly controlled by the military"





SECURITY AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

A connection network that can rapidly manage continental communications and energy supplies is the fly-wheel for the development of 25-member Europe and represents a project that is actually the most advanced attempt at governing the globalization of the economy, so that 500 million European citizens can live together.



The creation of a political and economic area which is common to the countries that have been enemies for centuries represents a really innovative institutional project. After the Second World War, the European States started to establish with difficulty some institutions in order that they could favour the convergence of different political and economic systems and stimulate the process of integration. Creating an economic and monetary union has turned out to be extremely important. However, a lot remains to be done so that this union can be used for the common good rather than for individual profit. In this regard, in 2000 Lisbon hosted a meeting in which Heads of State and Government participated in order to lay the foundations for an ambitious European policy aimed at making the continental economy the strongest and the most competitive and advanced in the world from a social point of view. In addi-

Title pages.
Europe's energy networks.

Above.
Detail of a Swiss gas pipeline.

tion, it is interesting to note that there is also close cooperation in terms of security, which has resulted in visible improvements up to now, taking account of the variety of laws concerning judicial affairs and internal security. Finally, the Rapid Reaction Force has become operative and has played a leading role in different international contexts. Ultimately, Europe is making great strides towards its goals. That being stated, it is advisable to draw our attention to a key issue relating to the future of the European Union: development and modernization in a significant social dimension.


THE STAKES

In this context, any difficulties arising from negotiations on agriculture, transitional periods and emigration must not overshadow the enormous potential of the European Union. In fact, this is the greatest challenge to face because the last enlargement cannot be considered in the same way of the previous ones. We do not have to discuss the question in terms of population and living standards. We have to consider it in terms of civilization and values. Actually, the project to make 500 million people live together is an attempt to handle the process of globalization which the whole world hopes for. If this project is successful, historians will say that Europe has managed to create a perfect synthesis of marketing strategies (competition and free competition) and rules for the preservation of identity and talent.

We need to try new approaches to the problem. In fact, Europe cannot pursue only the objectives that have been defined by the Maastricht Treaty. It also has to establish attainable and realistic goals concerning the European Union as a whole: there is no difference between economic and social success because both of them are part of the same project. Hence the need for European ideals, a complementary role of the East and the West and the recognition of the cultural pluralism. Some people see this Union as a «continent» with its own personality and diversity. The new member states' contribution depends on their history. Many of them were victims of totalitarianism and were subject to the great powers for more than one century. Moreover we should take into account the peculiar mentality of people living in the smallest nations of Europe. In this regard, Jean Monnet said: *this abundance, this coexistence of big and small countries has great human value and even spiritual significance.*

Their contribution is much more qualitative than quantitative and this factor must be considered when discussing the European future. Admittedly it will not be easy. As well as economic and legal difficulties, these countries have to overcome other obstacles. After the Second World War they had to struggle to preserve their national identity because they could not benefit from effective administration within pluralist democracy and a free market economy. Another problem lies in the absence of the middle classes and the secularization whose effects were clearly visible in the new *Länder* of East

“The Heads of State and Government decided to make the continental economy the most powerful, most competitive and most advanced one on the social plane”



Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Economic Community.

Germany. Their past has not been erased. It can be recaptured and assume a different shape with nostalgia, remorse and difficulty. In other words, it is necessary to rediscover one's own traditions and personality. When Greece, Spain and Portugal became members of the EU, they brought a further quarter of territory to the Union, whereas the last ten new

members have brought just one third. The three Mediterranean countries produced an increase of 22% of the EU's population, the ten new members caused an increase of 30%. As far as the gross domestic product is concerned, the former brought about an increase of 10%, the latter only 5%. In addition, in Greece, Spain and Portugal the standard of living is two thirds of the average of the EU countries. It is only one third in the other countries (38%). The difference is significant. Lots of progress has been made, but considerable difficulties lie in the emigration of labour and the modernization of



Building an offshore installation.

various sectors of agriculture, energy, transport and environment. With regard to these four sectors the adoption of regulations would require huge investments (about 6% of GDP).

PRIMARY OBJECTIVES

The European Union pursues three major objectives. It aims to become a reference point for peace and security, to promote fair and sustainable development and to allow the cultural diversity of the population full and free expression. In fact, the essential features that distinguish one culture from another must be retained. Only in this way can we «reach the universal» without losing our unique identity. The first objective involves guaranteeing the integrity of the frontiers. This is an historic revolution. To give an example, there are still a lot of problems concerning Hungarian minorities and the Sudetes. This requires a remarkable effort to solve the situations in the Balkans. There is no doubt that Bulgaria and Romania are behind the other countries from the point of view of economic development, but it is also true that it is not easy to transform ex Yugoslavia, which originated from a treaty, into a system of independent nations. Nevertheless, we should wonder whether urging those countries to mutual cooperation, which requires considerable effort like that made for the ECSC, is really much more difficult now than before.

“The European Union pursues essentially three major objectives: to become a space of peace and security, to promote a fair and sustainable development and allow an enriched expression of diversities...”

This is a relevant question. Unfortunately, each country tends to establish direct economic and financial relations with the Union. It is a real hornet's nest. For instance, the Mediterranean countries that were not a party to the treaties need a leader. This makes the dream of a great Europe extremely difficult to realize. However, we should consider the objective of internal security carefully since criminality and terrorism touch all the countries. Of course, it is impossible to regulate everything; it is not only up to the Armed Forces to defend the frontiers, but it is necessary to handle the relationships with the States neighbouring on the European Union.

The second goal is to promote fair and sustainable development. The European market is becoming huge with its 500 million people and the aim is to get each member country to adhere to a single set of rules. The Single Act of 1985, which had a key role in creating a common market, was composed of three points which were accepted by the «Fifteen» reluctantly: competition spurs people into action, cooperation strengthens relations between countries, solidarity establishes close ties between states. If national egoism or financial reasons led European countries to disregard these golden rules, the EU would be nothing less than an area of free trade, and so it would not stand the wearing effect of time. Competition is based on the big market; cooperation and structural policies are based on the partnership between countries which have drawn up programmes, worked together and received European funds. In the past, the project succeeded pretty well. Now, it must be carried out in other sectors. To give an example, there is no effective cooperation in the scientific research because none of the countries are up to promoting it. The same is true for health and policy relating pharmaceutical products. Cooperation is essential for all countries and must to be developed.

The last objective concerns solidarity. The Single Market would never have been created if the European Community had not increased its budget from 5 billion Euro_s (1984) to 40 (today). However, it was not simply a matter of money: Europe did exist. People running regional and local affairs realized that and did not confine their attention to funds. They came up with innovations and exchanged experiences with each other.



Only in this way will they be able to build a common «laboratory» to handle the process of globalization. This will prove that the EU is able to accept competition and free trade provided that all countries observe basic and fundamental rules.

THE HISTORICAL REFERENCE FRAMEWORK

The downfall of the Soviet Union marked the end of an era which had lasted about fifty years, during which the gathering clouds of the Cold War had mastered the relationships between the powers. This situation resulted in a two-party system which defined all political and economic relationships clearly. The events that occurred during the period 1989–1991 led to profound consequences: all countries had to bring all up to discussion in order to assume a new role within the framework of geo-economical stability.

In this context, the Euro-Asian area with its beckoning riches was beginning to look like a «Big

The Spanish nuclear power station at Cofrentes.

Chessboard» (exactly as Brzezinski described it). Subsequently, this has been defined as a «Big Game», because the great powers employed their strategy in the game. This policy has also concerned the Balkan area because it enables the regions of the Black Sea to be linked with Europe and, consequently, with the West.

Italy is particularly interested in the free trade with the whole area of central eastern Europe: after Germany and Russia, it represents the third commercial partner. This complementarity is supported by the extension of the offshoring. Many Italian companies, especially in the North-East, have shifted their business affairs to those latitudes. The constant growth rate points to the tendency towards rapid continental integration, with regard to the penetrative capacity of Italian entrepreneurs. Obviously, future depends on the decisions that will be made in the European transport infrastructure and network.



An oil refinery.

THE CORRIDORS CONNECTING EUROPE

Transport policy represents one of the most complex issue. In order that all EU countries can benefit from the enlargement it is essential to build up an extensive network connecting Europe to other continents through the completion of the so-called «corridors». The significant growth of transport market with the expansion of transport infrastructure and the consolidation of the internal market makes it necessary. The Treaty of Rome had provided for a common transport policy but for a long time the Community did not carry it out. Only in 1985 when the Court of Justice officially admitted to the inadequacies of the council of ministers, did the member states allow the Court to take all necessary legislative measures to overcome them. In Maastricht, the shift from unanimity to qualified majority and the «propositional» role of the Parliament made the institutional, political and economic foundations of transport policy pretty strong. In addition, the concept of «trans-European» network allowed the EU countries to set a basic framework of transport infrastructure at a European level. On the occasion of the pan-European conferences of the ministers for

“...the corridors represent the way to achieve a common transport policy, which became essential after the enlargement”

infrastructure and transport, the Committee, together with the member states and conference participants, explored the topics relating to this policy and formulated the concept of «corridor». The second conference about transport, which was held in Crete in 1994, focused on the topic concerning the qualitative development of communications within the Union. On that occasion, the conference members delineated nine principal «corridors». At the third conference, which took place in Helsinki, in June 1997, they drew up a further detailed scheme involving a tenth «corridor» to link the countries of ex-Yugoslavia with the EU. In the final declaration, the participants underlined that the «corridors» represent the key factor to achieve the objectives of a common transport policy which seems essential after the EU enlargement. The

establishment of a «trans-European» network, which is fundamental to this infrastructure, involves 70 000 kilometres of roads and railways, 20 000 kilometres of river systems and 300 airports with an investment of over 400 billion Euro_s until 2010. In this context, great importance is given to the fourteen projects concerning the railway sector to which the EU will allocate 100 billion Euro_s. They aim to build high-speed train lines (the Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London line and the Paris-Berlin line via Strasbourg), a tunnel and a

bridge between Germany and Denmark, a link between Lyons-Turin and motorways in Greece.

With regard to the ten pan-European «corridors», three of them are of great interest to Italy. The fifth «corridor», which runs from east to west, links our northeast to the Ukraine and, in prospect, to Russia through Slovenia and Hungary. From Hungary three secondary lines branch off into Slovakia in the north and into the northern area of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the south. The main line of the fifth corridor (Venice-Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Kiev) and line B (Rijeka-Fiume-Zagreb-Budapest) would lead, in the south of the Alps, to central-eastern Europe and the Community of Independent States.

From a strategic point of view, the construction of the eighth corridor (Durazzo-Tirana-Skopje-Sofia-Plovdiv-Istanbul-Burgas-Varna) will be very relevant because it will extend from west to east, from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, through Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria. Among all the scheduled routes, within the EU, this is the most southern and poorest in lines of communication. The tenth corridor (Salzburg-Ljubljana-Zagreb-Belgrade-Nis-Sofia-Istanbul-Thessaloniki) extends along a line which cuts central and south-eastern Europe diagonally, across Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and FYROM as far as Thessaloniki. The improvement of the communication lines and the completion of the ten corridors are today even more urgent than in the past, because in a Europe enlarged to twenty-five members they represent an essential strategic factor. As the «Van Miert report», which gets its name from the Dutch minister who drew it up in June 2003, anticipated, lots of projects concerning this topic have been conceived. They aim to make the transport policy of the European Union protagonist of the new «European initiative for development» geared to stimulate investment in some fundamental sectors in order to promote, through an integrated approach, the socio-economic development of the whole EU and the job creation. In detail, in the list of the European projects that have been approved, four of them concern Italy: the fifth corridor (Lisbon-Kiev) including the railway line Lyons-Turin-Trieste; the sea motorways of south-western Europe which cover Spain, Italy and Malta; the first corridor (Berlin-Palermo) and the railway line Genoa-Antwerp (with the line Genoa-Milan-Swiss border). In any case, not considering the eighth corridor among our priorities, that is the Adriatic ridge, it seems to be essential for the cooperation with the whole Balkan area to shift the nerve centre of the European infrastructure networks in order to strengthen the integration between dif-



Detail of an off-shore installation.

ferent areas preserving the demographic and geo-political stability of the Union.

A NEW PROSPECT

The eastern Italian frontier has to cope with unrelenting pressure from organized crime which gives cover to jihadist terrorism in some Balkan areas. Therefore, extending our sphere of economic and geo-political influence towards east must be given the highest priority, considering the central importance of this region, as the report of the International Committee on the Balkans, which was presented on 12th April 2005, has pointed out. It stresses the necessity for European integration which is seen as the only solution to guarantee stability and complete the process of continental unification. At the same time, the Report of feasibility has been approved in order to negotiate an agreement of association also with Serbia and Montenegro. However, the most relevant event has been the establishment of an energy Community



consisting of the EU members and eleven states of this area (among which there is Turkey), whose principles were discussed on 14 December 2004 in Brussels. As far as the Mediterranean area is concerned, there are different levels of cohesion in the eastern and western zone. The eastern area is characterized by the inadequacy of sea transport; the western area is much more cohesive and is livened up by national interests and by those of some coastal regions, which have promoted economic cooperation and territorial partnership agreements between them and North Africa. In this context, it is also important to point out that new energy hubs are taking shape such as Ceyhan in Turkey (which gives importance to the nearness of Georgia and Azerbaijan) and Nile delta (which has relevance to possible political cooperation concerning not only Egypt but also Libyan region of Benghazi in the west and Israel in the east). These hubs will increase the energy sea traffic via the Mediterranean towards the Atlantic and the United States and boost the commercial trade with the hydrocarbon-producing regions and with zones that are considered a transit point in the hydrocarbon trade.

Our geographical position pushes us to areas outside the EU, such as beyond the Atlantic and the southern part of the Mediterranean coast, where Italy is an important link into Europe. The Balkans are a region whose identity is deeply European and whose historical events, in the nineties, ended up impairing the process of their becoming closer to the EU. We have committed to bridge the gap separating the Balkans from Brussels.

Above.

Layout of the Baku-T'bilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline.

Right.

The French nuclear power station of Civaux.

THE ENERGY ASPECT

Among the three main sectors of the development of networks (transport, telecommunications, energy) energy is the driving force behind the distribution of investment. The increasing use of natural gas in the thermoelectric sector poses the problem of provision from the outside. The recent «war of gas» between Russia and the

Ukraine ended with an agreement. This event has had important consequences for Europe and, in particular, for Italy highlighting the strategic relevance of the «web of energy»: gas and oil pipeline networks which supply our houses

with methane and petrol stations with oil by-products.

The Siberian gas and oil pipeline network dates back to the Fifties. Enrico Mattei, who founded ENI, is credited with building oil pipelines linking the Soviet Union and western Europe, when the «Iron Curtain» obstructed commercial trade. In the middle of the Fifties, despite the hostility felt by western oil companies, he flew to Moscow to reach an agreement: the Soviet Union would provide hydrocarbon in exchange for oil pipelines produced by Italsider of Taranto. Today, Russia supplies oil and natural gas to 23 European states among which Italy

“The increasing use of natural gas poses the problem of provision from abroad”



is second after Germany. As far as gas is concerned, the Ukraine is third. In 2004, Italy imported from Russia, through gas pipelines, 21 billion cubic metres each year, equal to 30% of its requirements. The Ukraine imported 18 billion. This gas comes from the oilfields of Pechora, Benezovo, Urengoi, which are situated 6 000 kilometres away from the Italian border of Tarvisio. Other oil suppliers are Holland (9 billion cubic metres), Norway (7 billion) and Algeria (23 billion). The link with Algeria is guaranteed by the pipeline «Transmed» consisting of two big sections: the first, 740 kilometres long, runs from the Saharan fields of Hassi R'Mel to Cape Bon, whereas the second runs from Tunisia to Sicily (Mazara del Vallo) through submarine pipelines (20–26 inches in diameter) which cross the Mediterranean 600 metres below the surface. The pipeline was constructed by Saipem that has been in use since 1982. The fifth supplier is Libya. Since 2004 it has pumped gas from Mellitah to Sicily through a 32-inch

pipeline, which is called «Greenstream» (540 kilometres long), at a record depth of 1160 metres. In future, the length of the pipelines, which are laid in different areas of the world, will multiply. Links from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Europe and China, from Russia to China, from Brazil to Chile, from Nigeria to the Mediterranean, from Iran to Russia, from Pakistan to India are expected to be built resulting in a web covering any border. Even the corridor Baku–Ceyan will be able to increase its consistency through the British–Russian company Tnk–Bp, the third most important company in the world, allowing other countries to use the gas flowing in the opposite direction from the Russian–Azerbaijani pipeline, which is called Novorossiysk–Baku. Moscow would join them to play «the match of the Caspian» accepting the fait accompli and trying to change the traditional anti-Russian spirit. In this way, there is a tendency to give the energy outlet a European sense rather than an



Italy's main external energy sources.

American one. The energy giant «Gazprom» will increase the capacity of the pipelines of Byelorussia and so the Russian energy supplies to Europe will depend less on Kiev. As well as the increase of the capacity of the pipelines, a primary goal is to build an emergency system of oil reserves (about one billion cubic metres of gas) in Minsk. Currently, 18% of oil exports to Europe passes through Byelorussia as against 80% of pipelines running through the Ukraine.

THE SECURITY PROBLEM

The Middle East crisis, the growing energy demand from the rapidly developing countries (India, China), the strategic position of Russia as a bridge between Europe and Asia, the increasing hostility the big Latin American producers (Venezuela, Bolivia) show against the United States paint an optimistic scenario for the energy policy

of the Kremlin. Gazprom is one of the giants not only of the gas industry (it controls almost all the Russian production) but also of the oil production. The private companies Yukos and Sibnef, in fact, merged under the control of Transneft: it is a public company which holds a monopoly on carrying gas and oil to the Russian Federation. It is an economic empire which is able to redress a new balance that the unilateralist policy of the United States cannot control.

Russia has established relationships with Iran, Byelorussia and China creating three trade links with the Persian Gulf (through which 40% of oil requirements passes), Europe (through the oil pipelines of the Baltic Sea which offer an alternative to those of the Ukraine) and Asia.

Europe appears to be vulnerable from the point of view of energy and it will have to adopt all necessary measures to ensure a regular supply of energy. What has happened recently serves as a warning to all European countries to develop a coherent and targeted policy. Therefore, it is not only about gas and oil pipelines. For example, in Italy it will be necessary to build a network of gas installations which are able to transform the methane coming from the sea from a liquid state to a gaseous state. Currently, there is just one. It is situated in Panigaglia (La Spezia) and was built by ENI forty years ago. Our territory is rich in maritime ports which are safe from an environmental point of view. In the next few years the market of liquefied natural gas will be relevant. From 2010, it will be possible to use the Russian deposit of Shtokmanskoye 600 kilometres away from the coast of the Barents Sea. Its current capacity is 22 billion cubic metres each year, but it will reach 70 billion when it operates at full capacity and the gas will be liquefied *in loco*. Other alternatives are coal and installations which are able to transform all waste material into clean energy, as it happened in Brescia. In this context, people who are in charge of European energy policy have to face important key questions: an increasing dependence on gas and oil imports, political relationships with energy-exporting countries, definition of a more sustainable mix of energy, preservation of energy resources, the use of alternative sources of energy.

In view of a constant increase of dependence on fuel oil imports, the data that has been collected by the EU hides lots of differences between one country and another. The natural gas, for example, represents almost 40% of the total energy consumption of Great Britain, and only 15% of France and Spain. The oil covers 50% of the total consumption of Italy and Spain. This consumption is much higher than that of the other principal continental economies.

The extent to which the consumption of natural gas will increase depends on a range of factors. To give an example, France is likely to complete a programme that aims to replace nuclear power stations with new installations and the potential development of the transport sector with the creation of reciprocating engine and consequently to reduce country's dependence on hydrocarbons. In fact, there is another factor to consider carefully: the relation between energy choices and environmental sustainability. The question about the climatic changes relating to carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuels is less controversial than in the past. Even though the prevalent opinion is that an «ideal» alternative energy source, which can replace oil, does not exist, at least in the short and medium period, the problem concerning the discovery of a variety of alternative sources remains pressing and controversial. With regard to Europe, this problem together with geopolitical uncertainty relating to the Middle East has reopened the talks on nuclear energy.

CONCLUSIONS

The structural reforms that have been proposed represent an important step towards the continental unification, especially in the most peripheral regions. In this process of integration it is necessary to point out that we cannot make definite choices regardless of the Balkans and, above all, the policy of enlargement since the process of stabilization of the Balkan area is based on their well-known ambition to enter the European Union. A change of strategy would lead to negative consequences for security in the short period in the whole area of south-eastern Europe. Economic development, social and environmental security are often interrelated factors. The failure of this process in the eastern region would result in a risky situation of vulnerability considering the fundamental geopolitical and geo-economic prospect of the Continent, that is «the Enlarged Mediterranean». Consequently, it is necessary to speed up the process of normalization. In an area where our soldiers have served a crucial function of security for a long time it is essential to achieve a new balance as a synthesis of a stronger sense of responsibility of local political forces and Europeanization of the international presence. This is extremely important within a widespread geopolitical agreement which can redefine the

“An important factor to be considered is the ratio between energy choices and environmental sustainability...”




The strategic energy area of the 21st Century.

regional and European frontiers and open a «season» of cooperation between those countries.

Therefore, in future it will be necessary to follow two fundamental lines closely related to each other in regard to functionality and effects: the military instrument for ensuring and strengthening security and the economic strategy aimed at enhancing the development of the EU and settling, in part, the unresolved conflict. Both of them are necessary in order that the Old World can take up the challenges that are present within the international Community at the dawn of the third millennium.

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BEYOND THE ADRIATIC: KOSOVO

BEYOND THE ADRIATIC: KOSOVO

After seven years of international administration the time has come to put into place the transfer of responsibility. The future status of the region cannot be separated from certain other essential factors: democracy, human and child rights, pluralism and guardianship of the heritage of art and culture.

Kosovo is a small region with a population of about two and a half million, half the people are Albanian and the rest are a mix from other ethnic origins, Serbian, Ashkali, Croatian, Romanian, Montenegrin, Turkish, Egyptian amongst others. A pile of cultures, religions, traditions, the tense mixture of difficult sharing. Kosovans don't exist. Only Kosovan-Albanian, Kosovan-Serbian and many other small communities spread out across the region. The minorities represent 5% of the population but even they have a right to live in dignity in a country in which who owns what is one of the great unknowns of the history of this region.

The other side of the Adriatic is close but very different: completely within the Balkan zone and here and there a handful of houses. The pace of life is slow, and much of the land is poor and to now ignored. Tens of *Auto Larje* fill the road, the local self car washes: a faint line of rubber on the road, a man without age endlessly waiting. A lot of mud, earth and dust, and one asks oneself why this interest in a clean car. And the people are not in poverty, they stop and join the queue. One cannot 'invent' work for oneself, a leftover from the days of communism. And something from those days that still hurts. The misery of today is more than before, because today there is the uncertainty of the future.

It's a region impervious, with a history going back to the battle of Kosovo Polje (1389), where the Serbian community was defeated and thus under the control of the Turkish invaders, and a modern history; less than ten years ago the Serbian repression, rapes and attacks on the ethnic Albanians. There were months of conflict

before NATO stepped in to repel the Serbian troops (June 1999). And the number of victims increased; victims of the poverty, of wretchedness, of the uncertainty of the future.

Seven years after that conflict and seven years of international presence in order to reconstruct the institutions and social structures, to bring about the changes and prepare the land for a solution of this *status*.

The negotiations for such a definition were only formalized at the end of November 2005 with the invitation by the United Nations to Ahtisaari and his advisor Rohan. The disappearance of the president Ibrahim Rugova, head of the country until after the war, delayed the timetable and also the negotiation platforms of the two sides had not been well defined.

Mitrovica is the symbol of this region, a city split in two, and the object of the struggle.

What will become of this city when the region takes its new political, or even geographical, structure? What will become of this 'Kosovan' society? There are no 'Kosavans' but Serbs and Albanians fighting over their differences and their common wish for liberation. It almost seems an error, a reality that is still hard to find and receive a degree of acceptance and legitimacy. Kosovo exists as an area, a region, the remainder is Serbia, but there are few Serbs here.

MITROVICA

A long grey road takes you from Pristina to Mitrovica. Even the sky is grey and the air heavy: these are the fumes of the city of Obelisc, the headquarters of electricity and carbon. Along the road

“...a pile of cultures, religions, traditions, the tense mixture of difficult sharing”

we come across international cars, some carts, or old style cars – all filled with poverty and wretchedness. Small towns with small populations and only the minimum for survival.

The signs of the war on the orthodox church, signs of the violence in March 2004. The small 'huts' of humanitarian aid and of the international organizations that are now abandoned, but they still bring back the memories of seven years ago. All next to each other, one after the other, UNDP, Humanitarian Relief and others. There are also signs of a border that passes through the heart of the city, signs of aid for Serbians as much as for Albanians. Now it's no-mans land, a border just like seven years ago. The Kosovan-Serbs have retreated north, the Kosovan-Albanians have almost completely the southern part of the city.

Thirty or forty metres from here is the river, and over there is 'Serb land', where the life is different, different pace, language and for some a different history to retell.

A mining carriage is the symbol of the city but the mine is now not in use, 20,000 jobs inexorably lost for the southern part of the country. In the plains below the city there is furrow, the River Ibar, that hugs the north and separates it from the south.

Mitrovica is an emblem of the Serbian community in another reality, a different reality, with the river as the perimeter fence. And it's not the memories of 2004 or of the war of 1999 that confirms these boundaries, it is a deep rooted division that leaves little space for change or modern times or new ideas of cohabitation. In the centre of the Serbian part of the city it's better not to have a number plate, or at least one just in case it is demanded. Because there is always the risk in the other part of the city of being ambushed, so it's dangerous.

The *Main Bridge*, the bridge over The Ibar, is the story of this city. It's the bridge that divides, that defines, the bridge that shows the difference, the bridge that is claimed by all. There seems to be a calm, but there is still the barbed wire and soldiers that check every other car they come across. The international soldiers have taken the role of 'Bridge Watchers' who defend the bridge and their portion of the city and are ready at any sign of problems to call for reinforcements. Old men sit in their poor clothing on the benches along the banks of the river. Even the old women in these times of uncertainty are ready to keep watch and call out for help if something happens.

Now it's the KPS (Kosovo Police Service) who control the area, the two banks, and maybe when they are approaching that certain bridge they have a vigil and worried eye watching it.



Title pages.

Pec: the old monastery.

Above.

Mitrovica: the mine, symbol of the city.

The situation is stable, there are only small incidents, and minor daily crimes, but the memory of March 2004 lingers on. Mitrovica was the centre of the mess. Some tens of dead but many houses were burnt, families forced to flee and the fear of the Serbians returned to haunt these old houses.

The course of the negotiations is to initiate two separate municipalities for the city, one on each side, and that these are run independently, but that there is also a international body that oversees both sides for some years to come.

And then there is another thorny issue. That of who owns what.

OWNERSHIP

Ownership is a difficult problem and is at the heart of resolving the issues of this area. No



Mitrovica: the bridge on the Ibar river.

ones wants to invest in the land if they cannot be sure who owns it. They are justifiably worried that in an instant the land could be expropriated and taken from them and so lose all they have done to the land, all the fruits of their labour. The Serbians, when leaving the region, took or burnt the land registry books. Now the retrieval of land is difficult and the process of proof is infinite.

Both sides claim ownership of this or that, but how can ownership be proved 10 years after the Serb attacks on the Albanians and their reprisals against the Serbian occupants? Times have changed, not the instruments nor the results; devastation and occupation. The issue now is confusing and even more confusing after the war. They say that it is essential to resolve the question of

“...the land is no one's, and up sprout commercial centres, gyms, hotels and petrol stations....all around reigns misery and unemployment”

ownership is necessary and helpful for finding the peace, and cohabitation. They don't know who owns the land, if the land belongs to those that occupy it, and also how the land can be managed by the local communities.

For now the land is no one's, and up sprouts commercial centres, gyms, hotels and petrol stations. And all around reigns misery and unemployment. All signs of a black market that must in some way invest its illicit proceeds. The geography of the area makes, like the uncertain political situation, the administration, the future, difficult to control.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international presence in Kosovo is now in its seventh year.

The work of the international community is still to create the four pillars that a society can be built on: law and order, civil administration, reorganization of the institutes and reconstruction and development of the economy. The reorganization of law and order is concerned with setting up the relevant institutions and guaranteeing the fair treatment of all minorities, and to facilitate the policing and intervention of eventual discrimination. This process will also include the solving of the problem of the missing people. Along the fence of the parliament there is a series of photos and a list of names of men of various ages and professions who all have one thing in common; they disappeared into thin air. They have long since lost trace of the disappearance but the family have not stopped waiting or hoping.

One of the principal tasks of the new civil administration will be to initiate a census of the population and addresses, but truly to work this out, any statistics here, is a task nearly impossible. In the area of economic development, there is the issue of looking after the artistic and cultural heritage of the area, the reconstruction of monasteries and the protection of relevant territories claimed by orthodox and Albanian alike. In the confines of civil administration there is also the issue of humanitarian aid, the right of freedom of movement and the respect of rights.

The reorganization of social institutions is in the hands of the European Organization for Security and Cooperation, which concerns itself with the democratisation of the country, at

development, the protection of human rights and the organizing of the police force. No matter how much the European Union is concerned with economic development in this area the resources are always meagre. It's only recently that they've met the requirements of the International Monetary Fund to receive aid, and the Kosovo Trust Agency follows a path of private investment.

On the seventh anniversary of the presence of the international community it is still there. NATO guarantees the stability of the area. The region has the Kosovo Police Service and the civil protection force (KPC) but doesn't have at its disposal an army (and won't have while it is not an independent country, technically now it has the armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro Foundation). The NATO forces in Kosovo are in fact split into four areas with four separate brigades, but is in the process of being unified into one *task force*.

The United Nations is gradually transferring power to the local authorities. The Provisional Institutes of Self Governing (PISG) have already taken on board a lot of the local responsibilities (the more sensitive areas are still out of their control). OSCE is taking care of human and minority rights, the repatriation of refugees and securing the rights of freedom of movement. The European Union is almost ready to take over the reins of the reconstruction mission that probably the United Nations will pass up. There are a hundred or so non-governmental organizations that are involved in various initiatives related to the protection of rights such as freedom of movement, minorities, multi-ethnicity and repatriation.

The European Agency for Reconstruction has redesigned its funding for the Balkans and for Kosovo. From about 2,000,000 euro for the period 1997-2003 (about 280,000 euro a year) the budget has been reduced to about 250,000 a year. A fifth for Kosovo but the majority going to Serbia. The reconstruction and reorganization of the infrastructure of Kosovo has always been focused on building houses, water supplies, bridge rebuilding, municipal buildings, care of the environment (water, waste ecc) and energy issues. They also fund the reorganization of institutions, economic development and the protection of rights for the minorities.

The biggest problem has remained the eyes of

the public, who continue to only see, and suffer, the lack of and inefficiency of state services.

MOVING TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF THE STATUS

In addition to the complexity of the state administration, politics, institutions is added the problem of how to find and define a future stability.

The international community will eventually have to leave the region and the Albanians see no other solution than independence.

What can be done? What is the solution?

The Serbian Authorities want to extend their control to cover the Kosovo region and have sweeping bureaucratic powers over the whole corridor, cutting the region. The Albanians don't approve. Nor do they accept revisions of the border or divisions as the north want that would join it to Serbia. The borders are non-negotiable.

And in this way sticks the problem of the orthodox monasteries, the churches, of the small Serbian communities. The futures of these people are in the hands of the negotiators, between those moderates and those of more extreme

beliefs who could set off a new conflict. You can ask which side will win in the negotiations, but maybe it's better to say how could everyone win. One solution that only one side and displeases the other is just not acceptable, it will surely only result in a future bomb or attack that will set off another conflict that is ready and willing.

And so what is the best way? To not create winners or losers but to make everyone a little loser, is that the best way? What are the possible options?

The Albanian government working group are campaigning for a solution that protects the rights and full respect of the minorities, that allows the region to stay unified and under independent Albanian authority. To find Albanian consent on this issue is difficult. Rugova was able to manage the negotiations but his already ailing health meant there were serious doubts about the future government of the country. His disappearance has raised many new questions.

It should be tried to create alliances that would satisfy all groups in the discussion. And to make such improbable alliances were made for these discussions. And to make sure that these negotiators reflect the population.

“OSCE is taking care of human and minority rights, the repatriation of refugees, securing the rights of freedom of movement”

Number of Serbians returned each year, according to UNMIK data:

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	totale
906	1.453	2.756	3.801	2.302	12.218

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

At this stage in the negotiations it is essential that the local government takes control of the responsibility for the protection of minority rights, just as they are to be responsible for economic development, reconstruction work and the making of local institutions. If the local powers can take responsibility for the future of the area, in all aspects, then it will be possible for the international community to hand over the reins of control to the local authorities.

The problem now is indeed the hand over of power from the international community, who manage the projects now, to the local authorities. The problem being that on the one hand this is delaying the time when they will have "assumption of responsibility" and can control their own political, economic and social development but on the other hand they are not fit to run the country autonomously. The organization most competent for this type of work at the moment is the municipality, but they are reticent to assume control of the projects, when the projects are handed over by the international community they falter, for two reasons one for lack of managerial capability the second for lack of financial resources.

There doesn't exist a holistic vision. The management of the projects is more ad hoc than that there is a central system that plans and controls everything from one master plan, which would then maximise resources. One area lacking in the activities of the international community has been to fix a political objective that can be followed; to guarantee the end of the inter-ethnic conflict. One cannot think about 'after', how the living together can be managed and the community can be re-integrated. One cannot think of a long term plan without solving the complete problem, to think to about the empowering of the politicians and the populace.

THE 'PERCEPTION' OF SECURITY AND THE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES

One of the persistent problems in this region, and one which will signify a large step forward

when it is achieved, is the security of the country, but not so much physically but how safe the people feel themselves to be. This perception in fact, and above all the perception of not feeling secure in a situation, brings numerous problems when one considers the returning of refugees, how the minorities are to be represented, the participation of them in the community, or more simply how they can live together.

The problem regarding the Serbian population is that they could be forced to leave their place of origin or to live in enclaves, where Albanians who then would live, particularly in the north, in constant fear and insecurity.

“One of the persistent problems in this region is not security as such, but rather how the people perceive it”

The numerous non-governmental organizations, local and international, the United Nations, the PISG (the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government) who are involved in the protection of the rights of the minorities have all underlined the importance of involving all the people in the finding of the possible solutions, including even families who have left the region. They have proposed numerous projects such as awareness, information and prevention of infringement campaigns, regarding the rights of others and to ease the return of refugees, but the problem is that the results have been limited.

When the Bishop Artemije, head of the Serb-orthodox community, visited the towns of Vidanje, Bicu and Gradac, in the area of Klina, he deplored the level of poverty, the lack of freedom of travel, the lack of respect for property, and the faith and hope for Serbia to help their plight.

According to United Nations estimates only 5.5% of Serbian and non-Albanian people who had abandoned their houses in 1999 have returned to Kosovo (see table).

Certainly it seems that more refugees would return once there was a system of justice and local security in place, but not all the public services can ever be fully guaranteed. Access to justice and the protection of the rights and heritage of the minorities are not fully functioning. The popula-

tion are still outside the system, because it's impossible to appoint a Minister of Justice and to refer to a system of justice in a country that is still being built.

The lack of coordination between the central and the local governments ensures that the repatriation (for IDP and refugees) programmes are insufficiently controlled. Yet a greater coordination would build a legal connection to the people and greater information would render more concrete the effects of these *'going and see visits'* (the monitoring of local activities). Instead, however, the monitoring is uncoordinated and impractical and lacks the initiative at central government level.

There doesn't exist a central plan for repatriation. There doesn't exist a plan that would guarantee the security of people once they have returned, for them to integrate and readapt to the area, nor systems that guarantee the essentials, such as health, freedom of movement, education, access to public services amongst others.

There are no plans that can guarantee the placing and utilizing for these people. The work prospects in this area are limited as all resources are left to flounder. When the fear of unemployment is added to the fear of marginalization then there becomes little reason for people to return. Such measures would require the collaboration at government level of a number of ministries, for example, the ministry responsible for repatriation, for defending the rights of the minorities, economy, finance, labour and so on in order to maximise the social impact. These questions however are only theoretical, because the changes are stuck in practice.

THE PROTECTION OF THE MINORITIES

The protection of the minorities in this zone, according to the standard definitions of the international community and the local authorities include; the guaranteeing of freedom of movement and security, access to public services (water, electricity, medicine, education) and respect of peoples' cultures, languages and religions. It is often the access to public services which actually causes the most problems.

The hospitals are badly organized and lacking. Within the population there is a silent code, one that states the hospital in Mitrovica is for the Serbians and the hospital in Pristina is for the Albanians. An underlying mistrust and a split

society. Probably given the deficiencies and inadequacies of the system, people think that not only that one cure for one ethnic race won't suit another, be it Serbian, Romanian, but also the fear, the perception of the difference between the people that further splits them today.

It's the same regarding education. The international community is attempting to initiate multi-ethnic schooling. One of the criteria for a project, apart from its feasibility, is that it must be multi-ethnic. There are schools where both orthodox and Islamic children go, and it is this mode that the community will gel, not by religion, but time will bring down the divisions.

Good access to public services is a mirage. The electricity system hiccups along, and the in Pristina, like those in every Kosovan city, are used to power cuts for hours on end, without warning it just goes off. And they have already built two new power stations. The second has five generators but only one works, and the

country in general requires a third station and a central plant. The European Agency for Reconstruction, who is the main donor in the energy sector, is not prepared to invest money in the new electrical plants.

In the same way, water, gas and central heating, to supply the people is difficult because of the obsolete system and anyhow the cost of these services is too much for the pocket of most of the people.

Looking after the rights of the minority includes guaranteeing them access to the law, but not just rights of arrest and detention, that happen in language they don't speak. Also, in the years of Milosevich the Albanian lawyers and judges were kept far away from the legal system. Now everything must start from scratch, all the relevant people required by a legal system must be educated to international standards and the complex structures of a legal system must be put into action.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The political institutions have developed over the past few years under the guidance of the international community and the United Nations, but their ability to govern autonomously is still untested. Three vital sectors, security, justice and defence, are still in the hands of the international community.

The future independent and autonomous government will need to be monitored by the inter-

“the problem of access to public services is almost a mirage”



Mitrovica: a partial view of the city.

national community, otherwise it will simply collapse. At the local level there has been the welcome presence of the international community for nearly a decade, but the people also know that in the final solution there will need to be this much needed *status* that will bring about the political, economic and ownership solutions that they need.

The security sector is still relatively untested and needs more training and a longer period to consolidate. It's at more of an embryonic stage at the moment, and its ability to protect the rights of the minorities is more on paper than in reality, but however it is still the only system that is understood in this zone and is the first step towards the end result of democracy and respect for the law.

Perhaps it will take the "handover of power" and the "taking of responsibility" themselves that will bring the final pieces of the jigsaw together and make a complete final system. Until now however the sectors most sensitive are in the hands of the international community. It's probably a necessary state, so that they can search for a form of government, and push them

towards self-rule and autonomy, that they could reach in an undefined number of years, but a sovereignty that they will reach.

The local politicians are all of the same opinion that the security of the region is a fundamental step towards the final solution, for this area to leave the security in doubt would be a very risky policy.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The economy is finding it difficult to get going. The vast majority of international aid has come as donations and not as investment, fair enough at the beginning, but this has the possible long-term implications of asphyxiating and paralysing the economy. The unemployment rate remains high (fluctuating between 40 and 65%, depending on the source), and what can be done to renovate a economy from the recent difficult years.

The biggest project so far in the sector of the economy has been the privatisation of companies, which will bring more jobs, but only in the long term, and has brought more immediate problems such as the legality of competitive tenders. The results in terms of new work have been poor, and

it would need the restructuring and large scale intervention to become productive. In the second place there are all the sectors that remain obsolete (the mine for example) and which present themselves as good investment opportunities.

The process of privatisation of the large companies started in 2004, but was only given a big push in 2005 and subsequently completed in 2006. The process was broken down into various phases; identification, analysis, partition and sale. By December of last year Kosovo was in the tenth stage of privatisation, that would then finish in January 2006 with the auctioning and assigning of lots.

Some of the effects of the Kosovo Trust Agency have been negative, the privatisation and the parcelling out weren't always in the interests of the local population, and were not completely free of dubious activities. The Kosovo Trust agency carried monitoring on the process and those people who gained in the process (on individuals, on their activity, as well as any possible illegal activity). But more went to foreign investors and multinationals. The only local-born investors were those Kosovans who had recently left to live abroad. It was the mining and energy sectors who had attracted the most attention. Financial legitimacy was controlled by the banks who checked all funds for any transparency and illicit monies. However there are some doubts over the activities of the agency and the banks. An example is Ferronickel, a multinational that deals in the extraction and transformation of nickel. Work was stopped for four months in this firm because of doubts over the legitimacy of contracts.

The achieving of *status* could have numerous good effects for the economy, it would mean the country could divert its economic energies towards neighbouring countries, like Italy and FYROM. The stability would attract foreign investment. Some countries, European and non-European, have made some moves already, especially in the sectors of banking, telecommunications and energy, but is still listed as a "risky area."

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

The slow but gradual development of the country comes undoubtedly because of the permanent presence of the international community, based around the presence of the UN army, that guarantees the legal functioning of institutions, especially the new ones.

The European Union has developed an excel-

lent regional political structure that is perfectly in line with the needs of the area and the evolution of the local situation. It concerns two objectives; the creation of institutions and self-governing, in the knowledge that the country still needs the control and support of the international organizations.

The European Union will probably be asked to step and take control of the reins of the situation, but it will have to do it in respect to what has already been set in place by the UN, who have already set up reference and interlocutor structures, but there will be a lot more work in regarding the development and application of a system of law. The results at an institutional level can already be seen, but not yet at the level of law enforcement (application of the law). If the governing of the area changes to the EU their role will be rather peculiar, not least because they will arrive at the time when the need to decide on the new *status*, for 'autonomy' or 'independence'.

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF KOSOVO

The political situation is constantly changing. The Albanian delegation is looking to find a platform to support independence, expelling any dissident internal voices or splits. The choice to make these so-called Working Groups represents some of the political opinions in discussion, that they come to the agreement of independence without conditions, refusing any type of idea such as cantons, municipalities or conditional independence.

The political authorities refuse suggestions of decentralised administration or partition, in fact they want the borders as of the 1974 constitution. On the eve of the negotiations Daci, as president of the Assembly, was asking all and Kosumi, the then Prime Minister, to support measures together and not to put things to the vote. The natural convergence point of the Albanians is to where the EU stands. Lufti Haziri, Minister for local self government steers the Pristina negotiations.

The disappearance of President Rugova, the discharge of Premier Kosumi (AAK party) and the mistrust for the President of the Assembly Daci (LDK), in early March there were a serious of attacks on the state of progress for the negotiations.

Fatmir Sejdiu, a lawyer and university professor, was elected President on the 10th February. The Premier Kosumi has never experienced the full support of the main party AAK, that had elected

“The European Union will probably be asked to take control of the situation”

him head of government after the accusations of the Hague Tribunal at ex-Premier Ramush Haradinaj. The discharges were inevitable after the poor results achieved in terms of material gains and reforms. From the dismissal of Bajram Kosumi, the candidate names for taking this post include the Comandante of the Kosovo Protection Force (KPC) Agim Ceku, a member of the Alliance Party for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and close to Haradinaj.

And in fact on the 2nd March President Sejdiu nominated Ceku the new Prime Minister with the responsibility of forming a new government based on the support of the coalition of the majority (LDK and AAK). Kole Berisha (LDK) was appointed the new President of the Assembly and so replaced his predecessor Daci.

The United Nations and the High Office representative Javier Solana had said that the appointment of Ceku was an 'internal issue' for Kosovan politics. While politicians in Belgrade are puzzled and critical at the appointment of a member of the Kosovo Liberation Army to be at the negotiation table. There are fears that it will stifle negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. The Serbian President Boris Tadic has in fact declared "Serbia cannot choose the Premier of Kosovo but it is not a good sign that an ex-soldier has become the new leader of the regime."

On the 10th March a new twist followed when the Hague Tribunal Court of Appeal stated that Ramus Haradinaj could return to political life. Another ex-soldier has returned to Kosovan politics. On the part of the Serbs it has caused some puzzlement, but also some hope that this popular figure will bring a small sense of security and stability to the region.

The next day the Hague Tribunale declared the death of the ex-Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevich. It remains a matter of rancour for Albanians and Serbians alike who were awaiting a sentence in order to put a full stop to that past.

On the part of the Serbs it was debated for quite some time as to who should be at the negotiation table and after weeks of indecision between the President Boris Tadic and the Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica the government appointed a team of thirteen, led by Kostunica and Tadic, that also included two Serb Kosovans. From Belgrade there even came a suggestion of their line to follow 'more than autonomy, less than independence'. The current resolution offered by Kostunica

refuses any changes to the Balkan boundaries but offers instead wider powers of autonomy for the Albanian people.

At the UNMIK summit first Petersen, and then Ahtisaari called for the possibility of mediation, since the unilateral declarations of one or the other group could not do anything but aid the conflict. There are certain request that are, regardless of the eventual Kosovo *status* that cannot be ignored; the value of democracy, respect of human rights, pluralism, respect of minorities, care of the cultural and artistic legacy. The diplomats in the Contact Group, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia, have fixed the guidelines for the future: the pursuit of international standards, the development of one legal state, the respect of the rights of the minorities, the equilibrium of the region and non-violability of the borders of neighbouring countries are all essential objectives.

“ The diplomats of the Contact Group, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia have fixed the guidelines for the future ”

The 20th February in Vienna saw the first meeting between the two sides. It reached no set conclusions but the atmosphere was definitively "constructive". The topics for discussion on the second round (17th March) were devolution, the financial formulas for the municipalities, the connections sideways and up-down and to Belgrade of the municipalities. Serbia has promoted the financing of the municipalities and in regard to the connection between the municipalities and the capital has suggested: a wide margin of autonomy and decentralisation, that would include the monasteries and Serbian monuments. The ties between the municipalities and the capital would have to be guaranteed however in certain sectors, health and education for example. However on the other hand Sejdiu has reasserted the importance of finding a way that would guarantee the full respect of Kosovan law. Sejdiu, promoter of dialogue and harmony, has underlined the importance of inter-ethnic tolerance as an essential value in every municipality. One of the essential aspects of the *status talks* is in fact the restructuring of local administration, in line with the internationally wanted aims of 'integration between citizens' and 'integrity of territory'. The second round didn't produce anything concrete but was a good attempt to face those particular problems that face self-governance, there was even a fear that Pristina would not have even accepted the order of business.



Gracanica: the Monastery.

At the end of March there was a sixth round of negotiations, dedicated to the economic issues and as said by Stefan Lene, from the European Union, 'the most difficult to date', which really struck home the differences and the lack of compromise especially regarding the issue of privatisation, but with some exceptions regarding foreign debt and care of cultural and artistic patrimony. Independent of the defining of *status* the economic divisions appears a tough issue.

In June even the UN Security Council added a session on Kosovo. Ahtisaari proposed that in the following round, the seventh, that both sides were to be headed by their respective heads of state, Kostunica and Ceku. The topics to be discussed were the respect of the patrimony of art and culture, property ownership, rights of the minority and the economic question.

In the case that they don't reach a decision by autumn it was mooted that the Contact Group would decide on the *status*, and that then would be approved by the UN Security Council. However this has not been officially announced.

The attention on these *status talks* takes the attention away, and one could say worry away, regarding the future stability of the area. One

fear of the situation is that the new Kosovo will spark a new resentment in the region, and in particular in the Presevo Valley, and also there is the fear that the whole balance of the area will be upset. Kosovo will have its independence, economically and politically, but its borders cannot be up for discussion once the *status* is decided. Although there seems to be no drive towards a reunification with Albania, there is an international fear of this eventual possibility. And if differences exist between one and the other, between Kosovan Albanians and Albanians in other countries, in nearby Albania, they haven't received the expected fraternity that has been expected. It has been the foreign policies of the Albanians to concentrate on regional stability than Albanian fraternity in the last ten years, that in fact saw them place the country in a difficult humanitarian emergency that the government was unable to deal with.

The permanence of the international structures, both civil and military, will continue to have the function of supplying the stability to the region, the protection of the minorities and the following of standards. It is probably the only point in common that the two sides have that of the relative permanence of the international presence, and more so for the military presence than civil.

THE ROLE OF THE NATO MULTINATIONAL CONTINGENT

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) today has the role of peace keeper. In the course of the recent years of this mission it has been noted that what is missing is not security but the perception of security by the local population, and like a vicious circle if security is perceived not to be present it brings mistrust and fear of the future and a lack of willingness to invest, it stops the development and growth of the economy, things which could all turn the situation around and simplify the work of the multinational force.

The current objective of KFOR is as a guaranteed presence, supervision, deterrent and supporter of the people and the local authorities and controlling the borders and seizing of arms. The objective is also prevention, as well as arrests, of criminal activity from both locals and cross-border. Much of the arms and munitions seized by KFOR, like those arrested, have been sent to the International Court of Justice (the Hague Tribunal) for the ex-Yugoslavia.

As well as the traditional work of the peace keeper KFOR has followed other work plans in relation to the essential reconstruction of the



Prizren: dome and minaret of the mosque.

country's infrastructure. It's an essential element for various agencies of the United Nations and the provisional government, to the non-governmental organizations and the European Agency for Reconstruction – but often these agencies have to rely on the support and security of the NATO forces to achieve their project objectives. And in other times, situations of extreme danger have required the immediate intervention of the multi-national contingent.

The control of reconstruction is above all the duty of the J9 coordination, in KFOR command, of civil and military activities. The cell evaluates the

feasibility and sustainability of various projects based on the resources that are at their disposition.

The projects must respect the criteria of 'multi-ethnicity' and conform to the politics and objectives of KFOR as a whole. The realization occurs at brigade level, that is to say a national level.

The reorganisation and reconstruction of the structures of the country requires particular prominence and sensitiveness, in order to create a legal relationship with the local population is often through the actual carrying out of projects. The J9 cell operates as an outpost within the armed forces in respect to the population and its needs. As a consequence the projects

are often coordinated by another part of the mission, for example PIO (Public Information Operations) and PSYOPS (Psychological Operations), who focus on optimising the impact of various initiatives on the people and publishing the benefits.

The current big project is the winterisation of the area, namely preparing the people and the structures for the winter ahead. Another current project initiated by the European Council is the reconstruction of about 11 orthodox churches and the care of the environs of the monasteries.

Amongst the projects for cooperation in civil and military matters are also small private projects aimed at kickstarting small and medium sized enterprises. The 'Small Enterprises Project' is one of these projects (initially financed by the Finnish government). Another project concerns a dairy factory. The financing is usually used for buildings and for training of staff.


The projects carried out at a regional and local level are coordinated by the Brigade (who directly follow the project), and then also by the central cell in Pristina. The other international groups and non-government organizations are also involved in the projects and the development of the area.

NATO has also some place to the NAI, NATO Named Area of Interest. Which concerns places of historic value – both culturally (for example churches and monasteries) but particularly sensitivity. Usually the guarantee of protection to these areas is by assigned Task Force. In the case of the Monastery of Decani there is a constant surveillance from the Italian army.

The process of reorganisation and reconstruction of the area by the NATO forces is also concerned, as said, by the protection of the people, of the rights of the minority, of projects of a civil nature, however there is limited funds available for work in this area. The NATO Quartier General level maintains a combined vision of the operations of *liaison*, with particular attention to the recent politics and strategy of topics related to minority rights and IDP (Internally Displaced Persons).

Even the local authorities, the provisional government, the United Nations, the OSCE and the non-governmental organizations are all involved in the process of looking after the rights of the minorities and of refugees. To now though the results, especially to do with repatriation have been very slow.

The presence of the multinational forces remains an essential element for the future of



Obelic: a coal mine.


“ The presence of the multinational forces remains an essential element for the future of the region ”


the region, as such the common agreement between Kosovan-Serbs and Kosovan-Albanians: the presence of the armed forces builds a trust and hope that day by day there is a gradual movement towards a peaceful co-existence of the various ethnic peoples. The time is not yet right to leave these peoples to their own destiny, but probably the definition of the *status* will be a move in that direction, and within a few years an area that can offer 'autonomous survival' and project itself into a new future and new boundaries within the European Union.

Laura Romanazzi

Researcher for the SME-IMONT cooperation project

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NATO AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

NATO AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

In order to contribute to the security and stability of the Mediterranean area, NATO has worked out a Master Plan, which entails a wide range of initiatives. This will require the active involvement of the Mediterranean and Middle East Countries and will include some important sectors: information and the press, civil emergency planning, science and environment, crisis management, defence policy and strategy, as well as a programme of military cooperation.



The Atlantic Alliance launched, at the end of 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue with the aim of increasing the security and stability of the Mediterranean area. At the Prague summit of 2002, the NATO member countries, obviously including Mediterranean Italy, signalled their intention to intensify, and as a complement to European Union's Barcelona Agreement, the cooperation of the seven Dialogue members (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia), as an extremely important consideration for the security of Europe.

After September 11, in and outside the Mediterranean area, the Mediterranean Dialogue became the object of much internal and external attention. It brought up certain questions regarding its future development, in particular, the project that sees NATO and its Mediterranean Partners act more closely in collaboration in order to initiate a true partnership against common threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such a project was better outlined by the Istanbul Summit of 2004, going beyond an agreement of stability in order to

TASKS OF THE ALLIED COMMANDS FOR TRASFORMATION (ACT) AND OPERATIONS (ACO)




Fig. 1

Opening pages.

Turkish soldiers disembarking from a Black Hawk helicopter during an inter-allied exercise.

Left.

A meeting of the NATO Members

give a wider and more ambitious structure of a net of cooperation between these countries, the NATO leaders started the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), a separate programme than the Mediterranean Dialogue but which complements it in the purpose of promoting the practical cooperation with the wider zone of the Middle East, and starting with the six member countries of the Gulf Council of Cooperation (GCC); Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Undoubtedly it is only the start of a process of cooperation with a far off end in whose success will rely on the active cooperation of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries in a spirit of partnership. It remains understood that the countries involved will be free to choose to cooperate with NATO and determine its own rhythm and level of cooperation. The Alliance for its own part doesn't want to

impose anything, but rather, to take into account their diversity and their specific role in the development of the cooperation programme. Such a line was also taken in the recent informal NATO meeting (note 1) of Defence Ministers held on February 10 last in Taormina. And such a meeting represented a clear political signal in the interest for the Alliance in a practical cooperation, wider and deeper than before, with the *partners* in the Dialogue. It's worth noting that in Taormina, for

the first time, the seven Defence Ministers of the countries involved in the Mediterranean Dialogue were sat around the same table with the 26 Defence Ministers from the allied countries, signalling the continuation of the commitment of cooperation between NATO countries and the Istanbul Summit.

The allied leaders, in Istanbul, hoped for the transformation of the Mediterranean Dialogue into an effective *partnership* that would strengthen the annual programme of activity that was already in place, including a wide range of activities that covered various sectors, such as; information and the press, planning for civil emergencies, science and

“It is the start of a long-term cooperation process whose success will require the active involvement of the Mediterranean and Middle East Countries”

the environment, crisis response, defence politics and strategy, light and small gauge arms, humanitarian action against mines, and a programme of military cooperation. This last aspect concerns one of the most priorities of the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces of NATO (SHAPE) that aims for the interoperability of the NATO forces with those of the countries involved in the Dialogue in a manner of military operations that NATO would choose and guide.

INTEROPERABILITY AS THE BASIS FOR THE MILITARY COOPERATION PROGRAMME

From strictly a military point of view the improvement of the Mediterranean Dialogue is centred on various activities (Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme, MDWP) within which the interested countries are able to choose that which best suits their needs. In order to construct a common framework of selection processes of the activities offered the Supreme Command of Operations (ACO) developed a methodology that sets itself the aim of building an Individual Work Programme (IWP) tailored to the needs of individual *partner* countries but still following the common objective of interoperability (note 2) of their own armed forces with those of NATO. The concrete idea is that of developing a generic plan, called *Bi-Strategic Command Training and Exercise Master Plan*, that the interested *partner* country has to follow if it wants to contribute with NATO and make it inter-operable. In other words for the Allied Forces, and where possible their *Partners*, the training, exercising and operating, effectively and necessarily, should be done as one for an improved execution of tasks and their assigned missions. In particular the *Master Plan* specifies a series of *building blocks* relevant to certain essential aspects of the interoperability of the Forces: instruction, training, exercises, evaluation and operation.

Figure 1 shows the division of the responsibility between the two NATO Strategic Commands: *Allied Command Transformation* (ACT), based in Norfolk (USA), and *Allied Command Operations* (ACO), based near Mons (Belgium).

One can see that ACT is responsible for *Education*, *Individual Training* and a part of the *Collective Training*, while ACO is actually responsible for most of *Collective Training*, *Exercises* and the *Evaluation of Operations*.

Utilizing the *Master Plan* could seem vague but every possible *building block* has to be detailed, specific and suited to the needs of the mission for which the *Plan* has been set in place. Some sectors could observe the threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mine clearing operations and the combined multimedia libraries. To give a precise idea of the recent developments within NATO, which figure 2 serves as a way of further exemplification, the typology of missions already included in the recently approved *Master Plan* of the North Atlantic Commission (NAC) (note 3) include; *Disaster relief*, *Humanitarian relief*, *Search and Rescue*, *Peace Support Operations*.

Such a *Master Plan* is undoubtedly very generic but represents the starting point for future negotiations with the countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue. In fact, after the preliminary contacts and formal meetings between NATO and the countries in the Dialogue, the generic *Master Plan* was able to be adapted to the needs and capacities of every single partner, with a view to establishing an *Individual Work Plan*.

The various *Individual Work Plans* (potentially as many as the number of different individual countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue) will be revised annually via bilateral negotiations taking into account the evaluation of the approved developments of the *partner* (in accordance with the guidelines of the *Framework of the Operational Capabilities Concept*) (Note 4).

PROCESS OF DEVELOPING INDIVIDUAL WORK PLANS (IWP)

SHAPE elaborated the general guidelines in order to facilitate the achieving of the interoperability on the part of the countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue within their selected participation in military co-operations. The objective is the ideal development of every IWP in order to implement it in the already existing *MD Work Programme*. Such *Guidelines* flesh out the *BI-SC Interim Proposals for the Implementation of the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme* document - Military Cooperation Activities.

The existence of the *MD Work Programme*, is not at odds with the *Individual Work Plans* where the main difference between the first and the new approach is seen in the fact that while the MDWP

“ From a strictly military point of view the improvement of the Mediterranean dialogue is centred on various activities among which the interested Countries can select those which best suit their interests ”



CONSTITUENT COMPONENTS




Fig. 2



PROCEDURES




Fig. 3



FORCE PACKAGES

Command	Battle orders	Front line support	Logistics network
Staff composition	Basic Army Units at various levels with a view to indicate means of disembarking, boat and helicopters, into combat	Artillery, engineer and communication units, as well as specialist teams	Specialist logistic units, transport helicopters, transport divisions



Fig. 4

is a simple list of cooperation activities, the proposed objective of achieving interoperability, that we are illustrating, through a *objective driven approach*, as mentioned before, will be used in the harmonic development of every IWP. Such a process is very detailed and based on the definitions in *Force Modules, Missions, Standards, Supporting Activities*.

Based on the Plan and on the negotiations with individual *MD partners* it is possible to identify their levels of ambition (Level of Ambition, LoA) and their operation requirements (structures) of obtaining and possessing in order to be considered inter-operable. In such a way it's possible to design an IWP suited to the needs, interests and capabilities of each country in the Dialogue (figure 3).

The starting point is the definition of the Forces that can be included in the *Master Plan*, the potential list could be increased where needed in the future where necessary, and also, it's worth remembering that the point of view of the *partner countries* that it is not obligatory that they will have to cooperate in the future. By way of example of the main point see Force Modules (figure 4).

For every mission, the *Force Modules* have to be able to satisfy a range of operational requirements (note 5), for example: (tabled) in succession, NATO Strategic Command and the *partner countries*

identify the requisite objectives that these countries have lacking and put in order of priority for attainment. In this way they put together a list of requisite objectives to follow that represent the point of reference for creating the *Individual Work Plan* for the country in question.

Closely related to the *operational requirements* are the interoperability objectives of the NATO forces. They define the criteria for measuring if the operativeness is attained in a specific area (figure 5).

Every Strategic Command manages a number of activities already placed for contributing to achieving the specific objective of interoperability.

For instance in the slide that follows it is possible to see a list of existing activities that support the above said *Interoperability objectives*. These, as already borne in mind, have to be modified for

“Every Strategic Command manages a number of activities already placed for contributing to achieving the specific objective of interoperability”

Right.

A lesson on CIMIC procedures in Agadir, Morocco.



FORCE STANDARDS- MTI (MILITARY TASKS FOR INTEROPERABILITY)

N.	Mission	Modules	Operation requirements	Interoperability objectives	connected tasks
5.	Generic	Staff components (multi- army)	Make up of connected team	The interoperability is often reliant on the cohesion of the Team. Its members must speak English and know NATO terminology. They also have to be able to interpret the intentions, plans and orders of Supreme Command	G.1.7
6	Generic	A multi level specialist team, crafts, battle and transport helicopters and staff members (multi army)	Utilize maps, diagrams and symbols approved by NATO	The procedure connects local/other maps to NATO maps. All the Command and the Unit must be able to exchange geographical information quickly and accurately using standard documents	G.1.8
7	Generic	Battalions with crafts, battle and transport helicopters and staff members (multi army)	Presentation reporting and return	The military forces are subject to a structure that foresees the realization of formal reporting for communicating information along the chain of command. The Superior Command and the Unit have to familiarise themselves with reports in order to achieve this.	G.1.9
8	Generic	Battalions with Staff (multi army)	Functioning of a combined Commission	In peace-support operations (PSO) the joint commission is essential for the exchange of information amongst all those involved in order to achieve agreed implementation. Every unit given an area of responsibility (AOR) from the level of battalion and up, has to pre-arrange with the joint commission of operations.	G.1.10

Fig. 5





SUPPORT ACTIVITY

SERIAL No 7

MISSION: GENERIC

FORCE MODULE: BTG.

OPERATION REQUIREMENTS: Presentation reporting and return.

INTEROPERABILITY OBJECTIVES: The military forces are subject to a structure that foresees the realization of formal reporting for communicating information along the chain of command. The Superior Command and the Unit have to familiarise themselves with reports in order to achieve this.

ACTIVITY (in sequence)

Order	Activity	Nominative	Duration	Cost	Additional MTIs	Activity Classification
1	NEW 4	Work meeting and staff procedures for the Partnership for Peace (PfP)	7	6600	1/2/3	
1	MB-45	Official course for Operational staff in the dialogue between NATO and Mediterranean countries	19	14800	1/3/4/6/10/13/20/21/22/23/24/26/31/32/33/34/35/36/37/38/66/67/68/69/70/71/98/99/100/101/102/103/130/131	
2	NEW 12	Planning of ground operations	4	4800	1/4/8/10	
3	NEW 21	Course for combined central operations	5	5400	1/6/10	
4	NEW 15	Information management	4	4800	1	
5	ACO 05041	Crisis Response	4	4800	1/8/10/31/66/98/130	
6	ACO 05056	Combined Task Force training	12	9600	1/6/10/24/25/26/27/28/31/32/33/36/66/69/98/101/130/132	
7	NEW 20	Specialist training of Quartier Generale Multinazionale and combined forces	3	4200	1/6/10	

Fig. 6

diverse requirements and capacities for each of the various *Mediterranean Dialogue Countries*. Furthermore the participation in certain activities contributes to the attainment of other objectives that are listed under additionally supported Military Tasks for Interoperability (MTIs) (figure 6).

Taking as reference the highlighted activity, from point ACO-05-0416, *Crisis Response Operations*, it could be described in more detail, such as indicating the type, scope, location, duration, estimated number of people involved in similar events, as shown in the following diagram (figure 7): whose careful examination allows an elaboration of the generic *Master Plan*. Taking account of the characteristics of a good part of the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries (note 7), of their military capacity and their objectives, we can reasonably imagine the *partner countries Master Plan* ambitions they hope to develop in regards to what level they want to be represented in the Battalion Manoeuvres for PSOs. The Master Plan lists therefore in sequential order the relevant activities, which NATO offers to the *partner countries* to help determine their Level of Ambition (LoA). In the example in figure 8, the partner that would want to supply a battalion for Manoeuvres in future operations of NATO, has the possibility to join both Officially and Unofficially certain courses

given at the *NATO School* in Oberammergau in Germany, in order to learn how better to train up their participating personnel in specific seminars, in learning to plan an exercise, and requests that NATO sends "home" a *team* of CRO experts and, in the end, participates in a NATO exercise that is open to Mediterranean Dialogue Countries. These are the essential elements, together with estimates of cost (note 8), that is all included in the Master Plan (figure 8).

CONCLUSIONS

In the new methodology NATO considers the most important element in relation to the Mediterranean Dialogue Nations to be a clear and precise definition of the level of ambition of each country in the alliance in relation to cooperation, taking into account the type of mission where possible developments could occur, according to each's opinion, with the Allied Force's interoperability. Of the successes gleaned from the Mediterranean Dialogue, one of the most remarkable is surely the participation of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in the NATO operations in the Balkans, where Morocco was represented by the second highest contingent of non-NATO forces (figure 9).



SUPPORT ACTIVITY

Seminar on Peace Support Operations (PSO)

- **Identification code:** ACO-05-041;
- **Typology and Purpose:** the seminar is open to participation from MD (Mediterranean Dialogue) and PfP (Partnership for Peace) Partners – (ACO.3143.1). The scope of the seminar is the presentation and discussion of relevant scenarios both to the Support Operations for Peace and those for Crisis Response;
- **NATO authorized responsibility:** CC-Land Madrid;
- **Headquarters:** Madrid, Spagna;
- **Date and duration:** 4 days in the last week of May 2005;
- **Required linguistic capacity:** all the activities will be conducted in English, translations or interpretation will not be possible;
- **Number of participants:** 1 or 2 per country, preferably suited to those in operational planning and/or Ministry of Defence, or Command level up, training;
- **NATO point of contact:** omitted;
- **Note:** the seminar will include information briefing and collective debates regarding all functional areas relevant for Peace Support Operations and Crisis Response.

Fig. 7



GENERIC PLANNING PRINCIPLES - BATTALIONS

MISSION: GENERIC/PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS


FORCE MODULES: BTG.

ACTIVITY: COMPLETE SEQUENCE

Order	Activity	Nominative	Duration	Cost	Active Classification
1	M5-32	NATO course in orientation for Staff Officers	5	5700	M
1	M5-33	NATO course in orientation for Senior NCO's	5	5700	M
1	NEW1	NATO/PfP seminar for Trainer training	12	9600	M
2	NEW2	Advanced Seminar on NATO/PfP	7	6600	M
2	M5-42	Course in orientation for multinational forces	5	5700	M
19	NEW22	Training course in the planning for Multinational Task Forces and inter-forces	5		
20	ACO-05-039	Mobile team training for operations in support of crisis situations	5	5700	R
20	ACO-05-015	Masters in Logistics and Medicine	5	5000	R
21	ACO-05-043	«Better combined effort»	22	5000	R
				15600	M
22	ACO-05-044	«Associate cooperator»	21	15000	M
TOTAL			310	326100	

Fig. 8

Fig. 9



Also there are the operations being carried out in the eastern Mediterranean, *Operation Active Endeavour*, which represents the concrete contribution of NATO against the world threat of international terrorism, and where Israel, Algeria and Morocco have shown their willingness to contribute with their own means to the same operation. Beyond the political significance of such a gesture the integration of military forces of these countries with the Allied forces has allowed great strides to take place in mutual confidence in view of an eventual complete cooperation across the Mediterranean, while at the moment it is still in an embryonic phase while the problem of diversity has negatively influenced the programme, firstly because of the reluctance of Arab countries to participate in the same exercises as Israel. And obviously the process of cooperation requires a long time in which its success is, however, clearly staged in intermediate steps such as the Taormina Meeting (note 9) where, for the first time, the six Arab states and Israel participated.

“ Succeeding in this undertaking would represent a success of immense prestige for NATO ”

The project described that is based on the *Master Plan* could represent a clear signal in the changing nature of the Mediterranean Dialogue, with its measure of trust towards a more operational and centralised partnership, from a military point of view, regarding interoperability. The

project is ambitious if one only thinks of the amount of military interaction required for the NATO commanded operation *peace-keeping* that covers thousands and thousands of kilometres in distance. The implications in the field of command, doctrine, communi-

cations, logistics, international law, health and so on are innumerable, complicated and cannot be set aside from the procedural process nor the *modus operandi* of NATO to which the new methodology highlighted approaches. Managing this task represents for NATO a success of immense prestige, more than the extraordinary prospects in the rapport with the Arab world forgetting the fact of the economic interests and security of energy resources – which is at the



centre of NATO in the Mediterranean politics, the zone where about 65% of petroleum and natural gas that Western Europe consumes passes through.

Alfredo Mesolella
Major,

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

NOTES

(1) The informal *meetings* of NATO Defence Ministers are traditionally held twice a year in addition to the formal meetings. The informal consultations don't have a fixed agenda and are not aimed towards having decisions reached, but the Defence Ministers have the opportunity to freely discuss the key issues of the Alliance.

(2) In NATO terminology *Interoperability* means: "The ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of partner and other nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks."

(3) Council's Memorandum (C-M (2004)056)

(4) The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) is designed to establish new means and mechanism to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities through enhanced and closer military cooperation. The OCC has two specific aims: to improve the ability of partner forces to contribute to NATO-led PfP operations; to give increased flexibility, predictability about potential contributions, and capability in putting together tailored

SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium.

force packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfP operations.

(5) The different non-article 5 possible missions are typically those of *peace-support operations, humanitarian relief, disaster relief, search and rescue*. The word *General* in the slide indicates a common mission of the typical type PSO.

(6) The activity termed ACO-05-041 corresponds to the 41a activity cited in the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme 2005, managed by ACO and approved by NAC.


(7) Apart from Israel, the other partners have a very low level of expenditure on Defence in comparison with the national economy.

(8) Currently NATO gives financial support to the Mediterranean Countries that corresponds to approximately 80% of the costs incurred when training at MDWP, in terms of courses, seminars, conferences, observation of exercises, workshops, meetings and such like.

(9) In this view the Taormina Meeting of the 9th and 10th February 2006 represented an important preamble to the next NATO Summit that will be held at Riga (Latvia) on the 28th and 29th November 2006 for the levels of Head of States and Heads of Governments, as confirmed by the Alliance spokesman James Appathurai when talking about the Sicilian meeting "This meeting is an important building block in the preparations for the Riga Summit, which will focus significantly on NATO's modernisation."



NATO IN TIRANA



NATO IN TIRANA

The “open doors” policy of the Alliance

Albania wishes to become a full-fledged NATO member. A reciprocal advantage that will entail a remarkable financial effort and concrete cooperation.

Since January 1, 2006, the NATO Headquarters Tirana (NHQT) has been working with a new structure and a new role, in order to be more effective and more in keeping with the reform necessities of the Albanian Armed Forces. NHQT has become a focal point for both NATO and the Albanian authorities, increasing its visibility and the cooperation with the diplomatic community and with the organizations present on the territory.

The change has occurred at the most appropriate moment. As a matter of fact, in a little less than two years (within 2008) Albania expects to receive the invitation to become a full-fledged NATO member. An objective that the Albanian citizens and the Albanian authorities consider extremely important (1). For achieving, it they are called to produce a significant effort, also financial, which should be consistent with their expectations. At the same time, NATO and the international community will have to direct their efforts in such a way as to correctly assist them. In fact, Albania's NATO membership is a mutual benefit. For Albania it means to be through, once and for all, with a past marked by isolation and open a new door on a future based on principles and goals shared with the entire international community. For NATO it represents a resolute step forward towards the stability of the Balkan area and the Mediterranean basin, and also an advanced platform in the fight against terrorism.

NHQT is the on-the-ground expression of the NATO policy, and therefore its transformation is in line with the new course, which takes the Albanian necessities in greater consideration.

Title pages.
Tirana, Skanderbeg Square.

A SHORT HISTORICAL SYNTHESIS

In March 1999, as a result of the conflict in Kosovo and within the “Allied Harbour” operation aimed at giving solidarity and assistance to the Kosovan refugees, the Atlantic Council endorsed the employment of a multinational force called “Albanian Force” (AFOR), to which Italy gave the largest contribution with 2300 men, mainly from the “Taurinense” Alpine Brigade, along with about 300 men of the “San Marco” Regiment and 160 “Carabinieri”. Operation “Joint Guardian” started on August 31st of the same year, when the refugees returned to Kosovo. A “Command of the Communication Zone West” (COMMZ WEST) was

constituted on the basis of the “Taurinense” Brigade and included in the structure of the KFOR forces. The COMMZ's operational task was to control the main lines of communication (LOC) from Albania to Kosovo, the important Puke Pass among them, and to maintain the ability to ensure the flow of supplies and reinforcements by making use of the Tiran-Rinas

Airport (Airport of Debarkation – APOD) and the Port of Durres (Sea Port of Debarkation – SPOD). From the humanitarian viewpoint, COMMZ WEST HAD instead the task of keeping, through its CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) team, the necessary contacts with the local Authorities and with the non-governmental and international organizations.

On June 17, 2002, following the normalization of the political situation in the whole Balkan area, NATO started a process of reconfiguration of its presence in the region, which led to the creation of three NATO Headquarters: in Bosnia, FYROM and Albania (Sarajevo, Skopije and Tirana). COMMZ WEST was transformed into NATO Headquarters

“The change has come at the most appropriate moment. Within 2008 Albania expects to receive the invitation to become a full-fledged NATO member,”

Tirana (NHQT), with the task of continuing to carry out the mentioned operational tasks and assist and support the Albanian authorities in their path towards their NATO membership.

The parties to NHQT were Greece, Italy, Hungary and Turkey. The Command was assigned, in turn, to an Italian and a Greek General, as representatives of the main contributing Countries. At the beginning the NHQT was located at the Plepa Compound in Durres and afterwards was transferred to the "Ure Compound" (10km from Tirana) projecting to Tirana those components that were to start giving advice to the Albanian MOD. Thus the NAT (NATO Advisor Team) offices were located inside the Ministry of Defence, while the Public Information Office (PIO) and the Political Advisor (POLAD) were based at the "Rogner" Hotel.

Italy (ITALFOR) supplied the operational component, heir to the tasks of COMMZ West, and the security company of the Ure base.

With the utilization of the new, shorter and faster line of communication, which goes from Greece (Thessaloniki) to Kosovo (Pristina), the Puke Pass little by little lost its importance and, as a consequence, also the "operational" role of NHQT in support of the KFOR forces was reduced to the point of becoming irrelevant. NATO started a new reorganization process, in terms of reduction of personnel and reconsideration of NHQT tasks, which in the summer of 2005 was implemented within the periodic revision of the missions of the NATO Headquarters. NHQT was tasked with giving advice to the local Authorities on the military aspects concerning the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the entry into NATO, in order to increment the Euro-Atlantic integration. The Senior Military Representative (SMR - NHQT Commander) and all personnel of the new NAT, in order to carry out their tasks as best as possible, had to be embedded within the MOD, i.e. their Offices had to be inside the MOD.

The ceremony of Lowering the Flag, carried out on November 11, 2005 by the "Trieste" 21st Field Artillery Regiment, marked the end of both the ITALFOR Italian mission - therefore the return home of the Manoeuvre Regiment - and the operational role of NHQT, with the transfer to KFOR of the LOC responsibilities.

The Italian Contingent deserves a separate consideration. Its return, after eight years, represents the success of the mission and the achievement of all goals. Thanks to the commitment, capability and sense of responsibility of our soldiers, the

Italian presence has doubtlessly contributed to the stability and to the process of democratisation of the Country. In these years, there have been countless episodes where our soldiers have helped the population with material, infrastructural and logistic aid, as well as with humanitarian assistance, that often saved human lives.

Albania today is a Country that has implemented a series of important institutional and administrative reforms, whose democratic vocation has been confirmed by the peaceful alternation of its Governments and which is, above all, a Country that is about to join NATO and the European Community.

THE NEW NHQT STRUCTURE

The first consequence of the new mission, considering the reduction of personnel and in order to have closer relations with the Albanian Authorities, was the closing of the Ure Compound and the subsequent transfer of the Offices of the NATO Command to a new building at the centre of Tirana. The NHQT personnel were to be housed at the "Rogner" Hotel, and everything was due to take place by the end of November 2005, so that, starting

from December 1, 2005, NHQT could begin to operate in the new Offices, thus expressing its Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and achieving its Final Operational Capability (FOC) by December 31, 2005.

The Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade HQ, with the addition of some components (J ENG and J 8 cell), which in August 2005 replaced the Field Artillery

Brigade HQ at the head of NHQT, implemented the reorganization project, harmonizing the simultaneous closing of the two Compounds (Tropikal and Ure), the transfer to the new venues and the start of the new organization structure.

These operations are easily described but they are actually extremely complicate, owing to the quantity and intricacy of the actions that must be coordinated in order to abandon the occupied areas, restoring them to their original state and handing them over to their legitimate owners, without controversies and/or administrative or legal outstanding matters. On the whole, this has required a detailed inventory of the materials present in the two Compounds, the definition of the state of their final employment (return home, hand back to KFOR, donation to the Albanian Armed Forces and unserviceable), the ensuing handling of the materials, occurred without prob-

“ NHQT has become an Advice and Planning Command for the Albanian Armed Forces, for the process of their democratisation and for the Reforms of the Security System ”

NHQT NEW STRUCTURE




Fig. 1

lems, the closing of all trade activities and relevant administrative acts.

The works for the adaptation of the new office building and the mentioned closings were carried out at the same time. In order to give an example of the number of administrative acts, for the functionality and implementation of all the security measures of the new building, about 40 tenders were called and the related contracts assigned. Moreover, in order to allow all the Italian military to be back home by November 30, 2005, simultaneously with the handing over of the new offices and the transfer of the NHQT personnel to the "Rogner" Hotel, the security of the Ure Compound, after the departure of the Greek Support Group, was entrusted to the Albanian soldiers until the materials were completely dismantled and the keys given back to the owner.

Once retrenched, the new NHQT has abandoned the structure based on branch heads (J-Heads) and chosen an ampler NATO Advisor Team. It consists of three modules (fig.1): the Senior Military Representative (SMR) with his office, to which are attached the Political Advisor (POLAD) and the Legal Advisor (LEGAD); NAT, with one component concerning the operational aspects and another the Security Sector Reform of the Albanian Armed

Forces; the Support Element, that provides the maintenance and security of the Headquarters.

SMR and NAT, having to work in close contact with the Albanian Defence Ministry, have also offices inside the MOD, so that they can establish the appropriate connection with the staff and increase the links with all those involved in the modernization process of the Albanian Armed Forces.

Thus NHQT has become and advice and planning command that works on a wide range of activities concerning the Albanian Armed Forces, the process of their democratisation (Defence Institution Building) and the Reforms of the Security System (SSR) (fig.2). The activities carried out and the progress achieved are listed in the documents: "Membership Action Plan" (MAP), "PfP Planning and Review Process" (PARP) and "Individual Partnership Plan" (IPP), which are compiled with the contribution of NHQT and presented to NATO by the Albanian Authorities.

As is known, MAP is a process, a kind of "road map" introduced during the Washington Summit (23-25 April 1999), aimed at strengthening the commitment of the enlargement of NATO as practical manifestation of the Open Door Policy. It includes the development of a programme of




Fig. 2

activities intended to assist the aspiring nations in their preparation for their future entry into NATO as full members. The first important step is their complete assent to the PfP operations, because this increases the political and military bonds of the aspiring nations, helping them in their preparation in every sector of the new missions.

MAP is a yearly programme that includes the objectives for the preparation and also the specific information on the activities carried out, the responsible authorities and, when appropriate, a list of the work on the particular aspects of the preparation.

NHQT AND THE ALBANIAN FORCES


NAT and the professionalism of its personnel, which is the guarantee that they will fulfil the role of advisor, as sanctioned by the mission, will be the driving force of the new NHQT. In the last months, NHQT has already opened a new chapter, carrying out an active and effective role, which has somehow anticipated the reorganization and has been met with enthusiasm by the Albanian MOD.

There are now the conditions for a more open cooperation with the Staff and especially with the Minister of Defence, who is firmly determined to carry out the reforms of his Ministry.

The work done by NAT before its reshuffle was certainly positive, especially in supplying indications and suggestions for drawing up the MAP, PARP and IPP documents. Nevertheless, such work has been limited to a few aspects deemed more important by the Albanian Government, without its including the entire aspect of the potentials. Besides, the efforts that the donor nations have offered on a bilateral basis have not been synchronized, coordinated and harmonized within a framework of a wider vision.

NHQT can play an important role also in this latter field. There are at present all the conditions for developing this plan for the convergence of both the donor Countries and the Albanian Government towards the common objective of receiving, within 2008, the invitation to become a member of NATO.

Training is carried out according to the NATO doctrine and standard. Some units, especially those of the Commando Regiment and the Rapid Reaction Brigade, are part of the PfP forces, equipped with modern systems and materials, and take part in the missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and



Bosnia with excellent results. These units, working alongside the colleagues of the NATO Countries, have acquired a significant experience. Moreover, the level of the exercises carried out with the Countries of the Adriatic Charter (2) and the coming employment in Afghanistan of SEEBRIG (3) represent a further indication of the progress made in the integration and cooperation with the other Armed Forces.

At the moment, it is necessary to concentrate the efforts to extend to the other units of the Army the level of the NATO standards, the improvement of the living conditions and quality of life of the soldiers (infrastructure and quarters), regulation of the military conditions (recruitment, status and promotion), rationalization of the reserves and of the structure of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force).

NHQT, included in the MOD through its daily presence and contact with the main operators in the various fields, will make the difference. In fact, a daily life in close contact increases mutual trust and transparency, leading to the development of a familiar language and a common vision.

To carry out the task of "advisor" one ought to "know". To know the NAT personnel it is necessary to be able to move freely and have free access to information. For this, the MOD must give its contribution. "Knowledge" generates "comparison" and hence "suggestion/advice" (fig.3).

Moreover, thanks to its role of coordinator of the donor countries' aid, NHQT will have the possibility to direct such aid towards the areas that need it most, avoiding overlapping and duplications, improving the standardization, homogeneity and maintainability of the materials. The concept of "coordination" has been fully accepted by both the MOD, which intends to create a specific Office for the Coordination that will operate within the General Staff, and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, having acknowledged the importance of its role in the entire process of entry into NATO, will create a special NATO Office.

In short, there are the conditions for the wish to come true. What is important is to continue to forge ahead.

In order for NHQT to carry out its new task as best as it can, it should be provided with the necessary quantitative and qualitative human resources.

For what concerns quality, a special attention should be given in assigning personnel expert in the specific sector, in order that they effectively contribute to the NAT work, and through this latter, carry out the requested role of advisor. The duration of the mandate of at least one year (preferably two) is a guarantee of continuity. Besides, considering that a part of the Partnership Goal (PG) within the PfP cooperation concerns the Navy and the Air Force, NAT should necessarily include also these professional figures.

That the personnel selected for NATO Headquarters Tirana (the Senior Military Representative and all NAT personnel) should necessarily be "expert" in their branch, has been conceptually accepted at all levels, for it is a *conditio sine qua non* for playing an effective role of advisor. This importance stems from at least two considerations: each branch can count on a single person, who, therefore, must trust his own knowledge, without help from a staff. His work has a high political value for NATO, and his behaviour and professionalism have direct repercussions on the NATO credibility.

As a consequence all Nations should select their personnel according to the "job description", verifying the personnel's professional preparation before assigning them.

The possible actions or activities at NATO level concerning the candidates could be: interview them in order to ascertain their basic knowledge

Tirana: entrance of the URE Compound, former home of NHQT.



of the present NATO standards and of the procedures of the specific branch in which they are going to work (logistics, training, operations, finance); supply an update of the NATO situation and policy in the Balkans and in the specific area (Albania, FYROM, Bosnia), so as to follow the same line of action and show the coherence of the Alliance. Thus NHQT would become a true and effective tool of the Atlantic policy in the area; once assigned, periodically (possibly every six months) organize workshops focused on the progress made by the respective Countries and the likely way ahead, besides a possible update of the NATO policy.

As regards the number of personnel, keeping in mind the new role and the increased cooperation with the Albanian MOD, the structure of NHQT could be reconsidered so as to meet its real needs and be up to the new tasks, once its efficacy and effectiveness have been proved on the field. In any case, considering that for every NAT sector there is only one Officer, NHQT, if necessary, should have the possibility of calling ad hoc teams of experts, especially for assessing the progress made in the various sectors.

THE FUTURE OF NHQT

The presence of NATO in Albania, as well as in the other Countries that wish to join, is a mutual benefit. The work that NHQT has been doing up to now, to which Italy has contributed a great deal, can be considered a great value. Now it is necessary to increase the efforts and engage all energies, because the goal is at hand. The Albanian authorities must make every effort to continue on the road already taken. For its part, NHQT must focus its commitment on its new function, performing it in an active and propositional way. When Albania receives the invitation to enter into NATO, it will be possible for NHQT to undergo a further reduction in terms of personnel as regards the Military Liaison Office (MLO), which could be put under the command of a Colonel. The MLO will have to continue to assist and advise the Albanian Authorities and to interface with NATO.

Actually, the present NHQT structure is already comparable to a Liaison Office, except for the command level (Brigadier General), considering that the tasks that derive from its mission are performed by the SMR and by NAT personnel only (the latter consisting of just 8 servicemen and 3 civilians). Its location in a building separate from the Albanian MOD is mainly due to the employment of

classified means of communication (CRONOS, VTC), which, if not deemed indispensable, would allow NHQT to operate from the Offices supplied by MOD. In this way one could do without the entire personnel of the Support Element, saving equipment and human and financial resources.

The "End State", and consequently the definitive closing of NHQT, will be achieved when Albania becomes a member of NATO, or when it does no more request the support of any NATO Headquarters, because its reforms in the Defence and National Security sectors will be at an advanced stage, in line with a realistic development and with the full support of other international sources.

CONCLUSIONS

The advisor, in terms of military professionalism, is a figure introduced recently, and envisages not only a deep knowledge of the specific matter, but above all an analysis and synthesis capability and an ability to find the right corrective measures or the suitable advice. A complete professionalism, with the addition of diplomatic qualities, for it is an action that must be carried out with colleagues of different nationalities.

NATO, like every dynamic and vital structure, undergoes a continuous evolution, together with the local structures committed to the specific need. NHQT is the expression on the ground of the Atlantic policy. Its transformation is an expression, and at

the same time a guarantee, of the attention given to the development of the problems vis-à-vis the whole Balkan Theatre. Thanks to its dynamism, today NHQT is in a position to play its role thoroughly, due to the relations created with the Albanian Authorities and with the international community working on the territory.

Vito Di Ventura
Brigadier General,
NATO Senior Military Representative

NOTES

- (1) A recent survey shows that about 95% of the population is in favour of Albania joining NATO.
- (2) Croatia, FYROM and Albania participate in the "Adriatic-3 Charter".
- (3) Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, FYROM, Turkey, Italy and Rumania participate in the "South Eastern Europe Brigade" (SEEBRIG).





LOGOS

OPERATION «INDUS»

OPERATION «INDUS»

In Pakistan, the "Elefante" Task Force operated to assist the local population hit by a disastrous earthquake.

The work of our Engineers, also thanks to the quality of their equipment, was appreciated by all local Authorities and international Organizations.

Ours is one of the few states to have intervened to help the victims of last October's terrible earthquake in Pakistan that had destroyed an entire city. In particular it was the contingent called 'Task Force Elefante', based around an engineer's unit, that intervened to face the emergency.

"Here we don't throw anything away... It seemed like a scene from the film 'In the Name of the Rose', when from an opening in the monastery the leftovers from the kitchen were jettisoned out onto all the poor people that were stationed under the high wall of the abbey, instigating amongst all the people a mini-war to get the best pieces. Similarly the population of Bagh, above all the children, were standing below the ramp, waiting for the discarded rubble, more than 25 metres below, in the hope of salvaging something that could prove useful." This is the strongest memory of Corporal Raffaele Cipriano, specialist engineer machine operator, participant in mission 'Indus' in the devastated earthquake region.

"Pieces of wood, iron rods from reinforced concrete, utensils or whatever other objects that might have any economic value become precious booty for the masses of desperate people," continues the Corporal.

"In spite of the efforts of the local police to keep the crowd away, every time they raised the skips of the dumper trucks to unload the rubble" he remembers, "it triggered a rush for whatever was available. All this at great risk for the safety of the unfortunate people, because the rubble comes down at high speed towards the ground." It's a touching story from the Corporal "because these are experiences that touch the heart."

THE EARTHQUAKE

It was one of the most devastating earthquakes of the last fifteen years. It destroyed entire villages, causing tens of thousands of victims and bringing an entire country to its knees. It happened in Pakistan, the eighth of October last year, firmly remaining in the minds of many. The earthquake, with a magnitude of 7.6 on the Richter Scale, annihilated cities and affected numerous regions in central Asia; apart from Pakistan, it also affected certain zones of India and Afghanistan. The tremors were felt above all in Islamabad, in the Rawalpindi area, and Lahore, Peshwar and Quetta, near the Afghan border. The zone hardest

hit was that of Kashmir and the mountains of the Hindu Kush.

“ Villages buried under landslides, bridges collapsed, houses, schools, public buildings reduced to rubble, hundreds of dead or injured: this was Pakistan's landscape a few days after the earthquake ”

Villages were buried under landslides, bridges collapsed, houses, schools, public buildings reduced to rubble, hundreds of dead or injured: this was the countryside of Pakistan a few days after the earthquake. Once again the country was sinking under the consequences of a truly devastating

earthquake and again it needs the effort to pick itself up again. The country, and the international community, mobilized immediately. The President Pervez Musharraf and the Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz mobilized all possible equipment and all available armed and civil forces for the purposes of the aid operation. 'A national tragedy, the worst catastrophe in the history of Pakistan,' was the unanimous comment from the country's authorities.

'What will remain in my mind is not the images of destruction, represented by the thousands of cubic metres of rubble, but the fatalism and resignation of the people. Surrounded by the mountains of rubble,' continues Corporal Paolo Palumbo, operator of specialist engineering



LOGOS

equipment, "the population just continued to live out their daily lives. The women haggling over the shopping with the shopkeepers, the bakers making the chapattis in their stone ovens, the butchers killing the animals on their blocks surrounded by blood and dust, but no one works on the removal of the ghostly rubble. The fatalism with which they acted was for me something inconceivable, especially if I remember the images of the earthquake in Umbria-Marchè or the Sardinian landslide. In those disastrous situations of our national history the local population, even though desperate, united to find ways to help the return of normal life and return faster to normality.'

They started appealing for international help immediately: We need it urgently, affirmed the Pakistan President. The first to arrive on the scene was the European Union, three million euros was the first contribution. And immediately help teams were sent from Great Britain, France, Japan, China and Russia. The United States needed no encouragement to help. President Bush, talking of the *horrible tragedy* for an allied country, sent aid equipment, and Washington offered \$50 million

Title pages and above.

Engineer personnel and equipment during the removal of rubble.

and 31 helicopters. Other important help came from Turkey (\$150 million) and Saudi Arabia (\$113 million). Help also came from UNICEF, who sent covers, clothes, tents, medicines, food, above all aimed at children, the most vulnerable to the cold and hunger and sickness. There was also a health emergency. Thousands and thousands of injured, in particular in the mountainous regions, remained for days waiting for suitable help. A situation defined by one UN co-ordinator, Jan Egeland, as "worse than the tsunami of December 2004."

A factor worsening the situation was the torrential rain that hit the north of Pakistan and the Kashmir area in particular. Factors that slowed the aid operation and sapped the hope of finding further survivors in the stricken areas.

The final balance was awful. More than 80 thousand verified as victims, 75 thousand injured, and nearly 4 million homeless.



The reconstruction and strengthening of a road hit by a landslide.

NATO INTERVENTION

NATO intervened immediately. On the 10th October, a few hours after the terrible earthquake and subsequent minor tremors, the Pakistan authorities had formally requested assistance. The same day the Council contacted their military structures and then on the 11th October the allies had constructed an Operation Plan relevant to supporting the humanitarian relief operation.

But how did our military organised their mission?

"It had snowed the day before when Commander Brigata's cell in charge of CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation), giving the evening report he had asked us to organize, along with our complex loads the transportation of a Pakistani bulldozer to a village in Birmani, about 40km from Arja, at an altitude of 2,100 metres." Says Corporal Antonio Di Giulio, Commander of Mobility Team. "The activity was necessary in that it needed a communication

trench to reach a small built up area that had become isolated following a landslide. The next morning we had loaded it no problem, an old Caterpillar out of condition, large in comparison for our tow truck. However we managed to overcome the problems of hooking it up and we began to take it along the narrow and curvy small mountain road. After 30km we were forced to unload the machine in order to remove a mudslide on the road, after the work we reloaded the bulldozer to continue the ascent, along a road with about 20cm of snow and that in certain stretches two vehicles couldn't pass. It took us about four hours to do the trip and arrive at Birpani and there deliver the machine to the local department of civil engineers, who then started immediately the work to reach the isolated built up area."

The primary objective of the mission was to construct an air supply bridge to reach the stricken areas as fast as possible, taking account of the approaching winter. The coordination of the offers from NATO countries and *partners* was formalised in the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) (note 1), the only interlocutor - both for NATO and for the Europe Union - with the Pakistan authorities and its representatives in the United Nations (UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). The responsibility for the execution of movements was given to the Allied Movements Coordination Centre (AMCC) of SHAPE, managing also the air equipment of the NATO Response Force (NRF) both for the air-tactic-positioning transport, from inside of Europe, for aid, and also for sending goods from the United Nations from Turkey directly to Pakistan.

“ The first NATO men reached the village of Bagh on the 29th October, one of the most important urban centres of the homonymous region, symbol of a country that is no longer there ”

Following the further request on the part of Pakistan, on the 17th October the Council made available the sending into the emergency zone a contingent of NATO, taking advantage of NRF equipment available, limited to a 90-day use. And so the *Joint HQ* involvement was set off from Lisbon which, on the 24th October, and so

lightening the load in Islamabad - giving life to a Deployable Joint Task Force HQ - and initiating the necessary contacts with the Pakistan governmental authorities, at the start of operations. The first NATO men reached the village of Bagh on the 29th October, one of the most important urban centres in the homonymy of the region, a symbol of a country that was no



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longer there. After the earthquake of 8th October it became a spectral city. It was here that the majority of the international aid forces were to be concentrated.

"The rubble were not only a symbol of the damage caused by nature on the civilisation," says Corporal Gianpietro Caleschi, pathfinder, "but also the source of earning, with hard work, something could be done to improve the wretched conditions of a people's life that does not know the meaning of the word surplus. On top of the cracked buildings were tens of people, people of all ages, with hammers, picks, bars and other rudimentary tools, hitting the building in order to extract the iron from the concrete slabs. Back-breaking and frenetic activity, interrupted only by the occasional cheer of success as a small piece of iron was wrought from the building, which at the end of the day would be weighed and sold."

The NATO contingent is characterized by extreme lightness and flexibility, in order to be able to deployed all over the area by air. Everything obvious that could be done to help quickly has been started, but they are heavily limited in the necessary work that require heavier

Unloading vehicles from a train.

machinery, specifically such as bulldozers and tow trucks.

From the organizational point of view, the Joint Commander of Operations – Air Commodore Andrew Walton, British – and his relevant staff, were deployed in Islamabad, while the Land Component Commander, Spanish, were based near Arja, near Bagh. The land component of the NATO Task Force planned, a Multinational Battalion, based in Bagh, composed of three engineering companies, supplied respectively by Great Britain, Poland and Spain which would be with a Lithuanian platoon dedicated to water purification and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal from Spain.

This was how NATO had foreseen the mandate and on February 1st the mission at Bagh was finished. The operations included, 168 flights from Europe transporting around 3,500 tonnes of necessary materials, such as tents, covers and such like, supplying over 7,500 people. The NATO medical unit had helped over 8,000 patients.

EFFECTIVE AID

At a fast pace – but always with a ready smile – the Italian engineers have brought to a successful conclusion the following projects:

Boys College: A scholastic institute within a wide leafy zone, composed of two buildings of two floors destined to become classrooms, one to become a library, one two storey building to be for management, two single storey buildings to be for classrooms and a one storey building to be a theatre.

Completely built in mixed structure of prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete which the earthquake had razed to the ground, except the administration building which was badly damaged.

The engineering equipment used for this project includes an excavator, two loaders, 4 medium sized dumpers. In 5 days work they had managed to remove 5,000 cubic metres of rubble.

Other work to the removal of the rubble includes the demolition of the dangerous building and the levelling of the whole area.

Boys School: A scholastic institute built on three terraces on top of which 5 single storey buildings destined to be classrooms and one building for meetings.

The school complex was built of mixed materials, prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete. All the buildings were seriously damaged except two which were razed to the ground.

The engineering equipment used for this project includes an excavator, one loader, a bulldozer and 6 dumpers, 4 medium and 2 small. In 8 days work they had managed to remove 4,500 cubic metres of rubble.

Also in this project as well as the removal of the rubble was the demolition of the dangerous building and the levelling into two terraces the original three terraces.

Electrical Power Station: comprised of the administration building of the company that manages the distribution of electricity in the city of Bagh, composed of a four storey building, made in reinforced concrete with brick filling. The building was completely razed to the ground.

The engineering equipment used for this project includes two excavators, one loader and 6 dumpers, 4 medium and 2 small. In 8 days work they had managed to remove 5,000 cubic metres of rubble as well as levelling the whole area.

Military Hospital: complex composed of four buildings in two floors, used for one hospital wing and the other a doctor's surgery.

The structure was made of prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete. The buildings were seriously damaged and partially collapsed.

The engineering equipment used for this project includes an excavator, two loaders, a bulldozer and 8 dumpers, 4 medium and 4 small. In 10 days work they had managed to remove 5,500 cubic metres of rubble and level the entire area.

Market Square: the piazza was in the centre of the city of Bagh and was surrounded by buildings of various heights, with an average of two floors, in which the ground floor was used for commercial purposes and the other floors for residential purposes.

The buildings were built of a mixture of prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete. Virtually all the buildings were either razed to the ground or seriously damaged.

The engineering equipment used for this project includes an excavator, one loader, a bulldozer and 6 dumpers, 4 medium and 4 large. In 10 days work they had managed to remove 5,000 cubic metres of rubble. And also in this project they levelled the ground afterwards.

In this project there arose certain problems with the rubble. Part of the area was owned by the state who wanted the area cleared and then left flat and vacant for building works to begin when the better weather arrived, while the other buildings were privately owned and the owners were keen to have their property, in rubble, available for them to salvage and start rebuilding immediately. It meant the extra task of keeping the rubble demarcated amongst ownership.

Sewage system: After the earthquake part of the city sewage system for Bagh had collapsed or was blocked up. The plan was to get it unblocked and working again, at least to a small degree. In 5 days it was achieved and the system was flowing again, albeit as an open system. Such work took two small capacity plastic terns, and the related removal of about 60 cubic metres of rubble.

Arja-Bagh Road: A key strategic transport route on the route between Kashmir and India. However following the earthquake some containing walls had collapsed and as such some of the road was covered.

The Italian contingent were assigned two sections of the road, where respectively a 12 and 30 metre wall had fallen onto the road.

The project was carried out with a reinforced concrete foundation, on top of which a new containing wall was placed, using dry stone wall techniques, but with the external walls reinforced. The work had also the additional issue of allowing for water run off. The complete task was finished in 20 days, thanks in addition to two working teams of pioneers.

"Thanks to the government and the Pakistani population for the open reception offered to NATO personnel and I offer my congratulations to the Alliance staff for their humanitarian mission which was carried out with professionalism and passion." These were the words of the Secretary General of the Atlantic Organization at the end of the rescue mission.

THE ITALIAN PARTICIPATION


One of the key roles, inside the NATO contingent, was by the Italian Armed Forces. In particular it was the Engineer Brigade that had the task



of organizing rapidly a group of men and equipment to help as quickly as possible in the stricken zone. And in order to guarantee the rapid deployment of aid NATO utilised a specific recourse - the NATO Response Force - composed of Command and Troops in "Tours of Duty" in rotation from the Alliance countries, justly organised to respond immediately and, consequently, deploy men and equipment in a matter of days. In a national environment it has to start from zero, putting together all the required parts for such aid (the engineering requirements), and the troops with all the total elements necessary to guarantee the complete logistic autonomy, communications included, 6,000 km from their homeland.

The original Engineering Company was alongside a Support Group - at company level - and a Communications platoon, all organically integrat-

"A key role was played by the Engineer Brigade, which was tasked with carrying out timely interventions in the areas hit by the earthquake"



Above and Left.

In the middle of the rubble, the population has been trying to go back to normal life.

ed into a Task Force Command at battalion level of about 250 units.

It was more than evident that such components, right from the start, would have to be free of any planned obligations.

From the initial activation, felt at the lowest level from 14th October, the national equipment was added to NATO on the 19th. If one can imagine the strict logistics that are involved in such an operation in such a time period one can imagine how they must have worked to achieve this feat.

There followed a period of an apparent lull in individual duties within the necessary vectors while the contingent were sent to Pakistan, while the chain of command were organizing their designated personnel, deciding on suitable acquisitions for using overseas and the completing of necessary preventative medicinal measures, once known.

The port of Civitavecchia was to be the point of embarkation (SPOE) - the only dispatch - of the materials and equipment on board a ship direct to Karachi and noting the date of departure available to NATO was to be the 7th November, all the troops related to the operations had received the orders to get equipment, material and personnel to the 6th Pioneer Engineers Regiment in Rome, the unit set aside an Assembly Area for the reception of the needed practical equipment, the reconditioning of loads, the transfer and loading at the SPOE dock, as well as the



Notwithstanding the damage, the schools return to teaching activities.

collection point for the Contingent where they could go through all the last minute preparations prior to departure. Similar support was given to the regiment.

The Italian personnel were transported to Pakistan by air in two legs, apart from a small group who were on board the transport ship. The first group, about 40 units, were to disembark in Karachi, with the task of carrying out the unloading, and then transfer back to the column in Islamabad/Rawalpindi, some by road others by rail. The remaining personnel, the Main Body, reached Islamabad on the 2nd December to join with colleagues and head to the disaster zone. Together until Bagh, the Contingent camped at Arja – a place nearby – giving control of the Engineer's Company over to NATO Command.

Here is the log book of 8th December 2005 the day that saw the disembarking of our engineers in Pakistan. Lieutenant Maurizio Spaccini, Mobility Platoon Commander retells the day;

"12.00 8/12/05: ultimate reconnaissance in hel-

icopter to decide on deployment area for Italian Contingent.

"17.30 8/12/05: after 180km journey in and 10 hours in convey, along the rocky mountain road that connects Islamabad to Bagh, the first tranche of essential equipment and personnel reach Camp Green Elefante.

"20.00 8/12/05: the core of the camp is built, tents have electricity and the latrines are functioning; one can finally eat (obviously combat rations) and then sleep in order to continue tomorrow morning the necessary work for the setting up of the Italian Base."

In the next ten days with tranches of 30 vehicles a time the deployment of Task Force Elefante was completed.

The base was officially opened on the 15/12/05 but in reality there was group working on the Boys College in Bagh from the 11/12/05.

Camp Green Elefante, in its final version, comprised a Battalion Command, an operations room, two company commands, a hospital, an office, a refectory for 100 persons and 30 camp sites, all under tent cover, while the kitchen, the bread oven, the washroom, the fuel and lubricant depository, the latrines, the showers and central communications are placed under Shelter. For water

requirements the camp was based near a river and near a purification plant.

Electricity was taken from the large capacity COELMO 300Kw, which supplied the kitchen, the oven, the wash-room all the services and the transmission centre.

The remaining electrical needs, perimeter lighting for example, were taken from a COELMO 5Kw from the illumination tower SIRIO.

In order to surpass the problem of the cold, typical at that altitude all the tents were isolated and equipped with their own extremely efficient generators (CARMAR).

The camp was built on terraced land, some already existing others purposely made or extended – using rubble from earthquake remains.

The base of the camp was built with drainage underneath so allowing the camp to live suitably even in snow or rain.

15 days were still required for the ship with its load and support troops to reach Karachi, then 8 days to reach Islamabad and 9 days to reach Bagh, the city flattened by the earthquake.

In line with the Allies our Contingent initiated the first phase before February 1st. The only difference being that half of the Islamabad-Karachi journey was by train. The last Italian personnel to arrive home were on the 24th of February and the whole operation was officially closed on the 9th March by the Head of the General Staff the Army, in conjunction with the unloading of the ship by the 6th Pioneer Engineers Regiment.

"It has been a difficult mission," said the Head of the General Staff of the Army, Armed Forces General Filiberto Cecchi, "to which our men gave a exemplary performance, managing with self-assurance and natural capacity to resolve the problems they faced. Notwithstanding the distance from our own country, the disrupting conditions, the difficulties of protection faced and all with extremely heavy machinery, and so today I can say that the faith in the Italian Army, the Armed Forces, has been repaid valiantly. You have the recognition of the civil and military authorities, here in Italy and internationally, but above all of the population that you have helped. You have brought inspiration to humanity."

TASK FORCE "ELEFANTE"

What is Task Force "Elefante"? It's the name given to the Italian Mission in Pakistan, to the group of

engineers, logistic troops and a transmissions platoon. The personnel that were called up apart from the Engineering Brigade, who comprised 55% of the total group and almost all of the officers – with the exclusion of the Commander of the communications platoon, the administration officers and veterinary officers – of 17 groups from all over Italy (from Merano to Palermo). Despite the initial concerns the military group gelled although they were diverse it proved to be quite simple, probably thanks to the choice of individual commanders and the commander of the whole Task Force, Lieutenant Colonel Giulio Biot.

32 light vehicles, 90 trucks, 60 of which were heavy, 4 tanker trucks, 13 specialist engineering vehicles, 4 compressors, a water-purifier, 2 very large generators and 10 smaller ones, shelters of various types for cooking, communicating, planning, washing, showering and toilet facilities. There were these equipments, and materials and tools put at the disposal of the Italian Contingent. In total 1,200 metres of loaded ship, weighing 2,200 tonnes.


THE AID ACHIEVED

In almost a month a village was completely reconstructed. Operation 'Indus' could be said to have reached its goal.

The orange flashing lights illuminating the human shapes in the Kashmir night leaning against the damaged buildings, staring in wonder at the file of arriving Italian transport vehicles. "These trucks," affirmed Lieutenant Spacini, "had crossed 'koala bridge', the limit of administration for the Kashmir region, in order to follow the near-impassable mountain track to reach Camp Green Elefant, in Arja, from which the next day they would leave to go to Bagh to start their assigned work in Task Force Elefant.

"The expressions of wonder, that the Italian soldiers had read in the eyes of the Pakistani peoples, in seeing these large vehicles plough along their broken roads in that so unfortunate zone of the world, from the moment of their arrival, they had accompanied them until the end of their work. What the Italian soldiers had seen change," continues the Lieutenant, "in fifty days of work in favour of the earthquake struck people was the attitude of the people!

"Day after day the suspicion transformed first into curiosity and finally into admiration and gratitude. At the start of the Operation the Bagh population watched with suspicion these soldiers dressed in strange clothing and camouflage



Strengthening a road after a landslide.

colours with a three coloured shield, green, white, red, on their left arm.

"The symbol of a nation, geographically and culturally far away, had come slowly slowly to symbolize fraternity that the population of Bagh proudly displayed back to our soldiers, busy with their machines removing the rubble, hitting dangerous buildings and flattening the ground for subsequent rebuilding, all accompanied by the phrase 'Italian my friends'

"The eyes of the population were no longer small cracks but had become large, light and laughing. The population had wanted to talk to the Italian engineers to understand what places they had come from, if they were married or if they had any children. In short they wanted to know all about their new friends that, with smiles on their lips, covered in dust, they worked all day to the point where only the steel parts of the tools were visible.

"Initially the tasks assigned to the Italian Contingent were in the periphery of the city of Bagh, like the electrical power station, or around

the perimeter wall, like the Boys College or the Boys School. With every project the Italian Contingent moved closer and closer to the heart of the city, ever closer the market square.

"The population continued to carry out their daily life even though many of the buildings had been destroyed in the earthquake. Amongst the mountains of rubble there was a barber, with a client sitting on the unmistakable chair having his hair cut and his beard trimmed. A short distance away two firemen were washing their red fireengine in what remained of their fire station.

"In this context, somewhat surreal, excavations, loadings, earth shifting and a continual stream of vehicles with 'Italian Army' written on the side, the uninterrupted work continued.

"By this point the Italian Contingent had become an integral part of the urban life. In those fifty days the Italian army had had the fortune to see also the change in behaviour of the local women. At first the faces of the women, at the moment they were near Italians, became covered with their traditional veil and they looked away.

"While they began as strong, untiring and modest, the warm nature of the engineers was able to pull down the barriers between the cultures and also the veils of the woman and the suspicions of the female populace.

"Significant examples include two road worksites that were reconstructing a collapsed wall along the road Arja-Bagh. Near the work there was a female school. Initially the girls, when passing in front they covered their faces with blue veils. As the work progressed so did the esteem and trust in the Italian Army, and so in this brief time the engineers had the fortune to eventually see faces characterised by startling looks, alive and full of life as any young girl of that age.

"Some girls were 'courageous' and offered a greeting in English to the soldiers, with a smile and a timid gesture of the hand. Once again the street lights started to work, now all the night could be lit.

"And in the orange light one sees the population of Bagh and the friend of the policeman, who every day regulates the traffic on the access bridge into the city, greeting Task Force Elefante that had discharged its mandate and is returning to Italy.

“ By then the Italian Contingent had become an integral part of that particular urban context ”

CONCLUSIONS

Starting a month 'later' than the other countries, the work of the Italian Contingent - constructed for this particular mission - was



extremely appreciated, above all taking into account the capacity of how the engineers could express themselves with the tools they had at their disposal. In fact the same spokesmen of NATO, James Appathurai, in reference to the impressions made by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) - Generale Sir John Reith, British, - on occasion of his visit to the effected areas in January 2006 had expressed his compliments from all of the Alliance to Italy for its important role in bringing aid to the Pakistan people, above all thanking the heavy machinery. In particular, General Reith was very favourably struck by how much the Italians had done in such a small amount of time, removing an incredible amount of rubble, showing the unquestionable value of its equipment.

From the national point of view, to be able to send in good time a high quality specialist Contingent that's capacity, workload, stamina at a distance far from home is valued, surely means another objective has been reached for our armed forces in the continual process of transforming what we have already started.

Finally a simple consideration connected to the occurrence of natural calamities ever more unpredictable and with effects ever more disastrous. Remembering that the Italian territory is stretched over a tectonic plate, whose movements can cause earthquakes, we are certainly conscious of our own country being at high risk.

A view of the destruction caused by the earthquake.

We cannot understate the possibility of intervention, for emergencies, in our territory and, consequently, the employing of a minimum amount of resources for investment or at least keeping the level of equipment for our engineers, and so guarantee their capacity in this specific sector.


Antonello Carpino
*Colonel, Commander,
6th Engineer Regiment*

Serena Sartini,
Journalist

NOTE

(1) In April 1997, during a NATO meeting for the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPEC), the Russian Federation proposed the increased cooperation within international aid in case of disasters. Recognizing the importance of such an initiative, on the 17th December 1997 in a ministers session, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) formalized the proposal to create such a capacity. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre was inaugurated on the 3rd June 1998.





TECHNE

THE «PZH 2000» SELF-PROPELLED GUN

THE «PzH 2000» SELF-PROPELLED GUN

Its technical characteristics make it flexible and suitable for employment in any operational theatre. In the envisaged procurement programme, the Italian Army requested all the guarantees that can ensure an adequate logistic support for the future.

In 1994, while the programme of transformation of the self-propelled M109G into the M109L with a 155/39 barrel (concluded in 1996) was under way, the Army General Staff was monitoring with particular interest the development of new weapon systems, with a view of equipping the artillery units with a new self-propelled gun which, following NATO's trends concerning the modernization of the artillery systems, could permit to achieve ranges of 40km, and improve the rate and accuracy of fire while ensuring, at the same time, a reduction of the systems' vulnerability, in order to give to the crews ample possibilities of survival.

According to the results of an international technical-economic survey conducted by the General Directorate of Land Armaments on the self-propelled guns already developed or in an advanced stage of development, the Army General Staff singled out the PzH 2000 howitzer as the system that, as regards performance and characteristics, could totally meet the requirements of the Service.

GENERAL FEATURES

The PzH 2000 was conceptually born in Germany at the end of the eighties, after the conclusion of the SP 70 programme in which, beside Germany, Italy and Great Britain participated.

Krauss-Maffei Wegman (KMW) developed and produced 185 systems for the German Army, and they entered into service in Germany in 1998 (actually the development was done by Wegman alone, since Krauss-Maffei was incorporated later).

Armed with a 155/52 gun, it employs modular propelling charges with a range of 30km with non-

assisted projectiles and 40km with assisted projectiles of the "base bleed" type.

The barrels and the propelling charges have been developed according to the common military requirements defined by the Joint Working Group on Ballistics which includes France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.

It has an automatic shell-loading system, which permits a substantial reduction in the times of intervention, while ensuring a high firing rate, so that a single howitzer can develop an amount of fire equal to that of three M109L self-propelled guns. In practice, a battalion with three six-piece batteries develops a volume of fire almost three times

that of the present M109L and can simultaneously intervene on a target with 3-5 rounds fired by a single howitzer (Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact).

The PzH 2000, which is planned as a fire unit that can automatically and autonomously manage all firing operations, can position itself, make fire preparations (releasing the anchorage of the gun, sighting, loading the first shell), carry out a mission with 10-shot volleys and resume movement in less than 2 minutes, ensuring a remarkable level of survivability in case of counter-battery fire.

TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Before analysing in detail the main technical and operational characteristics of the weapon system we wish to highlight the technical administrative activities that have permitted to realize the programme.

On the basis of the Army General Staff's decision to acquire the system, in July 1995 the German

“...the Army General Staff singled out the PzH 2000 howitzer as the system that, as regards performance and characteristics, could totally meet the requirements of the Service”



counterpart pressed for the timely start of the initiatives necessary for signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

On the industrial plane, the German company Wegman and the Italian Oto Melara, still in 1995, signed a preliminary agreement of industrial and commercial cooperation for the production of the self-propelled gun.

Later the Army General Staff confirmed its interest in the German programme, proposing the signature of a "Letter of Intent" aimed at laying the foundations of a successive legal-administrative agreement between the two Governments, in order to safeguard the rights of the administrations and of the manufacturers.

This letter, signed in October 1996 by the Minister of Defence, in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff Committee, envisaged the acquisition of 94 weapon systems. Later on, owing to the Service's reorganization process, aimed at achieving a new structure corresponding to the foreseeable tasks and the financial resources, the order was reduced to 70 systems.

In October 1998 the Minister of Defence, considering the favourable opinion of the Parliament's Defence Committees, decreed the approval of a "long-term programme" for the acquisition of seventy PzH 2000 howitzers, with a


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A PzH 2000.

155/52 barrel.

On October 2, 2000, at the end of a long series of meetings, Italy and Germany signed a bilateral MoU, which included the Industrial Agreement signed in March of the same year by the Iveco-Fiat-Oto Melara (CIO) consortium, for Italy, and by Krauss-Maffei-Wegmann (KMW) for Germany.

The main aspects of the MoU concerned: the development of a national contract with the Iveco-Oto Melara Consortium for the supply of 70 self-propelled guns, 2 of which were to be taken from the German production line, in order to "Italianize" the system; the supply of a "Block Garantie" logistic support by the industry; the possibility of starting a Common Italo-German Integrated Logistic Support (with the prospect of involving other possible PzH-equipped Countries). This could be realized by working out a specific MoU for the joint acquisition of spare parts, test equipment and special implements; the institution of an Italian liaison Officer at the German Federal Agency for Technology and Procurement (BWB), with the task to coordinate

Fig. 1



the activities connected with the operational aspects of configuration, production, training and logistic support.

On December 13, 2002, the Defence Administration and the Iveco-Oto Melara Consortium (CIO) signed a contract which provides for the delivery of 70 howitzers between 2006 and 2009, and ensures the logistic support of a "Block Garantie" type that covers the period from the delivery of the first howitzer to the Service until the year following the supply of the last system (2010).

TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

The 155mm gun of the PzH, with its three components: breech-block, L52 barrel and muzzle brake was developed and produced by Rheinmetall. (fig.1).

In particular, the L52 barrel is characterized by a 60-groove rifling (an improvement, compared to the 48 grooves of the 39 calibre howitzers now in service with NATO). In order to

reduce the wear and tear problems of the guiding band of the shells, due to the longer barrel; internal chromium plating of about 2500mm,

starting from the breech, to reduce the wear and tear; the "full" part of the grooves are hardened through a laser process in the final part towards the muzzle; technical life equal to 2500 rounds at maximum charge (6 modules); length 8 metres and volume of the powder chamber 23 litres against the 18.8 litres of the 39-calibre.

Furthermore, the self-propelled gun can use DM 72 modular propelling charges, divided into "bottom charge" (2 modules for ranges of 3 to 11km) and "top charge" (6 modules for ranges of 7 to 30/40 km).

The DM72 Propelling Charge System can also be employed with all 39-calibre weapon systems employed by NATO and, compared with the "bag type" conventional ones, it offers the following advantages: easy use and handling (less human errors); increased firing speed; simple logistics (only two types of module); longer life cycle; use of non-employed modules;

“...the Defence Administration and the Iveco-Oto Melara Consortium (CIO) signed a contract providing for the delivery of seventy PzH 2000s between 2006 and 2009”

significant reduction of residual combustion products.

The modular propelling charge systems can be: 1) coupled – the various modules forming the charge are assembled through appropriate clutches or: 2) uncoupled – the modules that constitute the charge are placed one on top of the other, without clutches.

This new system of propelling charges, studied by the Joint Working Group on Ballistics, has been widely tested and used in many NATO Countries, and can be considered the future “standard” system that in the future will replace the one now in use (fig.2).

MOBILITY

Owing to its high degree of mobility, the PzH 2000 can compete with tanks. The power/weight (55 tons) ratio is similar to that of the Leopard 1. This degree of mobility, rather remarkable for an artillery system equipped with protection, a 52-calibre gun and a considerable availability of munitions, is the result of the high performance of the MTU MT881 Ka-500 engine (736 kw) mounted on the front of the hull. It is an 8-cylinder direct-injection, supercharged diesel engine which permits a maximum speed of 60km/h. Three fuel tanks provide a 420km cruising range.

AUTOMATIC SHELL-LOADING SYSTEM


The automatic shell-loading systems are now almost normal in modern self-propelled guns. They systems permit to achieve high rates of fire (6-8 rounds per minute in the first 2-3 minutes are now the norm) and reduce the physical efforts of the crew in the loading process.

The automatic shell loading system of the PzH 2000 can manage up to 60 shells. They are loaded from the back of the vehicle and automatically stored in the magazine located in the back, at the centre of the chassis. The automatic loading system includes, together with the “flick rammer”, a digital control system for the management of the shell supply and an induction graduation system of the fuses, permits a rate of fire of 3 rounds in less than 10 seconds and the loading of 60 shells by two gunners within 12 minutes.


The shell loading system has been realized for moving shells to the turret with no limitation and permits a rate of fire of 3 rounds in less than 10 seconds, 8-9 rounds in a minute and 20 rounds in 3 minutes.

If necessary, the 60 rounds stowed can be fired with continuity, without interruption.

Fig. 2



The PzH 2000 in a New Role



Example

Propelling Charge Trajectory Duration

Round no 1	7.L8A1	89 seconds
Round no 2	6.L8A1	70 seconds
Round no 3	6.L8A1	60 seconds
Round no 4	7.L8A1	49 seconds
Round no 5	8.L10A1	37 seconds

With an improved automatic loading system, the rate of fire of the PzH 2000 has been fixed, in a series of tests made in October 1997, at 12 rounds in 59 seconds and 20 rounds in 1 minute and 47 seconds.

MULTIPLE ROUND SIMULTANEOUS IMPACT (MRSI)

One of the peculiarities that boost the operational capabilities of the howitzer is the possibil-

ity of realizing the technique called "Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact", which enables the system to hit a target with more than 2 rounds (from three to five) at the same time, firing them with a single gun. This is done by applying procedures, which, through ballistic calculation, enable to find out several trajectories characterized by the time gaps that the crew needs in

Basic performance of the PzH 2000

UNDER ARMOUR






Fig. 4

order to conduct the operations for the next interventions.

The employment of the PzH 2000 in this new role is particularly significant, since a single piece can be considered a fire unit in every aspect, suitable for the determination of the firing data and the neutralization of spot targets (diameter 50m or less); the volume of fire strikes the target in less than 3 minutes, a time sufficient to neutralize it and permit to leave the gun's position without risking possible enemy reactions (counter-battery fire) (fig.3).

PROTECTION

Today, when speaking about protection of a self-propelled gun, the reference standard is given the PzH 2000. The Germans equipped it with a significant level of active and passive protection. Even if the roof of the turret is rather thick, the system's protection can be increased with reactive

armour that shelters the hull and the turret itself.


The weight of the vehicle, about 60 tons, partially reflects the weight of the armour. On the other hand, the limitations caused by the heavy weight are offset by a hull capable of supporting the armour's weight and by an engine that increases its mobility.

In particular, the protection of the weapon system includes: basic protection from 14.5mm rounds and artillery shrapnel; additional armour against small bombs (optional); collective system of anti-NBC protection and ventilation; alarm and fire-extinguishing automatic system in the engine compartment; subdivision of the charges in the turret into compartments; permanent emergency exit (back door).

LOGISTICS

The PzH 2000 is equipped with a sophisticated system of self-diagnosis (BITE) that, in case of

“The limitations due to the heavy weight are offset by a hull capable of supporting the armour's weight and by an engine that enhances its mobility”



failure of the electronic unit, can detect the damaged device and, in most cases, point out the element of the system that has to be replaced.

The special position of the devices inside the vehicle permits the easy replacement of the broken elements, thus reducing the times of technical stops (fig.4).

"BLOCK GARANTIE"

The high technological level of the weapon system, together with the evident complexity of the relevant logistic support, convinced the Army Staff to adopt an innovative solution consisting in the request to the industry to guarantee the efficiency of the system in the period between the delivery of the first gun until the year following the consignment of the last piece, by carrying out preventive and corrective maintenance.

"During that period, the industry's technicians, along with our Service's specialists, will give the necessary assistance, ensuring the operability of the system"

During that period, the industry's technicians, along with our Service's specialists, will give the necessary assistance, ensuring the operability of the system, making use of the equipment provided by the industry.

In detail, and provided that the employment of the systems and the preventive and corrective maintenance pertaining to the crew will have to be carried out directly by our military personnel, the industry will make its technicians available on the maintenance places, with the task of: carrying out the practical part of the courses for service engineers of the Adherence Area; making, together with the personnel of

the Service, the preventive and corrective maintenance belonging to the Adherence Area; organizing the transfer of the broken systems from the maintenance yards to the industry (CIO); testing the practical employment of the special tools and technical handbooks and provide the necessary

information about any possible modification; keeping up to date, in cooperation with the personnel of the Italian Army, the configuration of the weapon system.

CIO will also provide, at its own centres, the personnel necessary for: gathering and analysing the data made available by the sites, and those pertaining to the repairs carried out at the industries (Support Area); the transfer of the devices to be fixed to the industries in charge of the repairs, and vice-versa.

In short, the activities of maintenance and repair are executed at the sites by the industry personnel, with the involvement of military technicians controlled by a service centre of the industry.

To this end, the "Block Garantie" envisages a range of services that should ensure the efficiency of the systems, including research and adoption of corrective measures in case of difficulties, as well as study of the logistic support.

At the end of the "Block Garantie" phase, the Service will have at its disposal a data bank, with the number and types of the shortcomings found, repairs made and type and number of spare parts employed. All these data will be used in order to define the logistic support of the weapon system, with significant savings.

The data concerning the activities carried out at the sites are transmitted to the data bank of the industry, where they are scrutinized in order to detect the critical areas, start corrective actions and establish the Logistic Data Bank.

The information thus collected, and subsequently exchanged between the industry and the Army, concern the data of technical-logistic management (configurations, logbook), maintenance activity (consumption, progress of repairs), supplying activity (spare parts used, whole, partial) and technical publications.

Through the analysis of these data and the scrutiny of those connected with the "Block Garantie" on the 185 German PzH 2000s, the Service can decide the type of logistic support needed to assure the operational life of the 70 weapon systems.

This is the first time that the Italian Army puts a weapon system into service ensuring at the same time, with the said guarantee, the initial support of the industry and the possibility of defining, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the logistic requirements for the future life-cycle (fig.5).

CONCLUSIONS

Outside Germany this weapon system is already in service in Greece (24 pieces) and KMW has started the production of 57 guns for Holland.



A PzH 2000 with its gun at the highest elevation.


The PzH 2000, with its very advanced characteristics as regards firing rate, precision, range, protection and rapidity of deployment, is the most technically advanced system to be found on the market; in our Army is destined to replace the M109L self-propelled gun at three Land-Artillery Regiments (8th "Pasubio", 21st "Trieste" and 132nd "Ariete"). The M109L has been in service since the seventies and has now reached the end of its operational life (25 years).

In view of the distribution to the units, the Army Staff programmed to start, at the Bracciano Artillery School, training courses aimed at qualifying the instructors that subsequently will train the crews.

Meanwhile, CIO has begun the production of the first systems, whose introduction into service is envisaged for the first months of 2007 with the assignation of six PzH 2000s to the Artillery School. Within the first quarter of 2008, the distribution to the "Pasubio" Regiment will be completed and the delivery to the 132nd Regiment will begin. The last PzH will be delivered to the 21st "Trieste" Regiment in 2009.

Pierluigi Genta
Colonel,
Logistic Division,
Army General Staff





EXERCISE WATC 2005

TECHNE

EXERCISE WATC 2005

In Guinea, Ghana and Senegal, the 1st «Lagunari» Regiment carried out amphibious training activities under the Marines' European Command. Once more our «Fanti da Mar» (Infantrymen of the Sea) have shown that they have acquired the skill and experience that enable them to operate as landing forces from amphibious assault ships.

A unit of the Regiment «Serenissima» participated in the training activity of that the US Marine Corps carries out every two years, off the western coast of Africa, which is called West African Training Cruise 2005 (WATC). The aim of the training was to do training amphibious activities with the Armed Forces of three coast countries: Guinea, Ghana, Senegal. Designed and produced by the European Command of the Marines, who are based in Stuttgart, the activity consisted of three international preliminary meetings which were held in Dresda, Cape Town and Naples, in which some representatives of General Staff and of the «Lagunari» took part. The Regiment of the «Lagunari» participated in the WATC with a landing platoon that had been strengthened as principal component of multinational amphibious force. They spent 57 days on board two American vessels: the floating dock landing ship USS «Gunston Hall» and a swift troopship USS «Swift». During the training cruise, the amphibious assets of the «Lagunari» were used by all participants and turned out to be the backbone of all activities that were conducted in the ocean and on the African rivers.

The «Lagunari» had already done several training embarkations on American troopships but they had always operated in the Mediterranean. The WATC was the first multinational training to have some units of the Regiment landing on the African coast and operating in the Atlantic Ocean.

Before describing in detail the activities that were done during the WATC to fully understand how the «Lagunari» have acquired ability and experience to operate on board amphibious assault ships like a landing force, it is useful to cover the history of this Regiment in order to understand the cultural framework of the «Lagunari» by referring to the special equipment

that they have been issued with and that improves their amphibious capabilities.

A HISTORY WITH VERY ANCIENT ROOTS

The modern «Lagunari» were founded on 15th January 1951 when an interservice unit consisting of army and navy personnel was established and was called «Lagunari Forces Sector». After it had lost every member of the navy and after subsequent changes, on 24th May 1967 the Regiment «Lagunari» was founded. The then Chief of Staff of the army gave it the name of «Serenissima», regarding the «Lagunari» as descendants of «Fanti da Mar», the embarked troops of the «Serenissima» Republic of Venice which were founded back in 1202 by the doge

Enrico Dandolo. Today, the «Lagunari» wear on their uniforms symbols and colours, like facings, which remind us of those noble Venetian «landing forces»; even the war-cry «San Marco», which they proudly sing out during every military ceremony, can be traced back to the «Fanti da Mar». Consequently, their sense of identity is sharpened by the overseas deeds in

which the embarked militias of the «Serenissima» distinguished themselves for six centuries: from the capture of Zara and Byzantium to the sieges of Candia, Famagosta and the famous victory of Lepanto. The Regiment seems like a recently established unit. Actually, its essence, traditions and symbols have distant origins and bring to mind an illustrious past. Being «Lagunare» means perpetuating this heritage of glory and bravery and looking beyond the sea like their Venetian ancestors. In addition, the Regiment is stationed in three different places in the surroundings of Venice. One of these headquarters is situated on

“ During the training cruise, the amphibious assets of the «Lagunari» turned out to be the backbone of all activities conducted on both the ocean and the African rivers ”



Title pages.

«Lagunari» on board a rubber dinghy during an exercise.

Above.

An AAV-7 RAM RS amphibious assault craft.

an island of the lagoon, which is used as an amphibious base, making its link with the lagoon city even more direct.

EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS


The «Lagunari» Regiment is one of a kind in the Italian army with regard to organizational structure, training and equipment. It has been professionalized for more than five years and has taken part in all the principal overseas missions that the armed force has performed in the last years. The organizational structure consists of the Command and Company Headquarters Logistical Support and the 1st Battalion «Lagunari», which is the operational pawn of the Regiment. In the Battalion there are three amphibious fusilier companies, a heavy-

mortar company, an antitank company and an amphibious tactical support company which includes amphibious assault forces and the special amphibious platoon. With regard to vehicles, the Regiment is issued with the double mechanized (VCC2) and amphibious line, with a range of specific materials: an amphibious assault vehicle AAV-7 RAM RS (designed in the United States) with different models (amphibious assault and recovery) with which even the Marines are issued (at the moment, the «Lagunari»-issue model is the most advanced); an assault boat

that is able to carry a well equipped team and is fitted with a 115 horsepower out-board engine; an inflatable boat Zodiac FC 470 with a 40 horsepower engine, auto-inflatable and air droppable material that is known for its rusticity and versatility; MTP, landing crafts that are able to carry a maximum of 30 equipped men; crafts of different dimensions and ton-

nage for all the training and logistical activities of the Regiment; special underwater material that is used by the special amphibious platoon, which is a reconnaissance pawn of the battalion consisting of rigorously selected and well trained

“The «Lagunari» identity is kindled by the great overseas deeds in which the embarked militias of the «Serenissima» distinguished themselves for centuries...”



Also the special amphibious platoon took part in the exercise.

people. Its organizational structure, the equipment and the considerable experience that springs from a fifty-year-long amphibious training show that the Regiment is perfectly able to be embarked on any amphibious units of marine NATO/EU to serve its own functions of landing force without requiring any external cooperation.

EXERCISE WATC

As mentioned above, a unit of the Regiment «Serenissima» took part in the amphibious training «West African Training Cruise» in the western Africa. The training, under the American leader-

ship, was aimed at establishing a multinational landing force consisting of a platoon of the Marines, an infantry platoon of Spanish navy and the unit «Lagunari» that would embark on two American ships. This activity involved employing 46 «Lagunari»: an Official of the Staff of CLF; an Official Commander; an amphibious fusilier platoon; a unit of ten amphibious scouts (five of whom worked underwater); three teams AAV-P7; a team AAV-P7; a team of craft pilots.


In the final phase of the training, as the Chief of Staff decided, a team of 10 men on foot of the Regiment «San Marco» of the navy joined the unit «Lagunari». After conducting a brief training of «amalgam» in Venice, where the Regiment is stationed, during the WATC the team of the navy was placed under the Command of the Captain of the «Lagunari», Commander of Italian unit, making use of the means that the «Lagunari» had put at their disposal. The «Lagunari» and the «Marò» of the «San Marco» shared an important experience. This allowed the small unit of the Marines to integrate into the amphibious unit of the army quickly.

As mentioned above, the Regiment «Lagunari» provided the multinational unit WATC with a significant number of landing crafts (in all, seventeen crafts): three amphibious assault personnel vehicles AAVP7; an amphibious assault recovery vehicle (AAVR7), three assault boats; six assault inflatable boats Zodiac FC470; three VM T 90 fitted with a boat trolley used for carrying small assault boats; a van «Ducato» in support of scuba diving operators. The American contribution consisted of landing ships with two LCU (big crafts for transport), logistical support and some wheeled vehicles, whereas the Spanish contribu-

tion was restricted to two inflatable boats with outboard engine. Though the number of participants was limited, the Regiment «Lagunari» employed «reconnoiters» of the landing beach, landing means and personnel with different vehicles (boats, small assault boats, amphibious assault vehicles), logistical means (recovery vehicle) and the Command and Control (Staff of Commander Landing Force).

In addition, during the last phase of the training that took place in Senegal, the multinational unit WATC integrated into an amphibious operation under the English leadership, participating in the training Green Osprey that had been organized and conducted by an amphibious task force of the

“...one can see that the “Lagunari” Regiment is perfectly capable of being embarked on any amphibious unit of the NATO/EU Navies to perform the functions of landing force without requiring any real support”



Above and right.

Two pictures of the floating dock on the landing ship USS «Gunston Hall» that facilitates the operations of floating and re-embarking craft.

British Royal Marines, as well as by Norwegian, Dutch, French, Danish and local amphibious troops.

EXERCISE WATC: ACTIVITIES

In Naples the unit of the «Lagunari» embarked on the ship USS «Gunston Hall» which headed for the Spanish base of Rota to take the remaining Spanish and American personnel on board. During the oceanic navigation, the cohesion of the unit WATC increased gradually on board the landing ship, taking numerous and mutual lessons on materials, radio systems, usual procedures, doing target practice at sea and focusing on preparatory activities for the following landing phases.

Guinea

The first nation to be visited was Guinea, where the unit WATC operated in the exercise area of Benti. They arrived there by sea. The exercise area is situated on the estuary of a large river, where they did intensive training to carry out «riverine» operations by using inflatable boats and facing the dangers of the great African waterways. Once they had landed, they undertook lots of activities to try techniques for ambushes and movements in the thick jungle of Africa. The Armed Forces of Guinea appeared to be fully satisfied with the quality of the joint exercise as the promotional activities that the Italian unit did at the end of the operations

showed. In fact, a special military ceremony took place in the Ministry of Defence in the presence of the accredited ambassadors and military attachés.

Ghana

After the re-embarkation from Guinea, the amphibious force headed for Ghana. During the navigation, they did other technical training in the daytime and at night to improve the «amalgam» of the unit. Once they had arrived off the coast of Ghana, a team of amphibious scouts was entrusted with the task of carrying out special patrols in the selected landing beach, in the area of Secondi, using submarine equipment they were issued with. After having taken a company of fusiliers of the



Ghanaian navy on board the ship «Gunston Hall», they did an interesting amphibious assault training when the sea was very rough. Then, the landing units headed for the Jungle Warfare School of the Ghanaian Armed Forces, 80 kilometres away from the landing beach to do four-day training activities that were aimed at planning and leading a surprise attack in the jungle. In addition, they used a small arms range with unmoving and moving targets in the dense local vegetation. The amphibious scouts focused on the training and perfected the techniques for carrying out patrols and identifying targets in the jungle. After their return to the ship, which had been docked at the port of Takoradi, official ceremonies took place in the presence of local authorities and the accredited ambassadors.

Senegal

After sailing back, the amphibious force headed for Senegal. During the navigation they carried on doing all preparatory and organizational activities



Above.
Rubber dinghies set sail off the Senegalese coast.

Below.
«Lagunari», Marines and Ghanaian infantrymen on board a US LCU getting ready for landing.



for the future training that they had to face, as well as the maintenance work and the tidying up of materials that had been employed. They also did target practice at sea. When the ships reached port in Dakar, the bulk of the multinational unit WATC moved to the Infantry School of Senegalese Army

that is situated in Thies, whereas the amphibious scouts of the «Lagunari» headed for the base camp of the battalion «Recon» of the British Royal Marines in Kaolack, 200 kilometres away from Dakar. During their stay in Senegal, the entire multinational unit WATC integrated into the Command and Control of the British amphibious force taking part in the different planned training activities. In detail, we should mention the most important activities that took place during more than two weeks of intense joint exercise without interruption. After the initial contacts with the British Officials to plan the activities of the patrol amphibious unit, the amphibious scouts «Lagunari» did their first thirty-six-hour operational exercise in the Senegalese savannah, a continual training exercise in target identification, cover fire and barrage, and assault on target; the fusiliers and the other personnel performed many different exercises. They had theoretic lessons on amphibious raids and NEO (Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation) for the final exercise Royal Chamois. The unit WATC took part with the Royal Marines in joint exercises using different kinds of

mines and doing practical demonstrations (for example, handling explosives for demolition work, setting booby traps using C4 and building explosive circuits). The instructors came from the British Royal Marines and the American Marines. During the day and at night target practice was done with



A «Lagunari» team regroups after landing.

different weapons. Soldiers were drilled in combat in the built-up areas and with the instructors of the Royal Marines they practiced hand-to-hand fighting. They also did the theoretic and practical training to make inspections of suspicious ships.


The training activity reached the most important moment with a major exercise in the area of Tobacouda. The first Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation under the British leadership took place with a following exhibition on «Lagunari»-issue means of transport and materials that was attended by relevant authorities. After the re-embarkation they started to prepare the final phase of the training thoroughly which included such activities as infiltration of scouts for target identification, amphibious raids and another bigger NEO. During these activities, which were very complex in terms of Command and Control, all the amphibious assets

“The amphibious scouts component focused on the specific training and perfected the techniques of reconnaissance and target acquisition in the jungle”

that were provided by the «Lagunari» were profitably employed: assault inflatable boats Zodiac, small assault boats and amphibious assault vehicle AAV-7 which sailed for the coast and navigated the wide local rivers to do the planned activities. It should be noted that one of the distin-

guished features of all training activities was a high degree of realism. The Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, which were in opposition to hostile forces, set a perfect example. They were real prisons for civilian hostages with the «cooperation» of an entire village, which was involved in the training as theatre of rescue operation. The closing ceremony of the training Green Osprey took

place in Fatick (230 kilometres away from Dakar) in the presence of the Senegalese Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, lots of ambassadors, among whom the Italian ambassador, as well as military attachés and a large audience. After these activities, during the navigation they commented on what they did: lessons and practical operations (maintenance of vehicles and materials). The



A landing craft leaving USS «Gunston Hall».

American ships headed for the base of Rota, where the Americans and the Spanish landed. Then, only the troopship USS «SWIFT» headed for the port of Venice where the unit «Lagunari» set foot in its native soil again and completed an unforgettable and invaluable training activity.

ASSESSING THE EXERCISE

During the WATC, the unit «Lagunari» was able to conduct different activities such as: amphibious assaults; amphibious raids; «riverine» operations; reconnaissance activity of landing zones; training in target identification; training in combat in the jungle; target practice with small arms; training in setting afloat amphibious vehicles in the sea and in recovering and taking them on board landing ships; Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation; refining combat strategies in built-up areas.

During the training activities, the comparison between techniques and procedures used by the principal world amphibious forces enabled the participants to develop highly professional skills. The cohabitation in small ships

and the unusual environment in which lots of operations were conducted (they experienced great difficulties in navigating the African rivers near the estuaries with the tide of the Atlantic and the dark nights in the jungle) increased the cohesion of the international personnel, the spirit of sacrifice and the comradeship.

Without any doubt, the training has had lots of consequences for the «Lagunari». Firstly, they were allowed the possibility of operating and launching the amphibious assets on board landing ships off the Atlantic coast: it was the crowning achievement of the amphibious training that was being conducted by the Regiment «Lagunari». Secondly, they were able to confront the life on board a landing ship and this has improved their professional skills. Thirdly, operating in unusual

latitudes and in hostile natural environments has broadened their experience. In addition, during the WATC they had the opportunity to test amphibious vehicles, crafts and different materials in particular waters and in unfamiliar environments. Lastly, as far as the training in the African countries is concerned, it is important to stress

the quality of Jungle Warfare School of Ghana where they took part in fruitful exercises with highly qualified instructors. To conclude, it is in their own interests to increase this «mutual

“...the participation in WATC caused a great image spin-off for the Italian Army and the Nation as a whole”

exchange». Their aim is to sharpen their military skills. The training activity WATC can do this very costly-effectively.

CONCLUSIONS

The West African Training Cruise 2005 turned out to be a golden opportunity to improve the amphibious training of the embarked units allowing the «Lagunari» to operate on board the allied landing ships to increase the knowledge of the procedures for launching into the sea the amphibious assets that the Regiment was issued with.

Taking part in the WATC has revived the image of the Italian army and the entire nation, because the training cruise has been a relevant activity for the host African countries and has brought the participants coming from sea into the spotlight. In fact, at the end of these activities, highly institutional military ceremonies and convivial receptions took place in the presence of government repre-



Above.
Reorganizing after landing.

Below.
A team of «Lagunari» embarking on their craft in the floating dock of USS «Gunston Hall».



sentatives and the accredited ambassadors.

The local media coverage has been considerable exactly like the spontaneous popular participation of the population in all these events. Taking part in the training enables the nation to report to other countries with highly professional military skills. To conclude, the participation of the «Lagunari» in the WATC, which has involved operations in unfamiliar environments (e.g. the savan-

nah of Senegal, the jungle of Ghana and Guinea), has been a good training opportunity and has proved that the Regiment «Serenissima» is capable of operating easily on board landing ships of any NATO and EU country.

Giovanni Parmiggiani
*Lieutenant Colonel,
Commander of a «Lagunari» Battalion*





VALUES AND TECHNOLOGY

VALUES AND TECHNOLOGY

The real essence of a modern Army

The road that leads to the growth and development of the individual and the organization goes necessarily through study, research, tradition and innovation. Although technology is the most concrete and visible element, ethical values remain the foundations for a well-balanced and effective action.

Whoever theorizes without knowing data tends to change facts to adapt them to theories, not to revise theories to adapt them to facts.

Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930)

In the last few years, science has changed our way of working, acting and communicating radically. Modern technologies have paved the way for extraordinary innovations in lots of fields, creating new opportunities and setting great value on everyone's life. Consequently, in order to be competitive both individuals and organizations must show willingness to follow new trends, cooperate with their own kind and pay attention to the feedback of their actions.

Scientific progress springs from a gradual process of global innovation concerning the cultural, social and ethical aspects of the western civilization. With regard to this, we can focus our attention on some events of transition which have made the evolution of our civilization patchy and studded with turning points.

Going into detail, the technological development has always produced changes not only in the ways of organization and in the use of military force. It has also changed its significance and the way it can be used to achieve political objectives affecting the schemes aimed at conducting military operations.

The spread of the computer science has transformed both the economy and the strategy. The



Title pages.

A Bv 206 tracked vehicle of the alpine troops.

Right.

The equipment of the «Future Soldier».




Fig. 1

transmission and sharing of knowledge in real time have become a fundamental factor to maximize the potential of human and material resources.

The use of knowledge does not consume it. It generates other knowledge. This is a decisive element in a context of widespread uncertainty and unpredictability in which the new tasks must be fulfilled, since the operations are multinational and interservice and require the employment of units that enable us to use force only if necessary. We have to carefully consider the changes affecting not only the political-strategic context but also sociology and ethics of the contemporary military systems in order to evaluate the enormous impact of technological development of arms and organizational structure.

All human actions are performed in a moral order that originates from a social discipline based on ethical principles and respect of natural and fundamental human rights. However, it is not easy to spot ethical values in a changing society.

Even though the military world tries to adhere to basic ethical principles, inevitably it acquires the qualities and faults of the contemporary society, because of its role within the community. Therefore, it is necessary to underline the content of military and professional ethics, although these principles are shared by all soldiers; only their «combination» has changed as time has gone by.

In the post-industrial society, the technologi-

cal progress has produced positive effects in different sectors and, above all, changes in the attitude to life and in the morals, setting new priorities and distorting the real meaning of essential values.

These changes of society (values of reference and instruments of action) are «internal». However, there has been also a radical «external» change which has been caused by the particular situation where the military instrument has to operate.


The world and the strategic context have changed radically: concepts like security, defence, two-party system, threaten, national interests are considered in a different way from how they were regarded ten years ago.

What is the *fil rouge* that can lead the organization and the individual to act in a consistent and effective way? What is the element that could represent a guideline? How does innovation combine with tradition within our military world?

These questions have aroused our personal and professional curiosity. We hope they also draw the reader's attention, in search of possible and not purely doctrinal answers.

The following paragraph will outline the historical evolution of tactics and techniques, referring to some battles or campaigns of great importance for the particular arms and systems that were used to fight them. After that, we will do an analysis of the «set of values» that has always represented a reference point of action, as a heritage of all fighters,

“...the technological progress has produced positive effects in different sectors and, above all, changes in the attitude to life...”



in accordance with the contemporary technological progress.

HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY

The topic of war has always been related to the history of civilization, touching all its aspects: culture, economy, politics, technology as well as the essential components of intelligence, courage, astuteness, intuition and even the luck of a combatant, Commander or soldier.

The primitive warrior is fighting spirit. At times, it is pure instinct. The hero is considered a lonely being, inevitably doomed to fighting. That kind of mystic insanity that drives him to the fighting is the mirror of the celestial favour. The clash between two armies represents a «judicial» duel in which the Gods choose which part has the right to win the battle.

With the dawning of the *polis*, war lost its individual dimension which was replaced by a collective action. The Homeric «prince» was no longer in charge of this kind of combat. The property owners, as a class of people of equal dignity even at political level, had responsibility for that. Therefore, the hoplites were in charge of war. They formed a compact group and were heavily armed to be able to resist the collision with another army when they closed ranks. The birth of the phalanx

was due to a slow and gradual process: it dates back to this period but it became in common usage only from the middle of the seventh century B.C.

This first important tactical revolution was caused not by the adoption of the big Argive shield, the *hòplon* (figure 1), after which the hoplite was named, but by its hilt with a double support consisting of a sling and a grip. As well as arms, even the conduct of soldiers and the concept of war underwent a lot of changes. Easier to handle and more effective, the *hoplòn* could cover not only the person who carried it but also the fellow man on the left. Whereas the Homeric hero could get rid of his shield easily, the hoplite, who was in the ranks, could not abandon his weapon or else he would compromise the compactness of the formation and betray his fellow men (figure 2).

In this sense, the battle that was fought by the Thebans against the Spartans in Leuttra in 371 B.C. is significant. In the spring-summer of that year a Spartan army under the Command of King Cleombroto invaded Boeotia and pitched camp in the plain of Leuttra, next to the walls of Thebes. The Spartan army consisting of 14 000 men was deployed in front of the enemy as usual; on the right side, in a position that was traditionally considered the most honourable, there was the elite of 2000 Spartan hoplites with




Fig. 3

the King. About 9000 Thebans adopted an innovative tactical disposition which was still unknown in the battles of hoplites. In fact, considering that the phalanxes, because of their armament, tended to divert to the right side to protect themselves with the shield of their fellow men on the left side, in order to upset the enemy army Epaminondas decided not to offer the right flank of his army (figure 3) – in contrast to what they used to do in that period – and adopted a more oblique disposition which was much deeper on the left (50 ranks instead of the usual 12) by which he would try to break through the enemy lines conclusively on the Spartan right side, exactly where the King Commander was. The tactical option, together with the Theban strict discipline, allowed the Thebans to defeat the strongest army of that period.

Of course, the phalanx had a gradual development (for example, the Macedonian phalanx laid the foundations for the envelopment), but this basic operational strategy would not change in the following centuries and it would be adopted by other populaces. Even the Roman legion originated from the hoplite phalanx but it moved in the opposite direction.

Originally, the principal arm of Legionnaires was still the spear: the first class consisted of actual hoplites and this tactical model lasted until the Punic wars, as the manoeuvre of the *triarii* shows.

The Samnite wars forced the Romans to make transformations and adaptations, streamlining the heavy close formation, which was not trained to combat on the uneven mountain ground of the Samnium, and planning more

“The topic of war has always been related to the history of civilization, touching all its aspects: culture, economy, politics, technology...”

flexible organizational schemes, which relied on the combative skills of each soldier. Hence the «classical» form of the legion: the so-called *velites*, who acted as scouts and vanguard, led the legion which was divided, in depth, in three successive lines: *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*. They were the backbone of the Roman heavy infantry and were deployed on the ground so that the maniples of soldiers formed an ideal chessboard. Even this second strategy did not solve the problems that the guerrilla warfare had posed after the conquest of the Iberian territories. They came up with a solution by adopting an organizational unity that is midway between the maniple and the legion, the cohort. It usually consisted of three maniples of *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii* which carried the same




Fig. 4

number of order: the men who were on the first line were equipped with long arms and each soldier could rely on the protection and help of their fellow men again (figure 4).

The key factor to achieve and maintain the domination of Rome was neither the arms nor the tactics: it was the organizational, material and cultural superiority of a civilization.

The battle of Alesia (52 B.C.), where operational and military efficiency enabled Cesar to suppress the Gallic rebellion, gives us a good example of this. The populaces of cisalpine Gaul revolted against Rome, but until 53 B.C. These facts were occasional events. However, the following year, the tribes of central Gaul managed to reach an agreement, taking advantage of the absence of Cesar. The chieftain of the Arverni, Vercingetorix, took




Fig. 5

over the leadership. He represented, together with his supporters, a point of reference for anyone who wanted to take part to the conspiracy. After different acts of provocation which were performed by the Gallic leader, there were minor conflicts and battles in *Cenabum* (Orleans), *Narbo* (Narbonne), *Gorgobina*, *Avaricum*, *Noviodunum* (Nevers), Vercingetorix was able to gather 15 000 knights and 80 000 infantrymen, constantly trying to avoid an open field battle and focusing his efforts on guerrilla warfare as well as preventing Cesar's army from being provided with any kind of supplies. After a first battle that was fought nearby Dijon, the rebels were able to take refuge in Alesia in 52 B.C., in Burgundy. The town rose on a hill that was 418 metres high and was situated between the rivers Ose and Oserain; Vercingetorix deployed his troops at the foot of the walls, on the eastern part of the hill delimiting the ground on the external side with a rudimentary wall that was 2 metres high. Before this great wall there was a moat.

Cesar ordered to build a double boundary wall. The external fortification, about 21 kilometres long, was designed to repel the attacks from the plain and the surrounding hills. The

internal one was about 17 kilometres. Both of them were interspersed with eight principal blockhouses and twenty-three secondary blockhouses. 100 metres away Cesar ordered to erect two large moats that were four metres deep and wide (the previous one was six metres deep and wide).

The most internal one was filled with the water of one of the two rivers whose course had been diverted. Behind this moat, three-metre high fences with breastwork were erected. On the rest of the terreplein, which supported the fences, there were some logs with sharp branches that were aimed towards the enemy. In addition, every 25 metres towers were constructed. War machines (probably, they were light catapults) were placed on the top of the towers. Then, between the first moat and the others he ordered to set a series of man traps: the first one consisted of fifteen lines of moats where there were logs with interlaced and sharp branches (a sort of barbed wire) that were embedded in the ground and were called *stones*. Before these, there were eight lines of sharp posts, which were covered with bushes and were called *lilies*. Finally, there was a set of stakes which were equipped with

iron hooks and were called *stimuli*. It took the Romans one month to build this wall. During this period, Vercingetorix sent messengers throughout Gaul and gather a mighty army. To resist the attack of this huge army, Cesar ordered to build the same fortification even aimed towards the outside providing his seven camps (three camps of infantry and four camps of cavalry) with supplies for more than one month and lots of water coming from the diverted river (figure 5).

On the one hand, all these fortifications, together with remarkable ability to exert control and command, enabled the Romans to prevent the Gauls, who had barricaded themselves in Alesia, from attempting any sortie from inside the town. On the other hand, they were able to repel any breakthrough attempt from the outside by the reserve Gallic army.

The Gauls launched the last decisive attack: the soldiers of Vercingetorix and the warriors of Comnius, who had command of reserve army, would attack the fortifications from the inside. They were about to succeed in their attempt, but once again the discipline and strength of the Legionnaires prevailed.

Their organizational skills and, above all, the use of obstacles as defensive and offensive weapons – this was a real innovation – allowed the legions, which were fewer in number, to get the better of the Gallic forces. The revolt was crushed – this was a warning to all subdued populaces – and the *pax* was re-established.

From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, a profound change occurred in the composition of European troops, which were of medieval origin and in which there was the tactical and moral predominance of the cavalry. The battle of Pavia was fought by the French and the imperial troops on 24th February 1525 in order to gain the control of Italy. This battle marked a turning point in the use of technology in the art of warfare. In fact, the dukedom of Milan represented a real strategic junction to link Italy to the rest of Europe.

All three components of the two troops had undergone a lot of changes in the Middle Ages. The cavalry had developed more and more sophisticated tactics and the infantry of the Swiss pikemen had had to face a new threat posed by the artillery and change the battle order by making rapid movements. This contrasted with the strategy which had been adopted to fight against the heavy cavalry.




Fig. 6

Francis I of Valois, king of France, came to Italy in 1524 with an army consisting of tens of thousands of men and powerful siege artillery. Since they were fewer in number, the imperial troops retreated behind the line of Adda to wait for backup troops. They left other units in some fortified towns, among which Pavia whose garrison consisted of about 6 000 men (Spanish, Germans, Italians) and was a thorn in the

French's side. Boosted by their superiority, Francis I decided to launch an assault on the town, mounting a series of attacks on the walls which were all repulsed. After three weeks of skirmishes, on the night of the 24th February 1525, the imperial militias penetrated into the woods

taking advantage of the element of surprise after breaching the eastern wall of the viscount park in the north-east of the town. Believing that it was a diversionary manoeuvre, Francis I waited for long before entrusting 6 000 Italians of the «black bands» with the task of guarding the town and before starting to deploy his troops in dribs and drabs.

At the peep of day, the imperials were already ready and the deployment of troops was the following: on the right side there were three formations of the imperial cavalry, in the middle of the field the Spanish harquebusiers under the Command of the marquis of Pescara; on the left side two squares of lansquenets. Only the

“...once again the discipline of the Legionnaires and the steadfastness of the infantrymen prevailed...”




Fig. 7

artillery dropped back and it was the last force to enter the park (figure 6).

The French deployed their mighty heavy cavalry before the imperial cavalry in accordance with the chivalrous scheme of King Francis I. The King knight sought the clash with his kind by tradition and blood. Immediately, the French lansquenets were deployed in front of the harquebusiers leaving the majority of the Swiss pikemen behind. The artillery was only part of the French army to be deployed in advance and it started to hammer the nearest enemy: the imperial lansquenets. In the meantime, the French light cavalry attacked the imperial artillery, which had not been deployed yet, dispersing their troops and capturing some soldiers (figure 7).

The French artillery was deciding the battle's fate and, after having neutralized the enemy artillery, Francis I did not want to give the cannons the credit for the victory and launched an attack against the imperial cavalry. At this point, the astuteness of the marquis of Pescara came on stage: he moved 1 550 of his harquebusiers to the small wood which was situated next to the spot where the French «spears» were. After the first three harquebus shots, the most powerful cavalry in Europe, for the most part, fell under the precise fire of 1 500 boorish Spanish.

The Spanish cavalry, which had been strengthened by the infantry, mounted an attack against what remained of the French

formation. In a desperate attempt to protect their king, many knights formed up in a defensive square. Despite their zeal, many of them, who were on foot and loaded down with their weapons, fell under enemy fire. The Spanish infantrymen had the opportunity to stab them in the chinks of their armour; even the weapons of the harquebusiers went right through the defences of the enemy and then they opened fire. Francis I was on foot but anyway he carried on fighting fiercely. His fate would have been sealed but for the intervention of the viceroy of Naples. The latter spared him the cruelty of the harquebusiers who had just captured him.

The battle continued. This time, the infantry came on stage (figure 8). The French lansquenets clashed with the imperial lansquenets in an evocative «head-on collision». After having overcome the first enemy lines and put the French artillerymen to flight, the German imperials had to face the fearful square which had been formed up by the Swiss pikemen who had just been deployed and hence fresh physically. Luckily for the lansquenets, the besieged of




Fig. 8

Pavia succeeded in defeating the Italians who made up the black bands in front of the walls of the town launching an attack against the same Swiss formation which hence was caught in the middle. This was the end for the pikemen and the French.

On 24th February 1525, at the beginning of the day, the battle ended. The French left 6 000 men

on the field. Francis I was captured and deported to Spain as prisoner. He realized that the era of heavy cavalry as dominator in the battlefield had ended.

Since then technology has made great strides and has decisively influenced the following conflicts: from the artillery of Austerlitz (1805) to the rifled musket of Vicksburg (1863), to the tanks of Blitzkrieg (1940) to the armour-piercing systems of the war of Yom Kippur (1973), to the strategic transport of the Falklands war (1982).


A further crucial turning point was marked by the last conventional war which was fought in Iraq in the first months of 2003.

After the Gulf war of 1991, Iraq was not able to take the past military power also because of the embargo that had been imposed by the UN. Even though the embargo was relatively ineffective and Iraq managed to find a way of dealing with it, without any doubt, it prevented Iraq from acquiring new weapon systems.

The Iraqi army was much more modest than that of 1991. This time the United States did not overestimate it, but it ran high risks because it employed a limited number of units (three divisions and just one brigade) counting on its technological superiority and the light strategy which was supported by the Secretary of Defence. In addition, the US could not «open» a second front since Turkey did not allow it to deploy another mechanized division and a regiment of armoured cavalry in the north as well as the use of air bases.

Taking advantage of the so-called *No Fly Zone* which was established by the UN, from the beginning of 2003 the Air Forces made sorties that breached the air Iraqi defences and hit the system of Command and Control (figure 9). The war broke on 20th March 2003, with an «attack of decapitation» led by missile and air forces against Baghdad in order to destroy the Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery on the basis of reports given by the Intelligence. In the meantime the land forces sprang into action, attacking the city of Bassora and the oil installations in the south of the country. Consequently, the American forces headed for Baghdad. The goal was to reach the capital as soon as possible counting also on the popular revolt of the Shiites in the south and believing that the regular army would not fight (figure 10). However, although the American «columns» advanced rapidly, the Iraqi army fought, the Shiites remained neutral

Fig. 9



and the irregular formations attacked the lines of supplies and communication. The Iraqi Commands made the mistake of ordering the Republican Guard to move in order to face the enemy exposing themselves to the air attacks of the coalition, which decimated their troops,

and to attack them in an uncoordinated way. In addition, it worried them that the enemy could open a second front in the north and so they kept some units still. On the contrary, the Americans sent a parachute brigade by air to the north, which would support the special forces and

the Kurdish militias. A positive change in the weather, between the 28th and 29th March, enabled the coalition to intensify the air attacks. The land forces, despite the bitter clashes, were able to reach the surroundings of the capital city by crossing the Tigris and to occupy the international airport of Baghdad on 4th and 5th April (figure 11). After having surrounded the town, the coalition forces started to advance relying on the support of the air forces which ruled the skies. They went along the clearways towards the city centre and conquered vast portions of the built-up area. The battle ended between 10 and 11 April, when the organized resistance ended without the


“...technology has made great strides and has decisively influenced the following conflicts...”

The allied advance on Baghdad

The US 3rd Infantry Division's rapid thrust west of the Euphrates

Fig. 10

US M1A1 Abrams main battle tank



urban battle happening. The Iraqi forces in the north and at the border crumbled and only a few pockets of modest resistance remained. The military operations on a large scale ended on April 14th; in the last decade the fighting decreased gradually and on May 1st the military phase of the operation ended.

Technology has undoubtedly influenced the military operations in the course of history. Who is the fighter? What are the moral resources that made the material resources necessary?

ETHICAL STRUCTURE

The ancient Greeks saw war as a violent «teacher» who could compromise the welfare of all people. According to them, war was an open loyal fight involving, however, stratagems and tricks to prevail over the most powerful enemies. Nevertheless, they had qualms about this conduct. Whenever they engaged in such immoral

conduct, they used to do it reluctantly. This attitude was expression of clever prudence which was one of their main features. As a famous author has highlighted, they took Achilles as their model, but they often behaved like Ulysses. Originally, the Greek fighter had a double nature and one of these two souls, that is the «intelligent» dimension of war, is embodied in the figure of Ulysses.

The shield of the phalanx was the symbol of indefectible esprit de corps, its element of cohesion. The hoplites decided on a common tactic and had to obey general rules from which the concept of discipline originated. Taking up one's position between the lines and keeping it, moving together with the enemy, performing every manoeuvre as if it were a single man were actions that could be condensed in one notion *taxis*, that is to say «order», which means «mental attitude»; it was no coincidence that the word *eutaxia* took on a new meaning, that is to say «discipline».

Ethical values such as discipline, order, esprit de corps were related to the technical principle involving the keeping of position as necessary condition for collective action. With regard to individual behaviour, the change was radical: primary virtue was considered the full command of one's faculties which replaced, inside the hoplite, the thrill of fight that had distinguished the archaic warrior.

Although the Romans were highly inventive with regard to tactics, as mentioned above in the conduct of war they proved to be linked to a deep-rooted and ancestral concept of *ethos*.

Apparently, the most ancient Roman code of war ruled out intelligent warfare and astuteness because it was at odds with the Roman virtue par excellence, that is the *fides*. For the Romans this concept, which originally defined the correct and loyal behaviour, was the essential theoretical condition for any kind of public and personal relationship. There has always been a link between this conduct and the «right hand» that reminds us of the famous gesture of Muzio Scevola.

Originally, the concept of relationship between poplances was based on the *fides*; consequently, war, which was seen as a transition phase, that is to say an abnormal moment of this relationship, must obey the same rules. Therefore, ethics imposed face to face fighting without resorting to traps, ambushes, betrayal, deception and so on. At the same time, the theory of *bellum iustum*, which had been fought according to precise rules, evolved and it would incur few and rare exceptions.

The Punic wars traumatized the Roman society. Mad panic about military aggression swept through the population. The Romans kept watch on the Greek powers' movements fearing hostile initiatives. *Si vi pacem para bellum*: for the Romans the military dissuasion became a fundamental theoretical principle of foreign policy. For the first time, it was applied when the defeated Carthaginians were disarmed by Scipio.

The same concept of peace came under the principle of preventive war, which meant that it depended on a preponderant military force that was able to dissuade any aggressor. Consequently, the concept of *pax* took on an active meaning in justification of that process that is commonly called imperialism. Those who accepted the conditions that had been imposed by the Republic had been appeased like the Gauls of Vercingetorix.

“Ethical values such as discipline, order, esprit de corps are also associated with the technical principle envisaging the keeping of a position as a necessary condition for collective action”



Fig. 11

They had been crushed by violent actions which were, however, aimed at bringing about peace.

When the Roman imperialism reached its peak, peace was seen as the only outcome of war. After the fall of the Roman Empire, in the Middle Ages, in the territories where the use of

the Frankish feud was spread, an elite class was formed. It consisted of young children who belonged to families within the rigid hierarchy of feudal society. They were trained to combat and were armed on horseback, but differently from their first-born brothers they did not have adequate resources to respond to the needs of their original status and they

aimed to shape a secure future through the art of war.

The transformation of these warriors into paladins of faith (the name «paladins» stems from the privilege which was granted by the Romans to some people to live in the *Palatium*) was due to the action of the Church which played on these people's religion feelings and was able to submit the force of arms to the Christian precepts. The Christian morals laid the foundations for chivalrous ethics and, consequently, the main activity of the members of this class -




Fig. 12

that is the war – was conducted in accordance to rules that were imposed by the Church, which would become the rules of the cavalry.

The ancient saghe, the oral traditions and the warrior Christianity of the early Middle Ages, whose models were the «bellicose» books of the Old Testament and the holy warriors such as Michele, Demetrio, Martino and Giorgio, gave this ethical world a symbolic and religious support, a moral justification. The knight, the *miles*, was the priest of war and, at the same time, a martyr of Christ. He was aware of being superior to the others because of his training and the access to the warrior world. He rose above the subdued rustic people, the battlefield offered an alternative to the fields to work, the blood an alternative to the sweat.

The cavalry – the class of *miles* – was created. It was an ideal society of men who had to protect religion and faith, to side with the underdog and to defend the principle of justice. The appellative noun «knight» lost its original

meaning (someone who rides on a horse) and it took on another one: knight is someone who has extraordinary qualities exactly as those people who have always lived up to high ideals. This was the achievement of an ethical and ideological purpose. The aim was to win or, at least, contain violence by making violent people convert to a new moral code which was based not only on courage and faith, but also on the defence of the Christianity and the weakest.

The chivalrous war was seen as anti-war, like fight against the evil – the *miles* became *pacificus*, that is to say bearer and restorer of peace – and soon it would become courtly. The rules of courtesy were applied even in combat against the enemy in the extent to which he took part in the chivalrous world. This set of values would continue to exert a profound influence on the military mentality in the following centuries. Still now its influence is significant.



A ranger on patrol.

The military ethics of the modern soldier dates back to the Middle Ages. In fact, in this period, after the feudalism, even the Italian city-states contributed to the birth of the modern military ethics.

In the Renaissance and in the following centuries, with the development of the Art of War, there were further changes. Technology (e.g. the gradual spread of guns) has made less «chivalrous» and more impersonal the contribution that the single fighter made to the conduct of military operations. The «life of trench» of the First World War, which lasted until the breakthrough of the western front, sets a good example. It is no coincidence that at that time a new battle system was introduced (tank) and it changed significantly tactics in battles. War

became fighting between popu-
lances, with a clear-cut difference
between social classes and their
employment in battles (workers
and farmers fought in the trench-
es, the noblemen were in com-
mand of units). What remained of
the «chivalrous war» could be
found in aerial battle which was
still fought «one-against-one» like
the ancient knights. The values of
reference, at times, could be even
antithetic to each other: deper-
sonalisation of infantrymen that
was opposed to the *virtus* of avia-
tors.

In modern society, technology
has developed fast in all sectors –
military art included. Even though
operational options have
increased, as time has gone by
they have been influenced by the
platforms: the weapon systems
and the equipment that are avail-
able define and, in some cases,
restrict the freedom of choice of
the Commanders, during the
operation and during the strategic
phase.

Among other things, the techno-
logical development has increased
the decision-making skills of the
Commanders and the amount of
operational time and it has made it
possible to perform manoeuvres
with fewer units and much more effective-
ness. In fact, this is the objective of the
current «network centric warfare», which is
a conceptual system leading to the integration
of different platforms in order to maximize the
effects of military operations. The know-how is
really useful only for those
who are able to use it.

Consequently, since the end
of the Cold War, with a greater
efficiency of military instru-
ments, public opinion has
revealed the tendency to tol-
erate conflicts in which there
are very few victims, not only
among civilians and the ene-
mies, but also among the

Armed Forces.

At the same time, the theme of defence of
human rights in the armed conflicts dates back to
ancient times. During the 20th century it entered
the collective consciousness after the atrocities of
the two World War and the totalitarian regimes.

**“...a composite universe of
values continued to act for
centuries on the military
mentality, and its effects
have not completely van-
ished today”**

Decision-making Factors




Fig. 13

A set of ethical values has spread through society beyond the military world and the single nations.

There is a wide range of reference points that sometimes appear to be fragmented and it is more and more difficult to achieve one's objectives.

To understand the battles and the campaigns of the past and to reflect on those of the future we do have to focus our attention not only on technology but also on the individual, with one's skills and values of reference.

CONCLUSIONS

Today, the Commander makes decisions considering carefully lots of factors concerning «what» to do and «how» to act. As far as «what to do» is concerned, technology and leadership are essential. The former is seen as a set of weapon systems and

instruments of Command and Control that are available. Therefore, technology establishes the parameters for the decisions that must be taken. With the coming of the computer age and new sophisticated technologies, the quality of weapon systems, which is seen as a factor that can influence the military capability, constitutes a decisive element. Links between military and civil technologies have undergone a lot of changes in the course of time. It is no coincidence that currently commercial components and subsystems constitute a reasonable alternative to the development of specific military items. Scientific research and technological innovation are primary strategic objectives for the efficiency of Armed Forces and, in this context, international cooperation is a valuable instrument to achieve positive outcomes. The latter performs a more complex and important function and it is a key factor in the decision-making process. It causes the change that allows complex organizations to survive and adapt to chang-



A VCC 80 on training.

ing contexts in which there are a high degree of uncertainty and intense competition.

Cohesion is a distinguishing feature of military leadership and it constitutes the result of different organizational factors (personality and abilities of leader, needs and expectations of subordinates). Internal values play an important role in the organization and lead people to find «how to do» to attain specific objectives. Willingness, honour, sacrifice, loyalty, determination, tradition are concepts of military ethics that constitute reference points of the army. In addition, we should consider the values of civil society that enrich and complete the «internal» values. The path of growth and development of the individual and the organization goes through study and research, tradition and innovation. Even though technology is the most concrete and evident element, ethical values and a good and effective leadership provide the foundations

“The path to growth and development of the individual and of the organization goes necessarily through study and research, tradition and innovation”

for a firm and effective action. In fact, both material-technological forces and moral-psychological forces are extremely important. Moral resources give cohesion and basis for operational capacity.

The aim of a modern army should be the continuing education of army personnel. In short, the development of human resources and an increase in the technological level of arms are extremely important to reach the principal objective: «the future soldier».

Roberto De Masi

Colonel,

General Office

of the Secretary General of Defence


Paolo Caviggiola

Lieutenant Colonel,

General Office

of the Secretary General of Defence





GENERAL GIUSEPPE GOVONE

ANTHROPOS

GENERAL GIUSEPPE GOVONE

A forgotten protagonist of our "Risorgimento", General Govone took part in the Three Wars of Independence and was an excellent Minister of War in the Lanza Government. He was a modern Officer ahead of his time but was culpably given a desolating marginal place by the historians.

He was born in Isola d'Asti on November 19th 1825. He came from a Piedmontese family where honour, morals, loyalty to the Country and the King were fundamental and universal values. From his adolescence, he was destined for a military career. Three of his brothers served in the army. In his youth, he attended the Military Academy of Turin and immediately showed a strong inclination for study, as well as reliability, sensitivity, kind nature and considerable intelligence. In 1845 he was nominated as Lieutenant of General Staff. During the war 1848-49, he took part in the operations as Official of General Staff and earned a silver medal. In that period, he threw himself into carrying out patrols heart and soul. He used to consider situations and suggestions carefully, showing an uncommon cleverness, a deep military knowledge and a strong sense of duty. At the outbreak of war, Govone was assigned to the General Staff of the Brigade «Piedmont» under the Command of Major-General Michele Bes. He was given the task of going to the stronghold of Peschiera to negotiate with the enemy for surrender. Then, he was assigned to the General Staff of the 2nd Army Corps, under the Command of General Ettore de Sonnaz, and took part in important operations. There were many other brave Officials besides him: Federici, Calderina, Avogadro, Saint-Andrè.

During the retreat of Cerlongo, General Ardingo Trotti told him: *...I would wish you were my brother or my son...* With these words, he wanted to emphasize the outstanding bravery Govone had demonstrated on that occasion. In the meantime, he reached the rank of Captain.

Unfortunately, war went badly for the Piedmontese and ended with an armistice that was signed by General Salasco.

Subsequently, he was assigned to the General Staff of the 6th Division under the Command of General Alfonso La Marmora.

At the end of March 1849, the 6th Division was marching from Tuscany to the north, but it was diverted towards Genoa where there were lots of political exiles coming from other parts of Italy. With rumours concerning the capitulation of the kingdom of Sardinia, news came in of agreements on the handover of Genoa to Austria, but it would prove groundless. An opposition movement, whose leaders were «Mazziniani», developed. The government ordered the 6th Division to suppress the revolt. It tried to restore order with the least damage possible since a rather tragic event had happened involving key figures and deep-seated motives. On the morning of 5th April the

Piedmontese attacked the town with the support of the artillery. These clashes claimed many victims. Subsequently, the rebels took a more realistic view about the situation and there were the first defections. Finally, the government granted an amnesty to the broad mass of the insurgents and allowed the leaders to go away

although it sentenced them in absentia.

After these events, Govone was awarded a second silver Medal.

In the same year, he was sent on mission to the camp of the French expeditionary force which would besiege Rome during the Roman Republic. It was a delicate task, considering in that period the kingdom of Sardinia was ideally linked to Italian patriots and, at the same time, it had to improve the diplomatic relations with France.

Despite the negative end of the war of 1848-49, the strength and prestige of the army remained unaltered. However, the need to reorganize and strengthen it arose.

“ He came from a traditional Piedmontese family where honour, high morals, loyalty to Country and King were absolute and fundamental values ”



Alfonso La Marmora, who was nominated Minister of War for the third time, formed a group of valued collaborators who started to work under him (e.g. the Duke of Genoa, Govone himself and other good collaborators such as Collegno, Valfrè di Bonzo, Dabormida, Genoa Thaon of Revel, Petitti of Roreto and others. Piero Pieri would describe this group as: *the most intelligent and lively element of the army... They could not be compared with Stein, Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, the people who rebuilt up the German army during the period 1807–1813, but they were honourable and brave men and were inclined to undertake the most important tasks that the standard procedure of that period could give them.* In this context, in 1856 «Rivista Militare» was founded.

In 1854, on the occasion of the conflict that had broken between the Russian and the Turkish empire, together with second lieutenant Giuseppe Landriani of Piedmonte Royal Cavalry, he was sent to the Turkish army as sultan's adviser and Sardinian-Piedmontese government representative to the Allies. The mission of the two Officials was part of a wide-ranging programme of Cavour that was designed to give much more political stature and prestige to the Kingdom of Sardinia in the context of the great European powers, also to facilitate the process of Italian unification.

Title pages.

Third War of Independence. The 16th Division in battle.

Above.

Second War of Independence: the battle of Magenta.

At first the Turkish army was concentrated in the Danubian region, between the present Romania and Bulgaria, in defence of the border of the Turkish empire. Its organization and training were not up to those of European armies. So, Govone made a valuable contribution identifying some faults in the defensive organization and in the military planning.

The theatre of operations shifted to Crimea. There, an allied expeditionary force, which was formed by the English and the French, landed. It supported the Turks in the siege of Sebastopol which was firmly held by the Russians. As well as maintaining good relationships with the Allies, he broadened his knowledge and experiences to frame new operational and organizational concepts.

On 25th October 1854, the British Division of Cavalry was situated somewhere around Balaclava, close to Sebastopol. It was made up of the heavy Brigade, under the Command of Brigadier Lord Scarlett, and of the light Brigade, under the Command of Brigadier Lord



General Giuseppe Govone.

Cardigan. The British, French and Turks on the one side and the Russians on the other were engaged in battles that took place at dawn of the same day. After that, the English Commander-in-chief Lord Raglan gave the Commander of Cavalry Division the order to mount an attack on the hills close to Balaclava. Things went badly for different reasons: a lack of clear orders, a limited knowledge of reality, personal misunderstandings which were due to deep disagreements among the Commanders. The heavy Brigade moved along the central part of North Valley which is situated between two hills and ended in a bottleneck in the east. On the top of the two hills the Russian infantry and artillery were deployed sideways. On that day, Govone and Landriani were at the Light Cavalry Brigade. When the two Officials received the order to attack, they did not hesitate to join the English regiments to take part in the charge. It was an extraordinary fact which proved valour and bravery of the two Officials. With regard to this, it is important to point out that when the battle occurred, the Kingdom of Sardinia did not go to

war yet. The attack took place under heavy artillery and rifle fire coming from the hills situated on the two sides and from the front lines. Cavalrymen suffered lots of losses. During the attack, Govone was slightly injured and his horse was hit. Landriani was severely injured and was captured by the Russians.

The Sultan conferred honours on him for bravery: the Medal of Silistria and the order of Medgidiè. In addition, he offered him to become General of his army. Govone asked the Minister La Marmora for authorization and leave. The latter refused to grant it but, at the same time, promoted him to the rank of Major and ordered him to go back to Piedmonte to plan the Sardinian expedition to Crimea. As military attaché of General Staff of the Sardinian expeditionary force, Govone took part in lots of operations and patrols, such as the battle of Cernaia, because he had a lot of frequent contacts with the Allies. The perfect command of foreign languages and his great personal qualities were helpful to him. In Crimea he received the following honours: the Military Order of Savoia, the French Legion of Honour and other English honours. After the Campaign of Crimea, he came back to Italy with the expeditionary force and operated an efficient and modern information service with an extensive network of officers. On 1st May 1859, after having attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, he reached the headquarters of the king to take part in the military operations as attaché of General Staff. In that period he was promoted Colonel for outstanding bravery.


“ At Balaclava, during the charge he was slightly injured and his horse was also hit ”

During the campaign a series of manoeuvres was carried out, also with the use of railway, and bitter clashes broke out such as the battle of Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, San Martino and Solferino. The French and Sardinian-Piedmontese

troops managed to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. The Austrian Commander, Field Marshal Giulay, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Kuhn encountered lots of difficulties. The intervention of the Emperor Francis Joseph and of the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Supreme Command, General Hesse, could not give this desperate situation a new twist.

During the famous battle of Montebello one of Govone's brothers, Giovanni Luigi, Second Lieutenant of the Light Cavalrymen Regiment, died.

After the war, he was promoted Brigadier General and when he was in Command of the



Crimean War: the Light Brigade reaches the Bulganek river on September 19th, 1854.

Brigade Forlì he took part in the military operations to conquer Central Italy and repress the brigandage.

On 30th June 1861, after the declaration of Italian unification, he was elected deputy in Cittaducale.

Subsequently, he rose to the rank of Major-General and as Commander of the 9th Division he conducted the operations to combat the brigandage in Sicily. There, he analysed the critical and unstable social, economic and political situation and drew up an interesting report for the government. In this context, he came under fierce criticism from political representatives for taking a firm line with the brigandage.

In 1866 Italy found the golden opportunity to go to war against Austria on Prussia's side in order to free Veneto.

Preparing the alliance treaty was not easy, given the well-known astuteness of the German Chancellor Von Bismark. The Italian government decided to send Govone to Berlin to collaborate with the Ambassador de Barral in cultivating the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

During the negotiations, Bismark decided to ally with Italy, not only to secure military support but also to persuade William I Hohenzollern to go to war facilitating an agreement with Napoleon III, who played at being the protector of Italy. Therefore, Bismark invited the Italian government to commit itself to support Prussia from the very beginning. In case of war Prussia

would help Italy to take Veneto back. In this case, the aim of the alliance would not be a war against Austria. Bismark would use it as a weapon to face a possible war and obtain positive results easily in case of diplomatic success which would allow him to take possession of the dukedoms of the north, reaching an accord with Austria. In the last case, Italy would no longer obtain Veneto, despite the considerable support given to Prussia. Obviously, the Italian delegation did not accept this agreement and, through negotiation, managed to impose more favourable conditions to Italy.

As well as a diplomatic function, Govone performed an in-depth analysis of military issues. In particular, he had lots of talks with his friend, the Prussian Chief of Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke. The latter belonged to the Prussian school of which Generals like August von Gneisenau, Gerard von Scharnhorst and Karl von Clausewitz had been exponents.

In Berlin Moltke and Govone faced lots of difficulties in planning the military strategies to adopt during the war. In fact, before the outbreak of war, he presented in vain a good plan of operation. It did not involve the division of the army into two armies, one along the Mincio,

“...promoted to Brigadier General, he directed the operations against brigandage in Sicily”

THE COURAGE OF ONE'S CONVICTIONS

On 25th January 1872 Giuseppe Govone died of a serious disease in his native home in Isola d'Asti. He was 47 and suffered from a psychological disorder that people still described as «the loss of one's wits» before Freud had defined it «neurosis, insanity» identifying its features and obscure roots. The news appeared in the «Times»; the press of his country that he himself had created fighting in the front line preferred to stay silent. It was a deafening silence in a country that was distracted by the recent conquest of Rome, filled with fears of a Bourbon-clerical conspiracy and fraught with enormous economic and social problems. And yet Govone was promoted General when he was only 40, he was considered an *enfant-prodigy* in an army where there were predominantly «mossbacks» and «methodical careerists»; he was also Minister of War. He fought against the Russians, the Austrians, the bandits and he had almost always won. He played a leading role not only on the battlefield but also in establishing diplomatic relations: he dealt with Bismark the «iron» Chancellor personally and was able to be a match for him.

However that silence was not a way to pay tribute to his life, but the final act of revenge which carried the signature of his fellowmen: the Generals. Govone was sentenced to death by the «camarilla», which at that time was called «chiesuola» because the term «mafia» was not still used by the Piedmontese. The Generals coming from the Sardinian army had control of the army, its power and rules. The first rule said that nobody could violate group and professional solidarity disclosing faults and inabilities of the «sacred» Institution. Govone had infringed the code of silence. He was isolated and had to face public and private accusations which were unjust and bitter. He had a nervous breakdown and found relief in the insanity. He was Minister of War and at that time politics «destroyed» even the strongest and best men fraying their nerves and making them physically exhausted. These events were the cause of his disease, the hidden detail of the Risorgimento which was much more «ferocious» than historians have written.

Places and, above all, men define the identity of a nation and its popular feelings. It comes as no surprise to us that the figure of Govone has sunk into oblivion making the history of our country less glorious. The Risorgimento without heroes has not spared anyone: Cavour who has been described as a cynical and clever manoeuvrer, Mazzini as a mystic revolutionary, Vittorio Emanuele as a «sergeant king». Garibaldi has been described as a «Che Guevara ante litteram» to live down his reputation as slaughterer of the Third State in Bronte. Radetzky and Cecco Beppe have had their revenge: those who defeated them in San Martino and on the Piave have been forgotten. We try to remember the Imperial Royal government with romantic honourable men and meticulous administrators while a large part of Europe considered it an intolerable prison of populaces. Govone rose above the Sardinian army: he was a modern General among old ideas. In that context, the art of war, despite Napoleon and the spectre of the Industrial Revolution looming over Europe, could be summarized as follows: *shiny buttons, discipline and marching in front of the enemy. Then soldiers will use bayonets. There is no need to do anything else!*

Govone got rid of all this mediocrity, he travelled a lot and knew foreign languages. At that time it was something revolutionary. In fact, the army used only French to write diaries and letters and spoke in the Piedmontese dialect to give orders. He travelled when the Ticino had already become a frontier: Vienna, Paris, Istanbul and Berlin. He was always careful and curious about the development of his «work»; he knew that planning, which is the doctrine of General Staff and the mind-set of war, would be fundamental in the future. In addition, he considered what today is called «intelligence» to be extremely important. At that time it was still espionage: anticipating the moves of one's enemy and stopping them was much more decisive than a cavalry charge. For this reason he acted as

detective: he penetrated in Austrian territories under a false name and created a network of informers among the enemies. They helped the Piedmontese army in 1859 to repulse an Austrian attack that could have been fatal. As Cavour was preparing his diplomatic plan, the king on horseback was going looking for a battle and the Generals were writing proclamations, Govone formulated concrete plans trying to establish an essential link with the French. Govone considered preparation and intendency extremely important whereas the Italian Generals saw it as a waste of time.


As well as battles there were other events that showed his great qualities. Together with another Italian official, Landriani of the «Real Piemonte» he took part in the «insane» charge of «Balaclava». As observer, during that war, he helped the weakest, that is to say the Turks for whom he drew maps and plans of fortifications, developing plans and putting his life at risk during the siege of Silistria. When he saw the light cavalymen of Raglan moving towards the Russian guns in the valley of death, spurred his horse and joined the battle. Nothing forced him to do it, it was not his war, it was not his battle. However, he decided to make his contribution because he firmly believed that people who were entrusted with the task of killing other human beings in the name of society had to prove that they did not fear death and sacrifice. He wrote lots of letters when he took the responsibility of the «dirty» war against the brigandage on the border of the Papal States and was sent to Sicily where there were people who failed to report for military service and lots of resistance to the central government. Instead of relying on firing squads he had the courage to write phrases like the following: *these events support the view that the brigandage is a social revenge which is sometimes able to do justice*. At Palace Carignano everyone turned pale.

In Custoza (the event was a masterpiece of military ignorance) he was the only one to make the right moves and managed to win. He only needed the support of some units of Infantry. In fact, even a feeble attempt to advance from Villafranca would lead the Austrians, who had been repulsed from Mount Torre, to retreat. He asked his Commander, General Della Rocca, for this. He was a courtier and an incompetent general. He was in a tavern drinking a toast and talking to his Officials. La Marmora had ordered him to keep still and his only answer was to neglect the military operations. When the messenger, who had been sent by Govone, asked for reinforcements explaining to him that they had victory within their grasp, he answered in dialect: *tell your General to sort it out himself*!

Many people would kept silent, but Govone accused and asked them for explanations. The Officer class could lose battles but they were not allowed to violate the code of silence. When he became Minister and undertook the task of cutting the military spending to balance the budget of a country that was on the verge of bankruptcy they took revenge on him.

Before accepting this task he gave the City Hall of Alba a considerable sum of money in order to build a school: 25 thousand liras. He had earned this money from the shares he had in the National Bank. In this way he tried to quash false rumours that he could have used the information he had to become richer. This was our country that would be called «Italiotta». It was the government of Quintino Sella and Lanza, the last one who would demand a balanced budget. Today, in Alba, a high school is still dedicated to Govone but now they want to dedicate it to Beppe Fenoglio. People say that a General clashes with modern times. This gives a perfect example of how a nation is able to keep the great heroes' memory alive.

Domenico Quirico
Journalist



Some British uniforms of the Crimean war. From left to right, on horseback: 4th Light Dragoons; 2nd Dragoons; 1st Royal Dragoons; 11th Hussars. Standing: Grenadier Guards; Royal Artillery; 26th Infantry.

the other along the Po. It called for a powerful army along the Mincio and the creation of a contingent, in Ancona, consisting of two or three Divisions, under Garibaldi's command, who would have to dock his ship in Trieste and go to Hungary. There, he would support the Hungarian patriots against the Austrian Empire. This plan was in line with the principle of the build-up of troops, even if with convergent manoeuvres, underlying von Clausewitz's doctrine. The adoption of his strategy would take the enemy by surprise (and this represented a key factor for von Clausewitz) and the disbanding of troops.

After the negotiations, Govone went back to Italy and assumed command of the 9th Division of the

3rd Army Corps which was commanded by General Enrico Morozzo Della Rocca.

Unfortunately, Italy committed grave errors in the organization of the Commands and in the formulation of military strategies. The Italian army was divided into two armies plus a volunteer division commanded by Garibaldi. These units acted in different theatres of operations and independently from each other. Among other things, after the separation of forces there was no longer an efficient unit of command which was able to supervise the operations adequately.

In the early hours of 24th June clashes broke out. Govone heard that the 3rd Division of General Brignone had been defeated at Custoza. Of his own accord, with the «Alps» Brigade and the «bersaglieri» battalion, he headed for Custoza, recaptured it and held his line. During the battle, he often asked for reinforcements but General Della Rocca obstinately refused his request and even decided not to employ the 7th Division of General Bixio and the 16th of Prince Umberto of Savoy which had not carried out his orders. Oreste Bovio wrote: *... just on that day Govone proved to be a great general not only because of his experience and bravery but also because he was able to tell everything at a glance and had an innate tactical sense that lots of officials are not able to acquire even after having studied hard at the military academy...*

In the north Garibaldi was in command of a volunteer division and managed to defeat the Austrians in Bezzecca. On the evening, after some divisions of the 1st Army Corps had disbanded and the others of the 3rd Army Corps of General Della Rocca had kept still, Govone, with his soldiers who were exhausted and without reinforcements, covered the retreat taking part in the clash with the Austrian reserve army. Even though his troops were exhausted, munitions had run out, lots of officials had been hit, and he himself had been injured, Govone was able to withdraw in good

order, covering also the «Cugia» Division and consolidating his bridgehead on the Mincio. Subsequently, after opposing the order of retreat in vain, he carried out lots of patrols and was placed under the command of the 2nd Army Corps of General Cucchiari.

After the unsuccessful battle of Custoza and the victorious

campaigns of the Prussian army, it is possible to paint a picture of the situation:

Prussia had won impressive victories over the Austrians and their allies;

The defeat of Custoza was due to the inefficiency and errors of the Italian Commands.

“...on his own initiative, with the “Alpi” Brigade and the “Bersaglieri” Battalion, he headed for Custoza, recaptured it and kept the position”



Nevertheless, the Italian army was not completely destroyed and the bulk of the army was in good conditions. In addition, the army corps of Cialdini was heading towards north;

It was in Italy's interest that war continued in order to allow the army corps of Cialdini to gain ground and obtain possession of Veneto.

Govone was sent on a diplomatic mission to Nicolsburg, where the Prussian headquarters is situated. There, Govone learned that Prussia and the Austrian Empire had already agreed to the armistice. Concerning this, Napoleon III had put them under intense pressure. In addition, Govone heard of the defeat of Lissa which had took place on 20th July. Consequently, his mission could not have any positive results but, according to the agreement, Italy would obtain Veneto in any case.


In regard to the battle of Custoza, Piero Pieri wrote: ... even if the Italian army had not been led

First War of Independence. Piedmontese Infantry during the battle of Novara.

effectively, it would have won; actually, the unworthy defeat of the young army was not in itself very heavy; it was seen as a disaster only because it was a presage of what would happen later because of the Commanders...

Oreste Bovio wrote: ... La Marmora and his two Commanders of the Army corps, Della Rocca and Durando, did not show strong military leadership on that occasion, but this cannot obscure the great bravery that Commanders of Division such as Cerale, Sirtori, Pianell, Brignone, Cugia and, above all, Govone displayed...

The Austrian Commander himself, Archduke Albert, wrote in his report: ... we must admit that the enemy fought bitterly and bravely against us. Their first attacks were vigorous and the Officials



set a good example throwing themselves forward...

For his behaviour the King conferred the Cross of Great Officer of the Military Order of Savoy on him. Subsequently, in consideration of his skills and broad experience, as well as the need to increase and reorganize the General Staff, he was nominated Commander of the General Staff. The army approved his choice. In that period, the government saw the necessity to take strong economic measures and so even the government had to subject itself to a rigorous financial regime. When the king entrusted Giovanni Lanza with the task of forming a new government, he asked Govone insistently to perform the office of Minister of War. He accepted this job reluctantly considering that his duties to Italy involved also taking on such responsibilities. After having recognized the necessity to pursue a strict financial policy, he welcomed the proposal of the Minister of Finance, Quintino Sella, to reduce military spending further. In his opinion, first of all it was necessary to plan public works, balance the state budget and improve the living conditions of population. After the project to cut the military spending had been approved, the war between France and Prussia broke out. It was the

“In his capacity of Minister of War, he devoted himself to the activity of organizing and directing an efficient Expeditionary Corps”

Above.

Crimean War: the port of Balaklava.

Right.

A piece of Piedmontese artillery at the battle of Montebello.

year 1870. Vittorio Emanuele II and some political representatives wanted to go to war in support of France and against Prussia. The Council of Ministers discussed this question. Sella and Govone were firmly opposed to it. The former handed in his resignation. The discussion about this was not minuted and was postponed.

During these events, he was subjected to lots of vigorous personal attacks. During a discussion in the Senate, which was in «Salone dei Duecento»

of the Old Palace in Florence that, at the time, was the capital of Italy, he was fiercely attacked by Cialdini but was defended by a broad coalition of authoritative members of Parliament. The bitter attacks of Cialdini, who was very close to the king, had been provoked by Govone's opposition to the entry into the war. As a great strategist, he sensed that France would not be able to compete with



Prussia. Since the Roman question was unresolved, France might have changed its attitude with regard to the defence of the Papal States. Consequently, it was necessary to put aside all economic plans and prepare units and materials. Govone, as Minister of War, engaged in the activity of organization and direction mobilizing a well-organized and trained expeditionary force.

As everybody knows, the following events would lead to the downfall of France, the creation of the German empire and the conquest of Rome.

Unfortunately, physical and mental exhaustion, bitter disappointments following his appointment as Minister of War, ignominious personal attacks were contributory factors to the deterioration of his state of health because of a disease from which he had been suffering for a long time. At the beginning of September, during a stormy session in the senate, he was sharply attacked by Cialdini again. His poor health worsened. He submitted his resignations and retired to private life.

On 25th January 1872 Giuseppe Govone died in Alba.


To conclude, in order to emphasize his nobleness of the soul, it is proper to quote some passages from the speech he gave on 24th June 1870 when the charnel house to the soldiers fallen during the war of 1859 was inaugurated. He addressed the Italian, French and Austrian fallen

united in their grim fate: ... my dear fellowmen, who are covered by just a little earth, the same earth on which you walked eleven years ago, to the sound of the bugles, with angry voices on your lips, with a deep love for Italy, may you rest in peace! You did not spill your blood for Italy in vain, and our hopeful country is grateful to you for what you did and bless you. The Army admires you. The King salutes you!

May you rest in peace, generous allies, you held out your fraternal hands to us. Our memory of your actions will never fade because we will always show our gratitude to you and even the future generations will do it. This memory will mark the dawning of a new era of freedom for all the nations of the world.

Enemies for one day. Brave enemies! Your sacrifice was glorious for your country. You did not win, the hand of God and the spirit of the new times were against you. Have no regrets about losing the battle, because racial hatred drained from the heart. You should be happy because today your fellowmen will shake hands with us, united by the same ideals of humanity and justice...

Michele Petrolo
Historian



Come gli Stati Uniti si confronteranno con l'Iran, di Edward N. Luttwak (pag. 4).

La delicata situazione libanese e il precario equilibrio nel Golfo Persico possono essere ricondotti ad un unico confronto asimmetrico, quello Stati Uniti-Iran. La contrapposizione ha luogo sia direttamente, sul piano delle trattative diplomatiche internazionali e ricorrendo allo scontro mediatico, sia a distanza, tramite una conflittualità indiretta che investe Paesi e fazioni politico-religiose armate vicini ai due contendenti.

Dall'europartenariato alla politica di prossimità, di Giuseppe Romeo (pag. 10).

In una prospettiva politica di integrazione e cooperazione verso il Mediterraneo, la dichiarazione di Barcellona del 1995 si è posta come documento strategico per l'Unione Europea. Un documento però non sufficiente a raggiungere obiettivi concreti perché affidati a una condivisione dei valori politici fra sistemi e culture molto diversi tra loro. La politica di prossimità dell'Unione - inaugurata nel 2003 - cerca oggi di rimodulare le possibilità di uno spazio politico condiviso verso Sud puntando sull'armonizzazione progressiva dei valori sociali e politici all'interno del partenariato euro-mediterraneo.

L'Esercito della Repubblica Islamica del Pakistan, di Daniele Cellamare (pag. 18).

Spina dorsale del Paese fin dai tempi della raggiunta indipendenza, oggi rappresenta il collante interno dell'identità nazionale e lo strumento di pressione per la politica estera.

Sicurezza e sviluppo energetico, di Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pag. 34).

Una rete di collegamento in grado di gestire rapidamente le comunicazioni e l'approvvigionamento energetico continentale sono il volano per lo sviluppo di un'Europa a venticinque e rappresentano un progetto che configura in realtà il tentativo più avanzato di governare la globalizzazione dell'economia per far vivere insieme cinquecento milioni di cittadini europei.

Al di là dell'Adriatico: il Kosovo, di Laura Romanazzi (pag. 46).

Dopo sette anni di amministrazione internazionale è maturo il momento per attuare il trasferimento delle competenze. Il futuro status della regione non potrà prescindere da alcuni requisiti essenziali: valori democratici, rispetto dei diritti umani e delle minoranze, pluralismo e tutela del patrimonio artistico e culturale. Le autorità politiche locali, tuttavia, non hanno ancora raggiunto un accordo univoco sulla questione.

La NATO e il Mediterraneo, di Alfredo Mesolella (pag. 60).

Per contribuire alla sicurezza e alla stabilità dell'area del Mediterraneo, la NATO ha elaborato un Master Plan che comprende un'ampia gamma di iniziative. Ciò richiederà l'attivo coinvolgimento dei Paesi mediterranei e mediorientali investendo alcuni importanti settori: informazione e stampa, pianificazione civile di emergenza, scienza e ambiente, gestione delle crisi, politica e strategia di difesa e un programma di cooperazione militare.

La NATO a Tirana, di Vito Di Ventura (pag. 72).

L'Albania aspira a entrare a pieno titolo nella NATO. Un beneficio reciproco che comporterà un notevole sforzo finanziario e una concreta collaborazione.

L'Operazione «Indus», di Antonello Carpino e Serena Sartini (pag. 80).

In Pakistan, la Task Force «Elefante» ha operato in soccorso della popolazione vittima di un devastante terremoto.

Il lavoro dei nostri genieri, grazie anche ai mezzi e alle attrezzature di cui disponevano, è stato unanimemente apprezzato dalle Autorità locali e dalle organizzazioni internazionali.

Il cannone semovente «PzH 2000», di Pierluigi Genta (pag. 92).

Le sue caratteristiche tecniche lo rendono idoneo e flessibile per l'impiego in ogni Teatro operativo. Nel previsto programma di acquisizione l'Esercito Italiano ha preteso tutte le garanzie atte ad assicurare un adeguato sostegno logistico per il futuro.

L'esercitazione WATC 2005, di Giovanni Parmiggiani (pag. 102).

In Guinea, Ghana e Senegal il 1° Reggimento Lagunari ha effettuato attività addestrative anfibie sotto il Comando europeo dei Marines. Ancora una volta i nostri «Fanti da Mar» hanno dimostrato di aver maturato la capacità e l'esperienza per operare, da bordo di navi d'assalto anfibie, come forza da sbarco.

Valori e tecnologia, di Roberto De Masi e Paolo Caviggiola (pag. 112).

La strada per la crescita e lo sviluppo del singolo e dell'organizzazione passa necessariamente attraverso lo studio e la ricerca, la tradizione e l'innovazione.

Pur se la tecnologia costituisce l'elemento più concreto e visibile, i valori etici restano il fondamento per un'azione equilibrata ed efficace.

Il Generale Giuseppe Govone, di Michele Petrolo (pag. 128).

Dimenticato protagonista del Risorgimento, prese parte alle tre Guerre d'Indipendenza e fu ottimo Ministro della Guerra nel Governo Lanza. Moderno Ufficiale ante litteram a cui gli storici, colpevolmente, hanno riservato un desolante posto marginale.



How the United States Will Confront Iran, by Edward N. Luttwak (p. 4).

The thorny Lebanese situation and the unstable balances in the Persian Gulf can be traced back to a single asymmetric confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. The contrast takes place both directly, on the plane of international negotiations and through the media, as well as at a distance, through an indirect conflict, involving Countries and armed politico-religious factions close to the two opponents.

From Europartnership to Proximity Policy, by Giuseppe Romeo (p.10).

Within a political prospect of integration and cooperation towards the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 is a strategic document for the European Union. But it is not sufficient for achieving concrete objectives, since these depend on political values that should be shared by systems and cultures very different from each other. The

Union's proximity policy – started in 2003 – today is trying to re-modulate the possibilities of having a shared political space towards the South, counting on a progressive harmonization of the social and political values within the Euromediterranean partnership.

The Army of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, by Daniele Cellamare (p. 18).

Backbone of the Country since the attainment of independence, today the Pakistani Army is the internal cement of national identity and an instrument of pressure for the Country's foreign policy.

Security and Energy Development, by Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 34).

A connection network that can rapidly manage continental communications and energy supplies is the flywheel for the development of 25-member Europe and represents a project that is actually the most advanced attempt at governing the globalization of the economy, so that five hundred million European citizens can live together.

Beyond the Adriatic: Kosovo, by Laura Romanazzi (p. 46).

After seven years of international administration, the moment has come to implement the transfer of responsibilities. The future status of the region cannot do without some essential prerequisites: democratic values, respect of human rights and minorities, pluralism and safeguard of the artistic and cultural wealth.

However, the local political authorities have still to reach a clear agreement on this issue.

NATO and the Mediterranean, by Alfredo Meselella (p. 60).

In order to contribute to the security and stability of the Mediterranean area, NATO has worked out a Master Plan, which entails a wide range of initiatives. This will require the active involvement of the Mediterranean and Middle East Countries and will include some important sectors: information and press, civil emergency planning, science and environment, crisis management, defence policy and strategy, as well as a programme of military cooperation.

NATO in Tirana, by Vito Di Ventura (p. 72).

Albania wants to be a full-fledged member of NATO. This will be a mutual advantage and will entail a remarkable financial effort and concrete collaboration.

Operation «Indus», by Antonello Carpino and Serena Sartini (p. 80).

In Pakistan, the «Elefante» Task Force operated to assist the local population, hit by a disastrous earthquake.

The work of our Engineers, also thanks to the quality of their equipment, was appreciated by all local Authorities and international Organizations.

The «PzH 2000» Self-propelled Gun, by Pierluigi Genta (p. 92).

Its technical characteristics make it flexible and suitable for employment in every operational Theatre. In the envisaged procurement programme, the Italian Army requested all the guarantees that could warrant an adequate logistic support in the future.

Exercise WATC 2005, by Giovanni Parmiggiani (p. 102).

In Guinea, Ghana and Senegal the 1st «Lagunari» Regiment carried out amphibious training activities under the Marines' European Command. Once more our «Fanti da Mar» (Infantrymen of the Sea) have shown that they have acquired the skill and experience that enable them to operate as landing forces from amphibious assault ships.


Values and Technology, by Roberto De Masi and Paolo Caviggiola (p. 112).

The road that leads to the growth and development of the individual and the organization goes necessarily through study, research, tradition and innovation.

Although technology is the most concrete and visible element, ethical values remain the foundations of a well-balanced and effective action.

General Giuseppe Govone, by Michele Petrolo (p. 128).

A forgotten protagonist of our «Risorgimento», General Govone took part in the three Wars of Independence and was an excellent Minister of War in the Lanza Government. He was a modern Officer ahead of his time, but was culpably given a desolating marginal place by the historians.



Comment les Etats-Unis se mesureront-ils avec l'Iran, par Edward N. Luttwak (p. 4).

La situation délicate au Liban et l'équilibre précaire qui caractérise le golfe Persique sont directement liés à un conflit asymétrique unique: celui qui oppose les Etats-Unis à l'Iran. L'opposition est aussi bien directe, sur le plan des négociations diplomatiques internationales et à travers le conflit médiatique, qu'indirecte, d'autant que des factions politico-religieuses armées et des pays voisins en subissent les contrecoups.

Du partenariat euroméditerranéen à la politique européenne de voisinage, par Giuseppe Romeo (p.10).

Dans le cadre d'une politique d'intégration et de coopération vers la Méditerranée, la déclaration de Barcelone de 1995 s'avère être, pour l'Union européenne, un instrument stratégique quoique encore insuffisant pour permettre d'atteindre des objectifs concrets dont la réalisation se base essentiellement sur la reconnaissance de valeurs politiques communes au sein de cultures et de systèmes très différents entre eux. Aussi, la politique européenne de voisinage – inaugurée en 2003 – vise-t-elle à recréer un espace politique commun en vue de l'harmonisation progressive des valeurs sociales et politiques dans le cadre du partenariat euroméditerranéen.

L'Armée de la République Islamique du Pakistan, par Daniele Cellamare (p. 18).

Colonne vertébrale du pays depuis l'indépendance, l'Armée pakistanaise représente aujourd'hui le ciment interne d'une identité nationale et l'instrument de pression vis-à-vis de la politique étrangère.

Sécurité et développement en matière d'énergie, par Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 34).

Un réseau capable d'assurer la gestion rapide des communications et l'approvisionnement énergétique à l'échelle continentale. Ce sont là les facteurs qui constituent le volant qui régularise le développement d'une Europe à vingt-cinq. Il s'agit d'un projet au travers duquel se concrétise la volonté de gouverner la mondialisation de l'économie afin de permettre la cohabitation de cinq cent millions de citoyens européens.

Au-delà de la mer Adriatique: le Kosovo, par Laura Romanazzi (p. 46).

Au bout de sept ans d'administration internationale, le moment est venu de procéder au passage des compéten-

ces. Le statut futur de la région est strictement lié au respect de certaines conditions requises: valeurs démocratiques; respect des droits de l'homme et des minorités; pluralisme; et sauvegarde du patrimoine artistique et culturel. Les autorités politiques locales n'ont toutefois pas encore atteint un accord univoque en la matière.

L'OTAN et la Méditerranée, par Alfredo Mesoella (p. 60).
En vue de contribuer à la sécurité et à la stabilité de la région méditerranéenne, l'OTAN a mis au point un Master Plan prévoyant une vaste gamme d'initiatives. Ce plan appelle la participation active des pays de la Méditerranée et du Moyen Orient dans des secteurs d'importance tels que l'information et la presse, la planification civile d'urgence, la science et l'environnement, la gestion des crises, la politique et la stratégie de défense, et les programmes de coopération militaire.

L'OTAN à Tirana, par Vito Di Ventura (p. 72).
L'Albanie aspire à devenir un membre de plein droit de l'OTAN. Un bénéfice réciproque qui impliquera cependant un grand effort financier et une collaboration concrète.

L'Opération «Indus», par Antonello Carpino et Serena Sartini (p. 80).
Au Pakistan, la Task Force «Elefante» a prêté secours aux victimes d'un séisme dévastateur.
Le travail des ingénieurs italiens, réalisé grâce aux moyens dont ils disposaient, a été fortement apprécié par les Autorités locales et par les organisations internationales.

Le canon automoteur «PzH 2000», par Pierluigi Genta (p. 92).
Ses caractéristiques techniques le rendent approprié à un emploi dans tout théâtre opérationnel. Dans le programme d'acquisition prévu, l'Armée italienne a exigé toutes les garanties nécessaires en vue d'un appui logistique approprié pour l'avenir.

L'exercice WATC 2005, par Giovanni Parmiggiani (p. 102).
Le 1^{er} Régiment Lagunari a réalisé en Guinée, au Ghana et au Sénégal, une activité d'instruction amphibie sous le Commandement européen des Marines. Une fois encore, les «Fanti da Mar» italiens ont prouvé leur expérience et leur capacité d'agir en tant que force de débarquement.

Valeurs et technologie, par Roberto De Masi et Paolo Caviggiola (p. 112).
Le chemin de la croissance et du développement de l'individu et de l'organisation passe forcément à travers l'étude et la recherche, la tradition et l'innovation.
Si la technologie représente l'élément le plus concret et le plus visible, il n'en reste pas moins que les valeurs éthiques sont le fondement de toute action équilibrée et efficace.

Le Général Giuseppe Govone, par Michele Petrolo (p. 128).
Protagoniste oublié du Risorgimento, il prit part aux trois guerres d'Indépendance et fut un excellent Ministre du Gouvernement Lanza. Un Officier moderne ante Litteram auquel les historiens ont volontairement réservé une place marginale.



Wie die Vereinigten Staaten sich dem Iran gegenüber verhalten, von Edward N. Luttwak (S. 4).
Die delikate libanesische Situation und das prekäre

Gleichgewicht im Persischen Golf können auf eine einzige asymmetrische Konfrontation zurückgeführt werden, die jene zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und dem Iran. Die Gegenüberstellung findet sowohl direkt, auf dem Niveau internationaler diplomatischer Verhandlungen und im Rückgriff auf die Begegnung in den Medien statt, als auch auf Distanz über einen indirekt ausgetragenen Konflikt, den Länder und bewaffnete politisch-religiöse Gruppen, die den beiden Kontrahenten nahe stehen, austragen.

Von der Europartnerschaft zur Politik der Nähe, von Giuseppe Romeo (S. 10).
Aus der politischen Integrations- und Kooperationsperspektive gegenüber dem Mittelmeer hat sich die Erklärung von Barcelona aus dem Jahr 1995 als strategisches Dokument für die Europäische Union herausgestellt. Ein Dokument, das jedoch nicht ausreicht, um konkrete Ziele zu erreichen, weil es die Teilung politischer Werte zwischen unter sich sehr unterschiedlichen Systemen und Kulturen vorsieht. Die Politik der Nähe in der Union – im Jahr 2003 eingeführt – versucht heute die Möglichkeiten eines gemeinsamen politischen Raums gegen Süden ausdifferenzieren, indem auf eine fortschreitende Harmonisierung sozialer und politischer Werte im Innern der euromediterranen Partnerschaft gezielt wird.

Die Streitkräfte der Islamischen Republik von Pakistan, von Daniele Cellamare (S. 18).
Wirbelsäule des Landes seit der Zeit der eroberten Unabhängigkeit, stellen sie heute das interne Bindemittel einer Nationalidentität und das Druckinstrument der Aussenpolitik.

Energiesicherheit und -entwicklung, von Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (S. 46).
Ein Verbindungsnetz in der Lage, zügig die Verständigung und die kontinentale Energieversorgung zu leiten, ist der Antrieb für die Entwicklung eines Europa der 25 und stellt ein Projekt dar, das in Wirklichkeit als fortschrittlichster Versuch erscheint, die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft zu steuern, um 500 Millionen europäischen Bürgern ein gemeinsames Leben zu ermöglichen.

Jenseits des Adriatischen Meeres: der Kosovo, von Laura Romanazzi (S. 60).
Nach sieben Jahren internationaler Verwaltung ist der Moment für die Übertragung der Kompetenzen gekommen. Der zukünftige Status der Region kann nicht ohne einige wesentliche Voraussetzungen auskommen: demokratische Werte, Achtung der Menschenrechte und der Minderheiten, Pluralismus und Schutz des Kunst- und Kulturguts. Die lokalen politischen Autoritäten haben jedoch noch keine einstimmige Vereinbarung in dieser Frage erzielt.

Die NATO und das Mittelmeer, von Alfredo Mesoella (S. 72).
Um zur Sicherheit und Stabilität des Mittelmeerraumes beizutragen, hat die NATO einen Master Plan ausgearbeitet, der eine breite Palette von Initiativen vorsieht. Das erfordert die aktive Einbeziehung der Mittelmeerländer und der des Mittleren Ostens. Dabei werden einige wichtige Sektoren involviert: Information und Presse, Notfallzivilplanung, Wissenschaft und Umwelt, Krisenmanagement, Politik und Verteidigungsstrategie und ein Programm militärischer Kooperation.

Die NATO in Tirana, von Vito Di Ventura (S. 80).
Albanien strebt danach, vollwertig der NATO beizutreten. Ein beidseitiger Gewinn, der einen beträchtlichen finanziellen Aufwand und eine konkrete Zusammenarbeit mit sich bringt.

Operation «Indus», von Antonello Capino und Serena Sartini (S. 92).

In Pakistan hat die Task Force «Elefante» der Bevölkerung, Opfer eines verwüstenden Erdbebens, Hilfe geleistet. Die Arbeit unserer Pioniere, dank auch den Mitteln und der Ausrüstung, die sie zur Verfügung hatten, ist einstimmig von den örtlichen Behörden sowie von den internationalen Organisationen geschätzt worden.

Die von selbst bewegliche Kanone «PZH 2000», von Pierluigi Genta (S. 102).

Aufgrund ihrer technischen Merkmale ist sie geeignet und flexibel für den Einsatz an jedem Schauplatz. In dem vorgesehenen Erwerbsprogramm des Italienischen Heeres beansprucht sie alle Garantien, die der Sicherung einer angemessenen logistischen Unterstützung für die Zukunft dienen.

Die Übung WATC 2005, von Giovanni Parmiggiani (S. 112).

In Guinea, Ghana und Senegal hat das 1. Lagunenregiment amphibische Truppenübungen unter dem europäischen Kommando der Marines durchgeführt. Erneut haben unsere «Fanti da Mar» bewiesen, dass ihre Fähigkeit und Erfahrung zu operieren gereift ist, von Bord der amphibischen Angriffsschiffe aus als Ausschiffungsgewalt.

Werte und Technologie, von Roberto De Masi und Paolo Caviggiola (S. 128).

Der Weg zu Wachstum und Entwicklung des Einzelnen und der Organisation geht notwendigerweise über Studium und Recherche, Tradition und Innovation.

Auch wenn die Technologie das konkreteste und sichtbarste Element darstellt, bleiben die ethischen Werte das Fundament für eine ausgeglichene und wirksame Aktion.

Der General Giuseppe Govone, von Michele Petrolo (S. 88).

Vergessener Held des Risorgimento, nahm er an den drei Unabhängigkeitskriegen teil und war ein ausgezeichnete Kriegsminister in der Lanza-Regierung. Ein Vorläufer der modernen Offiziere, für den die Historiker nur einen traurigen Randplatz schuldhaft reserviert haben.

**Cómo los EE.UU se confrontarán con Irán, Edward N. Luttwak (pág. 4).**

La delicada situación libanesa y el precario equilibrio en el golfo Pérsico podrían hacerse entrar en el marco de un enfrentamiento asimétrico único: el que pone frente a frente a Estados Unidos e Irán. La confrontación es tanto directa, a nivel de las negociaciones diplomáticas internacionales y a través del choque mediático, como indirecta, a través de la conflictividad que embiste países y facciones políticas y religiosas armadas cercanas a los dos contendientes.

Desde el Partenariado euromediterráneo a la política de proximidad, Giuseppe Romeo (pág. 10).

En el marco de una política de integración y cooperación en el Mediterráneo, la declaración de Barcelona de 1995 resulta ser para la Unión europea un documento estratégico, pero aún insuficiente como para permitir que se alcancen objetivos concretos puesto que para ello se supone que culturas y sistemas muy distintos entre sí compartan los mismos valores políticos. La política

europaea de proximidad – inaugurada en 2003 – apunta ahora a crear un nuevo espacio compartido hacia el Sur, centrándose en la armonización progresiva de los valores sociales y políticos en el marco del partenariado euromediterráneo.

El Ejército de la República Islámica de Pakistán, Daniele Cellamare (pág. 18).

Espina dorsal del país desde la época de la independencia, hoy día el Ejército representa el aglutinante interno de una identidad nacional y el instrumento de presión de cara a la política extranjera.

Seguridad y desarrollo energético, Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pág. 34).

Una red de conexión capaz de manejar con rapidez las comunicaciones y el abastecimiento de energía a nivel continental son el volante que regula y da impulso al desarrollo de una Europa de veinticinco países y representan un proyecto con el que se concretiza el intento de gobernar la mundialización de la economía para permitir que convivan quinientos millones de ciudadanos europeos.

En la otra orilla del Adriático: Kosovo, Laura Romanazzi (pág. 46).

Al cabo de siete años de administración internacional llegó el momento para proceder a la transferencia de las competencias. El estatus futuro de la región no podrá prescindir de algunos requisitos: valores democráticos, respeto de los derechos humanos y de las minorías, pluralismo y salvaguardia del patrimonio artístico y cultural.

Sin embargo, las autoridades políticas locales, aún no han logrado un acuerdo unívoco sobre la cuestión.

La OTAN y el Mediterráneo, Alfredo Mesolella (pág. 60).

Para contribuir a la seguridad y la estabilidad en la región del Mediterráneo, la OTAN ha puesto a punto un Master Plan que prevé una amplia gama de actuaciones. Dicho plan requerirá la participación activa de los países del Mediterráneo y de Oriente medio en algunos sectores importantes, tales como: información y prensa; planificación civil de emergencia; ciencia y medio ambiente; gestión de las crisis; política y estrategia de defensa; programas de cooperación militar.

La Otan en Tirana, Vito Di Ventura (pág. 72).

Albania anhela entrar con pleno derecho en la OTAN. Un beneficio recíproco que conllevará un esfuerzo financiero considerable así como una concreta colaboración.

La Operación «Indus», Antonello Carpino y Serena Sartini (pág. 80).

En Pakistán, la Task Force «Elefante» intervino para socorrer a la población víctima de un terremoto devastador.

El trabajo que los ingenieros italianos llevaron a cabo gracias a los medios y equipos de que disponían, fue apreciado unánimemente por las Autoridades locales y las organizaciones internacionales.

El cañón autopropulsor «PZH 2000», Pierluigi Genta (pág. 92).

Gracias a sus características técnicas, el cañón resulta flexible y adecuado para ser utilizado en cualquier teatro operacional. En el programa de adquisición previsto, el Ejército italiano exigió todas las garantías en cuanto al apoyo logístico apropiado para el futuro.

El Ejercicio WATC 2005, Giovanni Parmiggiani (pág. 102).

En Guinea, Ghana y Senegal, el 1° Reggimento Lagunari efectuó un ejercicio de instrucción anfibia bajo el mando

européu de los Marines. Una vez más, los «Fanti da Mar» italianos comprobaron su experiencia y su capacidad para llevar a cabo operaciones anfíbias como fuerzas de desembarque.

Valores y tecnología, Roberto De Masi y Paolo Caviggiola (pág. 112).

El camino hacia el desarrollo del individuo y de la comunidad organizada pasa forzosamente por el estudio y la investigación, la tradición y la innovación.

Aunque la tecnología representa el elemento más concreto y visible, es en los valores éticos que se fundamenta toda acción equilibrada y eficaz.

El General Giuseppe Govone, Michele Petrolo (pág. 128).

Protagonista olvidado del Risorgimento, participó en las tres guerras de Independencia y fue excelente Ministro de Guerra en el Gobierno Lanza. Moderno Oficial ante litteram al que los historiadores, culpablemente, asignaron un puesto marginal.



Como os Estados Unidos se confrontarão com o Irão, de Edward N. Luttwak (pág. 4).

A delicada situação libanesa e o precário equilíbrio no Golfo Pérsico podem ser reconduzidos a um único confronto assimétrico, o dos Estados Unidos e Irão. A contraposição tem-se, seja directamente, no plano das tratativas diplomáticas internacionais e recorrendo ao choque mediático, seja à distância, através de um conflito indirecto que investe países e facções político-religiosas armadas, próximos dos dois contendentes.

Do euro-partenariado à política de proximidades, de Giuseppe Romeo (pág. 10).

Numa perspectiva política de integração e cooperação para o Mediterrâneo, a declaração de Barcelona de 1995 pôs-se como documento estratégico para a União Europeia. Um documento, porém, não suficiente para atingir objectivos concretos por serem confiados a uma partilha dos valores políticos entre sistemas e culturas muito diferentes entre si. A política de proximidades da União – inaugurada em 2003 – procura hoje remodelar as possibilidades de um espaço político partilhado a Sul apontando à harmonização progressiva dos valores sociais e políticos no interior do partenariado euro-mediterrânico.

O Exército da República Islâmica do Paquistão, de Daniele Cellamare (pág. 18).

Espinha dorsal do país desde os tempos da atingida independência, hoje representa o colante interno de uma identidade nacional e o instrumento de pressão para a política estrangeira.

Segurança e desenvolvimento energético, de Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pág. 34).

Uma rede de ligação à altura de gerir rapidamente as comunicações e o abastecimento energético continental são o volante para o desenvolvimento de uma Europa a vinte e cinco países e representam um projecto que configura, na

realidade, a tentativa mais avançada de governar a globalização da economia para fazer viver juntos quinhentos milhões de cidadãos europeus.

Para lá do Adriático: o Kosovo, de Laura Romanazzi (pág. 46).

Após sete anos de administração internacional amadureceu o momento para efectuar a transferência das competências. O futuro status da região não poderá prescindir de alguns requisitos essenciais: valores democráticos, respeito pelos direitos humanos e pelas minorias, pluralismo e tutela do património artístico e cultural.

As autoridades políticas locais, todavia, ainda não chegaram a um acordo unívoco acerca desta questão.

A NATO e o Mediterrâneo, de Alfredo Mesolella (pág. 60).

Para contribuir à segurança e à estabilidade da área do Mediterrâneo, a NATO elaborou um *Master Plan* que compreende uma vasta gama de iniciativas. Isto requerirá o activo envolvimento dos países mediterrânicos e médio-orientais investindo alguns sectores importantes: informação e imprensa, planificação civil de emergência, ciência e ambiente, gestão das crises, política e estratégia de defesa e um programa de cooperação militar.

A NATO em Tirana, de Vito Di Ventura (pág. 72).

A Albânia aspira a entrar em pleno título na NATO. Um benefício recíproco que comportará um notável esforço financeiro e uma concreta colaboração.

A Operação «Indus», de Antonello Carpino e Serena Sartini (pág. 80).

No Paquistão, a Task Force «Elefante» operou em socorro da população, vítima de um devastante terremoto. O trabalho dos nossos soldados-engenheiros, graças também aos meios e às ferramentas que dispunham, foi unanimemente apreciado pelas autoridades locais e pelas organizações internacionais.

O canhão semovente «PzH 2000», de Pierluigi Genta (Pág. 92).

As suas características técnicas tornam-no apto e flexível ao emprego em cada Teatro operativo. No previsto programa de aquisição, o Exército Italiano exigiu todas as garantias aptas a assegurar um adequado suporte logístico para o futuro.

O exercício WATC 2005, de Giovanni Parmiggiani (pág. 102).



Na Guiné, Ghana e Senegal, o 1º Regimento *Lagunari* efectuou actividades de treino anfíbias sob o Comando europeu dos Marines. Mais uma vez os nossos «Fanti da Mar» demonstraram ter amadurecido a capacidade e a experiência para operar, a bordo de navios de assalto anfíbios, como força de desembarque.

Valores e tecnologia, de Roberto De Masi e Paolo Caviggiola (pág. 112).


O caminho para o crescimento e desenvolvimento do indivíduo e da organização passa necessariamente através do estudo e da pesquisa, da tradição e da inovação.

O General Giuseppe Govone, de Michele Petrolo (pág. 128).

Olvidado protagonista do Risorgimento, participou nas três Guerras da Independência e foi óptimo Ministro da Guerra no Governo Lanza. Moderno Oficial ante litteram a quem os históricos, culpadamente, reservaram um desolante lugar marginal.



THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



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